Chapter 5
RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
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CONTENTS SECTION I. Brigade Retrograde Operations SECTION II. Battalion Task Force Retrograde Operations SECTION III. Company Team Retrograde Operations |
SECTION I. BRIGADE RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
Delay is an operation in which maximum damage is inflicted on an advancing enemy without the delaying force becoming decisively engaged in combat. The force in contact trades space for time. A delay operation is usually conducted to provide time to concentrate or withdraw forces, to establish defenses in greater depth, to economize in an area, or to complete offensive operations elsewhere.
Planning
Intelligence
The nature of the delay is to maximize the use of terrain. The S2, therefore, will prepare a detailed modified combined obstacle overlay. This involves identifying possible areas from which occupying forces may cover enemy avenues of approach. The actual terrain analysis is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, Defensive Operations. For the delay, however, some of the following characteristics of the terrain will aid in mission accomplishment:
- Cross compartments astride the enemy line of advance.
- Streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles to the front or flank that will slow enemy movement.
- Good observation and fields of fire.
- Covered routes of withdrawal.
- A good road network and cross-country trafficability.
The delaying force must be able to inflict maximum destruction without becoming decisively engaged. The commander must be able to anticipate enemy maneuver and execute plans to counter it. The S2 should identify the worst-case scenario for the enemy's attack. A careful analysis of the enemy's avenues of approach and probable objectives must yield usable information regarding the locations of probable enemy vulnerability. This will serve as the basis for the delay plan.
The brigade S2 must request, from division, collection support that the brigade cannot provide. He must task battalions to cover portions of the brigade sector which cannot be covered by attached brigade R& S assets.
Maneuver
The same types of activities required for defensive operations would be necessary for a successful delay operation. The leaders and soldiers must understand the fundamentals of defensive operations (see Chapter 4). The delay, however, does not include decisive engagement. As a result, the delay is considered more difficult than the defense. The following list describes some of the reasons:
- Greater ranges for triggering disengagement.
- Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance operations must be highly mobile due to the defender's intent to forfeit terrain, thus preventing use of stay-behind patrols.
- More open terrain needs more effective obstacle systems to give the delaying force the freedom of maneuver.
- Maintaining contact with the enemy makes decisive engagement difficult to avoid.
Characteristics. Brigades accomplish delaying missions by assigning AOs to subordinate battalions. Battalions accomplish their delay missions by delaying on successive positions, by delaying on alternate positions, or through a combination of the two techniques. The C2 of the delay can take two forms: delaying in sector and delaying in sector forward of a specified line for a specified time. Regardless of how the delay is controlled, there are several characteristics of delay operations which should be taken into consideration during the planning process.
Centralized planning and decentralized action. Delaying actions are characterized by operations on a wider front than in defense. There are usually more forces in contact and fewer forces in reserve. Delaying in battalion sectors allows battalion commanders freedom to conduct independent operations within the parameters of the brigade commander's intent. The brigade commander must ensure that each unit has a frontage which is within its capability to control. Toward the rear of the brigade sector, the commander may wish to retain more control. One option is for him to designate battalion BPs. This will allow him to have a last defensive position from which his elements will fight until they have completed their mission.
Flank coordination is an important concern in a delay. Coordination points must be carefully located along task force boundaries in depth. The brigade must ensure the battalions do not become wrapped up in their own actions and forget their responsibility to provide continuous resistance along the entire brigade front. An enemy force which is able to exploit a gap in the brigade frontage could easily begin to roll up a flank or penetrate deeper into the brigade sector. With a relatively small brigade reserve, this could spell disaster. Flank coordination must also be maintained with the elements to the left and right of the brigade. Flank coordination, therefore, is essential to the success of delay operations.
Forcing the enemy to deploy and maneuver. Select terrain appropriate for the proper positioning of the battalion task forces. The commander should use the terrain analysis to determine which areas lend themselves to the most effective delay. There probably will not be an opportunity to create a brigade EA. As a result, the commander must be aware of the responsibilities of the battalions: to cause the enemy force to think it is facing a deliberate defense and require it to deploy to break through. He must provide the battalions with terrain that allows them to create effective EAs capable of inflicting significant destruction, appearing to be a deliberate defense.
Maintaining contact with the enemy. The commander must ensure that the battalions will be able to maintain contact with the enemy throughout the operation, but without becoming decisively engaged. This is accomplished by the battalions in contact. The brigade generally will not have the ability to deploy a reconnaissance element of its own; therefore, it must rely on the reports from the battalion task forces. If aviation assets are made available to the brigade, they may be deployed to assist a battalion that may have temporarily lost contact with the enemy. The division may temporarily OPCON the division cavalry squadron to the brigade. If this occurs, cavalry elements may assist the battalions. By alternating positions with the battalions, the cavalry will be able to maintain contact with the enemy, allowing the battalions to occupy their secondary positions. However, both of these situations are the exception rather than the rule.
Avoiding decisive engagement. One of the greatest dangers in conducting delay operations is that the delaying force will become decisively engaged with the enemy. To prevent this from occurring, the commander must perform a time-distance analysis. First, the commander must understand the conditions of the brigade delay. For example, the brigade may be required to delay forward of its rear boundary until 1200 hours. Second, he must determine the amount of time it will take the enemy to maneuver through the sector. The difference between these two times determines how long the brigade must delay, while the sector describes the amount of space in which the delay must be accomplished. The brigade commander's responsibility lies in the proper allocation of space and time within the predetermined parameters.
The time in which the enemy can negotiate the sector is determined using the following formula: Time equals distance divided by rate of movement. The commander will then examine each battalion sector to determine where the greatest danger lies.
Techniques. There are three techniques the commander may use to determine the allocation of space and time.
The first is called the buffer technique (see Figure 5-1). The commander knows that he must delay forward of the rear boundary until a specified time. Therefore, he moves the line forward and in turn issues instructions to the battalions to delay forward of the new line until that same time. That way if the enemy attack is stronger than expected, the brigade and battalion commanders still have some maneuver space in which to continue the delay.
The second method is the halves technique (see Figure 5-2). This approach divides the amount of time the brigade has to conduct the delay in half and applies it to the terrain. As a result, in areas of generally even terrain, a PL may be placed in the middle of the sector and the battalions are given equal time to delay in each portion of their sector. Similarly, the better defensible terrain requires less space; therefore, the halftime PL will be positioned accordingly.
The last and most effective technique is a detailed analysis of the brigade sector (see Figure 5-3). In this technique, the commander compares the tentative locations of the delaying elements to the location of the enemy throughout every stage of the battle. In chronological order, the commander will determine the following times and distances:
- Amount of time the enemy needs to travel from the point where it comes within line of sight to the trigger line.
- Amount of time the enemy needs to move through the EA from the trigger line to the break line.
- Amount of time delaying force needs to evacuate their positions, travel to the next position, and prepare to fight.
- Given the amount of time in number 3, the location of the enemy if it is able to reform and continue the attack at doctrinal speed.
- The amount of time it will take the enemy to travel between the location identified in number 4 and the next trigger line.
NOTE: This process will continue for the depth of the sector.
This process should be conducted for each battalion sector. It allows the brigade commander the opportunity to visualize each battalion's fight. Moreover, as the analysis is conducted, the brigade commander will gain an appreciation for where each brigade delay line should be drawn and the amount of time the battalions can reasonably be expected to delay at each one. Accordingly, in situations where the unit never seems to have enough maneuver space to outdistance the enemy and set up in position, the commander will have identified areas requiring priority of engineer countermobility support.
After the brigade commander has determined each phase of the delay (indicated by the PLs), he will determine the strength and mission of his reserve. Generally, a brigade conducting a delay can expect to face an enemy force ratio of about 6: 1. If the enemy knows it is facing a delaying force, the ratio could be greater. Therefore, the necessity to have maximum combat power forward becomes self-evident. The reserve, however, must be large enough to reinforce a weakened battalion or successfully block an enemy penetration. It is often impractical, during a delay, to designate an entire battalion task force as the brigade reserve. A smaller force, therefore, may have to be used. The brigade commander will position the counterattack force where it can respond to any sector within the brigade frontage.
Fire Support
The FS plan will be developed concurrently with the maneuver plan and in the same manner as defensive FS planning. One difference is that, in the delay, the ground maneuver forces will rely more heavily on artillery fire to prevent them from becoming decisively engaged. It may also be more difficult to plan fires to support the delay because of more extended frontages. Field artillery positions must be planned to ensure coverage across the sector.
The FS plan should be integrated with the obstacle plan so that obstacles are covered by fires. Munitions such as FASCAM will be of little use unless the terrain in which they are used is restrictive to maneuver by the enemy. Plan for large expenditures of smoke to support the withdrawal of units from defensive positions.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The brigade may not be able to emplace an extensive defensive obstacle belt. Resources may be limited. The brigade commander will decide which battalion sectors are the most vulnerable to attack and task organize his engineer assets accordingly. The trade-off during delay operations is between enemy countermobility and the delaying force's mobility. If the operation is to be successful, the delaying force must be able to maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy. A technique the brigade can use to integrate obstacles between task forces is to plan obstacle boxes on the brigade obstacle overlay.
Task organization of engineers will be decentralized to support repositioning forces. The most typical obstacle belts used in retrograde operations are disrupt and fix. The belts will correspond to the PLs. Mobility support to guide repositioning forces through obstacle belts and to close lanes will become a critical activity.
The obstacles used are surface-laid hasty minefields or other easily emplaced obstacles. Point obstacles must be sited where they may have a significant effect by themselves, or the enemy will quickly bypass them. Above all, both direct and indirect frees must be completely integrated into the obstacle plan. Breaking obstacles should be sited where they can allow the force to withdraw quickly while slowing the enemy. Smoke should be planned on delay positions.
Air Defense
Air defense is extremely important throughout the delay operation. Air defense assets must remain mobile yet able to engage at a moment's notice. Assets should work in teams, able to move to the rear in alternating bounds. This ensures that the air defense will always have ready units in position, with the flexibility to keep pace with the operation. Early warning of enemy air attack is provided over FM nets. Priority of protection should be toward maintaining the mobility of the force. Therefore, maintaining the security of routes to subsequent positions should be stressed.
Combat Service Support
The FSB should be positioned as far as possible to the rear of the delaying force without sacrificing the quality of support. This will keep CSS away from the enemy and out of the way of the delaying units. Due to the amount of time it takes to move support assets, every precaution should be taken to streamline support operations as much as possible. Only essential support equipment and personnel should remain forward. Evacuation operations should be planned to move the vehicles or personnel as rapidly as possible to the rear of the sector. Conversely, emergency resupply of ammunition and fuel must be made available to the force. Due to the inherent mobility of the operation combined with the expected high volume of fire, these two classes of supply must be preplanned and prestocked as much as possible.
Command and Control
The delay, often conducted on a broad front, demands greater decentralization. The brigade commander will rely heavily on the reports of battalion commanders and staffs to assess the situation. Additionally, members of the brigade staff may be placed to observe actions of each battalion to provide information from a brigade perspective. Throughout the operation, however, graphic control measures take on special importance, The brigade commander must ensure flank coordination is conducted at each phase of the operation. He must also know when each element is clear of the PLs because they could easily become on order FS coordination lines or other control measures.
Preparation
Intelligence
The brigade S2 will prepare for the brigade delay by rehearsing the operation with the brigade commander and battalion task force commanders. Specifically, he should role-play the enemy, depicting as accurately as possible the likely enemy courses of action. Using a sand table or some other representation of the battlefield, the S2 will commence his attack of the brigade area; battalion commanders will confirm their understanding of the reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance plan.
The brigade maneuver plan is rehearsed. The S2 should include unexpected enemy action in the process. This will challenge the chain of command and stimulate thought toward contingency missions. The commander ensures his intent is understood throughout. The rehearsal not only confirms the plan, but prepares the unit for other eventualities.
Maneuver
The brigade commander begins by having the battalion task force commanders backbrief their individual operations, explaining how their missions fit into the overall brigade plan. The commander must ensure that his control measures are understood by each commander and that flank coordination can be executed without hesitation.
Next, the commander checks that the battalions are able to maintain contact with the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. He examines the direct-fire instructions issued to the battalions by their commanders, paying special attention to the disengagement criteria. In particular, he should be satisfied that the battalions will be able to inflict maximum destruction, yet retain their mobility. Disengagement execution should be linked to obstacles and indirect fire; however, the commander may identify areas within the plan when and where a battalion task force may require assistance in disengaging from the enemy. Assistance could be provided by aviation, field artillery, or the commitment of the brigade reserve. The reserve can both significantly augment the lethality of the delaying battalion and assist in their disengagement.
The movement from primary to secondary positions (as well as other subsequent moves) is the area of greatest risk to the force. Friendly forces will be exposed and vulnerable to direct fire should the enemy be able to press the attack. Moreover, the delaying force must have a mobility advantage over the aggressor to allow time to occupy their next position. As a result, the commander will verify through the rehearsal and time-distance analysis that the forces will be able to maintain their mobility. Again, in locations where there seems to be little margin for error, the commander will consider the use of Army aviation assets or perhaps the reserve to overwatch the move.
Fire Support
The FS plan will be rehearsed along with the maneuver plan. In particular, the commander must ensure that the fire plan augments mobility of the force. Therefore, fires oriented on enemy avenues of approach and the break line must be carefully planned to inflict maximum destruction and provide obscuration of friendly disengagement. Priority targets should be placed on the likely areas of enemy mass formation.
During the rehearsal, the commander will check that smoke screens are called in anticipation of their actual use. DPs should be identified for this. In other words, because it takes several minutes for a smoke screen to develop, smoke must be fired before the withdrawing force needs it. Another consideration is that the force cannot count solely on indirectly fired smoke to provide the obscuration required, due to the unpredictability of weather. HE ammunition will raise some dust and contribute to the cloud. Similarly smoke pots and generated (on board) smoke may also add to the effect. However, the most important aspect of the delay movement remains the proper use of terrain. The disengaging force must be able to get behind covering terrain before the enemy can engage with direct fires.
FASCAM should be used judiciously and only under conditions of compartmentalized terrain. The time it takes to emplace the minefield should be carefully weighed against the effect other munitions may have over the same period of time. COLTs maybe used to increase effectiveness of the counterreconnaissance battle by attaching them to task force scout platoons; this should be made clear in the brigade commander's guidance.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The obstacle plan is examined during the rehearsal to determine its effectiveness. Specifically, the commander will check that obstacles are placed so they can be covered by direct and indirect fires. Moreover, the obstacles associated with the break line should be closely checked to ensure that the enemy will not be able to breach or bypass them without significant loss of momentum and a forced change of formation. Target turnover for brigade reserve targets should be exercised to verify that the battalions understand the conditions under which they should be executed.
During the early phases of the delay, the engineers should continue to improve the obstacle plan in depth. Care must be exercised to ensure the engineers are not vulnerable to being overrun as the enemy presses the attack and the delay is conducted to subsequent positions. The commander must check the obstacle construction plan as well as the control during the delay. Usually, engineers be attached to a battalion task force during this type of operation.
Air Defense
The commander makes sure that the air defense commander is satisfied with positioning of ADA assets within the brigade and that his air defense priorities of protection are met. He ensures that the early warning net is tied into the brigade command net so the force has time to prepare for an impending enemy air attack.
Combat Service Support
The CSS plan must be checked to ensure that only necessary vehicles and equipment have remained behind to support the brigade. The recovery and evacuation plan should be checked to ensure that damaged vehicles can be removed to the rear rapidly. This will not be easy due to the limited number of recovery vehicles. It will be important for tanks with fire control damage to drag other vehicles to the rear as necessary. Maintenance collection points should be used only long enough to transfer damaged vehicles to other recovery vehicles. What must be avoided is collection of damaged equipment that exceeds the UMCP's ability to transport it at a moment's notice.
Prestocks of ammunition should be placed adjacent to subsequent positions. The stocks should not be so large as to prevent the unit from continuing the mission should the stocks be destroyed. The stocks should be kept on transport vehicles to make availability more flexible and to permit their evacuation rather than force destruction in the face of the enemy. The same technique holds true for fuel, although fuel requirements will be easier to forecast than ammunition consumption. In this case, the fuel trucks must be available for emergency requisition. (Topping off before execution of the operation should be required to avoid emergency refueling during combat.) Again, the commander must ensure that his CSS plan allows the brigade to maintain mobility while providing the means to inflict maximum destruction.
Command and Control
The reserve may be called upon to execute several tasks, such as blocking an enemy penetration, reinforcing a weakened sector, assisting in disengagement, and counterattacking. Generally, the brigade reserve will avoid missions that extend far forward of the FLOT. Rather, it is used to maintain the cohesive nature of the delaying force. As a result, the brigade commander must clearly define how, where, and under what conditions he will use the reserve. The same time-distance analysis required in defensive planning is essential in proper reserve force planning; its integration into the maneuver plan using the decision support template must be a matter of course.
During the rehearsal, the commander will exercise the reserve in each of the missions which he has determined to be appropriate to the overall delay mission. Specifically, he must verify that the force can assume its required position prior to the arrival of the enemy. This will also confirm his decision support template. In each case, he must know how long it takes the reserve to move from its hide position to the counterattack/overwatch position and prepare to fight. This should be based upon information provided by the reserve commander, who actually drove the route at tactical speed in preparation for the battle.
Execution
Intelligence
As the enemy moves toward the delaying force, the battalion scout platoons will begin to report enemy maneuver. The task forces will relay these reports to the brigade staff. The reports will be reconciled against the commander's decision support template and event template to confirm the enemy's probable course of action. In particular, the commander will want to make an initial assessment of the enemy's strength. This information will influence his estimate of the brigade's ability to conduct the operation as planned.
Reports of enemy activity approaching TAIs should initiate responses from the brigade, such as calls for indirect fire. Throughout the operation, the brigade commander must rely on the battalions in contact for information concerning the enemy's strength, disposition, and probable future operations. This will be particularly difficult when delaying on a wide frontage.
Maneuver
The brigade commander controls the delay using the control measures assigned with the delay plan. Specifically, he requires the timely reporting of PL crossing, passing of checkpoints, coordination point contact, and the occupation of BPs. As the enemy presses the attack, attempting to maneuver against the delaying battalions, the commander will monitor the action closely, in an effort to anticipate possible decisive engagement. Should a particular battalion appear to have trouble maintaining separation from the enemy, the brigade commander may place greater emphasis of CS in that particular sector.
The use of Army aviation must be measured. It is a limited resource and should be used only when necessary. Early commitment of aviation assets may be a mistake if they are not in a position to significantly augment the killing power of the battalion in contact. A more appropriate use would be to assist the battalion in contact in maintaining its freedom of maneuver.
The commander must use the brigade reserve wisely. Due to the wide sector frontage, the brigade reserve will only be able to influence the situation within one area. When the commander commits the reserve, it must be for decisive action. As with aviation, the reserve should not be committed early in the operation unless the situation dictates. Early loss of the reserve could mean the end of the brigade commander's ability to influence the battle. It is possible to commit the reserve several times throughout the battle, but only when it can be quickly extracted.
Fire Support
Enemy action normally initiates execution of the FS plan in the delay. Fires normally begin after receipt of spot reports from the battalion scout platoons. Heavy and accurate indirect fires are key to the success of the delay and must be pursued aggressively throughout the duration of the operation. As the enemy encounters each obstacle, it must be engaged with effective indirect fire. Fires should cause the enemy to button up and slow down. Fires can also be used to separate enemy attack echelons. The brigade should seek to engage deeper enemy targets with available fires while the battalions are fighting forward enemy units.
The artillery must be especially strong for FPF and for recently evacuated friendly positions. Smoke missions should be called to further mask the movement of the force. The commander must ensure that supplies of ammunition are adequate to sustain this type of indirect FS.
The process will continue in this manner throughout the operation: hitting the enemy hard along choke points and in EAs, then just when he may think that he is successfully maneuvering against a position, he gets hit again while the delaying force disappears behind a cloud of smoke, dust, and HE munitions.
Mobility, Countermobility. and Survivability
Obstacles will be more effective if tied to existing obstacles. The effectiveness of the obstacles also depends on direct and indirect fires. FASCAM minefields should be used to delay enemy passage through choke points. The commander shifts the engineer's countermobility effort to the sector in which the enemy appears to be making the most progress. To this end a "reserve" of mine-emplacement equipment, such as GEMSS or even M113s loaded with mines, will assist in fortifying the area in depth. Of course, the engineers must be given enough time to accomplish their assigned mission.
Meanwhile, mobility assets continue to keep routes open for CSS assets as they travel back and forth throughout the sector. Target turnover, particularly of brigade reserve targets, should be reported upon execution.
Air Defense
Enemy aviation will attempt to multiply the effect of artillery. Air defense assets must be prepared to keep the enemy from reaching friendly positions. Weapons should be kept away from obvious defensive locations. They must remain in contact with the air defense early warning net. The trade-off will be between the siting of the ADA weapons where they are survivable and the mobility of the weapons themselves. This will be examined more closely at battalion and company level.
Combat Service Support
The FSB should be far enough away so the BSA cannot be attacked by artillery. At the same time, however, it continues to support the delay operation. Maintenance, medical, and resupply operations must continue, but with the intent to evacuate, as opposed to returning a damaged vehicle to combat. Unless the vehicle can be fixed quickly on the spot, it should be sent to the rear. The delaying force cannot afford to lose vehicles during the operation, as vehicles left behind will be captured or destroyed.
Command and Control
Due to the decentralized execution of the delay, the brigade commander must rely on his battalion commanders to execute the mission and ask for help when they need it. This places a heavy burden on the battalion commanders, particularly when considering the strength of the enemy force they will be facing. Therefore, the brigade commander must see to it that his subordinate commanders get what they need to do the job within the realm of the possibility.
During actual execution of the delay, the commander must carefully monitor progress of each battalion. Because he is separate from the action, he can look at the actions without becoming mesmerized by the close-in fight. His anticipation of future enemy actions, or battalion needs, will stimulate CS and CSS operations in a specific sector.
He must maintain the cohesiveness of the overall operation, ensuring that flank coordination is maintained at all times. Most important, he must carefully assess the situation to determine the most effective use of the brigade reserve. Once he reaches his DP, the commitment of the reserve must then receive all the support necessary to successfully accomplish its mission. It is imperative that the counterattack force strike quickly and violently. It must be withdrawn just as quickly so that it can be used again at another opportune moment.
Withdrawal
A withdrawal is disengagement from the enemy, either unassisted or assisted by another force. It is conducted so that the battle may be handed over to another unit positioned to the rear of the withdrawing force, allowing the withdrawing force to prepare for future operations. Withdrawals may or may not occur under enemy pressure.
Planning
Intelligence
The S2 reviews the intelligence estimate to establish the IPB process. He must ensure conditions are right for a withdrawal. He must also determine how the enemy is most vulnerable to deception. The S2's analysis of the enemy situation determines the type of withdrawal the brigade will conduct and predicts whether or not the withdrawal will be under pressure. A withdrawal requires employment of a DLIC.
The worst time to conduct a withdrawal is in the face of an enemy attack. Therefore, the S2 must analyze the situation carefully to determine the best time to conduct the withdrawal. The intelligence collection plan will be extremely important in this regard. Information from the division G2 should be obtained in an attempt to identify massing formations. The commander will then decide if the brigade should request an assisted withdrawal or conduct an unassisted withdrawal. He must also decide whether to retain a DLIC. The more potent and imminent the threat the greater the security precautions required for the operation.
Maneuver
The commander will begin planning for the brigade withdrawal by first examining the situation. The strength of the enemy and his intentions are weighed against the friendly situation. This analysis will suggest when it is appropriate to ask higher headquarters for assistance in conducting the withdrawal. The analysis may cause the commander to form a DLIC. The following paragraphs address the conditions under which each of these techniques is used. Withdrawals are usually conducted during periods of limited visibility.
The assisted withdrawal. If the brigade will have difficulty breaking contact with the enemy, or if the enemy will attack during the conduct of the withdrawal, the commander should request assistance from the higher headquarters. In practice, the assisted withdrawal takes the form of a rearward passage of lines and battle handover to a stationary unit, called a covering force, which is occupying defensive positions to the rear of the withdrawing force (see Figure 5-4).
The advantage of conducting an assisted withdrawal is that the stationary force will overwatch the withdrawing force, protecting it as it moves to the rear. The disadvantage is the detailed coordination required in planning, preparation, and execution of the passage. If time is at a premium, shortcuts in this essential coordination could contribute to fratricide. C2 is compounded when withdrawals are conducted under cover of darkness.
The withdrawing force actually moves as in a delay in sector until it occupies positions within direct-fire range of the stationary force. At a designated time or upon signal, the withdrawing force conducts a rearward passage of lines along covered and concealed routes through and around the positions of the stationary force. The withdrawing force then moves quickly to AAs where the force can form into march columns for subsequent movement to its final destination. Once disengagement is accomplished, the success of a withdrawal depends on the orderly movement of the forces to the rear. MP and traffic control are essential. Multiple routes are selected to avoid congestion.
Unassisted withdrawal. If the division is unable to form a covering force, or if the brigade is not under enemy pressure, the brigade will conduct an unassisted withdrawal. The brigade commander could establish his own covering force from within the brigade, form a DLIC with brigade assets, or a combination of both.
The brigade forms its own covering force. This operation mirrors the assisted withdrawal discussed earlier, but uses only the assets found within the brigade. One option is to use a battalion in reserve as the covering force (see Figure 5-5). This will simplify both C2 and CSS operations. The covering force may actually be located to the front, adjacent to, or to the rear of the forward positioned battalions. The actual positioning of the covering force will be a function of defensible terrain versus the likelihood of enemy attack.
When all battalions are in contact, the brigade commander may construct the covering force from a portion of each battalion in contact (see Figure 5-6). This is a complicated option because it entails an ad hoc task organization. The covering force units could come under the OPCON of the brigade S3. Changes in logistics arrangements will further complicate this option. This option is best undertaken when the withdrawal is not under enemy pressure.
The brigade forms a DLIC. When the enemy is not applying pressure to the sector, the commander will probably choose to remain in contact with the enemy while a major portion of the brigade withdraws. DLICs must possess sufficient combat power to delay the enemy if the withdrawal is discovered and the enemy attacks. Usually, one-third of the force is designated as the DLIC. For a battalion task force, this corresponds to one company team, the scout platoon, the mortar platoon, a C2 element, and an appropriate portion of CSS.
This technique provides a reasonable amount of security to the withdrawing forces and deceives the enemy about the true activities of the brigade. For simplicity and optimum C2, DLIC units remain in the same sector. C2 of the DLIC is accomplished by the brigade S3 in the TAC CP. He will monitor the activities of each subordinate DLIC, ensuring that all maintain flank combination throughout the operation. The DLIC will simulate the brigade's continued occupation of forward defensive positions. The DLIC's mission could be to guard the rear of the brigade, or it could be to delay in sector. The DLIC will remain in position long enough to ensure the safe withdrawal of the main body. The DLIC will then withdraw. It may eventually conduct a rearward passage of lines with a stationary unit.
Regardless of the type of withdrawal selected by the commander, the S3 will prepare a deception plan. This will require the close coordination of the battalion task forces to ensure that the plan is effective. Deception techniques the brigade may use are artillery suppression to simulate an attack or increasing radio traffic to further reinforce the idea that an attack is in preparation.
Within the brigade sector, only a portion of the brigade may actually be able to conduct a withdrawal (see Figure 5-7). Battalions in other sectors may be conducting a delay or defense in sector. The brigade commander may choose to commit the reserve as a covering force for a battalion under enemy attack. This will allow the battalion to disengage and withdraw, while at the same time strengthen the sector.
Fire Support
In planning brigade FS, the commander and FSO conduct the same type of process as in other defensive operations. There may be additional tasks for FS during withdrawal operations, however. FS could be used to support the deception plan. FS could simulate brigade offensive intentions. Fires can cover the sound of withdrawing vehicles. The fires should also be planned to take advantage of the intelligence concerning enemy locations, so as not to waste the ammunition.
The FS plan should be designed to keep the enemy from interfering with the withdrawal. The brigade must be prepared to revert to delay operations if the enemy attacks during the withdrawal. When a detachment is left in contact, the FS plan is critical to protection of the force. FPF should be planned for each element of the DLIC. Smoke missions could be used to lead the enemy to miscalculate the strength of the force and its disposition.
In assisted withdrawal, covering force fires can reinforce the withdrawing force's DS fires. The reciprocal holds once the withdrawal is over and the enemy makes contact with the covering force.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The obstacle plan which will support the brigade withdrawal will be based upon the same siting criteria as for the delay or defense. The obstacle plan will be prepared in depth to provide the covering force or a DLIC the ability to prevent the enemy from decisively engaging it.
In the case of a brigade deployed with all battalions abreast and only a small reserve, the obstacle plan should be designed mostly to protect the mobility of the brigade rather than to ensure complete destruction of the enemy. The DLIC must be strong enough to cover the obstacles with fire and ensure their effectiveness. Additional obstacles in depth will be required as the DLIC begins its delay in sector and attempts to hand the battle over to the stationary force.
If time and resources allow, engineer assets may improve the survivability of the DLIC by preparing fighting positions. Primary and alternate fighting positions should be prepared along subsequent lines of defense for the DLIC.
Air Defense
The brigade air defense plan must take three areas into consideration: the protection of the force while it is in position, the protection of the DLIC, and the protection of the force as it moves to the rear. While the main body withdraws from its forward position, it will move away from the DLIC, extending the area required to be covered by the air defense assets. As a result, dedicated air defense assets must be assigned to each of the forces.
Air defense assets must be sited to safeguard brigade routes of withdrawal. This will be less complicated when the brigade is out of contact and out of indirect-fire range. Therefore, ADA assets will assume good defensive positions along the route, oriented along air avenues of approach without fear of effective suppression.
Combat Service Support
CSS assets are reduced to only those elements essential to the sustainment of the brigade during the withdrawal. After replenishing the units, supply and service facilities are withdrawn. Only the minimum necessary recovery, medical, ammunition, and fuel assets remain forward. This clears the way for the main body of the brigade to withdraw. If a detachment is left in contact the CSS organization associated with that force remains in support.
Plans should include prestocks of Classes III and V along the withdrawal mute when applicable. Maintenance plans should emphasize forward repair. This may include maximizing use of component replacements, cannibalization, and forward positioning of repair teams.
There will be little time during the conduct of the withdrawal to operate on casualties or to repair equipment. Therefore, diagnoses, stabilization, and evacuation will be the rule for casualties; evacuation of damaged vehicles, whenever possible under their own power, will be the norm for vehicles.
If there is a covering force assisting the brigade's withdrawal, the covering force's CSS assets can support the brigade. This will allow the withdrawing force's support elements to move to the rear sooner. The brigade should coordinate CSS with the covering force early in the planning process.
Command and Control
The brigade commander must select a position which allows him to control the withdrawal. If the division provides a covering force, then the commander will collocate his headquarters with the covering force's headquarters. This will ensure proper battle handover and rearward passage of lines. In an unassisted withdrawal, the commander must place himself where be can control the main body's movement to the rear. The brigade S3 and the TAC CP will remain to command the DLIC. The TAC CP must be provided with sufficient staff and radios to command and control a delay if the enemy presses an attack. Accordingly, there must be representatives from the S2, FS, engineers, S3, and S4 sections to assist the S3 in the C2 of the operation. This is an instance in which the commander must delegate the control of the operation to allow himself the opportunity to plan for future missions. This also keeps the commander with the main force of his brigade.
Preparation
Intelligence
The brigade S2 will prepare for the withdrawal by ensuring that R&S can be executed even after the main body withdraws. The R&S plan will be essential to the security of the force, as it will provide for early warning of an impending enemy attack. The S2 should ensure that the units concentrate on NAI along enemy avenues of approach. Seeing an enemy attack coming, the brigade commander can get the brigade in the proper delay posture to receive the oncoming enemy. The proper selection of DPs will allow ample time to react to the enemy attack.
Maneuver
Critical to the success of an assisted withdrawal is the coordination between the brigade and the covering force. The collocation of headquarters will help in solving some of the problems during preparation and execution.
The withdrawing brigade must coordinate a rearward passage of lines. The BHL and recognition signals must be agreed upon. Fire control measures must be established to safeguard the rearward movement of the brigade. If time allows, members of the covering force should meet on the ground with the leaders of the withdrawing force to agree on contact points, PPs, passage lanes, obstacles, and FS plans.
The commander must rehearse the conduct of the withdrawal, paying particular attention to the possibility of reverting to the delay. Movement plans, followed by rearward passage of lines, should be stressed. Control must be maintained throughout the operation. Each player must understand his role in the operation.
Fire Support
In preparation for the operation, the brigade FSO should attempt to identify all possible artillery support for the operation. Additional FS may come from the covering force.
The brigade commander should rehearse the FS plan along with his maneuver plan. The execution of the FS plan, as the brigade moves rearward to the BHL, will be critical. The withdrawing force must be able to inform the covering force when a particular FS coordination line is active. This will allow the covering force to actively engage the enemy with indirect fire before the withdrawing force departs the sector.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The preparation of the obstacle plan will be contingent upon the coordination made between the covering force and the brigade. Each facet of engineer operations will come into play in the withdrawal. First, the countermobility plan must not impede the maneuver of the DLIC or the main body. Obstacles must be significant enough to slow the enemy and make it vulnerable to attack by direct and indirect fire. Mobility throughout the sector is essential to avoid decisive engagement but targets must be planned to deny the enemy the use of these same routes. Brigade target turnover must be rehearsed so that the responsible unit understands the conditions under which targets are executed. Obstacle free zones must be identified. In some cases, obstacles may have to be removed to make way for counterattacks. As with all operations, the commander must check that the FS plan and the obstacle plan are completely integrated. The preparation of survivability positions for the DLIC will be critical if the enemy presses the attack.
Air Defense
The air defense plan is rehearsed along with the maneuver plan. In particular, the commander should ensure that the air defense assets are able to engage enemy targets at any time during the operation. As the force moves to the passage lanes, it will become a lucrative air target. As with artillery, ADA support from the covering force may further protect the force.
Combat Service Support
During preparation for the withdrawal, CSS elements will begin their movement to the rear. Ensure that the movement is not observed by the enemy. Many separate routes may be preferable to a few MSRs until the force is behind the covering force. Evacuation routes should be checked to ensure that none are closed accidentally. Target turnover is important along supply routes.
CSS assets that do remain should be able to meet the needs of the combat units during the withdrawal. To this end the S4 should make every effort to provide ample supplies to the battalions, covering the period of the operation, before the withdrawal begins. Prestocks maybe sited to sustain DLIC operations. If the DLIC is composed of a battalion task force, CSS will generally occur as it would for any defensive operation.
Command and Control
The commander will check the coordination between the brigade and the covering force. The covering force should be kept informed of the activities of the brigade throughout the withdrawal. Collocating headquarters and providing LOs between headquarters will help in reducing confusion. The commander and staff will rehearse the conduct of the withdrawal, to include reverting to the delay in the event of an enemy attack. The decision support template and other tools must beat their disposal.
Execution
Intelligence
As the time of execution arrives, the brigade will begin the deception plan. Artillery fires could trick the enemy into thinking the brigade is going on to the offensive and prevent him from detecting the withdrawal. The suppression should cover the withdrawing force's movement from the FEBA.
Security elements will carefully monitor their assigned sectors, reporting any signs of enemy activity. As the force begins to move to the rear, the security force will displace to the next designated PL.
Accurate reporting and relaying of information through the battalion task force headquarters will be essential to the proper assessment of the situation. Security elements will call for indirect fire to keep the enemy off balance and prevent him from closing with the main body. Once the screen reaches its last position, adjacent to the covering force, battle handover will be effected and the enemy engaged as in a deliberate defense. If this is conducted properly, the enemy, in its haste to reestablish contact with the withdrawing force, will plunge into the deliberate defense, sustaining heavy casualties.
Maneuver
As the battalions report they are clear of each brigade PL, the brigade will inform the covering force that the PL represents the brigade CFL. This will allow increased FS in the brigade sector and prevent the enemy from reestablishing contact.
From their final positions, the battalions will begin passage of lines in accordance with the plan coordinated with the covering force. If there is no covering force the DLIC will cover the movement of the brigade to the rear.
After the battalions have passed to the rear of the covering force, they will quickly form up in AAs to prepare for the road movement to their final destination. The covering force will have assumed responsibility for the sector once the brigade clears the BHL.
Fire Support
The artillery may begin the withdrawal with a preparation of known and suspected enemy positions as part of the brigade deception plan. The fires will be directed toward the suppression of enemy reconnaissance or first-echelon forces. This will help prevent the enemy from observing the rearward movement of the main body.
Should the enemy attack, the brigade may revert to a delay, in which case direct fires would augment the effect of indirect fires, particularly along obstacle belts. FPF and smoke screens may be required to keep the enemy from decisively engaging brigade elements. Once the force arrives at its final position before conducting its rearward passage of lines, the FS must be continuous. After the brigade completes its rearward passage, the artillery may fire in support of the covering force as it repels the enemy's attack.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
As the security elements evacuate a position, they will close the lanes and roads used by the withdrawing forces. It is imperative that as each lane is closed, it is reported to higher headquarters. The enemy may otherwise discover an open road which was thought to be closed. Security elements must call for artillery as the enemy reaches each of the obstacle belts.
Air Defense
Air defense elements will protect the main body and the DLIC, if deployed. The air defense commander will issue air warnings over the command net. The ADA assets should integrate their support with that provided by the covering force.
Combat Service Support
The greatest CSS challenge lies in supporting a DLIC. As vehicles are damaged and casualties are sustained, the support assets will quickly evacuate them to the rear area. Ambulance exchange points and UMCPs are essential to these operations however, they must remain streamlined and mobile so they do not slow down the tempo of the operation. After the withdrawal has begun, it may be best to evacuate vehicles and equipment behind the covering force. Emergency resupply of ammunition and fuel should be accomplished, if possible, out of contact. Those supplies or items of equipment which cannot be evacuated should be destroyed.
Communal and Control
C2 of the withdrawal is conducted much like a delay, except that enemy contact is avoided as much as possible. Therefore, the brigade commander must position himself where he can monitor each battalion sector. During initial stages, this may be just to the rear of battalion sectors. The brigade main CP, collocated with the covering force CP, provides the commander with critical information.
Throughout the operation, the commander's main concern is avoiding decisive engagement with the enemy. To do this, he must make his assessment based on reports of units in contact with the enemy. The commander should remember that an appropriate course of action for one battalion may not suit another. A battalion may respond to enemy success by reverting to the delay while adjacent battalions continue to withdraw.
If a DLIC is employed, the brigade S3 will control it as the commander moves to the rear with the main body. The S3 will closely monitor reports. He will ensure that flank coordination is maintained between each of his subordinate units.
Retirement
A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force not in contact moves away from the enemy. In the retirement, the brigade conducts either a tactical or administrative move to the rear.
Planning
Intelligence
The S2 evaluates the terrain, weather, and enemy. His assessment of the enemy's capability to maintain contact or attack determines whether the brigade will move tactically or administratively. When enemy contact is unlikely, the brigade commander will likely choose administrative movement, especially when a stationary force lies between the retiring brigade and the enemy. Otherwise, the brigade S2 must prepare the same types of products for the commander and the rest of the staff as in any tactical operation. Under conditions in which the enemy is able to maintain contact, the S2 prepares a R& S plan. This information is critical to the conduct of the rear guard because it prevents enemy interference with movement of the main body.
The S2 also should analyze movement routes and the final AA to determine possible locations for enemy ambushes or other level one and level two threat activity. This information affects main body movement and influences the formation and disposition of forces as the brigade moves to the rear. A further discussion of movement planning and AA operations is found in Chapter 2, Preparation for Combat.
Maneuver
The commander prepares for retirement by examining the S2's analysis of the enemy situation. If enemy contact is unlikely, he will probably choose to move administratively to the designated AA. A discussion of road movement planning is in Appendix A, Movement. When the enemy appears to be able to affect movement of the brigade, the commander may choose to form a rear guard and move tactically. In a retirement that follows an unassisted withdrawal, the commander designates the DLIC as the rear guard. If the brigade has its own covering force during the withdrawal, the covering force can be the rear guard. It is preferable to form the rear guard using existing subordinate organizations (see Figure 5-8).
Fire Support
The FSO will ensure that the artillery is positioned to support the rear guard throughout the retirement; however, some assets must also support the flank and advance guards should they also make contact with the enemy. Generally, task force mortars will support their designated guards, but if the support is not strong enough, the artillery must be ready to respond.
If the brigade conducts a rearward passage of lines through a stationary force, indirect fires must be coordinated with the unit owning the ground. The objective of FS planning is to keep the enemy from closing with the rear guard. Fires should be planned to maintain mobility of the force while slowing the momentum of the enemy. Smoke missions and targets planned on obstacles will obscure the rear guard and separate the enemy from the rear guard as the rear guard conducts its delay.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
There will probably be little opportunity to emplace significant obstacles in the path of the enemy forces. Some countermobility and survivability assets, however, should support the rear guard.
Air Defense
ADA assets will be allocated to support both the main body and the rear guard. For the rear guard, these assets will conduct operations as in delay or defensive operations. The main body, however, will receive the bulk of the protection because movement formations present lucrative targets for enemy aircraft. The brigade ADA officer will plan to locate his assets where they can best provide air security to the force as it moves to the rear and occupies its AA.
Combat Service Support
CSS assets will have to sustain the rear guard, move to the designated AA, and supped the movement of the brigade main body. If the rear guard comprises a single maneuver element, CSS for that organization already exists. Service support operations for the movement mostly involve recovery, emergency refueling, and medical evacuation. CSS elements not essential to the operation should be moved early to reduce congestion during the retirement A complete discussion of movement planning is found in Appendix A, Movement.
Command and Control
The command of the rear guard may come under the brigade S3. If a battalion is designated the rear guard the battalion commander will command it. The brigade S3 will use the TAC CP to provide the brigade C2 element for CS and CSS. An alternative is to provide necessary CS and CSS assets to the rear guard.
The brigade commander will monitor the movement of the main body. He will either control the force in its tactical movement or monitor its progress as it moves administratively to its designated AA.
Preparation
Intelligence
The S2 briefs the commander and orders group on the enemy situation. He will ensure the commander receives as complete a picture of the enemy situation as possible. The commander and staff war-games the decision support template to ensure everyone understands how the commander wants the operation to be executed.
For the axis of advance, the S2 will identify to the orders group possible congestion areas, likely locations of enemy ambush or interdiction, and areas of vulnerability to air strikes.
Maneuver
The commander reviews the maneuver plan with the battalion commanders. He ensures each commander understands his mission and responsibilities. If the brigade is conducting a tactical movement coordination between the rear guard and the main body will be addressed. The main body must not outrun the rear guard. Actions in rearward passage of lines with a stationary force must be rehearsed so each element understands which position to occupy before executing its rearward passage. The BHL must be understood by the rear guard as well as on-order CFLs. Order of march from each unit's final defensive positions to passage lanes and ultimately routes to the AA must be clearly understood.
For administrative movement, maneuver is less complicated, but should be reviewed nevertheless. Each battalion task force and brigade element must know when and where it is to travel on the rearward route to the AA. Emergency stop areas, maintenance halts, and rest halts should be identified as well as UMCPs and emergency fuel support.
Occupation of and actions within the AA should be reviewed so that each element understands the geographical boundaries of his area and his responsibilities upon occupation. A complete discussion of AA operations is found in Chapter 2, Preparation for Combat.
Fire Support
The FS plan is rehearsed during the brigade rehearsal to ensure the rear guard has enough FS to accomplish its mission. The FS plan for movement of the main body is also rehearsed Artillery may engage only identified enemy threats because the brigade does not own terrain through which it is traveling. The brigade should coordinate with the unit that owns the ground before engaging targets.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Mobility of the force is critical during retirement. Engineer mobility assets will be placed along the route to safeguard transportation across bridges and other potential choke points. The rear guard should take over targets turned over by supporting engineers.
Air Defense
The air defense plan should be checked to ensure continuous protection is achieved throughout the operation. As the last elements of the brigade clear a particular area, the ADA assets must redeploy to provide continued protection all the way to the AA. Actions upon air engagement should be rehearsed. Once occupation of the AA begins, the positioning of the air defense assets should be checked to ensure they are coordinated with the organization which owns the land.
Combat Service Support
CSS operations should be rehearsed to ensure that support of the rear guard does not interfere with movement of the main body. There will be forces traveling in opposite directions. If available, separate routes should be identified for each activity. During an administrative movement, CSS elements can be positioned along the route to support the force. Once in the AA, CSS assets should be positioned to refit, refuel, and rearm the brigade for future operations.
Command and Control
The commander must ensure that the rear guard commander has everything needed to command and control the rear guard. Control measures should be clearly understood. The brigade commander will position himself where he can best control and monitor the operation. Actions upon contact should be rehearsed with each of the battalion commanders to ensure that they understand the proper procedures.
Execution
Intelligence
Once the brigade begins its move to the rear, the rear guard will attempt to keep the enemy from observing the force. Identified enemy elements will be engaged by indirect fire. Properly directed artillery fires, to include smoke missions, should keep the main body and the rear guard obscured.
Advance parties will report any enemy activity and verify the conditions of the routes to be taken by the main body.
Maneuver
The rear guard will delay the enemy as required to protect the main body, fighting from subsequent lines of defense. The rear guard must not become decisively engaged.
The main body will move in column. As the brigade approaches its final positions before executing a rearward passage of lines, the units may have to temporarily adopt a hasty defensive position until each element is able to conduct its rearward passage of lines. This temporary halt may be expedited by increasing the number of passage lanes.
Once the passage is complete, the brigade will form into march elements and begin the road movement to its designated AA. It may be advisable to occupy temporary AA positions to reorganize before beginning the road movement. Reconnaissance elements and MPs may assist in traffic control during this phase of the operation.
Fire Support
FS will be used primarily to support the rear guard. At times, significant amounts of artillery suppression may be required to prevent the rear guard from becoming decisively engaged. As the force conducts its rearward passage of lines, FPF may be needed. Fires called during the administrative portion of the movement will be shot only upon positive identification of enemy forces to reduce the risk of fratricide.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Throughout the operation, engineer assets will move with retiring units to ensure the mobility of the force. The highest priority mission for those engineer assets accompanying the rear guard will probably be survivability. Engineers may be called upon to execute point type targets located at identified choke points. Some hastily emplaced minefield may be emplaced as well.
For administrative moves, pre-positioned engineer mobility assets will ensure the route remains open.
Air Defense
ADA will provide area coverage throughout the operation. In the event of an identified air strike, the information will be issued over the brigade command net so the brigade can quickly adopt a protective posture. If the route becomes clogged due to air interdiction, march units may be issued on order AAs to the left and right of the mute where they can better protect themselves and present less of an obvious target to the enemy until they can resume travel.
Combat Service Support
Support of the rear guard will occur as it would for a delay operation. As for the main body, the FSB will move in its assigned location. If possible, some support assets may be able to leave with the quartering parties to pre-position themselves along the route in support of the administrative movement. The majority of CSS operations will be devoted to getting the brigade to its AA, losing as few vehicles along the way as possible. Once the brigade arrives at the AA, CSS assets will attend to the needs of the battalions. Task force LOGPACs of ammunition, fuel, food, and any other expendable supply item will be sent to the battalions, where they will conduct tailgate resupply.
Command and Control
The brigade will provide C2 for the rear guard as well as the retiring units. The commander will travel in the area of the brigade where he can best influence the action. He will also want to ensure the smooth transition from tactical to administrative movement. He will temporarily collocate his CP with the stationary force CP to supervise the rearward passage of the brigade. Then he will move to a forward march unit to monitor movement all the way back to the AA.
SECTION II. BATTALION TASK FORCE RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
Delay in Sector
A delay operation trades space for time while avoiding decisive engagement. The delay incorporates all the dynamics of defense, but emphasizes the preservation of the force and the maintenance of a mobility advantage over the enemy. The battalion task force may be given a delay mission as part of a covering force or an economy of force operation or to control an enemy penetration in preparation for a counterattack.
Planning
Intelligence
The battalion S2 prepares for the delay as he would for any defensive operation (see Figure 5-9). To avoid decisive engagement and make the enemy deploy as frequently as possible, his terrain analysis must clearly address the relationship between terrain features and enemy avenues of approach. A delaying force, delaying on a wider front, must be prepared to fight larger enemy forces than in defensive operations. Enemy areas of vulnerability, therefore, take on even greater significance.
The situation template will help the commander determine the best times and locations to force the enemy to deploy throughout the depth of the sector. The event template will help the commander to focus intelligence gathering efforts and identify NAIs. Finally, the decision support template will be used to war-game the plan against probable enemy courses of action.
Maneuver
There are two kinds of delay missions. A delay in sector is geared to the capability of the force to slow the enemy as much as possible given its inherent capability. A delay forward of a specified line for a specified time accepts a potentially greater risk to buy time. In effect, this process identities the horizontal parameters of the AOs, that is, how much space may traded for how much time. Coupled with the terrain analysis, the vertical parameters complete the apportionment of the battlefield. Specifically, the commander will determine if it is better to delay by companies in sector, in BPs, or in combinations of the two.
A narrow frontage suggests the use of a delay on alternate positions; a broader from lends itself better to a delay on successive positions. The terrain analysis and identification of platoon and company positions will help confirm which technique is most appropriate for the given battalion task force sector. As with defensive planning, these positions should be identified by their ability to influence the previously identified enemy areas of vulnerability, particularly from the flanks and rear of the approaching enemy.
Once the commander has identified all of the potential platoon BPs, he will combine them to form company positions. This refinement, however, is not merely a grouping of positions. It is an assemblage based upon the ability to engage the enemy where the commander has determined to kill him, maintain the survivability of the force, and allow the force to displace to subsequent positions before the enemy has the opportunity to close with it.
Direct-fire control measures will then be added to the plan as in defensive operations. EAs, TRPs, trigger lines, break lines, and engagement priorities are examples of the control measures required. A more complete discussion is found in Chapter 4, Section II, on battalion defense. Routes from position to position should be clearly identified and reconciled with the battalion obstacle and FS plans. Likewise, order of march and on order orientations to cover other unit moves should be assigned to each element.
Delay operations are designed to maximize firepower within the sector. For this reason, the reserve is normally smaller than for a defense. While defensive operations usually suggest a company reserve, delay operations will more often form a smaller reserve. In the case of a two-platoon reserve, the remaining platoon could be given to one of the other companies, creating a four-platoon company. The advantage to this is that the C2 of the reserve is consistent with the organizational structure. In a single-platoon reserve, the platoon leader will report directly to the battalion commander. The same type of control measures must be incorporated into the plan for the reserve as in defensive planning. Likewise, obstacle-free zones, no-fire artillery zones, and RFLs should be completely integrated into the counterattack plan.
The delay in sector should be planned to end in another operation. The company teams will establish final defensive positions along the rear portion of the battalion sector. Another force could conduct a counterattack into the enemy's flanks, supported by the delaying force. The delay is often designed to buy time for another force to prepare its defenses. In this case, the delaying force would coordinate and establish a BHL and conduct a rearward passage of lines, handing the battle over to the stationary force.
In planning employment of the scout platoon, the commander will often want to maximize early warning by placing the scouts in a forward screen. Reports generated by the scouts are useful when used with the decision support template. Once the enemy maneuvers within close proximity of the MBA, the scouts could screen a vulnerable flank.
Fire Support
The FS plan is developed concurrently with the maneuver and obstacle plans. The same considerations are used in delay FS planning as in the defense. The only significant difference is that in the delay the artillery is used more for maintaining the mobility of the delaying force than in ensuring destruction of the enemy. As a result, linear sheaths of smoke should be planned to assist companies as they move to their subsequent BPs. FPF should be planned forward of each BP and artillery targets should be placed on the positions themselves. Fires for the EA will be linked to the obstacle plan and prepared in the same manner as in a deliberate defense.
The mortars will generally operate in split sections to cover the large frontage of the battalion sector. In narrow sectors, they are more likely to operate as a platoon. It is important that the mortars keep a section on the ground at all times so they can respond immediately to calls for fire. The disadvantage of operating with mortars in split section is that any call for mortar fire will generally be met by only one firing section. Only in the areas where the two sections' arcs of fire converge wilt the battalion be able to take advantage of the platoon's massed fires.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Obstacle emplacement in delay operations should be planned so as to force the enemy to deploy repeatedly as it maneuvers through the sector. Point obstacles will be used to close routes of egress. Close-in protective obstacles will be planned to prevent the enemy from closing with the force.
The mobility of the force on routes to subsequent positions must be maintained throughout the battle. It is essential that the delaying force be able to retain its mobility advantage. Therefore, what the obstacle plan fails to do in slowing the enemy, the mobility plan must accomplish in allowing the force freedom of maneuver.
Survivability must be incorporated into each BP. The ability of the force to maintain its fighting strength will further complicate the enemy's attempts to break through the sector. Initially, the commander will designate the level of preparation for each BP however, as time allows, each BP will be prepared to the same standard as those deemed primary. Therefore, engineer assets must be prepared to continue their work in depth even though the delay may have already begun.
Air Defense
The battalion air defense plan will center on protecting the force; all other ADA considerations for protection will be secondary. C2 facilities may receive some protection, but the most critical air defense role in the delay is to maintain the force's freedom to maneuver. Due to the fluid nature of the delay and the likelihood of receiving enemy artillery suppression, air defense assets must be placed under armor. Delay considerations with respect to early warning are the same as in battalion defensive operations.
Combat Service Support
CSS will be accomplished in a manner similar to defend in sector missions. The significant difference is that the commander knows exactly when he will evacuate a specific portion of the battlefield and move to subsequent positions. This information, if held to in execution, will allow the support units to better forecast the location of ammunition and fuel resupply and to determine which LRP to use during each stage of the operation. Because operations seldom go according to plan, a certain amount of flexibility must be required.
Command and Control
The most significant aspect of the delay is selection of the times by which the force must delay forward of specified lines. A thorough discussion of the techniques involved in this planning is found in brigade delay planning. The same process holds true at battalion and company levels. The commander must also carefully determine when and where to commit the reserve. There are many possible missions for a task force reserve, but the most effective is the counterattack to destroy enemy forces and assist in the disengagement of the battalion from delay positions. This mission accomplishes the aim of inflicting the greatest number of casualties while maintaining the force's freedom of maneuver. In developing his decision support template, the commander must ensure that the reserve arrives at the most opportune point in the battle.
The commander should plan to position himself where the greatest enemy threat is likely to occur. Due to the wide frontage of the battalion sector, the S3 may be required to position himself in a different area.
Preparation
Intelligence
The S2 prepares for the delay by role-playing the enemy during the battalion orders group backbrief rehearsal. As the company team commanders discuss their maneuver to the battalion commander, the S2 will portray the likely enemy actions as a result of the delay. These enemy actions should reinforce the actions of the company team and identify weaknesses within the plan. While this rehearsal occurs, the battalion commander should check his decision support template and synchronization matrix, ensuring they are appropriate for the operation.
Maneuver
If time allows, an actual dry run of the delay will be extremely beneficial. Companies will be able to confirm that trigger lines are effective. Disengagement criteria and the move to the next set of BPs can be confirmed. The battalion commander will pay special attention that his elements are not exposed to fire from the EA as they move. Also, he will time the companies to check that his disengagement criteria allow them enough time to occupy their new positions.
Fire Support
During the rehearsal, the FS plan will also be exercised. Once the enemy enters the EA, indirect fires should be called simultaneously with direct fires so that the commander can verify the accuracy of his synchronization planning. Units will practice calling for fires, in particular battalion priority targets.
As the enemy nears the break line, the companies should begin to call for linear sheaths of smoke and, if appropriate, FPF to assist in breaking contact and covering the move. As the companies evacuate the positions, fires should be called on the BPs and along the routes to their new defensive position. This will discourage a persistent enemy who is reluctant to lose contact.
The mortar platoon should practice shooting and displacing all the way to the rear of the sector. It should check that it has enough smoke rounds on hand to meet requests of the company teams. The mortar platoon should coordinate with the S4 and support platoon leader to prestock ammunition at firing points located on subsequent positions.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The commander should examine the obstacle plan to ensure that it effectively channelizes the enemy as the enemy maneuvers toward the defensive positions. He will ensure that close-in protective obstacles are able to effectively break the enemy's momentum, forcing it to lose contact with the delaying force. Continuing through the sector, he will check target turnover to ensure no lane is left open for enemy use. All obstacles should be reinforced by direct and indirect fire. This process should be repeated throughout the depth of the sector. The commander will note any problems with the plan and adjust the tactical plan to correct mistakes.
Air Defense
Air defense assets will locate themselves with each supported unit and move under armor with the supported force. They will practice issuing enemy aircraft attack warnings to the battalion over the command net and identifying weaknesses in the task force maneuver which may make it vulnerable to air attack. These weaknesses will be reported to the commander for corrective action.
Combat Service Support
The CSS plan, like the maneuver, FS, and obstacle plans, will be rehearsed. In particular, the CSS assets must be prepared to displace in anticipation of the task force's movement so as not to clog the withdrawal routes and slow down the maneuver. LOGPAC operations, identification of critical logistics points, and evacuation and recovery operations should be rehearsed to ensure they can be accomplished while on the move. Arrangements must be made to destroy equipment that cannot be evacuated in time.
Command and Control
The commander could drive the enemy's axis of advance and take note of each of the company plans to ensure they are properly integrated and achieve the required synchronous effect. Further, he will ensure that his control measures are properly placed and adequate for the operation. During the rehearsal, he should commit the reserve to check its timing and ensure that it can occupy a position to the flank and rear of the unsuspecting enemy. The commander's most important task, however, is to ensure that the battalion will be able to maintain its freedom of maneuver throughout the duration of the operation. Therefore, the break line, obstacles, and indirect fires which support disengagement must be carefully checked to ensure effectiveness.
Execution
Intelligence
As the enemy approaches the battalion sector, GSRs and the scout platoon will issue spot reports. Indirect fire will be adjusted against the enemy reconnaissance forces. If available, COLT teams will destroy these vehicles in lieu of other artillery-fired munitions. Counterreconnaissance forces will complete the destruction of enemy reconnaissance. Once the enemy's first echelon begins to draw near to the sector, the scout platoon, and GSRs will withdraw and displace to a flank where it will continue to screen.
Maneuver
After the screen has withdrawn, the enemy will begin to move into the battalion sector and EA. Direct and indirect fires will begin to engage once the enemy reaches the trigger line. If the enemy has detected the delaying force, it may begin its artillery preparation of the area in support of the assault. That is why it is important that every vehicle commander understands how long he is to fight from each BP. Fires from the battalion should be controlled in the same manner as in any defensive operation; however, as the time or physical requirements are met to withdraw, the force will call for the necessary indirect fires to cover the move.
As the companies displace, other companies will change orientations to cover the move. Each company will travel along its designated route, executing reserve demolitions as required and calling for additional fires if the enemy is able to maintain contact. At the next set of BPs, the process will continue. As stated earlier, the objective of the delay is to trade space for time. The more damage the delaying force is able to inflict upon the enemy the longer the delaying force will be able to stay in position. If decisive engagement appears inevitable, however, the commander must be able to displace the force early and attempt to make up the difference on the next set of positions.
Fire Support
The artillery will be used initially to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets as they begin to probe the battalion sector. As the first echelon begins to deploy, the FS will be directed to shatter the enemy's formation as it encounters the obstacle system. Together with the direct fires of the company teams, the fires should be significant enough to inflict severe losses on the initial formations.
Once the battalion reaches the point where they choose to displace to their next positions, the artillery will again engage the remnants of the enemy force. If the enemy is able to maintain contact, an FPF will be shot in support of the company requiring assistance. Mortars will provide smoke as required to further mask the movement from enemy observation. For those elements which are in danger of becoming decisively engaged, artillery fire may be called on the position once it has been evacuated.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The effectiveness of the obstacle plan will be a function of how well it is covered by direct and indirect fire, in addition to its actual siting. There will be little opportunity to reinforce or repair obstacles unless there is sufficient time between the arrival of echelons. The battalion may be able to reinforce a critical obstacle by firing FASCAM.
As the companies displace to their subsequent BPs, reserve demolitions will be executed to deny use of the routes to the oncoming enemy force. It is imperative that each demolition is reported to the battalion headquarters so that the commander can be sure that the enemy will be unable to find an open mobility corridor into the next defensive line. Mobility assets will be used to keep routes of withdrawal and supply open. Blade assets may continue to improve the fighting positions of those BPs located in depth.
Air Defense
The battalion's air defense will be accomplished by Stinger teams under armor and Vulcans protecting the force as it conducts the delay. ADA assets will provide early warning of impending air attack over the battalion command net.
Combat Service Support
During the delay, CSS assets will support the battalion as they would in any defensive operation. Damaged vehicles will be removed from contact and evacuated as necessary to maintenance support. Wounded will be transferred by ambulance to the battalion aid station for triage and treatment. Emergency requisitions of ammunition will be handled as for the defense, with push packages being brought forward to the receiving unit. If possible, prestocks of expendable supplies should alleviate part of this problem. CSS will jump in anticipation of the battalion displacement. This will allow the support to remain effective throughout the operation. The aid station and other support organizations may operate from alternating locations to keep pace with the operation and provide continual support.
Command and Control
The commander should monitor the battle from an area which allows him to observe the enemy's main effort. The S3, in turn, may cover the supporting effort. As the enemy attacks, the commander will want to avoid decisive engagement. If decisive engagement occurs, the battalion may lose freedom to maneuver and perhaps its ability to delay, and it may be forced to fight the battle to conclusion.
As an example of the most lethal counterattack, the commander may commit the reserve as the enemy begins to mass in the EA and when he appears vulnerable. If the counterattack is executed as planned, the enemy, fixed upon the delaying force, will be suddenly struck in the flank and rear by the counterattack force. After inflicting severe damage, the battalion will displace to subsequent positions, where the delay mission will continue.
Withdrawal
A withdrawal is an operation in which all or part of the battalion frees itself for a new mission. A withdrawal is conducted to break contact with the enemy when the task force commander finds it necessary to reposition all or part of his force. The withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted and may or may not be under pressure from the enemy.
Planning
Intelligence
The battalion S2 will plan for the withdrawal in the same manner as the delay. Specifically, he must analyze enemy forces to determine whether or not the operation will be conducted under enemy pressure. A complete situation template and most probable enemy course of action should be prepared. He will use the event template to prepare a R&S plan. This will allow him to continue to monitor the situation and confirm his findings.
Maneuver
The brigade commander will determine if the withdrawal will be assisted or unassisted. If the withdrawal will be conducted under pressure, the battalion is normally assisted by a covering force (see Figure 5-10). The covering force could be provided by brigade or higher headquarters. If the withdrawal will not be conducted under enemy pressure, a covering force may not be provided (see Figure 5-11). In this case, the battalion usually will form a DLIC.
Generally, one company team will become the DLIC to ease C2. This company may also be augmented by scouts and mortars. When this is not possible, the DLIC could be formed by platoon-size elements from each of the forward companies. The DLIC may be commanded by the battalion S3 and augmented with the scout and mortar platoons. In any case, there may be a DLIC, a covering force, or both.
Whenever possible, a withdrawal, which requires a force to disengage from contact with the enemy, should be conducted under limited visibility conditions. The DLIC will remain in position while the remainder of the battalion moves to the rear. The scout platoon will maintain contact with the enemy while the remaining DLIC units occupy their former companies' positions. The DLIC should maintain contact with the enemy. It should deceive the enemy as to the true activities of the battalion. The DLIC must, however, be prepared to fight to maintain the security of the main body.
Fire Support
The FSO will develop an FS plan to protect the battalion task force as it withdraws from position. The FS plan must take advantage of the natural and man-made obstacles within the sector. Choke points and other identified areas of possible enemy Vulnerability should be targeted as well as potential EAs. The FS plan should help the withdrawing units and the DLIC maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy. FPF and smoke screens should be planned to keep the force obscured from enemy observation and separate from the enemy.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Unless the enemy is not in contact, there will be little opportunity to construct obstacles forward of the main defensive line. Therefore, obstacle planning will be oriented toward slowing enemy momentum throughout the depth of the sector. Because the bulk of the battalion's support assets are moved to the rear in preparation for the withdrawal, barrier materials and mine availability may be limited to what is on hand. The same considerations used in siting obstacles for the defense in sector will be used for the withdrawal. As in any obstacle plan, the obstacles must be completely integrated with the direct-and indirect-fire plans. Reserve demolitions should be sited to take advantage of choke points and to close routes of egress.
Air Defense
The battalion air defense plan will be constructed with three considerations in mind: the protection of the main body as it withdraws, the protection of the battalion's security force or DLIC, and route protection as the battalion moves to its AA. To safeguard the main body and the security force during the initial stages of the withdrawal, Stinger teams will accompany those forces providing security from designated positions throughout the depth of the sector. Once the battalion begins its passage of lines and subsequent road movement, the Stinger teams may revert to a route security role unless that is already being accomplished by a higher headquarters air defense element. In that case, the Stinger teams will remain with the maneuver elements.
Combat Service Support
CSS of the withdrawal is divided into four area missions: support of the main body as it withdraws, support of the security force or DLIC, support of the road movement to the AA, and support of the battalion task force upon reaching the AA. In addition to these requirements, the bulk of CSS assets will be evacuated early to ease the rearward movement of the force. Therefore, the battalion S4 must carefully determine the minimum amount of support required for each of these elements and apportion them accordingly.
The most significant support concern will be the security force or DLIC. Because this force must be prepared to quickly revert to a delay mission, ammunition, fuel, and medical and maintenance support must be on hand at all times. Some prestocking of ammunition on BPs in depth may be considered; however, it is probably best if the supplies remain on the prime movers so that they can be evacuated rather than destroyed if not used.
All other AOs will require mobility support and perhaps emergency refueling. Therefore, maintenance and evacuation support will be located along the route to assist damaged vehicles. UMCP locations may also have fuel trucks for those few vehicles which were unable to top off before the start of the operation.
Command and Control
In a withdrawal, the commander moves with the main body, leaving the battalion S3 in command of the DLIC. Usually, the S3 will also be given a representative from each staff section so he can fight a delay should the enemy press the attack.
Because the delay precedes a new mission, the commander must be able to maximize his planning time. Also, he will want to orient his attention to the bulk of the battalion rather than only one of its maneuver elements. This is the type of operation in which the commander gives as much assistance and support to the S3 as he deems appropriate.
Preparation
Intelligence
The battalion S2 prepares for the operation by briefing the orders group on the overall enemy situation. This includes the likelihood of enemy attack during the operation and level of threat expected during the road movement.
The S2 war-games with the orders group the enemy's probable course of action. He role-plays the enemy as the key players rehearse the conduct of the operation. The commander watches the rehearsal to ensure that the force has everything it needs to operate effectively and that key players will operate within the commander's intent.
Maneuver
The battalion orders group will begin with an overall rehearsal of the operation. The commander will verify that each element understands its tasks. Usually, a withdrawal includes a rearward passage of lines through a stationary force. Therefore, coordination for the passage must be complete, including recognition signals and contact points and lanes. Each company commander must understand his responsibility in the rearward passage of his element. If possible, members of the stationary force should be present during the rehearsal to ensure that everything will be executed according to their interpretation of the plan.
If there will be a DLIC, the DLIC's mission will be rehearsed. The S3 will begin by exercising the R&S plan, with the S2 simulating the enemy force. The DLIC will simulate the battalion, continuing to occupy defensive positions as the remainder of the battalion withdraws. Withdrawals take place during periods of limited visibility to make it more difficult for the enemy to detect them. If the enemy detects the withdrawal, however, the S3 will determine when to bring in the screen and order the force to begin the delay. He should report the situation to the commander so the commander can have the battalion ready to take action. During the rehearsal, the commander and S3 should verify each delaying PL and agree on a simple way to designate the time required to delay to each one.
Fire Support
The FS plan will be exercised concurrently with the maneuver rehearsal. The battalion FSO should ensure that the mortar platoon is used to advantage, particularly in terms of its ability to fire smoke missions. Other fires should be rehearsed. Artillery groups should force the enemy to deploy repeatedly, and FPF should prevent decisive engagement.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The mobility plan will be checked during the rehearsal. Mobility assets should be positioned where they can respond effectively to potential choke point congestion (such as loss of a bridge because of an air strike). Countermobility operations will be rehearsed. Company teams should rehearse direct-and indirect-fire engagement of the enemy as they approach each obstacle. Also, as the companies move to the rear, reserve demolition execution should be rehearsed to ensure that the units comply with the target turnover requirements. This includes promptly reporting their execution to the battalion S3.
Air Defense
The air defense plan will be rehearsed to ensure that the air defense assets can provide protection to the forces throughout each stage of the operation. The commander will ensure that during displacement, when moving vehicles are especially vulnerable, the air defense assets are positioned to effectively engage attacking aircraft. He will verify the security of the force as it conducts its road movement.
Combat Service Support
The CSS plan is rehearsed at the same time as the maneuver plan. Evacuation routes will be driven to confirm accessibility to each maneuver element. Similarly, the battalion supply route and access to the combat trains and UMCP will be checked.
Once the mounted rehearsal is complete, LOGPACs will refuel and upload each vehicle in preparation for the operation. Special attention will be devoted to maintenance to ensure that each vehicle is able to make the trip to the AA under its own power. Prestocks of ammunition and other expendable supplies will be positioned on subsequent BPs, with the drivers remaining with the materiel as a guard.
Command and Control
The commander ensures all subordinate commanders understand their responsibilities and his intent for the mission. Next, he ensures that his position within the battalion is the best for C2. He will coordinate with the headquarters responsible for the control of the rearward passage of lines. Finally, he will supervise subordinate unit preparations to ensure they comply with his intent.
Execution
Intelligence
Once the command has been given, the battalion will move out of its positions and begin the withdrawal. Usually, the higher headquarters will execute a deception plan to mask the movement, such as firing artillery and moving at night. The enemy's degraded night fighting capability can be used to advantage in this case. The reconnaissance screen will monitor enemy activity during this early phase of the operation to see if the enemy has detected the move.
As the main body moves to the rear, the DLIC will initially remain in place, maintaining contact with the enemy, deceiving the enemy, and serving in the capacity essentially of a rear guard. Should enemy reconnaissance activities increase and movement of the battalion be detected, the DLIC will be prepared to delay to guard the rear of the battalion as it withdraws.
Maneuver
The main body will displace along each company's designated route while the security force remains in place. As the companies approach each contact point, they will be met by guides from the covering force and proceed as directed along passage lanes to the rear of the stationary force.
Meanwhile, the battalion S3 will continually assess the situation to determine if the DLIC will be required to conduct a delay. Should this become necessary, he should inform the battalion task force commander immediately to warn him of the danger.
The S3 will control the DLIC. He must ensure that the force does not become decisively engaged. Direct and indirect fires will be oriented on the obstacles to maximize destruction and force the enemy to deploy. The S3 should receive periodic updates from the headquarters so he can judge how long he must conduct his guard mission. Once the main body completes passage of lines, he will break contact with the enemy to rejoin the battalion main body. If the enemy has not yet detected the withdrawal, a gradual withdrawal of vehicles should be conducted along with the firing of artillery and smoke to cover the movement. If the enemy has detected the withdrawal and has attacked, the DLIC must delay and conduct battle handover and rearward passage of lines.
Fire Support
FS may be used initially in the deception role, masking the movement of the main body while suppressing known and suspected enemy locations. If the enemy chooses to attack during the withdrawal, the FS plan will be executed to support the delay operation. Indirect fires will be used in conjunction with direct fires and the obstacle system to break up the enemy's formations, force it to deploy, and inflict as much damage as possible. This is done before the security force's move to subsequent BPs is exposed. The mortar platoon will provide timely and accurate smoke missions, which will assist the DLIC's disengagement.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The engineers will ensure that the force is able to travel on their assigned routes, even if damaged by artillery or aircraft. If a route cannot be opened, an alternate will be used to avoid traffic congestion. The obstacle plan will be effective because it is covered by direct and indirect fire. Some FASCAM may be fired to seal potential penetrations in obstacles. Reserve demolitions will be executed as the force displaces to its next position, further impeding enemy movement along avenues of approach.
Air Defense
Air defense units will remain with the units they are protecting. Those assets attached to the security force will maneuver so they always have weapon systems on the ground, ready to engage hostile aircraft. Some assets may move to subsequent positions early in anticipation of the security force's displacement, while others remain with the force. Early warning of enemy air attack will be transmitted on the battalion's command net.
Combat Service Support
CSS operations will be similar to those in delay, with support oriented toward the sustainment of the DLIC. Evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged equipment should be all the way to the rear of the battalion task force sector. Casualties will be stabilized for transport to the stationary force's aid station, with which the moving force's aid station may temporarily collocate. Damaged vehicles which cannot be repaired quickly will be evacuated, so as not to have more vehicles in the UMCP than can be transported on order.
Once the battalion has actually conducted the withdrawal, CSS will shift to supporting the road movement and AA operations. A complete discussion of movement support is found in Appendix A, Movement. AA operations are found in Chapter 2, Preparation for Combat.
Command and Control
The commander will monitor the progress of the withdrawal and the situation of the DLIC. As the rearward passage of lines begins, he moves to the CP (collocated with the covering force's CP) to ensure that passage occurs smoothly. If the enemy attacks, the DLIC must provide enough time for the battalion to complete its rearward passage. Coordination must be constant, and the DLIC's mission to delay for a prescribed amount of time must be made clear. In the face a strong enemy attack, the commander must ensure that the security force is given all the CS needed. The stationary force may provide assistance.
SECTION III. COMPANY TEAM RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
Delay in Sector
A delay operation trades space for time while avoiding decisive engagement and retaining freedom to maneuver. The delay incorporates all the dynamics of defense, but emphasizes the preservation of the force and the maintenance of a mobility advantage over the enemy. The battalion task force may be given a delay mission as part of a covering force or economy of force operation or to control an enemy penetration in preparation for a counterattack. Due to its difficulty, delay is one of the most difficult missions a company can receive.
Planning
Intelligence
The company commander will plan for the delay in the same manner as the defense in sector, with one major difference in mind; the delay does not necessarily mean the complete destruction of the enemy. Rather, the delay is designed to establish conditions for some other future operation. The enemy is forced to deploy repeatedly against a force which will not commit to dedicated combat. With this in mind, the terrain analysis takes on greater significance. The company team commander must use the terrain to its maximum advantage. He must plan the use of every available piece of terrain which lends itself to the delay. He must identify the enemy's avenues of approach and most likely course of action. In particular, he will attempt to identify any area in which the enemy would be vulnerable such as choke points, restrictive terrain, and other natural obstacles which can be used to advantage.
Maneuver
At the company team level, the delay can take many different forms. A delay at the battalion task force level does not necessarily imply that the same type of operation is conducted at the company team level. The battalion, for example, may delay from a series of BPs. At the company level, this may translate to the defense of a BP, with one difference: the defense will be regulated so as not to result in decisive engagement.
For the purposes of this section, the conditions and terrain are such that the company team is given a sector delay mission to set the conditions for the battalion reserve to counterattack. Therefore, the company will delay in sector, then finally occupy a BP at the rear of the sector to support the counterattack.
A delay mission could be high or low in risk. If the company is required to delay forward of a specified line for a specified time, the mission is high in risk. The company commander would then determine the length of time necessary to delay from each position or FL. (A complete discussion of this type of planning is found in Section I, the brigade delay).
In the other case, the company may be given the mission to delay in sector for as long as possible without becoming decisively engaged. This would be a lower risk delay because the mission is not tied to a completion time. In both cases, the company commander must plan to use the terrain to its optimum advantage.
There are three general options for a company team delay: three platoon sectors, a series of platoon BPs, or a combination of both. When the terrain is so close or compartmentalized that two platoons cannot be positioned to mass fires, sectors may be the best method. A combination of sectors and BPs suggests that a portion of the sector contains close terrain, while the remainder is more open.
In relatively open terrain, the use of BPs is usually the preferred technique. For a delay mission, however, the sector is normally wider than for a defend mission. For this reason, the company commander will position his platoon BPs abreast to adequately cover the wide frontage. In this case, the company will have to delay from successive positions. When the company is given a narrower sector, the commander can stagger his platoons and delay from alternating positions. The terrain, battalion concept for the operation, and the size of the sector will affect the company concept for the delay. The company commander will select the BPs and the associated direct-fire control measures.
Having identified where the enemy will be vulnerable and selected the locations of BPs, the commander will establish the direct-fire control measures. He will prepare the delay just as he would the defense, with one difference. Knowing that the company will displace rather than become decisively engaged, the commander must establish on order orientations for the platoons to cover one another as they withdraw to the next set of BPs. Also, he must select routes to the next positions which avoid engagement by the enemy. By calculating the time-distance factors to move from position to position, the commander should determine where to place his break line and establish his obstacles. This process will be repeated throughout the depth of the sector until the platoons reach their last BPs.
Fire Support
The FS plan will be prepared as it would for the defense in sector. Artillery and mortar fires will be planned to exploit the restrictive nature of the terrain and the obstacle plan. Fires will also be planned on BPs to help the platoons break contact and move to their next BPs without being taken under fire. Smoke missions and FPF will be planned for each set of BPs. Additionally, the commander will also determine when the platoons should use self smoke to further heighten the effect.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The obstacle plan should slow or stop enemy movement. The commander will ensure that obstacles are planned so that they take advantage of the terrain and both direct and indirect fires. This is the point in the company delay plan where the commander brings the maximum combat power to bear upon the enemy.
In addition to the obstacles sited within the EA, the commander will plan for a series of obstacles between BPs. These are designed with a reserve demolition included at the point where the route of egress crosses the obstacle. The intent for this type of obstacle to deny the enemy the use of the same route, ensuring a mobility advantage over the enemy.
Air Defense
The Stinger teams will be placed under armor for the entire operation. If the time and resources allow, Stinger firing positions may be prepared on each position, in proximity to the armored vehicle designated as their primary transportation. Whenever possible, however, Stinger teams should have access to the air defense early warning net. If the company has Vulcans, Stinger gunners can ride on those vehicles. As in any other tactical operation, the air defenders must have the capability to forewarn the company team of impending air attack, usually over the company command net.
Combat Service Support
Because the battalion attempts to reduce the number of CSS assets forward during the operation, company trains may not have the level of support they would have for defensive operations. Company combat trains must remain flexible throughout the operation. They must be prepared to move repeatedly. For this reason, they will not be able to engage in maintenance activities which require more than a few minutes. Generally, both vehicles and wounded will be evacuated expeditiously to the battalion combat trains, rather than receiving attention at the company trains location.
Command and Control
The commander must plan to position himself where he can see the battle and assess both the enemy situation and the effectiveness of the delay plan. Because the enemy will attempt to find a gap in the delaying forces, the commander must plan to maintain flank coordination throughout the operation. Also, he must assess whether the defenses are strong enough to make the enemy deploy. The commander must have a series of preplanned and redundant signals to have the platoons displace to their next set of BPs.
Preparation
Intelligence
The commander prepares for the delay mission by conducting a rehearsal. He will ensure that company OPs are positioned where they can observe the enemy's primary and secondary avenues of approach into the company sector.
One technique for the rehearsal is for the commander to drive the sector, placing himself in the shoes of the enemy. He should look for dead space that may not be covered or perhaps a mobility corridor which may have been overlooked. Also, he will attempt to find weakness in the locations and camouflage of fighting positions. Each discrepancy will be corrected prior to execution.
Maneuver
The commander will rehearse the maneuver first by ensuring the platoons are able to execute the direct-fire plan as he (playing the enemy) enters the EA. Platoons will practice engaging and moving to alternate positions. Next, as the commander reaches the break line, the platoons will displace. The commander will see that they do so in the designated order and that the platoon covering the move reorients his weapons to cover the company sector.
He will then observe the area to identify any vehicles which may become exposed as they conduct the move and to ensure that they displace using the proper lanes. The commander should attempt to approach the position at a speed commensurate with enemy doctrine to find out if the enemy has an opportunity to close with the delaying forces or to engage them as they displace. He will continue the rehearsal all the way to the final positions. He will then adjust his plan as necessary.
Fire Support
The FS plan will be rehearsed concurrently with the maneuver plan. The company FSO will rehearse engaging the enemy simultaneously with the platoon leaders and their direct-fire engagement. Calls for fire should be rehearsed as well, especially priority targets. As the platoons displace, the FSO should ensure that smoke missions are called in anticipation of the move. This will allow the smoke screen time to develop. Similarly, FPF should be shot as the commander approaches a platoon which may still be in position (for example, the overwatch platoon). As the platoons displace, other fires on the position and along the route of egress should be rehearsed to assist the force in breaking contact with a particularly determined enemy.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
The obstacle plan will be checked as the commander drives the sector. He should ensure obstacles are covered by direct and indirect fire. Dead space should be made unavailable to the enemy by minefields and any other countermobility assets. During the move to subsequent BPs, platoons should practice executing reserve targets and reporting the execution to the commander.
Air Defense
The Stinger teams should physically practice setting up on each BP to verify the effectiveness of their firing position. Likewise, they should practice issuing an aircraft attack warning over the company command net.
Combat Service Support
The M88 and ambulance should drive the route to each platoon on each set of BPs. They should also drive routes to LRPs and the battalion combat trains. By the end of the rehearsal, they should be completely familiar with how to render assistance to any element within the company. Likewise, they should always displace ahead of the company so that the maneuver platoons will not be impeded on their moves to subsequent positions.
Command and Control
Once the commander has completed driving the sector and rehearsing the company in the delay, he will make whatever adjustments are necessary to rectify identifiable weaknesses in the delay plan. These changes should be as minor as possible to avoid creating confusion in the company and subsequently degrading the execution. The commander will review the conduct of the rehearsal with his XO and ensure that his second in command will be prepared to take over the operation if necessary.
Execution
Intelligence
The battalion scout platoon and GSRs will begin to report the activities of enemy reconnaissance elements as they approach the battalion sector. The commander will monitor scout platoon spot reports and in turn transfer the information to his platoons. He may give instructions to pay close attention to a particular avenue of approach which the enemy appears to be using. Once the battalion screen has been withdrawn, the commander will warn the platoons that the enemy will be arriving in the area shortly. With this heads-up warning, the platoons will be prepared to move from their hide positions to their fighting positions. OPs will continue to scan their designated areas and report enemy sightings upon contact. Initial enemy elements may be engaged with artillery if they have not come into direct-fire range. The delay time to artillery impact must be taken into account so the enemy drives into the impact area. It is important that the enemy force not be able to identify the location of the delaying force until the last possible moment. That would degrade the effectiveness of enemy artillery suppression.
Maneuver
As the enemy first echelon enters the EA, the company team will engage in the same manner as for a defense in sector. Massed direct and indirect fires initiated at a trigger line will inflict severe casualties as the enemy is placed in a vulnerable posture by an effectively placed obstacle system. The platoons should fire with the same sustained rate as for a BP defense, moving to alternate positions to further exploit enemy weakness. However, once the enemy appears to make progress through the EA by reaching the break line and meeting the disengagement criteria, the company will begin its displacement to subsequent positions.
The disengagement and withdrawal to subsequent positions is the most dangerous part of the operation. If the commander waits too long for the enemy to break out of the EA, the enemy could decisively engage the delaying force. It is imperative that the commander begin the displacement before the enemy can close with the company. Massed artillery fires and smoke screens should further assist the delaying force in disengaging.
As the displacement occurs, the covering platoons will shift direct fire orientation to cover the majority of the EA. Once the other platoons are out of danger, the covering platoon will displace under the overwatch of the other platoons. Along the egress route to the next defensive positions, artillery fire and reserve demolitions, combined with overwatching fires, will reinforce the delaying force's ability to avoid decisive engagement. Once in position, the delaying force will repeat the process, attempting to cause the enemy to deploy as often as possible and destroying as much enemy equipment as possible.
Fire Support
Indirect fires will be used initially to engage enemy reconnaissance forces as they enter the company sector. Once the enemy's first echelon reaches the EA, artillery groups and priority fires will be fired in conjunction with the obstacle system to destroy enemy formations. As the company begins its displacement to its next BP, artillery and smoke missions will be fired to assist the withdrawal. FPF may be called if a particular platoon appears to be becoming decisively engaged by the enemy.
As the force displaces, indirect fires may be called upon recently evacuated BPs and on routes to the next set of BPs. These fires should also be linked to obstacles along the routes of egress to gain the fullest effect. On-board smoke may be required to achieve the masking effect needed to obscure the move. Once the force is in position, the process wilt repeat itself, keeping the enemy suppressed throughout the depth of the sector and degrading his C2.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
As described earlier, the obstacle plan will be fully integrated with the direct and indirect fires of the company team. The obstacle system may be reinforced during periods between the arrival of echelons if time and resources allow. Countermobility assets will work on obstacles in depth. Blade assets in particular may be used to improve the effectiveness of fighting positions throughout the sector. Meanwhile, target turnover will be accomplished by the delaying forces as they move to their subsequent positions, further degrading the enemy's ability to maintain contact.
Air Defense
The Stinger teams will ensure the protection of the force throughout the battle, setting up firing positions in support of each BP. If an enemy air strike appears imminent, the Stinger teams will warn the company over the command net.
Combat Service Support
CSS of the delay will be accomplished as in the defense in sector. Combat elements will evacuate damaged vehicles to platoon support points, where they will be met by elements of the company trains. Evacuation rather than repair will be the rule. The trains will displace in anticipation of the company's move so they will always be in a position to support the force.
Command and Control
The commander will ensure that he is positioned to see the battle. He will determine when the force should disengage and ensure that direct and indirect frees are oriented to cover enemy avenues of approach. He will ensure lateral coordination between platoons and between units on the company's flanks is maintained so no gaps can be exploited by the enemy. He must demand timely reporting by all units.
Withdrawal
Withdrawal is an operation in which a force in contact frees itself for a new mission. Inherent in the withdrawal is disengagement from the enemy and moving to a point where the enemy can neither observe nor engage the unit by direct fire. Withdrawals may be assisted or unassisted and may or may not be under pressure from the enemy.
The company team could conduct a withdrawal under a number of situations. The battalion task force could be conducting a defense, a delay, or a withdrawal. The company team is always prepared to disengage, withdraw, and fight from a subsequent position or to counterattack. This section will discuss the company's role during the withdrawal of a battalion task force.
Planning
Intelligence
Regardless of the conditions under which the withdrawal is conducted, the commander must still ensure that security is maintained throughout the operation. He must analyze the terrain and the enemy in the same way he would for the delay or defense. A complete discussion of this planning is in Chapter 4, Defensive Operations.
Maneuver
If the enemy chooses to press an attack (withdrawal under pressure), whether the withdrawal is assisted or unassisted, the maneuver is executed as a delay. The only significant difference between the two operations is whether or not the withdrawal is assisted by a covering force.
If the withdrawal is assisted, the commander must know the location of the covering force (provided by higher headquarters) and plan the rearward passage of lines. Also, the BHL (usually established by higher headquarters) will be checked to ensure that the withdrawing company understands where the battle handover will take place. Final BPs, recognition signals, contact points, and passage lanes must be established in the planning process.
If the withdrawal is unassisted, the company may delay as part of the battalion delay. In case the enemy attacks, the commander should plan BPs from which alternate or subsequent bounds may safeguard the rearward movement of the force. This maneuver would end in disengagement from the enemy and road movement to another location.
If the withdrawal is not under pressure by the enemy, the company may have to provide a platoon to become part of the battalion DLIC. OPSEC is important in this case so the enemy does not detect the withdrawal. The DLIC will remain in position to simulate the company while remaining platoons withdraw. The withdrawal should be conducted under limited visibility when possible. It should be covered by artillery fire or some other noisy distraction so the enemy cannot detect the sound of the movement. Once the company is out of enemy contact, it conducts a road movement to its destination. Following this, the DLIC will withdraw quickly before the enemy has time to react and maintain contact.
NOTE: The discussion of the battalion delay in Section II addresses execution of withdrawal under pressure.
Fire Support
The FS plan will suppress the enemy so he cannot detect the withdrawal. It will be planned by the battalion or brigade FSO. At the company, the commander and FSO will ensure fires are planned where needed throughout the depth of the sector. Fire planning will be prepared as discussed in Chapter 4.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Engineers supporting the company can dig survivability positions, in depth if necessary. Engineers can contribute to the deception plan by constructing dummy vehicles and other items to simulate the company remaining in position. The engineers should also assist in the mobility of the force by improving routes.
Air Defense
Conducting the withdrawal at night will reduce the enemy air threat. Nevertheless, the Stinger team should position itself with the DLIC in case the DLIC is unable to move before sunrise. Other ADA assets, if available, should protect the rest of the company.
Combat Service Support
The company combat trains should be the first to move, usually to the next position to be occupied by the company. The DLIC should receive all the ammunition, fuel, and other supplies it may need in the event of contact. Vehicle recovery will have to be conducted internally by the DLIC platoon. The ambulance may remain with the DLIC to ensure the prompt treatment of wounded.
Command and Control
The commander will plan to move with the main body. He may attach the FSO to the DLIC to ensure that it will receive indirect FS. The conditions should be that an enemy attack is unlikely and such precautions will be the exception rather than the rule. The DLIC platoon leader will establish communications with the DLIC commander at the time designated for the battalion DLIC to take responsibility for the sector.
Preparation
Intelligence
The commander prepare for the withdrawal not under pressure by monitoring the enemy situation in his sector and in the sectors of the units on the flanks of the company. The DLIC platoon leader ensures the security of the force by checking that the OPs are properly sited and are able to observe the enemy mounted and dismounted avenues of approach into the sector. Also, he will check that the platoon's flanks are coordinated with flank platoons.
Maneuver
As with the deception plan, the company must do everything possible to ensure that company activities appear normal while preparing to withdraw. Radio transmissions, eating schedules, maintenance, and virtually all normal defensive activities must appear to be conducted as in the current mission. Vehicle movement may be necessary to position the DLIC for its new mission, as well as to prepare the company to move to the rear. The shifting of vehicles to new locations must be done gradually and as quietly as possible.
The commander will quietly rehearse the withdrawal with his subordinate leaders. A mounted rehearsal would defeat the purpose of the operation as it would give away the company's intentions to the enemy. The commander must ensure that the platoon leaders understand the sequence of withdrawal and which routes they are to take. If at some point the platoons will be required to overwatch the displacement of the DLIC, the positioning of the platoons and their direct fire control measures would be established as in the delay. This type of rehearsal is best conducted at night to retain secrecy and to give the members of the rehearsal a feeling for the conditions under which they will be operating.
If the DLIC platoon will remain under command of the company commander, the commander will review, with the DLIC platoon leader, the conditions and timing of DLIC displacement, ensuring that signals used by the commander will be both effective and redundant. If the DLIC will be overwatched during its movement recognition signals will be established just as in a rearward passage of lines. This will prevent the possibility of fratricide.
Fire Support
The company FS plan will be rehearsed by the DLIC commander to ensure that he will be able to call for fires at any point in the operation to assist in disengagement from the enemy. FPF, fires along obstacles positioned in depth, and smoke screens should be practiced.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Along with the FS plan and the maneuver plan, the obstacle plan will be exercised during the rehearsal, particularly the reserve demolition targets that the DLIC will execute during movement to subsequent positions. Mobility along the route will be essential to the success of the operation. Therefore, any area which may be made impassable along the route should be reconnoitered for bypass routes.
Air Defense
The Stinger team will position itself to protect the DLIC. The team must remain mobile. During reconnaissance, it must identify on order firing locations in case the DLIC is engaged by hostile aircraft during its move to the rear. Early warning to the DLIC must be made possible over the command net.
Combat Service Support
Except for those vehicles assigned to the DLIC for support, the remainder of the company combat trains will move to the rear AA or their next support position. This will free the routes of egress from possible clutter during the operation. Also, the 1SG will ensure that the company has completed all SOP and precombat checks and that it is prepared and supplied for the impending mission.
Command and Control
During the rehearsal, the commander will ensure that each member of the orders group understands his responsibilities with respect to the mission. In particular, he will rehearse with the DLIC commander to verify that the DLIC will be prepared to conduct a delay in the event of an enemy attack and warn the main body of the company. The commander must identify locations along the route where he can monitor the progress of the movement. If a rearward passage with a covering force is part of the operation, the XO will finalize coordination with that force.
Execution
Intelligence
Upon receiving the signal, the company will begin its withdrawal. Artillery tired by the higher headquarters, combined with night movement, should mask the movement from enemy detection. The DLIC will scan its sector to monitor enemy activities.
Maneuver
The platoons will move to positions of relative safety, where they will conduct a road movement to their destination. If the DLIC remains under the company's control, the commander will signal to the DLIC commander to execute his displacement. Close-in artillery fires and smoke will mask the movement from enemy observation. At this time, however, the enemy may attempt to reestablish contact with the DLIC. Therefore, it is imperative that the DLIC move quickly, stopping only long enough to execute reserve demolitions. The DLIC may be assisted in disengaging by an overwatch element.
Fire Support
The artillery will be used initially as part of the deception plan. It will then cover the displacement of the DLIC, assisting in its disengagement from the enemy. FPF and smoke, targeted on obstacles, will effectively prevent the enemy from engaging or maintaining contact with the withdrawing force. The combination of smoke and dust will make night-sight detection impossible.
Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability
Well-sited obstacles will help prevent the enemy form maintaining contact with the withdrawing force. This will give the withdrawing force a mobility advantage over the enemy, allowing the company to disengage. Reserve demolition guards may be positioned along the route. As the last vehicle crosses over the unexecuted target, the target is fired and the unit continues the withdrawal.
Air Defense
The Stinger team wilt remain in position until the DLIC displaces. While on the move, the team will continue to observe the air for approaching hostile aircraft. Monitoring the air defense early warning net, it will have early warning of approaching enemy aircraft and will be able to warn the company. Because he will have to dismount to engage, the Stinger gunner must engage enemy aircraft when he is not vulnerable to direct fire.
Combat Service Support
The combat trains will already be either moving to the rear or located at the next position before the start of the withdrawal. They will be ready to receive wounded personnel and damaged equipment. An ambulance from the battalion combat trains may be brought forward in support if the company medics accompany the DLIC. The 1SG will ensure that all necessary resupply is executed.
Command and Control
The company commander will divide his attention between the execution of the main body's withdrawal and the movement of the DLIC. Specifically, he will ensure that the DLIC does not remain forward any longer than it has to, due to its limited combat power. The commander will position himself where he can overwatch both the withdrawal of the main body and the DLIC. If a rearward passage of lines must be conducted at the end of the operation, he will report when all of the company elements have completed passage, handing the battle over to the stationary force. From there, he will join the force in preparation for its new mission.
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