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Chapter 3

CSS in Full Spectrum Operations

FM 3-0 describes the doctrine of full spectrum operations as offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. This chapter discusses combat service support (CSS) to full sprectum operations. It discusses the four types of Army operations and how CSS influences these operations through its effect on operational reach and sustainability. Finally, it discusses force projection as the responsive means of getting Army forces employed in full spectrum operations. It also includes a discussion of how CSS reach operations support the force while minimizing the Army CSS footprint in the area of operations.


CSS to Offensive, Defensive, Stability,
    and Support Operations
Operational Reach and Sustainability
CSS in Force Protection
CSS Reach Operations
Intermediate Staging Base
CSS in Urban Operations
CSS to Special Operations Forces




3-1. CSS planning to support offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations requires a thorough mission analysis, careful identification of the supported force, and an understanding of the commander's intent and concept of operations. CSS planners must consider all specified and implied requirements and be aware of resources available, including those of other U.S. services, the host nation, and theater support contracting capabilities.



3-2. CSS in the offense is characterized by high-intensity operations that require anticipatory support as far forward as possible. Commanders and staffs ensure adequate support for continuing the momentum of the operation as they plan and synchronize offensive operations. Plans should include agile and flexible CSS capabilities to follow exploiting forces and continue support. Commanders and staffs plan for increased quantities of fuel and selected other classes of supply, as well as for maintenance and recovery of damaged equipment. Planners consider casualty rates and preposition medical treatment and evacuation capabilities forward to clear the battlefield efficiently. The biggest challenge to plans for supporting a rapidly moving force may be the lengthening lines of communication (LOC). Transportation support must be closely coordinated to deliver essential support to the right place at the right time. CSS assets must follow exploiting forces to ensure continuity of support. Plans for all offensive phases must enable CSS elements to react quickly to changing needs, just as total asset visibility (TAV) helps commanders quickly reprioritize assets as situations dictate.

3-3. During offensive operations, critical needs present great challenges. The most important materiel is typically Class III and Class V. Service support plans direct the movement of Class III and Class V resupply to meet predicted requirements. As advancing combat formations extend control of the area of operations (AO), personnel elements face similar challenges to reconcile and report command strength information, report casualty information, and conduct replacement operations.

3-4. Offensive operations put a high demand on maintenance elements. To continue momentum, task-organized maintenance support teams may operate with forward elements. Similarly, widely dispersed forces and longer LOC require all transportation resources, including aerial delivery assets, to deliver supplies well forward. Movement control personnel manage movement priorities in accordance with the commander's priorities.

3-5. The higher casualty rates associated with offensive operations increase the burden on medical resources. Combat support hospitals may move forward to prepare for offensive operations. If the increased numbers of casualties overwhelm medical resources, nonmedical transportation assets may be needed for evacuation. Following an offensive operation, combat stress casualties may be more prevalent and require moving combat stress teams forward.

3-6. Plans should also provide for religious support, which may become critical during offensive operations. Chaplain support through counseling and appropriate worship can help reduce combat stress, increasing unit cohesion and productivity.

3-7. Using contractors in offensive operations entails great risks. However, the force commander may be willing to accept risk and use contractors in forward areas. Contractor support outside of AOs may help minimize Army CSS force structure at locations such as intermediate staging bases (see paragraph 3-82). Chapter 5 discusses contractors in further detail.



3-8. The commander positions CSS assets to support the forces in the defense and survive. CSS requirements in the defense depend on the type of defense. For example, increased quantities of ammunition and decreased quantities of fuel characterize most area defensive operations. However, in a mobile defense, fuel usage may be a critical part of support. Barrier and fortification materiel to support the defense often has to move forward, placing increased demands on the transportation system. The maintenance effort focuses on returning primary weapon systems and critical equipment to mission capable status. Defensive operations may allow CSS assets to field services and refit degraded units. CSS planners and operators also prepare to resume support to the offensive operations projected to follow the defense.

3-9. CSS managers direct routine resupply of forecasted requirements to designated units, as stated in the service support plan. They should push Class IV directly to battle positions, when possible, and give Class V the highest priority. The increased expenditures of ammunition significantly impact transportation assets. Throughput of supplies from the echelons above division (EAD) to the lowest-level supply support activity (SSA) expedites deliveries.

3-10. The task of medical units is to triage casualties, treat and return to duty, or resuscitate and stabilize for evacuation to the next higher echelon of medical care or out of the theater of operations. Medical treatment facilities should locate away from points of possible hostile actions.

3-11. Using contractors in forward areas during defensive operations may entail unacceptable risk. If not, they may provide support in rear areas of forward deployed units.



3-12. CSS in stability operations involves supporting U.S. and multinational forces in a wide range of missions. Stability operations range from long-term CSS-focused operations in humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions to major short-notice peace enforcement missions. Some stability operations may involve combat. Tailoring CSS to the requirements of a stability operation is key to success of the overall mission. In stability operations, small task-organized CSS forces may operate far from traditional chains of command and support agencies that cannot sustain themselves. Stability operations also include large-scale operations that support peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These operations may or may not involve direct hostile action to U.S. forces and may have nearly the same CSS requirements as offensive or defensive operations. Contracted services and support may significantly augment Army CSS capabilities in major stability operations.

3-13. In addition to the movement control challenges typically presented by joint and multinational operations, large numbers of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sharing the same LOC and node facilities usually complicate movement control in stability operations. As in any major multinational operation, forces may establish a multinational movement control center to prioritize usage.

3-14. Maintenance units often have to support civilian assets as well as those of other military forces. In United Nations (UN) operations, the UN may purchase U.S. equipment for other multinational forces. In such cases, those forces may not have the capability to service the equipment. U.S. units may provide support or identify support packages. Also, the desired end state may require that maintenance support for stability operations include reestablishing or upgrading the infrastructure maintenance capabilities. This may entail providing tools and equipment.

3-15. For medical personnel, stability operations often result in more frequent and direct contact with the local population. Planners consider the mix of care-provider skills, instrument sizes, drugs, and supplies to support pediatric, geriatric, and obstetric missions. Human resource support activities (such as postal and morale, welfare, and recreation [MWR]) may have a higher priority and be a more immediate requirement during long-term stability missions than during offensive and defensive missions; long-term stability missions operate at a reduced tempo. These morale-related services become a major focus to both commanders and soldiers. Using contracted services and support may augment some CSS units. (See FM 3-07.)



3-16. CSS is often the primary focus of a support operation. Army forces often provide assistance to civil authorities and respond to national and international crises that include significant humanitarian assistance requirements best met with CSS capabilities. In many support operations, Army CSS units conduct the decisive operation. The ability of Army forces to move large amounts of equipment and supplies under adverse conditions and provide small tailored forces on short notice makes Army CSS forces a valuable asset in both domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance missions. Distributing food, water, supplies, field services, and medical support is often the primary emphasis of support operations; the Army has trained personnel and deployable assets to provide such support. Transportation, supply, and medical units are often most in demand.

3-17. The key to success in many support operations is interagency coordination. Only in the most extreme situations does the U.S. military provide relief directly to those in need. In most support operations, the U.S. military assists NGOs in providing the required support. Multinational support, host nation support, and support from NGOs may reduce the demands on transportation, medical, food, water, and housing resources. (See FM 3-07.)



3-18. Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be employed decisively (FM 3-0). The goal of the CSS effort is to enable the commander to initiate and sustain operations over time as well as extend the operational reach of the force. Operational reach relates to distance; sustainability relates to the ability of the force to conduct operations over time. The following is a discussion about how CSS influences both.

3-19. If military operations extend beyond a commander's operational reach, they reach the culminating point. In the offense, the culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker's effective combat power no longer exceeds the defender's or the attacker's momentum is no longer sustainable, or both. In the defense, the culminating point is that instant at which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of culminating point.) To avoid this, the commander may choose an intentional operational pause or a reduction in tempo. Commanders can extend operational reach by moving forces, repositioning CSS assets, and securing LOC forward.

3-20. Several of the interrelated CSS factors that affect operational reach and sustainability are the scope of support, distribution networks, sources of support, and availability of materiel. The commander may adjust any of these factors to extend operational reach or enhance sustainability, but incurs additional risk by doing so. He must do a rigorous risk analysis before adjusting factors.



3-21. The scope of support refers to the types and levels of support to provide to the force. The commander decides whether to provide all the CSS functions (and all subfunctions) or to defer certain types of support early in an operation or perform support functions at a reduced level. For example, he may defer food preparation, laundry support, and MWR in the early stages of an operation. However, the phase of the operation is just one consideration in determining what support to provide and to what standard. Other considerations include the type of operation, level of hostility, time available to prepare, expected duration of the operation, and resources available in the AO.

3-22. Adjusting the scope of support can extend operational reach and remove the need to move support assets forward. However, it has an associated risk. Deferring some functions (such as laundry or MWR) may simply result in reduced morale. However, deferring or reducing other functions (such as maintenance) has significant impacts, and the commander must carefully manage the associated risk.



3-23. The distribution network consists of the information system and physical and resource networks. It has critical effects on operational reach and sustainability. The information system network provides the means to achieve asset visibility through the flow of information among the CSS elements at all levels. The physical network consists of the capabilities of fixed structures and established facilities. It includes factories, warehouses, airfields, seaports, roads, railroads, inland waterways, pipelines, terminals, bridges and tunnels, and buildings. The capacity of the physical network defines the point of diminishing returns of resources (people and machines), influences the feasibility of courses of action, and characterizes the risk inherent in the network. For example, in seaport operations, the capacity of the port is defined in short tons that can move through the port per day. The resource network consists of the people, materiel, and machines operating within and over the physical network. It includes a mix of military and civilian organizations and equipment.

3-24. A key element of distribution management is managing the capacity of the distribution system. Enhancing its capacity can extend operational reach or sustainability. The force can employ information systems in theater to enhance those networks. Engineers to repair or construct facilities to increase the capacity of the physical network may be critically important.

3-25. The commander can deploy CSS units to the AO to operate support facilities as part of the resource network. Though each of these may extend operational reach or enhance sustainability, they also carry risks. The primary risk is a potentially larger Army CSS footprint, to the detriment of combat force capabilities. However, the risk analysis associated with this decision is complex. (See FM 100-14.) On one hand, deploying CSS assets required to enhance the distribution system causes an additional burden on strategic lift as well as adding to the overall CSS requirements in theater. On the other hand, if the distribution system cannot provide responsive distribution support, the commander must accept other mitigating actions or increased risk. (For example, he may have to increase supply stocks in the AO to compensate for decreased ability to move supplies to the AO quickly; or he may choose to accept the risk of operating without robust supply stocks or a responsive distribution system.) In any case, the operational commander has to weigh his options carefully.



3-26. The sources of support can also influence operational reach and sustainability. CSS may come from a myriad of DOD, Army, joint, multinational, contracted, and host nation support sources. Integrating CSS from all available sources maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall CSS effort. CSS personnel should always exploit all available sources based on a valid risk assessment and mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC). (FM 100-14 discusses risk assessment. When published, FM 6-0 will discuss the factors of METT-TC.)

3-27. However, adjusting sources of support through expanding contracted support also has risks. FM 3-100.21 discusses the risks associated with using contractors to provide support. Risk factors include exposing contract personnel to imminent danger in hostile environments and a possible lack of flexibility in support. Risks with relying on interagency or multinational sources may include lower reliability or varying standards of support. Solid, in-place support contracts and support agreements are critical when using contractors and multinational support.



3-28. Availability of materiel is directly related to all three of the other factors. Materiel is available to a force through accompanying stocks and resupply. Internal constraints on a force's accompanying stocks include the upload capacity of its troops and equipment, the storage capacity for materiel not uploaded, and the transportation assets available to move supplies from stockpiles to their point of employment. Enhancing resupply by improving distribution networks or capitalizing on host-nation or locally contracted support and materiel can lessen the need to deploy and establish large stockpiles in theater. Also, increasing its unit basic load (UBL) may extend a unit's operational reach and sustainability, but this may prove impractical due to limited unit storage and transportation capabilities. Normally, if a unit's UBL is increased, it needs transportation augmentation to maintain agility. The commander has to balance unit agility with the threat of disruptions in the distribution system.



3-29. The Army's ability to project power with the most capable forces at the decisive time and place relies on focused CSS that is responsive, flexible, and precise. Distribution-based CSS provides rapid crisis response, tracks and redirects assets en route, and delivers tailored CSS packages directly to strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It must be fully adaptive to the needs of the Army's dispersed, mobile forces and provide support in hours or days versus weeks. It enables joint forces to be mobile, versatile, and deployable from anywhere in the world.

3-30. Since many CSS enablers are not yet fielded, not all facets of distribution-based CSS are currently executable. Distribution and other CSS functions and organizations are being modernized to incorporate information technologies that will allow Army forces to transition from the rigid vertical organizations of the past to more flexible, precise CSS structures. Modular and specifically tailored CSS packages are evolving in response to wide-ranging contingency requirements. Service and DOD agencies are working jointly and with the civil sector to take advantage of advanced business practices, commercial economies, and global networks.

3-31. Information technologies to support force projection and velocity management enhance airlift, sealift, and prepositioning capabilities. This enhancement lightens deployment loads, assists in the precision of distribution systems, and extends the reach and longevity of systems currently in the inventory. The combined impact of these improvements will be a smaller, more deployable, and more capable force.



3-32. Current world situations require the Army to deploy a first-rate force effectively and efficiently, perform complex and difficult missions, and redeploy it as quickly and efficiently as it deployed. To accomplish this, Army forces require the four characteristics of force projection: precision, synchronization, speed, and relevant information.



3-33. Precision applies to every activity and each piece of data within force projection. Its effect is far-reaching; the payoff is speed. Precise deployment equipment lists, for example, ensure that CSS staff can quickly assign correct lift assets against the requirement. Precision in loading increases departure speed and safety. Precision in meeting the joint force commander's timeline supports his concept of employment. Current doctrine, realistic training, adequate support structure, and enablers provide the framework for precision. Such current and future CSS efforts as configured loads and modular, rapidly tailorable CSS units enhance precision.



3-34. Synchronization is a critical force projection characteristic. Just as a commander arranges activities in time and space to gain the desired effect during employment, he should also synchronize deployment activities to close the force successfully. Resources (such as lift assets, technical enablers, time, and information) are scarce. However, effectively synchronizing resources produces maximum use of every resource. Synchronization normally requires explicit coordination among the deploying forces and staffs, supporting units and staffs, a variety of civilian agencies, and other services. Synchronization is best achieved when supported with situational understanding based on timely and accurate data from information technologies that create a common operational picture (COP) and are enhanced with automated optimization, scheduling, and decision aids.

3-35. The CSS contributions to the force projection processes, as discussed in the paragraph 3-38, are key elements to synchronize with other activities to project the force. Extensive joint exercises and training are the key to successful synchronization.



3-36. Speed is more than miles per hour; it is the sustained momentum achieved with the complete complement of joint lift assets. The bulk steadily delivered by ship can often outpace the pieces delivered by air. Speed is also the velocity of the entire force projection process, from planning to force closure. In deployment, speed of force projection should be directed to the timely arrival of throughput enablers; maintaining unit integrity; and delivering capability, not just individual units. Factors such as efficient planning tools, agile ports, submission of accurate information, safe and efficient loading, and trained unit movement officers are instrumental elements contributing to deployment speed.

Relevant Information


3-37. Relevant information is all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control (FM 3-0). Successful force projection requires commanders to combine knowledge of the deployment process, judgment, and relevant information. Relevant information is the basis on which the commander makes decisions. The deploying commander must make crucial decisions on employment in a short period of time; these decisions set the tone for the remainder of the deployment. Many of the decisions are irretrievable or very hard to change. For example, understanding the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is imperative to making decisions on high-priority items, sequencing, use of time, and prioritization. Also, knowledge of the theater throughput allows the commander to manage deployment to enable employment. Having relevant information and understanding the deployment process is fundamental to achieving the situational understanding that allows the commander to effectively command and control deployment operations.



3-38. JP 3-35 lays out the five interrelated processes involved in force projection: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. CSS elements are involved in all five processes providing support to the force projected, and as part of that force. The concept of support for the deployed force in theater dictates which CSS elements mobilize and deploy as a part of the contingency force. (See figure 3-1.)

3-39. Commanders of combatant commands, joint forces, Army service component commands (ASCCs), ARFOR, theater support commands (TSCs), and other echelons above corps (EAC) CSS commands have primary responsibility for CSS planning and preparation within a theater. Their staffs perform CSS planning and preparation activities in accordance with operational priorities and in coordination with their strategic and tactical counterparts. Through technological advances (such as improved asset visibility, the Global Transportation Network [GTN], and improved distribution methods) CSS planners prepare CSS plans that meet the commander's intent, support the concept of operations, and accomplish the mission.

3-40. Improving the theater-base capabilities may require early deployment of maintenance, engineering, or terminal operations forces. Contracting, medical, legal, and resource management personnel who arrange access to host nation capabilities at staging and support bases should be among the first to deploy. The requirement for adequate CSS capability is especially critical in the early stages of operations, when buildup of combat power is critical and forces are vulnerable.

Figure 3-1. Force Projection Processes (normal entry, not forcible entry into theater)

Figure 3-1. Force Projection Processes (normal entry, not forcible entry into theater)


3-41. Identifying and planning theater infrastructure requirements during mission analysis are essential to establishing the support base and enhancing the responsiveness and sustainability of the force. The time required to establish a support base depends greatly on the extent and nature of the civil and military infrastructure in theater before operations begin. When there are ports, airfields, roads, depots, repair facilities, supplies, and transportation facilities, CSS operations can begin quickly without having to establish a new support base. When there is neither facilities, supplies, nor a distribution network, Army units may have to operate for a considerable period from austere theater bases until they build CSS facilities. In an austere theater, where operations may initially be restricted, CSS and construction units should arrive early in the deployment flow. Chapter 5 discusses, in detail, these considerations in the logistics preparation of the theater.



3-42. Mobilization is the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components and assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. (See JP 1-02 for a complete definition. JP 4-05 and JP 4-05.1 provide the joint doctrine for mobilization. FM 100-17 establishes Army doctrine.) As discussed in these publications, CSS for mobilization involves extensive personnel processing (see FM 12-6), and filling unit equipment and supply shortages. Installations provide life support and the CSS required to train mobilizing units and individuals.

3-43. Actual mobilization and deployment from continental United States (CONUS)/outside continental United States (OCONUS) force projection bases are primary responsibilities of strategic-level CSS elements. As the TPFDD is developed, the geographic combatant commander and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) allocate transportation assets to ports of embarkation (POEs) and coordinate load planning/uploading of personnel, equipment, and initial sustainment stocks (such as ammunition basic loads [ABLs], UBLs, combat prescribed loads, authorized stockage lists [ASLs] and operational loads).

3-44. A flexible decisionmaking process referred to as a graduated response (GR) controls the pace and extent of mobilization. GR triggers readiness and response actions incrementally to provide timely, yet reversible, steps that increase the U.S. national security emergency preparedness posture. The levels of mobilization response include selective mobilization, Presidential selected Reserve call-up, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization. While levels of mobilization are progressive, they do not always progress from a lower level to a higher level.

3-45. Military mobilization requires assembling and organizing resources in 12 interdependent resource areas:

  • Manpower.
  • Supplies and equipment.
  • Transportation.
  • Facilities.
  • Industrial base.
  • Training base.
  • Health service support.
  • Communications.
  • Host-nation support.
  • Environment.
  • Legal authorities.
  • Funding.

Mobilization decisions occurring in any one area might influence other areas.



3-46. Deployment operations support the initial projection of forces and, once deployed, link the deployed forces with their home station and the strategic-level sustainment base. Ready supplies are available for issue pending additional procurement or expansion of the industrial base to support anticipated requirements. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas (JP 4-0). The deployment process includes all planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities beginning with a mission requiring deployment of U.S. forces.

3-47. The four deployment phases are-

  • Predeployment activities.
  • Fort to port (movement to and activities at the port of embarkation [POE]).
  • Port to port (movement to the port of debarkation).
  • Port to destination (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration [RSO&I]).

3-48. These phases describe the major activities from point of origin to a prescribed destination. They are continuous and iterative and depend on the joint force commander's (JFC) and ARFOR commander's concepts for employment and changes in mission.

3-49. Predeployment activities. Predeployment activities are actions taken to prepare forces for deployment. They are essentially constant and on-going activities performed at home station before and continuing after warning or alert notification. Predeployment activities include training validation; deployment planning, to include force protection plans (see detailed discussion in paragraph 3-52); task organization; equipment maintenance; and soldier readiness processing (SRP). During normal peacetime operations, pre-deployment activities involve preparation for crisis response and force projection missions, always considering the operational requirements of the supported force commander.

3-50. The Army designates, equips, and trains organizations to perform force projection missions. Units conduct routine collective deployment training to ensure the Army forces, manpower, and materiel can deploy to meet the JFC's mission requirements. Units maintain trained unit movement officers and deployment data (such as, unit movement plans, organizational equipment lists [OELs], and load plans).

3-51. Installations must prepare and maintain support plans and appropriate ISSAs for POEs. Some units and individuals deploy from OCONUS locations. While they are subject to the same deployment preparation requirements as those deploying from CONUS, the support structure may be significantly different. Normally, such support derives from the geographic combatant commander and subordinate ASCC policies and procedures.

3-52. Due to potential terrorist activity against U.S. forces, all units integrate force protection (including antiterrorist) plans into movements through high-threat areas. Commanders include the following areas in force protection predeployment planning:

  • Threat and vulnerability assessments. Units assess the threat and their own vulnerability prior to deployment.
  • Security planning. Units take the results of threat and vulnerability assessments and develop security plans for self-protection while in transit. Although emphasis is on movements through high-threat areas, commanders should not discount appropriate security measures for movements in lower-threat areas. The commander should consider advanced or on-board security augmentation for travel through high-threat areas. Commanders/senior Army representatives accompanying the movement are responsible for ensuring that security measures sufficiently address vulnerabilities. Movements may require tailored intelligence/counterintelligence support, host-nation assistance, or preplanned alternative routes based on the vulnerabilities associated with the movement.
  • Training. Units moving through high-threat areas ensure personnel receive pre-deployment training on rules of engagement, the AOR threat orientation, defensive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)/exercises, and security equipment. Training is performance-oriented and provides soldiers and leaders the skills required to defend against a terrorist threat and mitigate the effects of an attack.
  • Movement tracking. Major Army commands (MACOMs) will establish a process for units with 30 or more personnel to track movements through high-threat areas. MACOMs are required to report specific movements to Headquarters, Department of the Army G-3.
  • Logistics. Predictability and support of unit movements are a unit's greatest vulnerability. Unit commanders must understand that predictability places a higher demand on the unit's ability to know the local threat, assess unit vulnerabilities, and develop self-protection measures.

3-53. Fort to Port. When a unit receives movement guidance, it begins movement to and activities at the POE. For deployments supporting a JFC's operation/exercise, the unit must complete SRP, be verified as operationally ready, and be configured for movement. The unit submits required documentation for movement to installation unit movement coordinators, undergoes inspections to ensure accurate unit deployment lists (UDLs), and prepares personnel manifests.

3-54. Movement to OCONUS POEs is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander whose theater POEs are supporting the deployment operation. If theater movement requirements exceed theater capability, the geographic combatant commander can request augmentation of theater airlift assets with USTRANSCOM common-user assets.

3-55. Activities at POEs focus on staging, marshaling, and loading personnel, units, equipment, and supplies on designated transportation assets prior to movement to ports of debarkation (PODs). Load planning is driven by the deployment concept and lift assets supporting deployment, the anticipated operational environment, and the anticipated situation at the POD to receive, offload, and reassemble mission capable organizations. Forces and materiel may be combat loaded, unit loaded, or administratively loaded for deployment. Combat loading arranges personnel and equipment in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical situation and is significantly less efficient than unit or administrative loading. Unit loading allows troop units to move with their equipment and accompanying supplies on the same conveyance. It is more efficient than combat loading and maintains unit integrity better than administrative loading. Administrative loading achieves maximum use of troop and cargo space without regard to tactical considerations. The unit must sort equipment and accompanying supplies before they can use them. As the Army undergoes transformation, it is making efforts during the development of the objective force to eliminate reception and staging in theater. Extensive efforts at the home stations and supporting installations will be required to ensure strategic transportation assets are loaded in such a way that forces may begin operations immediately on arriving in the AO.

3-56. The TPFDD synchronizes arriving personnel, equipment, and supplies with mission needs during deployment, and echelons, configures, and schedules units for movement. Time phasing allows for rapid theater reception and onward movement of arriving personnel, equipment, and supplies.

3-57. During a typical deployment, commanders temporarily lose direct control, but not command authority, of unit personnel and equipment at the POE. USTRANSCOM, through its subordinate transportation component commands (TCCs) assumes transportation and reporting responsibilities (but not command authority) for embarked personnel, equipment, and materiel until they arrive at the POD and unload from common-user transportation. Transportation and reporting responsibilities include transporting, accounting for, tracking, and guiding deploying personnel, equipment, and supplies from the POE to the POD. CSS staffs account for and track personnel and cargo using movement data provided by the moving forces. Operational commanders and staffs are responsible for tracking and reporting unit movement and locations, and force build-up of operational capability. Commanders of the deploying force have the inherent command responsibility to reassemble their forces after movement, consistent with their mission requirements and task organization. FM 100-17 discusses the fort-to-port aspect of deployment.

3-58. Port to Port. Movement to PODs can be conducted using common-user and organic or assigned/attached lift assets. PODs include seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). USTRANSCOM conducts movement to PODs on common-user transportation in consultation with the supported and supporting combatant commanders. USTRANSCOM's primary responsibility is ensuring operational effectiveness in support of the JFC's deployment requirements while striving to attain the most efficient use of transportation resources. Alternatively, movement to PODs on organic or assigned/attached lift is the responsibility of the deploying unit commander in response to mission guidance from the supported JFC.

3-59. Careful planning and flexible execution characterize successful deployments. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and supplies are scheduled for movement; unit movement changes are minimized; and the flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies into theater does not exceed lift availability and the theater reception capability. When planning for deployments where there are only austere port facilities or where there may be no port at all, deployment planners may have to augment the POD operation with Army or Navy watercraft assets, or undertake a joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operation. USTRANSCOM coordinates en route support (such as, refueling, escort, and clearances) based on mutual support agreements and foreign clearance guides.

3-60. Port to Destination. The last phase of deployment (joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI]) is the responsibility of the supported combatant commander and subordinate JFC. Joint Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements (JP 4-01.8). The Army refers to these same processes as RSO&I. Deployment is not complete until the deploying unit is a functioning part of the in-theater force. Theater support personnel meet the initial transportation and reporting responsibilities for deploying unit personnel, equipment, and supplies based on the combatant commander's movement control and JRSOI plans. The supported combatant commander returns complete direct control to the deploying unit commander when personnel, equipment, and supplies arrive at, and transition through, the POD. Units deploying on organic or external lift assets coordinate in-theater arrival with the supported combatant command to facilitate terrain management and in-theater reception. If additional lift assets are needed in theater to support onward movement of arriving forces and materiel, the supported combatant commander's movement control element, with supporting commands or the host nation (HN), may augment theater lift assets. Since airfields and ports may not contain an organic force protection capability, the combatant commander and subordinate JFC plan for augmenting these sites with defensive/security forces, as deemed necessary.

3-61. RSO&I is the critical link between deploying and employing forces in the AO. The RSO&I objective is to create a seamless flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel from offload at PODs through employment as reassembled, mission-capable forces. The time between the initial arrival of the deploying unit and its operational employment is potentially the period of its greatest vulnerability. During this transition period, the deploying unit may not be able to fully sustain itself, defend itself, or contribute to mission accomplishment because some of its elements have not attained the required mission capability. RSO&I planning focuses on rapidly integrating deploying units and quickly making them functioning and contributing members of the force.

3-62. The supported combatant commander is overall responsible for JRSOI planning, and the subordinate JFC is overall responsible for the JRSOI execution. This includes all actions required to make arriving units operationally ready then integrating them into the force. CSS units and personnel play critical roles in building combat power in theater. The capability of strategic lift to move personnel, equipment, and supplies to the reception points must be matched by the capability to receive and process the force. The combatant commander must have visibility of the deployment flow to control the rate as well as the sequence of deploying forces.

3-63. Early in a deployment, a movement control module from the TSC, in conjunction with Air Mobility Command (AMC) forward elements, opens a common-user APOD reception area. If sea lines of communication (SLOC) support the theater, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), is the seaport manager for all common-user SPODs under the single-port manager (SPM) concept. The supported combatant commander has several options available for the port operator: using a deployable transportation group or MTMC under a command arrangement agreement (CAA), stevedoring contracts, or host-nation support.

3-64. Early in a force projection operation, the supported combatant commander regulates the transportation flow. To regulate transportation, the combatant commander must ensure that adequate support and reception assets are effectively coordinated through a theater reception plan and either available at the POD or deployed early in the movement schedule to facilitate JRSOI and distribution. This expedites personnel and materiel into the AO. During force projection operations under hostile conditions, soldiers have to perform many of the port functions. Once hostilities subside or cease, these types of activities may transition to MTMC-administered contract operations.

3-65. Terminal operations, line-haul, heavy equipment transport (HET), and movement control assets to provide surge sealift SPOD reception capability become available on arrival of Army prepositioned afloat (APA) assets. Other terminal operations, mode operator, and movement control resources may establish inland rail and water terminals to support resources flowing into the theater via land LOC.

3-66. Support elements are also required for life support at ports and staging areas. Terminal operations, line-haul and HET, supply, maintenance, and other required functional capabilities, along with TSC headquarters, movement control agency (MCA), and materiel management center (MMC) early-entry modules (EEMs) establish the initial Army portion of the theater sustainment base. The TSC commander and support operations staff ensure that subordinate support elements execute mission support according to theater-level priorities in close coordination with the ARFOR CSS and operations planners. The initial focus is on building combat power according to the commander's plan.

3-67. RSO&I is a critical operational challenge that relies on CSS elements for successful execution. Even self-sustaining units that arrive in theater are heavily dependent on other early-entry CSS elements (such as components of the TSC) until they reunite with their equipment. As deploying units assemble, efforts focus on preparing for future operations and integrating units into the force. JP 4-01.8 is the doctrinal publication on joint RSO&I. FM 100-17-3 contains the Army doctrine for RSO&I. FM 4-93.4 discusses the role of the TSC in providing CSS during RSO&I and during employment/ sustainment.



3-68. The CSS force package tailored for each contingency is streamlined, strategically mobile, and focused on the demands dictated by the contingency. This optimizes CSS resources and minimizes the operational and CSS footprint in the AO. Early-entry forces should exploit regionally available assets to include joint, multinational, HNS, and theater support contracting resources for transport, supply, and services to the maximum extent possible within the associated risk.

3-69. Initial CSS in the theater relies on a combination of UBLs and critical sustainment stocks, either from prepositioned stocks (ashore or afloat) or stocks designated to arrive early in a force projection operation. In any case, the CSS staff integrates sustainment stocks into the deployment flow to support elements arriving early on.

3-70. Early in an operation, CSS is conducted by a theater force opening package (TFOP). Arriving in theater, the TSC MCA, TSC MMC, and functional command EEMs of the TFOP establish information system links with joint- and strategic-level C2/CSS information systems to acquire visibility of CSS operations. As a minimum, information system connectivity is established with-

  • USTRANSCOM for visibility of strategic air flow and ship schedules.
  • U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) and the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) for visibility of Army prepositioned stocks (APS).

The key is to communicate to the force commander in operational terms the anticipated status of combat power as the staff receives and integrates it into the force. In smaller contingency operations, an augmented corps support command (COSCOM) or other CSS unit may have to execute these operational-level CSS functions.

3-71. In accordance with the JFC's guidance and theater contracting policy, the TFOP assesses and acquires available HN infrastructure capabilities identified in the logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) plan and updates the distribution plan. This includes directing the required logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) contracts by the USAMC logistics support element (LSE) module of the TFOP. It also includes activating HNS infrastructure agreements and establishing non-HNS theater contracts for supplies and services under the coordination of the principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC) to support the theater-level distribution plan. The PARC is assigned to the TSC but is normally attached to the ARFOR headquarters. Using acquired HN infrastructure and the functional capabilities of the TFOP's early-entry modules, the TFOP activates the nodes of the theater distribution network in accordance with the distribution plan. It establishes the initial Army theater RSO&I capabilities.



3-72. Redeployment is the transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander's operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing (JP 3-35). The commander must conduct redeployment in a way that facilitates using redeploying forces and sustainment equipment and supplies to meet new missions. Therefore, if redeployment is not a retrograde operation, it is, in fact, a new deployment in which the current AO becomes a power projection platform. The same operational phases, planning, and coordination actions required for deployment are required for redeployment. See FM 100-17-5 for details covering redeployment.

3-73. During redeployment, the CSS reception, staging, and onward movement orientation must shift from a forward to a rearward flow of resources. Based on the combatant commander's priorities, and in coordination with the JTF and ASCC/ARFOR staffs, the TSC support operations staff makes required modifications to the distribution plan to synchronize assembling, reconstructing, and moving resources to theater APOEs and SPOEs.

3-74. The TSC, through its support operations section, typically controls redeployment of Army forces from assembly areas (AAs) through redeployment assembly areas (RAAs) to APOEs/SPOEs. The TSC MCA coordinates unit movement requirements with USTRANSCOM strategic lift assets. The support operations functional directorates and distribution management center (DMC) of the TSC work with the functional commands to coordinate and monitor medical, personnel, field services, maintenance, customs and, in some cases, engineer support at AAs, RAAs, and APOEs/SPOEs. The TSC MMC ensures sustainment materiel and adequate blocking, bracing, packaging, and tie-down materials are available to expedite the flow of units departing the theater.



3-75. Critical to supporting full spectrum operations is minimizing the Army CSS footprint in the theater, thereby reducing strategic lift requirements and enhancing the strategic responsiveness of Army forces. A key to achieving this objective is CSS reach operations. Combat Service Support reach operations involve the operational positioning and efficient use of all available CSS assets and capabilities, from the industrial base to the soldier in the field (FM 3-0). CSS reach operations refer to deploying the minimum essential Army CSS elements to the AO and establishing links to, and fully exploiting all available sources of, support. As Figure 3-2 depicts, CSS reach operations include using normal support relationships and reaching in all directions to acquire available support from contractors, HNS, other services, multinational partners, and NGOs.

3-76. Sources of support available to Army CSS elements in the AO include-

  • Strategic-level CSS provider contingency elements.
  • CSS management and technical support from nondeployed elements of Army CSS organizations and strategic-level CSS providers in the AO.
  • Prepositioned equipment and supplies.
  • HNS.
  • Theater support contractors.
  • Other service components.
  • Allies and coalition partners.
  • Figure 3-2. CSS Reach Operations

    Figure 3-2. CSS Reach Operations


    3-77. Deployed elements of the TSC and other CSS organizations integrate support with deployed elements of several strategic providers. For example, DLA sends a DLA contingency support team and USAMC sends an LSE to an AO, as required.

    3-78. Deployed Army elements also reach back to elements of their organizations that do not deploy. A prime example is split-based operations. Split-based operations involve deploying only minimal essential CSS management cells to AOs with links back to home station (or in some cases an intermediate staging base [ISB]). With proper information system links, deployed elements may receive support from some strategic-level providers (discussed in chapter 4). Telemedicine is an example of technical support available outside of the AO. The COSCOM and TSC MMCs are also capable of performing some materiel management functions from home station, but again, robust and reliable information systems are essential to make split-based operations work.

    3-79. Another aspect of CSS reach operations involves deliberate positioning of stocks and units/capabilities dedicated for a specific operation. The commander may position these stocks and/or units at home station, an ISB, or another location within or near the theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA). For example, minimal explosive ordnance disposal, personnel, or legal resources could deploy to an AO, with other assets positioned at an ISB for rapid insertion into the AO, if required. This minimizes the CSS footprint in the AO while still providing a relatively high level of responsiveness.

    3-80. Reliance on HNS and theater support contractors are another facet of reaching to available sources and minimizing the deployment of Army CSS units into the AO. (Chapter 5 covers these sources of support.)

    3-81. Finally, Army CSS elements integrate support from joint and multinational sources available in the AO. Commanders weigh the risk of joint and, especially, multinational support; this support may not be as reliable or responsive as organic Army support.



    3-82. An intermediate staging base is a secure staging base usually established near to, but not in, the area of operations (FM 3-0). While not a requirement in all situations, the ISB may provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances warrant. The commander may use an ISB as a temporary staging area en route to a joint operation or as a long-term secure forward support base. An ISB may serve as a secure transportation node that allows the switch from strategic to intratheater modes of transportation and provides a staging area where units can redistribute and finalize their accompanying loads. When possible, an ISB takes advantage of existing, sophisticated capabilities, serving as an efficient transfer point from high-volume commercial carriers to a range of tactical, intratheater transport means that may serve smaller, more austere ports.

    3-83. The ISB may enhance the strategic responsiveness of the deploying force by providing continuous and wide-ranging capabilities. Army forces may use an ISB in conjunction with the other joint force elements to preposition selected CSS capabilities for rapid deployment into the JOA (discussed previously under CSS reach operations, paragraph 3-75). ISB personnel may perform limited CSS functions (such as materiel management and selected maintenance support routinely performed in the communications zone [COMMZ]). ISBs may also serve as secure staging areas for redeploying units, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and redeployment or evacuation of other individuals and units, until strategic lift is available to final destinations. Using ISBs when operationally feasible may allow joint forces to minimize the CSS footprint in an AO, thus enhancing the combatant commander's ability to meet operational requirements rapidly.



    3-84. Using an ISB is operationally dependent on, and must support, the combatant commander's campaign plan. It is normally located within the theater of operations and outside the AO. The JFC determines the feasibility of using an ISB, its location, and when it should be established and disestablished. This determination is based on the availability, length, and security of the LOC (water, air, and rail) between the ISB and the JOA, and on the criticality of a specific support function. However, there are disadvantages inherent in using ISBs. An ISB is a transshipment point, so it may add extra time and handling to the deployment or CSS process. Further, additional infrastructure (personnel and equipment) is required to operate the ISB.

    3-85. In an ideal situation, secure bases are available within the AO for RSO&I operations and continued support of the deployed force, lessening the need for an ISB. Unfortunately, the very situation that results in deploying forces may negate the advantages of basing within the AO. The JFC weighs factors (such as the theater operational situation, the need to minimize the CSS footprint in the AO, and using strategic lift to move CSS capabilities) when determining the risk of basing within the AO. In cases where the joint force must secure a lodgment to project the force, an ISB may be critical to success.


    Taszar: The ISB for Operation Joint Endeavor

    In Operation Joint Endeavor, continental United States (CONUS) and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) units en route to Bosnia were deployed to Taszar, which served as an ISB, staged and either loaded on railcars or prepared for onward movement for a 12-hour convoy to staging area Harmon. At the height of the operation, the ISB covered an area of some 35 square kilometers and processed 200 containers per day. Various CSS support functions performed there provided life support and services, expedited the movement and repair of equipment, and assisted in mode change for the onward movement.




    3-86.Coordinating with the host nation for using an ISB is a Department of State responsibility. Commanders should identify ISB sites as early in the deliberate planning process as possible and complete measures to prepare the selected areas as quickly as possible.

    3-87. Selecting an ISB is a JFC decision; however, if the Army component operates the ISB, the ARFOR commander should have a critical role in the selection process. Planners must carefully consider the location because, once established, ISBs are inherently difficult to move and relocating an ISB may adversely impact the entire operation. The ISB should accommodate sufficient Army command and control, combat support (CS), CSS, and joint support to enable projecting the force into the AO. Commanders should locate the ISB beyond the range of enemy tactical and operational fires and outside the adversary's political sphere of influence. They should secure the ISB against special operations forces (SOF) and terrorists. The factors of METT-TC and the operating range (or reach) of intratheater lift assets that must operate between the ISB and the AO influence the location of the ISB.

    3-88. There may also be situations where forces might need ISBs located outside the theater of operations. The greatest distances of displacement might be as much as 1,000 nautical miles; however, the expected distance is hundreds of miles for two important reasons: First, commanders need to base tactical aviation within 300 to 500 nautical miles of the theater to have a steady presence. Second, the sustaining operations that make air bases and land forces viable need roughly the same distance to be effective. The commander should leverage existing air facilities and seaports.

    3-89. ISB facilities need not necessarily be in a single contiguous location. A single ISB may include facilities in noncontiguous locations as long as the distance between these facilities does not significantly hamper ISB C2. As a minimum, there is one staging area for each airport and seaport reception complex. However, the size of the deployment, the host nation infrastructure, and the requirement to disperse the arriving force adequately may compel the JFC to establish multiple staging areas.



    3-90. Once established, an ISB has two basic roles. First is the traditional role as a staging base for deploying units in transit to an AO. The focus in this role is on throughput. The ISB may be the initial theater reception and staging facility. Deploying forces debark from strategic lift, reassemble, and prepare for missions in the AO. For deploying forces transiting through, ISBs allow supported commanders time to gather additional intelligence on the AO and finalize plans following briefings and rehearsals. Also, deploying soldiers can recuperate after long trips from their home station. ISB requirements for the staging activities depend on the deployment flow, time lines, and the requirements of the transient force population.

    3-91. The second ISB role is serving as the principal staging base for entry operations. Using an ISB this way allows the JFC to project the maximum combat power into the JOA. For example, a Stryker brigade combat team may arrive at the ISB by strategic air and sealift. They reassemble, prepare for operations, and conduct a joint entry operation using Army watercraft.

    3-92. Onward movement from the ISB to the JOA may be multimodal and require some level of reassembly in the AO. Transportation assets employed in onward movement normally include strategic and theater assets, including, truck, rail, sea, and airlift. These movements are a part of deployment and should be included in the TPFDD.



    3-93. Potentially the most important role of an ISB is as a remote support base as a part of CSS reach operations. This may involve three types of support capabilities beyond support required as part of the staging activities.

    3-94. First, certain elements engaged in split-based operations may locate in an ISB. Other elements operating in CONUS, another theater, or another ISB perform the remaining functions. Ideally, these forces should conduct split-based operations from home station vice the ISB, but communication requirements may not allow this. Elements at an ISB may perform such functions as distribution management, materiel management, and some personnel or legal functions. Split-based operations require the appropriate structuring of management organizations with information systems and depend on adequate communication links between the ISB and the JOA.

    3-95. The second part of an ISB functioning as a remote support base in CSS reach operations involves the deliberate positioning of stocks and units/ capabilities dedicated for a specific operation. The commander can position these stocks and units at an ISB for rapid movement into the AO via intratheater transportation. The purpose of positioning capabilities at an ISB is to increase responsiveness of support and sustainability of the force, while keeping the CSS footprint in the AO to a minimum. The commander may integrate this concept using split-based operations. For example, the commander may move legal resources providing support from an ISB to the AO quickly if the commander, due to a change in the operational situation, needs them there. Different methods of using an ISB are on-going concepts being developed as part of the Army CSS transformation campaign.

    3-96. The final role of an ISB in CSS reach operations is performing certain support functions at an ISB that were traditionally performed in a COMMZ. For example, an ISB may provide sustainment maintenance or higher levels of medical treatment if evacuation assets and time considerations allow.



    3-97. A number of capabilities are required to perform the various staging and support activities (discussed above). Much of this support is dedicated to ISB overhead and not in direct support of the force in the AO. Examples of facilities and capabilities that may be required at an ISB include-

    • Signal support.
    • Contracting support to acquire local supplies or services.
    • Field feeding, water, and ice for transient troops.
    • Billeting.
    • Command post sites.
    • Field shower and laundry facilities.
    • Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) for ground and aviation requirements.
    • Repair parts.
    • Ground maintenance support.
    • Roads and grounds support.
    • Utilities operation and repair support.
    • Power management/distribution support.
    • Aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) support.
    • Materials handling equipment (MHE).
    • Medical facilities.
    • Civil-military operations.
    • Intelligence preparation of key leaders and troops.
    • Legal advice supporting ISB operations and legal support for personnel transiting to or deployed in the AO.
    • Human resource support.
    • Mail service.
    • Finance support (to include limited currency exchange).
    • Mortuary affairs.
    • Military police.
    • MWR support (including telephones and Army and Air Force Exchange Service [AAFES]).
    • Religious support.
    • Ammunition supply.
    • Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.
    • Fire prevention/control.
    • Waste management: non-potable water, solids, medical and hazardous waste.
    • General engineering support.
    • Runways and hardtop surfaces for container handling/trailer transfer and maintenance operations.
    • Training facilities.

    3-98. Support operations staffs should plan for maintenance support teams (MSTs) and AVIM teams to perform repairs at the ISB. Plans may include providing a hot refuel site to support deploying aviation forces and a refueling on-the-move site for refueling deploying ground vehicles. Depending on the environment, a mobile water supply team may be needed to set up a bulk water distribution site for both ISB support and transient personnel.

    3-99. The ISB needs adequate facilities to accommodate the billeting, feeding, and sanitation requirements of the base. In addition to a maintenance unit to repair aircraft and other transportation assets, a force provider module can provide feeding, shower, and laundry support. Supply elements can be used to operate the MHE and storage facilities for rations, jet fuel, oils, lubricants, ammunition, and medical supplies at the ISB. A safe haven may be required when long-range transportation is unavailable to move, at one time, all evacuees from the HN to the United States.



    3-100. Support at an ISB may come from numerous sources: other services, multinational partners, HNS, strategic providers, contractors, and Army organizations. Using theater support contractors is particularly desirable in ISB operations. FM 100-10.1 and FM 3-100.2 cover this option in more detail. The commander may task elements of the EEMs to command and control the ISB. An area support group (ASG), if available within required time parameters, should operate an ISB rather than a corps support group (CSG) because it leaves the CSG free to accompany or precede a JTF into the AO. Also, a fully resourced ASG has the staff elements and units necessary to operate an ISB. A CSG requires augmentation to perform those functions.

    3-101. ASGs are subordinate units of the TSC. The basic mission of the ASG is to provide direct support (DS) CSS to designated units and elements within its AO, which may be an ISB. Depending on how long forces are to remain at the intermediate staging base-

  • Field feeding personnel may provide hot meals.
  • DS Class III supply point personnel may provide limited transport of fuel from HN sources.
  • Other DS unit supply personnel may issue from prepositioned stocks.
  • MSTs may provide emergency repairs to unit equipment before the units depart the airfield.
  • AVIM teams may provide maintenance on aircraft.
  • Movement control teams (MCTs) may commit truck assets to line-haul unit basic loads of ammunition for plane-side issue to units deploying by air.
  • 3-102. As the ISB site begins to develop, the requirement for a health service support (HSS) base increases. The HSS force structure is tailored to requirements ranging from those of a single brigade to those needed to support a corps plug (including Level III care and air evacuation) through a fully matured theater with a medical command (MEDCOM) in place. (FM 4-02 discusses levels of care.) The initial HSS structure may be limited to medical C2, logistics, Level I and II treatment, and evacuation functions. Elements of a brigade, division, or area support medical company may meet these capabilities.

    3-103. Early-entry elements of a combat support hospital (CSH) are required to support ISB personnel as well as the deploying force. As the ISB grows, corps medical elements may deploy into it. Specific elements, such as combat stress control, medical laboratory, preventive medicine, or veterinary detachments may be needed to augment U.S. or HN services. With the growth of the ISB and the corresponding supported force, the requirement for more extensive HSS capabilities may arise. These capabilities may be services such as an area support medical battalion (ASMB), ground and air evacuation companies, forward surgical teams (FST), an area support dental company, a medical logistics battalion, or a CSH. The arrival of the CSH provides an initial Level III capability. The medical logistics battalion provides medical logistics support to the ISB. The commander synchronizes medical logistics operations with other theater logistics operations.

    3-104. Force provider modules, engineer forces, and contractors may establish staging areas; supply early-entry units may establish commodity-oriented SSAs for staging sustainment stocks. Consistent with the distribution plan, USAMC and USAMMA transfer APS to theater SSAs. The early-entry module also employs a combination of HNS, contracts, and functional CSS modules to establish the distribution system infrastructure and sustain operations.



    3-105. Missions of U.S. forces are changing from the Cold War's forward-deployed forces to the more complex missions of a post-Cold-War projection force. For U.S. forces, these new missions may involve an increase in military operations in urban areas. Urban operations include offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features (FM 3-0). Although urban operations have occurred throughout history, their frequency and scale are likely to increase due to adversaries seeking protection within cities. Cities are likely battlegrounds where weaker enemies attempt to negate the advantages Army forces have in more open terrain. (FM 90-10 discusses urban operations.)

    3-106. Preparing for urban operations presents a significant challenge for CSS personnel. Urban operations are CSS-intensive, demanding large quantities of materiel and support for military forces and noncombatants displaced by operations. A thorough LPT is critical in developing an adaptable urban operations CSS plan. CSS planners conduct the LPT to assess the situation and determine how to support the commander's plan. Commanders identify urban areas in their AOs that could become urban battlefields and direct their staffs to prepare detailed studies for those possible contingencies. CSS planners may find products from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) useful in assisting in this CSS analysis. Conversely, the LPT may contribute to the IPB with the discovery of critical resources and infrastructure influencing the operational plan that may remain hidden without a careful CSS analysis.

    3-107. Relevant information about the urban AO, as it pertains to LPT, is critical in terms of the following:

    • Supported commanders' intents and concepts of operation.
    • Transportation infrastructure (air, rail, waterways, pipelines, subway).
    • Telecommunications and information systems posture.
    • Traffic pattern and flow; selection of main and alternate supply routes.
    • Local resources with military CSS value.
    • Local population sentiments (friendly/non-friendly).
    • Contracting, bartering, and trading capabilities.

    3-108. The nature of the urban environment creates distinct demands on CSS units and operations. Though the infrastructure of an urban environment may be a source of valuable resources (such as supply systems, services, personnel, and facilities) CSS planners must know the potential threat and force protection requirements that urban society may present. Criminals, gangs, or riotous mobs may serve to disrupt CSS operations. Urban operation causes increased ammunition consumption, higher casualty rates, and transportation difficulties resulting from rubble. Units must accomplish maintenance operations, such as equipment recovery, expeditiously because disabled vehicles may block narrow streets or roadways.

    3-109. Other CSS factors in urban operations often include the following:

    • Increased consumption of small arms ammunition and explosives due to fighting in close quarters and breaching barriers.
    • Increased consumption of precision munitions, which are needed to target enemy locations while limiting collateral damage and civilian casualties.
    • Decreased consumption of certain large-caliber and area-type munitions.
    • Increased consumption of nonlethal munitions.
    • Increased aerial delivery requests.
    • Increased medical workload due to increased casualties and difficulty in locating and reaching wounded soldiers above and below ground level.
    • Increased mortuary affairs workload.

    3-110. Airfields, ports, and rail and road hubs are predominately located in urban centers. Therefore, CSS organizations frequently locate their bases in urban areas. They may have to provide support from either inside or outside these urban areas. They may also have to support large numbers of small units widely dispersed throughout an urban area or dispersed in multiple urban areas.

    3-111. CSS assets are a high-payoff target for potential adversaries in urban operations. LOC are more difficult to maintain-access may be limited to a few key routes easily blocked by rubble or manmade roadblocks that soldiers cannot easily bypass. Routes may be limited, making CSS more easily interdicted than in open terrain. Congestion, rubble, debris, and craters may also limit wheeled and tracked vehicle movement, mandating alternative modes of transportation. Planners may have to consider such nontraditional means of distribution as precision airdrop and manpacking supplies.



    3-112. Most SOF units locate in CONUS and operate in a force-projection mode. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has aligned its Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) and SOF CSS organizations and activities with the U.S. Army's concept of force projection. This change allows SOF to integrate organic CSS elements within the theater support structure for continuous and responsive sustainment to deployed Army special operations forces (ARSOF).

    3-113. In a mature theater, the theater base is established, prepositioned stocks and operational stocks are in place, and support agreements exist. When operating in a fully developed CONUS or overseas base, ARSOF operate as part of, or collocated with, a conventional force. They receive support from three primary sources:

    • Army Title 10 support through Army CSS units.
    • CUL lead service units (in most cases Army CSS units).
    • SOF channels for SOF-peculiar items that are beyond normal CSS element capabilities.

    3-114. In a developing theater, ARSOF units bring enough resources to survive and operate until the United States sets up a bare-base support system or arranges for HNS. The bare-base support system may function from CONUS, stocks afloat, or from a third country. Until this system becomes operational, the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) may authorize SOF units to request items through their parent units or directly from the CONUS wholesale CSS system. ARSOF units may request CSS for SOF-peculiar and conventional items through the special operations theater support elements (SOTSEs). The SOTSEs are forward deployed, regionally oriented elements from the SOSCOM with the mission to coordinate ARSOF CSS support. (See FM 100-25.)

    3-115. Sustaining special operations is a challenge for CSS planners and operational units. Each SOF operation requires some combination of mature theater and contingency CSS. Special operations CSS planners apply their knowledge of conventional CSS operations to meet specific SOF needs. The fundamentals of contingency CSS apply to most SOF operations.

    3-116. The nature of special operations frequently imposes stringent operations security (OPSEC) requirements on the CSS system. Certain special operations are extremely sensitive and require compartmentalization of their support to avoid compromise. Supporting CSS commanders ensure OPSEC within their own activities.

    3-117. SOF units are comparatively small and, except for special operations aviation, consume few critical combat supplies (Class I, bulk Class III, and Class V). However, they use special operations-peculiar and low-density items of standard and nonstandard configuration. The solution to SOF CSS requirements is theater-specific and situation-dependent.

    3-118. Each type of ARSOF unit depends on the support system for a different mix of general support (GS), DS, and, in some cases, unit-level support. For example, the special forces group has organic support companies at the battalion level, but the ranger regiment has almost no organic CSS capability and depends on home station and SOSCOM for logistics support.


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