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CHAPTER 5

Security and Terrain Management

CONTENTS RESPONSIBILITIES SECURITY ORGANIZATION COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE THREAT LEVELS DEFENSE OPERATIONS BASE OPERATIONS BASE CLUSTER OPERATIONS TRAINING TERRAIN MANAGEMENT AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

 

RESPONSIBILITIES

Commanders fight throughout the depth of the battlefield. Operations in the rear include efforts to--

• Secure and support the force.
• Neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear.
• Ensure freedom of action in deep and close operations.

The division commander is responsible for rear operations within the division boundaries. The keys to rear operations are sound planning, early warning, continuous operations security (OPSEC), and rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat. Rear operations are a part of the division's overall operations. The division commander ensures that battle planning includes considerations for deep, close, and rear operations. The G3 includes detailed operational planning for the entire rear area. The division commander typically designates the ADC-S as the division rear operations commander.

The Rear Operations Commander (ROC) exercises C2 through the division rear CP. This CP collocates with the DISCOM CP for Class I and HSS support. Collocation also facilitates local security and support coordination. From the rear CP, the ROC coordinates support of current operations and prepares for future operations. He manages terrain and security for all units currently residing in or moving into or through the division rear area. The division rear CP monitors the battle and is staffed for continuous operations. It is prepared to assume control of the fight if the TAC CP and the division main CP can no longer function.

The rear CP consists of the headquarters, operations, and CSS cells. The ROC is in the headquarters cell. The operations cell plans and controls terrain management, security, and operations in the division rear. Responsibilities include--

• Securing rear areas and facilities.
• Minimizing enemy interference with command, control, and communications.
• Minimizing disruption of CS and CSS forward.
• Providing unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear.
• Providing continuous support to deep, close, and rear operations.
• Finding, fixing, and destroying enemy incursions in the rear area.
• Providing area damage control (ADC) before, during, and after an attack or incident.

The CSS cell is responsible for logistics planning. It works closely with the DISCOM commander and staff. More information on the division rear CP is in FM 71-100.

Typically, the ROC designates the DISCOM commander as the base cluster commander for the DSA. The ROC coordinates with the DISCOM commander to plan and to implement rear operations in the DSA.

The division rear CP controls terrain in the entire division rear. The DISCOM commander is responsible for security and terrain management in the DSA.

All ground units entering the division area report to the division rear CP that is collocated with the DISCOM CP. They coordinate routes, terrain, communications, and CSS. The division rear CP contacts the main CP to confirm operational aspects of the coordination.

The maneuver brigade commander is responsible for rear operations throughout the brigade area. The FSB commander is responsible for security and terrain management only within the BSA. METT-T and the division commander's intent, however, may require the FSB to perform additional rear operations functions. In such cases, the brigade or division commander may allocate additional resources to the FSB. All ground units entering the BSA report to the brigade rear CP that is collocated with the FSB CF. They coordinate routes, terrain, communications, and CSS. The brigade rear CP contacts the brigade main CP to confirm operational aspects of the coordination.

SECURITY

Security operations enable the DISCOM to perform its foremost rear operations function--support. Each unit in the DSA and BSA provides its own local security. All units except medical companies assist in the security of the DSA or BSA. DISCOM, MSB, FSB, and ASB commanders ensure that their units are proficient in basic tactical skills.

ORGANIZATION

To enhance support operations, the DISCOM commander often groups DISCOM elements together. Elements are grouped into bases and base clusters for mutual support. The ROC is responsible for the composition of bases and base clusters in the division rear. The R0C ensures units selected for collocation complement each other. A viable base requires a mix of weapon systems, adequate planning and supervisory personnel, and varied communications assets.

The ROC designates certain bases or clusters as critical. These include groups that contain most of a class of supply or service. Examples include--

• Nuclear or chemical ammunition storage sites.
• Ammunition or fuel storage sites.
• Command and control headquarters.
• Critical communications nodes.

At the same time, the ROC assesses each base for its vulnerability. Vulnerability depends on the base's location, composition, relative target value, and defensive capabilities. The ROC allocates resources to protect the most critical assets first.

BASES

A base is a geographically small, defensible area. It has a contiguous perimeter and established access controls. Frequently, a DISCOM company constitutes a base. The base commander is the senior unit commander when more than one unit is in the base.

Selection of the base commander is determined, not only by rank, but also by branch and experience. The medical company commander does not command a base or a base cluster with nonmedical units.

The base commander establishes a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) to operate 24 hours a day. The BDOC is formed from the staff of the base commander. If the units occupying the base are less than battalion size, the base commander draws personnel and equipment from his own and from tenant units to form a BDOC. The base commander situates and configures the base to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. The support mission and security are considered when positioning the base. Additional considerations include--

• Dispersion.
• Cover and concealment.
• Proximity to supported units.
• Security and defense capabilities.
• Communications.
• Enemy avenues of approach.
• Possible landing zones/drop zones (LZs/DZs).

The base commander prepares sketches of the area. These include the traffic circulation plan, observation posts (OPs) and LPs, motor pools, and physical details of the base defense plan. Sketches also show locations and directions of fire for any crew-served weapons. Weapon systems in the DSA or BSA for repair are integrated into the base defense plan.

BASE CLUSTERS

Base clusters contain several bases grouped together to enhance security and mission accomplishment. A base cluster does not have a defined perimeter or established access points. Base clusters rely on mutual support among bases for protection. Mutual support is achieved through interlocking fires, integrated patrol and surveillance plans, and the use of base cluster reaction forces. The base cluster commander designates the personnel in the reaction forces. He ensures that they have sufficient weapons, mobility, and communications. Reaction forces train to react quickly and appropriately.

If the DISCOM commander is a base cluster commander, he establishes a Base Cluster Operations Center (BCOC) with assets primarily from the DISCOM S2/S3 section. He also designates an alternate BCOC. The MSB CP is an option. The S2/S3 section of the FSB is the BCOC for the BSA. Alternate BCOC possibilities include the FSB company CPs. The BCOC is the C2 cell for base cluster operations. The DSA BCOC interfaces with the division rear CP on terrain management, movement requirements, and security operations. Each base sends a representative to staff meetings. In addition, the BCOC issues a situation report twice daily on a regular basis. The report provides intelligence updates, reporting requirements, and impending movement orders. The base cluster commander integrates base defense plans into a base cluster defense plan.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications for security are conducted by wire, radio, signals, and personal contact. The primary means is wire. Each base is linked tot he BCOC by wire. The BCOC operates a switchboard 24 hours a day. Wire communications in a rear operations environment are preplanned. Responsibilities for the laying of wire form companies to the BCOC are not necessarily based on the doctrine of higher to lower. Planning takes into consideration the unit's capability to perform this mission. The work load is delegated accordingly. Ideally, the DISCOM also operates a separate rear operations radio net. However, availability of radios may not permit this. Therefore, if wire communications are lost, units monitor the DISCOM command/operations net, which serves as the BCOC radio net. If communications by these means are lost, the tenant activities send a messenger to the BCOC.

In addition, units in the DSA and BSA do not rely on wire and FM communications to relay alert status. Too much time passes before every soldier receives the message. The ROC specifies in an SOP recognizable, easy-to-initiate signals. For example, the warning for an NBC attack could be a metal-on-metal signal. This can be relayed quickly by voice, hand and arm movements, or horn blasts. Detailed information and instructions follow by radio, wire, or messenger. The all-clear signal is passed only via command channels.

INTELLIGENCE

Though the division rear CP coordinates rear operations in the division, the DISCOM, MSB, and FSB headquarters are involved in intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for two reasons:

• The information is valuable in support planning, and commanders are responsible for the security of their units.
• Intelligence information is also essential for battlefield deception operations.

Essentials of IPB are briefly discussed here. Detailed information on IPB is in FM 34-130.

TERRAIN

DISCOM and subordinate commanders know what possibilities the terrain offers to both friendly and enemy forces. This analysis is vital to DISCOM units due to limited availability of personnel and weapons. DISCOM, MSB, and FSB commanders rely heavily on the division rear CP for terrain analysis. A DS terrain team provides information to the G2 for IPB. The G2 passes it to the brigades and to the DISCOM headquarters. After review and modification for level of detail, DISCOM headquarters passes it to the MSB and FSBs.

Intelligence gatherers use observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA) to analyze terrain.

Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is protection from effects of fire. In built-up areas, DISCOM elements occupy buildings to maximize cover and concealment and reduce heat signatures. Planners also consider the surrounding roadnet for support and security operations.

Obstacles are natural and man-made features that stop, impede, or divert movement. To ensure freedom of movement for friendly forces, DISCOM planners know all existing obstacles. They also consider the effects of removing, overcoming, or bypassing them. The effects of weather on trafficability also act as an obstacle.

Any feature providing a tactical advantage is key terrain. Whether a particular feature is key or not varies with the tactical situation. However, commanders consider the following as possible key terrain:

• Bridges.
• Fording sites.
• High ground.
• Choke points.
• Road junctions.

Avenues of approach are ground and air routes by which a force may reach an objective or key feature. Considerations for avenues of approach in the rear are their capabilities to support movement and to allow rapid enemy movement into the rear.

WEATHER

Weather affects mobility and the functioning of virtually all items of equipment. It also affects personnel performance. Planners consider terrain and weather concurrently. DISCOM planners depend on the division rear CP for weather analysis. The six aspects of weather that affect planning are temperature, humidity, precipitation, wind, clouds, and visibility. Inadequate preparation and training for extreme temperatures increases susceptibility to personnel injury and premature equipment failure. Cooler temperatures combined with high humidity cause fog.

Precipitation affects mobility, visibility, and the effectiveness of personnel and equipment. It also affects the quality of some stored materiel. DISCOM planners consider precipitation of more than 0.1 inch per hour or 2 inches in 12 hours critical. Six inches of snow accumulation or drifts higher than 2 feet severely affect mobility.

Wind usually favors the upwind force. It blows dust, smoke, sand, rain, or snow on the downwind force. It affects employment of NBC munitions, smoke, and conventional weapons.

Clouds affect air operations. These include logistics air missions, our own close air support, and the enemy's ability to conduct airborne or air assault operations.

Poor visibility limits employment of airborne forces. Special-purpose force operations often rely on it to reduce the effectiveness of rear area security. Poor visibility hinders control and reduces effectiveness of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

THREAT EVALUATION AND INTEGRATION

Threat evaluation is a detailed study of enemy forces. It considers threat organization, tactical doctrine, equipment, and support systems. The DISCOM's primary interest for security purposes is in rear area threat evaluation. In coordination with the division rear CP, the DISCOM S2/S3 prepares a doctrinal template. This reflects the enemy's air assault, airborne, operational maneuver group, and special-purpose force employment doctrine. The DISCOM maintains a situation map of enemy and friendly forces along the FLOT. An unconventional warfare situation map and population status overlay depict other rear area threats. These include insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, agents, and potential civil unrest. The situation map shows probable operating areas, headquarters, encampments, and movement routes for unconventional forces. The rear area population status overlay shows areas with a high potential for civil unrest or concentrations of enemy sympathizers. The overlay also shows locations where psychological operations are effective.

The DISCOM passes any information on the threat to the division rear CP. Sources of information include local authorities, local civilians, and displaced civilians. Information obtained from base commanders in the DSA and BSA, MPs, truck drivers, customers, and any other elements moving into the area is used. Specific areas of interest include--

• Landing zones and drop zones.
• Key road junctions.
• Forest paths.
• Small groups of individuals attempting to move through or evade detection.
• Guerrilla and insurgency sites.
• Terrorist operating areas.

Intelligence analysts integrate the threat evaluation with weather and terrain factors. They determine how the threat is likely to operate in the rear area. They pass relevant information to the DISCOM.

THREAT LEVELS

Base cluster commanders ensure all base commanders understand the different threat levels and the associated actions. The ROC must keep in mind that DISCOM units are neither staffed nor equipped to continue support operations at normal levels while responding to increased levels of threat. Degradation of support depends on the threat level.

Base or base cluster self-defense measures defeat Level I threats. Level I threats involve the activities of agents, saboteurs, and terrorists. Typical actions the base cluster commander requires include--

• Manning OPs fully.
• Increasing guards and spot-checking vehicles.
• Tightening base security.
• Alerting defensive perimeter personnel.
• Increasing protection of key facilities.

Level II threats are those beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. Response forces, normally MPs with supporting fires, defeat Level II threats. They involve--

• Diversionary and sabotage operations by unconventional forces.
• Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations by small combat units.

The base cluster commander requires strictly controlled access to all areas, reinforcement of the defense assets, and preparation for withdrawal form Ops. He also alerts the reaction force.

A tactical combat force is required to defeat a Level III threat. Level III threats involve--

• Heliborne operations.
• Airborne operations.
• Amphibious operations.
• Penetration by enemy forces from the main battle area.

Artillery or air strikes normally precede such enemy operations. The base cluster commander withdraws OPs, commits reaction forces, notifies the DISCOM S2/S3, and curtails support operations.

DEFENSE OPERATIONS

DISCOM units form base defense perimeters to defend against the threat. When enemy forces exceed base and base cluster defense capabilities, response forces provide the initial force to close with and destroy the enemy.

Responsiveness is a key to defeating enemy incursions in the DSA and BSA. This involves the immediate deployment of sufficient combat power to destroy the enemy and minimize damage.

Responsiveness is achieved through--

• Effective C2
• Reliable communications.
• Accurate intelligence.
• Centralized planning by BCOC but decentralized execution.
• Organic mobility of response force (this is a special challenge in the light infantry division [LID]) with its limited transportation assets).
• Training and rehearsals.
• Accurate assessment of the defensive capabilities of DSA and BSA bases; the assessment is based on their degree of exposure and their importance to division support operations.

BASE OPERATIONS

The elements in the DSA and BSA are organized into bases for self-defense. Normally, each company in the DSA and BSA constitutes a base. The base cluster commander organizes miscellaneous small teams into bases. The base commander is responsible for preparing the base defense plan. He also coordinates with the base cluster commander. The base commander trains all personnel in basic defensive techniques. He develops a reaction force for internal security and reinforcement of the base. Each base is capable of defending itself against a Level I threat. It can also delay a Level II threat until a response force arrives. If the base is faced with a Level III threat, it takes action to--

• Prevent critical supplies and equipment from falling into enemy hands.
• Defend itself as long as possible.
• Avoid capture.

Base commanders are responsible for the following:

• Coordinating with bases on each side to plan mutually supporting fires and to avoid fratricide; conflicts are resolved by the base cluster commander.
• Ensuring each individual is assigned a fighting position.
• Configuring positions to provide for interlocking sectors of fire.
• Ensuring proper individual fighting positions are prepared in accordance with FM 5-103.
• Deploying crew-served weapons covering the most likely high-speed avenues of approach in accordance with FM 5-103.
• Ensuring each weapon has two adequate range cards; submitting one card to the base cluster commander.
• Identifying target reference points to direct fire against approaching ground or air enemy forces.
• Deploying all weapon-carrying vehicles on the base perimeter. This includes vehicles in the DSA or BSA for repair. Weapons that can be dismounted may be of more value to the defense dismounted and dug-in.
• Ensuring vehicles are properly positioned; using natural cover and concealment.
• Setting up overlapping OPs and LPs that provide a good view of the sector. Both the OPs/LPs and routes to them should provide cover and concealment. They should not be in positions that attract attention or on the very peaks of hills where positions are silhouetted. Further guidance on OPs/LPs is in FMs 17-98 and 19-4.
• Establishing patrols.
• Enforcing noise and light discipline.
• Ensuring proper camouflage is used (see FMs 5-20 and 8-10).
• Planning and establishing hasty obstacles.
• Creating a base reaction force to respond immediately against a threat to the base.
• Ensuring soldiers know alert signals and proper responses to artillery and air attacks.
• Preparing sector sketches and providing them to the base cluster commander. These are updated at regular base cluster meetings. Sketches include major terrain features, weapon positions, and OP/LP positions.
• Coordinating fire support with the division rear CP. The FSO at the rear CP establishes what type of fire support is available and specifies communications means.
• Ensuring that hazardous wastes are labeled, stored, and disposed of properly.
• Preventing unnecessary damage to local ecosystems and the environment.

An effective base defense system accomplishes the following four tasks:

• Security of the base. Each commander applies METT-T analysis to determine defensive requirements. If an attack is unlikely, defensive operations involve fewer people. Only LPs, OPs, and access points are manned. If a threat is probable, defensive requirements disrupt support operations.
• Detection. Detection involves communications, intelligence, radar, chemical and radiological monitoring, and sensor equipment to provide early warning of enemy infiltration. All personnel must understand warning systems and procedures. Alarms notify personnel of alert postures. Warning devices include sirens, pyrotechnics, and horns.
• Delay. The defensive system slows the enemy's progress in order to allow reaction forces to react. Obstacles covered by direct or indirect fires slow or canalize movement. The ROC can, with G3 approval, authorize mine emplacement in the division rear. He coordinates a proposed minefield with adjacent, higher, and subordinate units. He also ensures that limitations to friendly maneuvers are minimized. He makes sure all requirements for reporting, marking, and recording are met.
• Survival. If the threat exceeds the base's capability, the base may not prevent breach of the perimeter. Evacuation of critical units is described in a save plan and rehearsed for emergencies. The save plan can be initiated without any direct physical contact with the enemy. Its use is keyed to events. Examples include a heliborne assault into a nearby LZ or enemy breakthrough of the FLOT.

SUPPLY POINT BASES

Support units are least capable of self-defense. They are often the targets of enemy action. Time and effort spent on defensive operations degrade the performance of their primary mission. Natural berms, deep-cut protective positions, natural terrain concealment, and camouflage nets protect fuel tanks. Personnel protect Class I, III, and V items in deep-cut trenches if time allows. Traffic control conceals movement at, to, and from supply points. At water points, spills are controlled to avoid standing pools of water, which reflect light.

MAINTENANCE FACILITY BASES

In the base shop area, personnel prepare individual positions near billeting areas and on the periphery of work stations. They construct simple cut-and-cover or other expedient shelters next to key shop facilities. These provide quick protection from artillery and air attacks. They integrate weapon systems on vehicles in the DSA or BSA shop for repair into the base defense plan.

CLEARING STATION BASES

Medical personnel require shelters with adequate overhead cover. This allows treatment to continue during hostilities. Although a direct attack on HSS assets is unlikely, the commander does not rule out this action. Enemy actions disrupt HSS operations by interdicting evacuation routes, destroying bridges, and sabotaging supplies. The enemy may damage or destroy HSS assets because of their proximity to other rear area targets. Dispersion of HSS assets, within the limits of the tactical situation, becomes a vital consideration. HSS leaders dispatch treatment and evacuation assets to support the tactical mission.

Security plans do not require medical units to fire on enemy troops except as the result of direct attack on medical units. Medical units do not fire to support adjacent units unless the enemy directly threatens medical units. Medical unit personnel do not man the perimeter defense of nonmedical elements. These include unit trains, logistics areas, or base clusters. Such action causes the loss of protected status. FM 8-10 has additional information.

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY BASE

Rear operations that impact most on transportation units are the assembly and movement of reserves and the relocation of units. Deployment routes should offer concealment from observation. Supply personnel disperse supply storage areas and move them frequently. Strict traffic regulation and control are essential.

Dispersion of vehicles is essential. A 50-foot dispersion between vehicles and facilities offers some protection against loss from mortar and artillery fire. A dispersion of 150 feet between vehicles and facilities reduces their being targeted by hostile air attack. Alternate exits are selected and marked for emergency use. When authorized, roadblocks are constructed. Antivehicular and antitank mines are placed on likely avenues of approach. Trucks and facilities are camouflaged with natural vegetation or screening systems. Vehicle tracks going into the area are concealed. Vehicle tracks going into unoccupied areas are made to deceive the enemy. As transportation commitments increase, the number of personnel needed to man the perimeter decreases.

BASE CLUSTER OPERATIONS

The base cluster commander integrates base defense plans into a single plan. This requires development of a rear operations communications system and coordination with field artillery, engineer, ADA, signal, and MP representatives through the divisional brigade rear CP.

The base cluster commander assigns a defensive position and a sector to each base. He gives bases located on likely enemy avenues of approach a smaller sector. The base cluster commander ensures that sectors of fire overlap. When interlocking fires are not possible between bases, he plans other defensive measures. He covers gaps by emplacing minefield and obstacles, patrols, OPs, and sensors. He coordinates this planning with each base to avoid fratricide.

The base cluster commander keeps a sketch of the defensive plan. It shows--

• Base sectors of fire.
• Locations of mines and obstacles.
• Planned indirect-fire coverage.
• OPs.
• Patrol routes.
• Positions of key weapons.

Whenever possible, units occupy the same location within the DSA or BSA relative to other units every time the DSA or BSA moves. They build a habitual relationship with the units on all sides of them. This expedites coordination of sectors of fire. Details on sector defense planning are in FM 19-4.

The base cluster commander plans for a reaction force from assets in the cluster. This force is called when a base's defenses may be overwhelmed and combat forces are not available. The reaction force includes personnel, vehicles, weapons, and radios. It is well-rehearsed to react precisely and immediately. It plans rally points and practices detailed procedures in advance, such as lanes of movement to various points on the perimeter. The DISCOM commander submits the base cluster defense plan and indirect-fire support plans to the division rear CP for review and approval.

The base cluster commander determines the level of threat (both ground and air) and issues prearranged alerts to all bases. The base cluster commander also plans emergency move procedures. These are implemented if the DSA/BSA is under imminent danger from a Level II or III threat. The base cluster commander designates key elements in advance and ensures they are prepared to move to a predesignated site with minimum notice. Key elements include--

• The command section.
• Key battalion staff elements.
• Critical supply elements.
• Emergency medical treatment elements.
• Austere maintenance elements.

Troops perform emergency destruction of equipment and supplies (excluding Class VIII) to avoid enemy capture. Priority items for destruction include COMSEC items, fuel, ammunition, vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons.

Other duties of the base cluster commander are to identify primary and secondary entry points into the DSA or BSA and to designate landing zones for reaction forces. The base cluster commander also conducts regular (preferably daily) meetings with base representatives to update the defensive plan.

TRAINING

DISCOM personnel are trained in defense principles and techniques. Training includes--

• Use of organic weapons.
• Communications procedures.
• Emplacement and monitoring of ground sensors.
• Preparation of defensive positions.
• Fire support coordination.
• NBC defense measures.

STP 21-24-SMCT provides more information.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

All personnel take part in base defense operations. Some require refresher training in the following areas:

• Preparation of individual fighting positions.
• Camouflage, cover, and concealment.
• Patrols and operation of roadblocks and checkpoints.
• Limited visibility operations.
• Cross training on individual and crew-served weapons and supporting equipment available in the unit.
• Marksmanship, especially night firing, and the preparation of range cards.
• LP and OP operations. Emphasis is on security, sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.
• Emplacement and maintenance of special observation and detection devices. These include sensors, flares, and remotely employed sensors.
• Cross training in all communications equipment available in the unit.
• Construction of obstacles.
• Use of rally points.
• Use of individual and crew-served weapons in an air defense role.
• OPSEC.
• Identification of threat vehicles and equipment.
• Spot reports using SALUTE format.
• Fire support requests, coordination, and adjustment.
• Target engagement and designation techniques.
• Identification, marking, and neutralization of minefield.
• Employment of mines and expedient defensive measures.
• NBC defense measures.

UNIT TRAINING

Unit training focuses on rehearsal of base defense plans, continuation of the support mission under limited attack, and full occupation of defensive positions. The DISCOM/FSB asks the division/brigade rear CP for training support from combat units for tactical training. MI units provide OPSEC training.

Rehearsals include--

• Manning of defensive positions.
• Commitment of reaction forces.
• Coordination of supporting fires.
• Coordination with adjacent bases.
• Rearward movement of enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
• Integration of external support by MPs and the tactical combat force.

BDOC and BCOC exercises also train leaders to exercise fire support coordination and test communications. They also exercise coordination among bases, base clusters, and the division rear CP. Rehearsals are conducted at day and night and in various weather conditions.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

DISCOM units have unique terrain requirements. They locate adjacently to established air, road, rail, and, often, water lines of communications (LOC). Their position simplifies the receipt of supplies and materiel from higher echelons, the movement of these supplies forward to the main battle area, and the evacuation, repair, and return of damaged equipment. Terrain also affects mission effectiveness. A maintenance unit located in a built-up area with adequate power, hardstand, and civilian resources is more efficient than one located in a forest with soft soil. The DISCOM S2/S3 and the planners in the rear CP CSS cell must be familiar with the terrain needs of DISCOM units. The terrain managers integrate DISCOM mission considerations with security, environmental, and movement considerations.

The DISCOM establishes a DSA as a base of logistics and HSS operations for the division. The DSA is typically an area occupied by the DISCOM CP and the MSB. This area also contains combat, CS, and COSCOM elements operating in support of the division.

Planners locate the DSA between the division rear and the rear boundaries of the forward deployed brigades. They position it next to the airhead or the beachhead and main supply routes (MSRs). It is normally 50 to 60 kilometers from the FLOT. The DISCOM commander, the ADC-S, G3, and G4 determine the specific location. They consider--

• Ability to support tactical plans.
• Location of echelons above division (EAD) CSS units.
• Availability of roads and their capability to handle heavy traffic.
• Capacity for defense.
• Terrain.
• Ability of the area to accommodate expansion.

The following DISCOM elements typically operate from the DSA:

• DISCOM HHC and DMMC.
• MSB HSC.
• MSB medical company.
• MSB maintenance company.
• Transportation motor transport company.

Some elements always locate in the DSA. An example is the division rear CP. Others move in and out of the DSA depending on METT-T. Examples are the division MI elements and chemical company elements.

The base of logistics and HSS operations for the maneuver brigade is the BSA. It is normally 25 to 30 kilometers from the FLOT. The brigade S3 selects the general location or sector of the BSA. He bases his decision on the tactical scenario and the recommendation of the FSB commander and the brigade S4. They consider--

• Availability of LOC capable of supporting the operation.
• Capability of roads to handle heavy traffic in bad weather.
• Concealed areas for parking vehicles.
• Accessibility to air support assets.
• Ease of defense.
• Distance from enemy artillery.

The DISCOM commander may choose to crosslevel assets between FSBs or send additional assets from the DSA forward. Although the FSB is based in the BSA, commanders position elements on the battlefield to maximize support. For example, some ambulances forward-deploy at ambulance exchange points (AXPs), ambulance shuttle relay points, or battalion aid stations (BASs).

Elements in the BSA vary with a number of factors. The brigade troop list identifies the division units in the brigade area. The following list is an example of division elements that locate in the BSA:

• FSB CP.
• Brigade rear CP.
• FSB HSC CP.
• Class I point.
• Water point operated by MSB personnel.
• Class III point.
• Class II, III (packaged), IV, and VII point.
• ATP.
• Salvage collection point.
• Mortuary affairs collection point.
• Forward support maintenance company CP.
• Maintenance shops.
• Class IX point.
• Forward support medical company CP.
• Division clearing station.
• Class VIII point.
• MP platoon.
• EPW collection point.
• MI team.
• ADA element.
• Engineer company headquarters.
• Signal platoon elements.
• Field artillery battalion field trains.
• Maneuver battalion task force field trains.

The FSB commander expects a number of corps elements to operate in the brigade area. Examples are a corps artillery unit and chemical and nondivisional engineer units. COSCOM elements may augment the FSB to support these units. Some BSA tenants always locate in the BSA. Examples are the brigade rear CP and the FSB headquarters. Others move in and out of the BSA depending on METT-T. Examples are the division MI elements and the decontamination platoon.

Locations of DISCOM elements in the DSA and BSA vary depending on METT-T. General guidelines for positioning DISCOM elements in the DSA and BSA include the following:

• Position the DISCOM CP/division rear CP near the center of the DSA for C2 and security reasons. Position the FSB CP/brigade rear CP near the center of the BSA for the same reasons.
• Balance the advantages of dispersion (reduced destruction from a single enemy strike) with the disadvantages (C2 constraints and extended perimeter). Normally, the DSA occupies an area approximately 3 to 5 kilometers in diameter; the BSA, approximately 2 kilometers.
• Make supply points accessible to both customers and transportation assets replenishing the supply points.
• Locate supply points near drop zones or landing zones. This reduces the requirement for surface movement to distribute supplies.
• Keep the Class III point away from other supplies to prevent contamination. Locate it downstream from the water point or as far away as possible from a water point on a lake. Ensure that spill containment plans adequately protect the local environment and any necessary cleanup is accomplished rapidly.
• Position mortuary affairs and salvage points near the MSR (possibly in the vicinity of the ATP).

This helps maximize backhaul missions of transportation assets. It also provides a quick turnaround for corps vehicles. Salvage points should also relocated as far away from water sources as possible. Salvage point managers must pay particular attention to safeguarding against leakage, seepage, and spills from damaged equipment.

• Locate the Class I point near the water point when water points are established in the DSA or BSA and water sources allow.
• Locate medical clearing stations away from likely target areas (ATP, Class III point, bridges road junctions). However, they should be near evacuation routes and an open area for landing air ambulances.
• Locate maintenance sites so they are on firm ground and accessible to customers and recovery and evacuation vehicles and downstream from water sources. Maintenance managers must pay particular attention to safeguarding against leakage, seepage, and spills from equipment. They must also plan for proper storage and disposal of waste petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) products and other hazardous materials; for example, batteries.
• Position units with heaviest firepower along the most threatening avenues of approach.

The elements in the DSA and BSA do not remain static. The DISCOM tracks and controls changes. All ground units entering or moving through the division rear area coordinate with the division rear CP. All ground units entering or moving through the brigade rear area coordinate with the brigade rear CP. They coordinate movement routes, positioning, communications requirements and procedures, and security responsibilities. Base commanders notify the BCOC of all support vehicle arrivals and departures. Movement of displaced and local civilians is also controlled.

Special considerations apply to locating a clearing station. There are three possibilities. First, the clearing station may locate near the center of the DSA or BSA. There, surrounding bases can protect it. This increases the size of the DSA and BSA without adding defenders. This also increases traffic movement in the middle of the DSA and BSA. A second option is to assign a sector of the DSA or BSA defense to the medical company. Medical personnel can carry individual small arms for their own defense and the defense of patients in their charge. However, the duty of medical personnel is to care for the sick, wounded, and injured. They may not operate crew-served weapons. Any defense sector assigned to the medical company could have no such weapons. The final option is to locate the clearing station away from the rest of the DSA and BSA. It is then essentially protected by the enemy's compliance with the Geneva Convention. In view of the medical company's mission and the constant coordination required with DISCOM elements, this option is not usually feasible. Regardless of the option chosen, security plans do not require medical personnel to take offensive action against the enemy. The Geneva Convention states that captured medical personnel exclusively engaged in caring for the sick and wounded or administering medical units are classified as retained personnel.

Determination of the enemy intent through intelligence gathering determines whether or not to employ the Red Cross. If the enemy respects the Red Cross, establishment of a clearing station within the BSA and adjacent to lucrative, legitimate targets is a hazard to the medical facility. It is more prudent to move the forward support medical company some distance from the BSA, fly the Red Cross, and openly declare its presence. When operating in a lodgment area, displaying the Red Cross is a standard procedure.

If operations are pushed forward with the intent of denying the enemy any knowledge of the division's AO, exposure of the medical unit alerts the enemy of a tactical unit's presence. Under these conditions, the medical company operates in stealth. It may be more prudent to disassociate the FSB medical company from the BSA and hide it in a separate location. When hostilities begin, the Red Cross may be displayed without compromising the location of the BSA. At times, the intent of the enemy toward the Red Cross is unknown or is known to be one of no respect.

Then hiding the medical company within the BSA is the best course of action. Personnel do not mark medical treatment facilities (MTFs) and use camouflage concurrently. FM 8-10 has a detailed discussion of camouflaging medical facilities, vehicles, and aircraft on the ground.

AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

Area damage control within the rear area is a responsibility of the ROC. He is responsible for ADC plans and activities to reduce the effects of enemy attack or natural disaster on units within the division rear. The ROC places priority on actions preventing or reducing the interruption of logistics and HSS operations. He considers the effect of diverting DISCOM elements to ADC tasks. When ADC assets are available, the division rear CP provides each base with external support to overcome an attack and return to its primary mission.

Effective planning, setting specific responsibilities, and using all available assets to conduct ADC help restore operations and provide continuous support. ADC assets are limited; in emergencies, they are diverted from other missions. In most cases, bases use local assets to deal with the situation.

Effective damage control is decentralized and executed at the lowest level. DSA and BSA base commanders assess their ADC capabilities by identifying all assets available within the base. Assets include medical evacuation and treatment elements, equipment evacuation and repair, critical supply, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. DSA and BSA base commanders and the DISCOM commander identify critical support points, including points that are the sole local sources of supplies. They implement ideas and initiatives to minimize damage. Commanders coordinate with host nation assets, MPs, and engineer units through the division rear CP. ADC plans are included in the BDOC and BCOC defense plans.

With DISCOM assistance, the division rear CP reviews all division rear base cluster defense plans. It ensures ADC plans are adequate and compatible. The DISCOM S2/S3 helps the division rear CP identify emergency food, clothing, water, and fuel sources and determine available distribution assets.

In accordance with ADC guidelines, bases in the rear area complete the following tasks before an incident occurs:

• Designating specific individuals and units to perform ADC operations.
• Attempting to disperse and harden units and facilities to minimize damage, using existing structures when practical; establishing priorities within the area of operations; identifying those critical facilities requiring protection; prioritizing responsibilities based on the commander's directives; reporting critical facilities not provided necessary ADC support immediately.
• Preparing, coordinating, and rehearsing ADC plans and SOPs; organizing, equipping, and training personnel and units for ADC operations.
• Designating alternate operational sites or alert areas; ensuring a distribution of support exists in the rear area when possible; reporting facilities or supply points that are sole-source facilities.

Bases in the rear area complete the following tasks during and after an incident:

• Conducting an immediate assessment of damage; ensuring the information is reported to the ROC; simultaneously initiating actions to isolate danger areas and to prevent extension or continuation of the damage (for example, fighting fires, stopping gas leaks, minimizing flooding).
• Preventing fires by bunkering and isolating flammable material and explosives; fighting existing fires with stored water or identified water sources. Fire fighting is primarily a unit responsibility with support from engineer fire fighter teams where available. Local fire fighting capabilities, such as HNS or the acquisition of commercial material to support ad hoc fire fighting teams, are options.
• Performing self/buddy first aid and transporting casualties. If possible, medical personnel and vehicles are used to evacuate patients. The use of nonmedical vehicles is required in mass casualty situations. If possible, medical personnel accompany those patients being transported in nonmedical vehicles and provide patient care en route.
• Coordinating with the military police to provide traffic control; ensuring fire fighting equipment gains access to the area and ambulances and evacuation vehicles clear the area. MPs notify the nearest base cluster commander of blocked routes. They divert traffic as necessary to ensure forward support is maintained and evacuation routes remain open and uncluttered with traffic. The MPs also provide refugee control, straggler control, and some local security.
• Coordinating with the engineers to support critical facilities. They construct fortifications and barriers and clear debris and rubble in support of the base ADC mission. Engineer units do not expend ADC resources to remove rubble and debris that have no bearing on mission accomplishment. Rubble and debris not affecting mission support remain as battle damage. Civil affairs units are advised of battle damage not cleared.
• Coordinating EOD support to area damage control operations with the explosive ordnance disposal control team (EODCT). Three to ten subordinate EOD detachments are allocated to each corps. If the division operates in conjunction with a corps, EOD support comes directly from the EODCT.
• Coordinating for decontamination support. Contaminated units evacuate along specific routes (not the MSR) assigned by the MCO to the appointed decontamination sites. The MPs provide route control.

Successful ADC operations require detailed planning, training, and rehearsals. The base is the cornerstone of this system. The ROC carefully weighs base priorities and provides ADC support to the bases as quickly as possible.