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Chapter 5

Orchestrating the CSS Effort

Combat service support (CSS), like the other battlefield operating systems, is the commander's business. The purpose of Army CSS is to generate Army combat power, extend operational reach, and sustain the force. Achieving this purpose requires commanders at all levels to orchestrate effective CSS to Army forces by planning, preparing, executing and assessing CSS operations. CSS involves working with operations planners to determine requirements, acquire resources and distribute them. This is not a one-time event; support personnel continually integrate activities with operations staffs to adapt plans and activities to meet the changing needs of the commander. This chapter discusses CSS command and control (C2), the planning of CSS, preparation activities, considerations for the acquisition of resources, and distribution. It also includes an overview of CSS information systems and how civilian personnel and contractor support are integrated into the CSS effort to supplement the activities of CSS units.


CSS Command and Control
CSS Planning
Logistics Preparation of the Theater
Acquistion of Resources
Civilian Personnel




5-1. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction, by a properly designated commander, over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (FM 3-0). CSS command and control has two components: the commander and the C2 system.



5-2. The CSS commander is responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the CSS mission in coordination and in conjunction with the combatant commander's operations plan (OPLAN)/operations order (OPORD). Like the combat commander, the CSS commander must execute the leadership aspects of visualizing, describing, and directing CSS operations (see FM 3-0).



5-3. Upon receipt of a mission, CSS commanders conduct a mission analysis to develop their initial vision, which they continually confirm or modify. To visualize the desired outcome, CSS commanders must clearly understand the mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, time, civilian considerations (METT-TC) in the battlespace:

  • What is the mission?
  • What are the enemy's capabilities and likely actions?
  • What are the characteristics of the AO?
  • Do weather and terrain favor friendly or enemy actions?
  • How much time is available?
  • What CSS factors are most important?
  • What role does civil considerations play?

This framing of the battlespace takes place during mission analysis (see FM 101-5) and continues with battle tracking during execution of the combat operation. This facilitates posturing for the most effective and efficient method of providing uninterrupted sustainment and building of combat power.



5-4. Unless subordinate commanders and staffs understand the commander's visualization, there is no unifying design. The commander must communicate his visualization by describing it in doctrinal terms. Commanders describe their visualization through the commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), using terms suited to the nature of the mission and their experience. Commanders may also describe their visualizations graphically using doctrinal graphics for easier communication. Describing is not a one-time event. As the commander confirms or modifies his visualization, he continues to describe his visualization to his staff and subordinates so they may better support his decisionmaking. Better effort in describing leads to better comprehension by subordinates of the context of his decision. It also enables better decisions on subordinates part when exercising individual initiative.



5-5. CSS forces do not respond to a decision until directed to do so. To effect execution or adjustment decisions, the commander must direct the action. The normal means for directing changes in action during execution is the fragmentary order (FRAGO). Subordinate CSS forces then perform their own decisionmaking and direct actions by their forces. After the commander makes an execution or adjustment decision, the staff must synchronize the operation. This involves synchronizing the operation in time, space and purpose across all battlefield operating systems (BOS) to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. The BOS is the physical means (soldiers, organizations, and equipment) to accomplish the mission. The BOS are intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability, CSS, and C2. FM 7-15 will provide details on the BOS.

5-6. Technology, the fluid nature of operations, and the volume of information increase the importance of commanders being able to visualize and describe operations. Modern information systems give the C2 system the capability to automate production of orders and associated graphics for dissemination, especially for execution decisions that use data already stored in a common database.



5-7. The C2 system is the arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential to the commander to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations (FM 6-0). A commander cannot exercise C2 alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. Even at the lowest levels, a commander needs support to exercise C2 effectively.



5-8. The C2 system begins with people. Since combat involves soldiers, no technology can reduce the importance of the human dimension; the commander must base his exercise of C2 on human characteristics rather than on equipment and procedures. Trained C2 personnel are key to effective C2 systems; the best technology cannot support C2 without them.

Information Management


5-9. Information management (IM) is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. It consists of relevant information and information systems. The computers (hardware and software) and communications directly involved in C2 constitute the information system.



5-10. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities to accomplish tasks. They govern actions within the C2 system to exercise C2 effectively and efficiently. Adhering to procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance as commanders rapidly shift forces to meet operational contingencies.

Equipment and Facilities


5-11. Finally, the equipment and facilities element provides sustainment and a work environment for the other elements of the C2 system.

5-12. As the Army moves toward more digitization in the C2 system, the most important aspect of digital capabilities centers on the combined suite of information technologies within the information system. The manner in which these technologies combine accelerates decisionmaking and makes it more accurate and reliable. Information systems reduce human labor and organize information into a usable form. Used correctly, these capabilities should allow commanders and staffs to spend more time and energy on the art and human dimensions of C2.



5-13. The Army battle command system (ABCS) is the Army's C2 information system. ABCS comprises seven separate systems to support key C2 functions of maneuver, fire support, air defense, intelligence, air support, battle command, and CSS. While each C2 system provides detailed support of its BOS to the other ABCS systems, it also receives relevant information from the other C2 systems to provide the commander with a COP of the battlefield. ABCS allow commanders to provide information to subordinates to guide the exercise of disciplined initiative within the commander's intent. This information provides subordinates with a common operational picture (COP) to facilitate their own situational understanding and conveys their superior commander's perspective. Subordinates can visualize intuitively the effects of possible decisions on the rest of the higher commander's operation and accept or mitigate the costs of their decision. This situational understanding provides a context for subordinates to use when assessing information obtained at their level within which to exercise initiative consistent with their superior commander's intent. As subordinates act on their decisions, ABCS allows them to pass information about that decision to their commander. The higher commander can monitor the subordinate's action and, with his staff, resynchronize operations rapidly with ABCS after a subordinate exercises individual initiative.

Combat Service Support Control System


5-14. Combat service support control system (CSSCS) is the CSS node of the ABCS. It is an automated CSS C2 tool for the commander. CSSCS provides information collection and processing capabilities that support maneuver sustainment operations. CSSCS maintains the maneuver sustainment status of all assigned units, tracks the CSS commander's sustainment posture, and meets the combat commander's requirements for CSS information that affect the command's combat power. When the commander and staff combine the sustainment information from CSSCS with the information from other ABCS systems, the synergy of information produces the COP of the battlefield in near real-time; this COP enables the commander to make sound decisions.

5-15. CSSCS maintains a database of personnel, military specialties, equipment, ammunition, blood, repair parts, and other supply items. The commander identifies items within CSSCS he considers critical to the operation and forms a commander's tracked item list (CTIL). The CTIL forms the basis of CSSCS common information tracking and reporting from the company to theater level.

Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below System


5-16. Force XXI battle command, brigade and below system (FBCB2) is a digitized battle command information system that provides on-the-move battle command information to tactical combat, combat support, and CSS commanders. FBCB2 is a key component of the ABCS and integrates with ABCS at the brigade and below level. It also interfaces with CSSCS. The CSS functions of FBCB2 include logistics situation reports, personnel situation reports, call for support, and logistics task order and task management.



5-17. CSS is vital to executing operations successfully. CSS planning, preparation, execution, and assessment must be versatile; they complement combat plans and operations, thus enhancing the ability of the supported commander to accomplish his mission. Commanders must anticipate their unit mission requirements and provide responsive support. They assess what resources and capabilities are available in theater and tailor follow-on forces accordingly. They ensure deploying/deployed units are sustainable in the theater of operations until establishing lines of communication (LOC) or providing other support from within the area of operations (AO) (for example, through contracted support or host nation support [HNS]).

5-18. The combatant commander bases his CSS plan on the overall campaign plan. As he develops his strategic concept of operations, he concurrently develops, in coordination with his Army service component command (ASCC) and other service component commanders, a concept of support. They and their staffs consider the many support factors that affect the ability of forces to conduct operations. At operational level, CSS can be a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations.

5-19. In conducting (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) operations, the ASCC commander's focus is on generating combat power by moving forces and materiel into the theater as well as on sustaining the forces there. ASCC commander's, in concert with their geographic combatant commander's guidance, are responsible for identifying ARFOR CSS requirements, coordinating resource distribution from the strategic base or local sources, allocating necessary CSS capabilities, and establishing CSS C2 relationships within the theater.

5-20. CSS planning should be centralized, comprehensive, tailorable, flexible, and continuous. Many of the factors planners consider are embedded in the discussions throughout this manual. Among other things, planners consider using Army prepositioned stocks (APS), in the theater or afloat, thereby reducing transportation requirements and providing earlier force closure for operations. If appropriate, they also consider joint, contracting, HNS, and multinational military sources. CSS planning-

  • Identifies significant time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources necessary to support the operation.
  • Identifies the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of the aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs), seaports of debarkation (SPODs), seaports of embarkation (SPOEs), and their reception and clearance capabilities.
  • Identifies support methods and procedures required to meet the needs of the commander.
  • Identifies vulnerabilities of certain types of systems and forces, including vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction.
  • Provides coordinating and controlling onward movement of arriving forces and materiel.
  • Includes reasonably assured joint, contracting, HNS, and multinational military sources.
  • Includes coordinating with national providers to identify sustainment capabilities to fill materiel requirements.

5-21. Using planning guidelines, planning factors, and established doctrine, CSS planners determine the quantities of supplies and services needed to support an operation. Before deployment begins, planners identify LOC capable of accommodating the types of aircraft and ships needed. Some commodities (such as fuel and ammunition) require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded everywhere without significant disruption of port activities.



5-22. Army prepositioned stocks are supplies located at or near the point of planned use or at other designated locations to reduce reaction time and to ensure resupply (FM 100-17-2). These reserves are intended to provide support essential to sustain operations until resupply can be expected. APS remains set at the minimum level needed to sustain and equip the approved forces as outlined in the defense planning guidance. In case of a major theater war, APS is released as directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Chief of Staff, Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army approves releasing APS to support a small-scale contingency (SSC). The FM 3-35-series manuals provide detailed discussions on APS. There are four categories of APS.

Prepositioned Sets


5-23. Unit sets consist of prepositioned organizational equipment (end items, supplies, and secondary items) stored in unit configurations to reduce force deployment response time. Equipment is configured into brigade sets, division units, and corps/echelon above corps (EAC) units. Materiel is positioned ashore and afloat to meet the Army's global prepositioning strategy requirements of more than one contingency in more than one theater of operations.

Army Operational Project Stocks


5-24. Operational project stocks are materiel above normal table of organization and equipment (TOE), table of distribution and allowances (TDA), and common table of allowance (CTA) authorizations, tailored to key strategic capabilities essential to the Army ability to execute force projection. They authorize supplies and equipment above normal modified TOE (MTOE) authorizations to support one or more Army operation, plan, or contingency. They are primarily positioned in continental United States (CONUS), with tailored portions or packages prepositioned overseas and afloat.

War Reserve Sustainment Stocks


5-25. War reserve stocks are acquired in peacetime to meet increased wartime requirements. They consist of major and secondary materiel aligned and designated to satisfy the Army wartime sustainment requirements. They provide minimum essential support to operations and post-mobilization training beyond the capabilities of peacetime stocks, industry, and HNS. Sustainment stocks are prepositioned in or near a theater of operations to last until resupply at wartime rates or emergency rates are established.

War Reserve Stocks for Allies


5-26. War reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) is an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-directed program that ensures U.S. preparedness to assist designated allies in case of war. The United States owns and finances WRSA assets, and prepositions them in the appropriate theater. The United States positions APSs as follows:

  • APS-1 (CONUS)-Operational project stocks and war reserve sustainment stocks.
  • APS-2 (Europe)-Prepositioned sets, operational project stocks, and limited war reserve sustainment stocks.
  • APS-3 (Army prepositioned afloat)-Prepositioned sets, operational project stocks, and war reserve sustainment stocks.
  • APS-4 (Pacific)-Prepositioned sets, operational project stocks, war reserve sustainment stocks, and war reserve stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K).
  • APS-5 (Southwest Asia [SWA])-Prepositioned sets, operational project stocks, and war reserve sustainment stocks.

5-27. Land-based APS in Korea, Europe, or Southwest Asia allows the early deployment of a heavy brigade to those locations. These prepositioned sets of equipment are essential to the timely support of the U.S. National military strategy in the areas of U.S. National interest and treaty obligations. Fixed land-based sites store Army prepositioned sets of combat, combat support (CS), and CSS equipment; Army operational projects stocks (such as, chemical defense equipment, cold weather clothing, and petroleum distribution equipment); and sustainment stocks. Land-based sets can support a theater lodgment to allow the off-load of Army prepositioned afloat equipment, and can be shipped to support any other theater worldwide. FM 100-17-2 has more details on APS.

5-28. Prepositioning stocks provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until sea lines of communication (SLOC) are established. Stocks are prepositioned in potential theaters. Alternatives are prepositioning stocks afloat or at an intermediate staging base (ISB), or assembling stocks in tailored packages for deployment with projected forces. In areas of potential operations with limited port facilities and requirements for SLOC, prepositioning port construction equipment and materiel is highly desirable.

5-29. The Automated Battlebook System (ABS) contains details on each APS program. G3 planners and unit movement officers use ABS to identify equipment in the categories to accompany troops (TAT) and not authorized for prepositioning (NAP). ABS also provides a consolidated list of all APS stockpile inventories. ABS supports deployment planning by providing the deploying unit with a contingency-updated database for all APS equipment and selected supplies in prepositioned locations. USAMC's Field Support Command (formally the Army War Reserve Support Command) updates the ABS continuously from the Army War Reserve Deployment System (AWRDS) database and, on request, provides units with a CD-ROM database. Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the proponent for ABS and can provide a mobile training team to units on request.

5-30. Army prepositioned afloat (APA) is the expanded reserve of equipment for an armored brigade, theater-opening CS/CSS units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks aboard forward-deployed prepositioned afloat ships. APA operations are predicated on the concept of airlifting an Army heavy brigade with logistics support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies positioned aboard APA ships and, subsequently, to conduct combat operations. See FM 100-17-1 for details.



5-31. Potential HNS agreements should address labor support arrangements for port and terminal operations, using available transportation assets in country, using bulk petroleum distribution and storage facilities, possible supply of Class III (bulk) and Class IV items, and developing and using field services. The United States should initiate and continually evaluate agreements with multinational partners for improvement. They should be specifically worded to enable CSS planners to adjust for specified requirements. Additionally, the commander should assess the risk associated with using HNS, considering force protection and operational requirements. FM 100-8 discusses more on this topic.

Note: If a command plans to use HNS, a primary objective is to ensure that the internal support of the nation providing the support is not disrupted.



5-32. Containerization significantly improves the delivery times of supplies and other selected cargo to the AO by reducing handling, shipload, and discharge time. Containerization is the use of containers to unitize cargo for transportation, supply, and storage. Containerization incorporates supply, security, packaging, storage, and transportation into a distribution system from source to user. Unitized cargo or load is a single item or a number of items packaged, packed, or arranged in a specified manner that can be handled as a unit. Unitization may be accomplished by placing the item or items in a container or banding them securely together (JP 4-01.7). However, effectively using the system requires advance planning to ensure that necessary materials handling equipment (MHE) and container-handling equipment (CHE) are available. Throughput of containerized materiel requires the right MHE/CHE at the receiving end. Planners must consider using existing technologies to enhance visibility of location and content of containers. JP 4-01.7 details container doctrine.



5-33. Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease (JP 3-0). Force protection at all levels minimizes losses to hostile action. Skillful and aggressive counterintelligence and threat assessments decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces. Effective operations security (OPSEC) keeps adversaries from identifying and exploiting essential elements friendly information. (See FM 100-6.) Properly dispersing CSS assets helps reduce losses from enemy fires and terrorist action. CSS commanders use camouflage discipline, local security, and field fortifications to reduce losses due to enemy actions. Protecting electronic links and nodes, to include combat troops with electronic devices, is vital to protecting information, information systems, and soldiers.



5-34. Logistics preparation of the theater (LPT) is a key conceptual tool available to personnel in building a flexible strategic/operational support plan. Logistics preparation of the theater consists of the actions taken by combat service support personnel at all echelons to optimize means (force structure, resources, and strategic lift) of supporting the joint force commander's plan. These actions include identifying and preparing ISBs and forward operating bases; selecting and improving LOC; projecting and preparing forward CSS bases; and forecasting and building operational stock assets forward and afloat. They focus on identifying the resources currently available in the theater for use by friendly forces and ensuring access to those resources. A detailed estimate of requirements, tempered with logistics preparation of the theater, allows support personnel to advise the JTF/ASCC/ARFOR commander of the most effective method of providing adequate, responsive support while minimizing the CSS footprint.

5-35. More often than not, identifying and preparing an initial lodgment or support base has a major influence on the course of a campaign. Lodgments should expand to allow easy access to strategic sealift and airlift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitate transshipment of supplies, and be accessible to multiple LOC. Thus, forces often establish lodgments near key seaports and airports in the theater. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations may augment undeveloped or damaged facilities or provide ports where none exist. Conducting LOTS operations from anchorages becomes more important if the enemy has the capability to deliver long-range, highly destructive fires. Split-based operations and modular operations are often required while establishing an initial lodgment.

5-36. Seldom does an initial lodgment or support base contain the ideal mix of desired characteristics. The ASCC commander, in concert with the JFC, makes difficult choices when organizing support for the operation. One of the most difficult is whether to stockpile supplies forward in the theater, or rely on time-definite delivery from CONUS or from an ISB. Stockpiling places supplies in relatively close proximity to units but may place a burden on the theater support structure in terms of having to move, protect, and handle large quantities of support resources on a repetitive basis. On the other hand, while responsive distribution reduces this burden significantly, it is highly dependent on the availability and responsiveness of limited airlift assets to deliver critical supplies in a timely manner to ensure that fighting forces are able to sustain the desired tempo. The commander weighs the risks and benefits of both of these options then decides which can best fulfill the support requirements. Depending on the METT-TC factors, he may transition from one option to the other, or adopt a combination of both.

5-37. Selecting and improving LOC are essential aspects of maintaining uninterrupted CSS throughout an operation. The operational commander must understand the relationship between stockage, time, LOC, and combat power. Time spent in deliberate preparation (projecting and preparing an ISB and forward support bases, and positioning resources in them) can result in shorter LOC and greater operational capability in the future. This was the case in Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, where Army forces positioned bases forward as part of the U.S. Central Command's strategic concentration to support future operations. On the other hand, the age-old problem of overextended LOC and supply shortages can have a detrimental impact on a large force trying to conduct offensive operations. Conducting nonlinear operations also greatly complicates the requirement to ensure LOC security. Operations and CSS planners must take great care in planning LOC security in any nonlinear operation.



5-38. Relevant information is all information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control (FM 3-0). Relevant information provides the answers commanders and staffs need to conduct operations successfully, that is, all elements necessary to address the factors of METT-TC. Once CSS planners know a contingency country or geographic region, they begin to build a CSS relevant information database. They develop this CSS relevant information in close coordination with the intelligence and operations community's intelligence preparation of the battlefield effort. When completed, they can use the information in the database to develop a comprehensive plan for LPT. The relative priority of this effort depends on the concept of operations, along with other command priorities. Because it is a complex and time-consuming function, CSS planners cannot afford to wait until deployment begins to start the LPT. Anticipation by CSS planners at the National and combatant command levels can preclude inserting soldiers into a completely "cold" base.

5-39. Planning must provide for the timely arrival of CSS assets balanced according to the mission. Strategic lift assets are extremely limited, and commanders cannot afford to squander even one sortie on movement of unnecessary supplies, equipment, or personnel. A well-thought-out LPT plan, along with the time required for proper execution, allows better use of scarce strategic lift capability. A detailed LPT plan covers the following areas.



5-40. Planners collect information on climate, terrain, and endemic diseases in the AO to determine when and what types of equipment are needed. For example, water information determines the need for such things as early deployment of well-digging assets and water production and distribution units.



5-41. Planners collect information on supply items that are readily available in the AO and can support U.S. forces. Subsistence items, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials are the most common. Planners must answer several questions, such as:

  • Can any of these items be purchased locally?
  • What supply systems are the Allies/coalition partners using? Are they compatible?
  • Are major equipment items compatible?
  • Does the host nation (HN) have repair parts that support current U.S. systems?

Answers to these types of questions assist in determining if HNS negotiations are feasible, if not already in place.



5-42. Planners collect information on the availability of such things as warehousing, cold-storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities, hospitals, sanitation capabilities, and hotels. Availability of such facilities could reduce the requirement for deployment. For example, force provider can house approximately 3,300 personnel. (See chapter 6.) However, if space is available in a complex of hotels with the requisite support in the required location, deploying the force provider, with its significant strategic lift requirements, could be eliminated or deferred.



5-43. Planners collect information on such things as road and rail nets, truck availability, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum pipelines, MHE, traffic flow, choke points, and control problems.



5-44. Planners examine the multinational partners' armed forces and answer such questions as-

  • Can they supplement the Army capability?
  • Does a commonality exist in such things as equipment and repair parts?
  • Does the host nation have adequate machine works for possible fabrication of repair parts?
  • Are there theater support contract maintenance capabilities available?

General Skills


5-45. Planners collect information on the general population of the AO. They get answers to such questions as:

  • Is English commonly spoken?
  • Are interpreters available?
  • Will a general labor pool be available?
  • What skills are available (drivers, clerks, MHE operators, food service personnel, guards, mechanics, and longshoremen available)?

5-46. Collectors routinely provide an abundance of information on targeted theaters or likely contingency areas. Also, agencies can assist CSS personnel in building the information file. The following sources of information are only a few; this list is not all-inclusive.

Department of State


5-47. Department of State embassy staffs routinely do country studies. They also produce information on foreign countries, including unclassified pamphlets. These pamphlets focus on political and economic issues, not military or CSS matters.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Data


5-48. The weather and terrain databases in the IPB, with its overlays, provide current information for preselecting LOC and sites for CSS facilities. The IPB event analysis matrix and template can determine the need for route improvements and bridge reinforcements. FM 34-130 has more details.

Special Operations Forces, to Include Civil Affairs Units


5-49. Whether in country or targeted on a specific country, SOF can provide a wealth of CSS information. They include functional specialists who focus on particular areas (such as civilian supply, public health, public safety, and transportation). Civil affairs (CA) units also can provide vital assistance when coordinating theater contract support and CUL support to NGOs.



5-50. Culturegrams are a series of unclassified pamphlets published by Brigham Young University that provide general/social information on specific countries. Though not focused on governmental or military interests, they provide a variety of useful information that can be used by deploying forces.

Army Country Profiles


5-51. Army country profiles (ACPs) are produced by the Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center. ACPs are classified country profiles providing information on logistics, military capabilities, intelligence and security, medical intelligence, and military geography. They include photos, maps, and charts.

Country Contingency Support Studies


5-52. Country contingency support studies are produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These classified documents contain extensive information on railways, highways, bridges, and tunnels within a given country.

5-53. Other assets or tools the CSS planner may want to consider as the LPT plan is developed include-

  • Army prepositioned stocks.
  • Use of containerization to limit handling.
  • HNS agreements.
  • ISSAs and ACSAs.
  • Prearranged contracts to provide support.

5-54. The CSS planner must not underestimate the time and resources required for these actions. The LPT is a living document that is in a continual state of review, refinement, and use. Forces should use it as the basis for negotiations, preparing the TPFDD, and the Total Army analysis process.



5-55. The LPT should be the basis for negotiating HNS and theater support contracting agreements. Considerations may include prepositioning of supplies and equipment, civilian support contracts, OCONUS training programs, and humanitarian and civic assistance programs designed to enhance the development and cooperative solidarity of the host nation, and provide infrastructure compensation should deployment of forces to the target country be required.



5-56. The LPT should be synchronized on a regular basis with the TPFDD to ensure that only the CSS capabilities that cannot be met with assurance from another source are phased into the AO. This synchronization takes place, at a minimum, each time the commander updates the LPT to ensure that only the minimum necessary strategic lift is committed to CSS assets.

5-57. The ASCC commander identifies the number of Army units, including CS and CSS organizations, required to support the combatant commander's campaign plan. This force tailoring becomes the basis for resourcing decisions concerning the various force compositions active component, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and stationing plans. (FM 3-0 discusses force tailoring.) A current, well-developed LPT enables the ASCC commander to make sound force tailoring and resourcing decisions.



5-58. The LPT ties support requirements and acquisition support together at the operational level. The LPT process ensures CSS personnel have considered all possible sources of support. The LPT provides the details in the CSS reach consideration of such sources as joint and multinational capabilities, HNS, and contractors. It also considers the link to the support capabilities available in the sustainment base.

5-59. The acquisition of resources refers to the activity at all levels to gain access to the support resources identified in the requirements determination aspect of planning. The process of acquiring resources is closely related to force tailoring in two ways: the commander aims to attain the resources identified during the planning process, and barriers to acquisition may influence support requirements. The acquisition of CSS resources is also associated with distribution. What is acquired, and where and how it is acquired, may depend on distribution capabilities. At all levels, CSS personnel are aware of and exploit all possible sources of support.

5-60. Acquisition of resources to support military operations involves such varied activities as-

  • Contracting materiel and services.
  • Negotiating ISSAs and ACSAs at the National level.
  • Arranging LOGCAP and HNS agreements.
  • Utilizing private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations.
  • Recruiting military and civilian personnel.
  • Conducting mobilization activities.

5-61. Planners must understand the availability of support capabilities from all possible sources to acquire them efficiently. They need to understand the requirements and assets available in all theaters, as identified in LPTs, to ensure arrangements are in place to acquire additional required resources.

5-62. In many operations, the primary source of supplies and other resources is from the sustainment base, as coordinated through the support managers at the operational level. Other sources may include other services or multinational partners and contractors (as covered in paragraph 5-86). Tactical-level CSS may include limited support from local purchase sources and short-term local support agreements with collocated joint or multinational partners. Cross-leveling assets are also part of determining what resources are available to meet the needs of the supported force.



5-63. Distribution is the process of synchronizing all elements of the CSS system to deliver the right things to the right place at the right time to support the commander. The distribution system is a complex of networks tailored to meet the requirements of the force across the range of operations. These networks are overlaid on existing infrastructure that the host-nation and military, civilian, and multinational forces participating in the same operation must share. Combinations of U.S. military, host nation, multinational, and contractor organizations operate the nodes and modes that distribute the forces and sustainment resources. These organizations collect and report data to a network of operational and CSS headquarters responsible for processing the data into information and issuing instructions to the node and mode operators. This process enables the JFC and subordinate ARFOR commander to carry out CSS effectively and efficiently.

5-64. Army distribution planning focuses on providing a versatile, continuous flow of personnel, materiel, and services to support the operational requirements of the ARFOR. CSS planners must consider the impact, constraints, and AO of each of the distribution functions, systems, and information systems required to sustain the flow of resources. The distribution management plans must focus on supporting operations across full spectrum operations within a joint and often multinational and interagency operational environment. Understanding the JFC's concept of operations and early involvement by the CSS staffs and planners at all levels are essential to ensure responsive CSS. Distribution planning must incorporate strategic, operational, and tactical deployment and sustainment requirements while balancing the theater distribution capabilities and resources available to the JFC and service component commanders.

5-65. Detailed planning for distribution operations is a key part of the environment of the distribution manager. Commanders, support operations elements, and control centers must plan far enough ahead to influence the flow within the strategic segment of the distribution pipeline. Success requires periodic monitoring of resource and movement transactions, knowledge of trends and performance, and knowledge of the commander's operational priorities. Planning makes future operations easier by permitting subsequent, rapid, and coordinated action by the staff and by other elements of the command. It also keeps the command in a better position to respond to rapidly changing situations. Adequate, practical planning is essential to the success of distribution.

5-66. Figure 5-1 depicts the interrelationship of the distribution plan with the LPT and the service support plan, with its associated annexes and appendices. At the strategic and operational levels, the OPLAN/OPORD provides operational mission information essential to developing the LPT. The LPT provides the data required to prepare the logistics estimate. This estimate draws conclusions and makes recommendations concerning the feasibility of various courses of action (COAs), and the effects of each COA on CSS operations. Once the commander selects a COA, the CSS planner uses the logistics estimate to develop the logistics portion of the service support plan along with the distribution plan to the OPLAN/OPORD.

Figure 5-1. Inter-relationship of the Distribution Plan with the LPT and the Service Support Plan

Figure 5-1. Inter-relationship of the Distribution Plan with the LPT
and the Service Support Plan.


5-67. The LPT, service support plan, and distribution plan are living documents within the CSS planning triad that are changed, refined, and updated as a result of continuing estimates and studies.

5-68. The distribution pipeline is a channel through which the DOD conducts distribution operations. The pipeline consists of a complex framework of integrated national/theater-level physical and resource networks linked by information systems. Figure 5-2 shows the end-to-end flow of resources from supplier to consumer.

5-69. The supported combatant commander's perspective of the distribution pipeline includes two portions: the strategic portion and the theater portion.

5-70. The strategic portion has two distinct functional areas performed by DLA and other strategic providers and by U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). DLA, respective service strategic-level CSS activities (such as USAMC and USAMMA), and installations provide maintenance, preparation for movement of units and equipment, and materiel support.

Figure 5-2. The Distribution Pipeline

Figure 5-2. The Distribution Pipeline.


5-71. The second functional area relates to strategic lift and in-transit visibility. USTRANSCOM and its subordinate transportation component commands using the Defense Transportation System (DTS), are the key organizations in this area. The DTS is the portion of the nation's transportation infrastructure that supports DOD common-user transportation needs across the range of military operations. USTRANSCOM has developed a single database to provide in-transit visibility to all DOD activities. This database is the Global Transportation Network (GTN) and contains all DTS-related transactions and movement status.



5-72. The theater portion of distribution is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander, but a subordinate JTF normally executes this responsibility. Theater distribution occurs in the distribution pipeline extending from the port of debarkation (POD) to the user. Distribution resources within the theater are finite, and regardless of the commodity distributed or the operational phase, the distribution system competes for resources. The theater distribution manager must possess total visibility over all distribution capabilities, service requirements, and common-item supply resources flow within the theater distribution system. This maximizes distribution flexibility and combines the overall system capacity. JP 4-01.4, which is currently under development, will be the joint reference for theater distribution.

5-73. The individual subordinate JFC is responsible for managing an effective distribution network. Many options are available to meet a JFC's requirements. His choice depends on the type and size of the operation and the campaign objectives. He may direct subordinate service components to manage and operate their own distribution systems. He may establish a logistics readiness center (LRC) and/or a series of joint boards and management centers at the combatant command and/or subordinate JTF levels. These joint activities establish policies and set priorities ensuring the flow of resources to support the joint/multinational campaign. FM 100-10-1 has more information.

5-74. Theater distribution synchronizes improvements in distribution activities; such, as movement control, mode operations, materiel management, supply and service support, and associated technology. The result is increased speed within an effective theater distribution system. CSS personnel integrate the current strategic, operational, and tactical level of distribution into a seamless joint continuum.

5-75. Theater distribution planning, preparation, execution, and assessment considerations are functions of visibility, management, and transportation support. Logistics planners consider theater distribution in every aspect of operational planning throughout the processes of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. The critical link between strategic deployment and operational employment is the seamless flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel from off-load at POD through employment of reassembled, mission capable forces in the operational area. Figure 5-3 depicts the link between the strategic and theater pipelines.

5-76. Throughout joint operations, the combatant commander continually matures the joint distribution system capability, and controls the flow of units and materiel within the theater to support the mission. The combatant commander and staffs manage and coordinate critical distribution resources and assets among the ASCC and other service components.

5-77. The combatant commander manages the theater piece of the distribution pipeline that comprises all the networks through which materiel and units flow before reaching their final destination. Theater distribution is accomplished from the PODs or other in-theater locations to the customers. It includes the physical flow of materiel and movement of forces, and associated information. An effective communications infrastructure needs to be in place to achieve the goals of theater distribution at the combatant command level. Similarly, the ASCC and other service components are responsible for upgrading their internal networks and identifying funding, placing required infrastructure, and placing their own distribution networks from the component to the tactical level. Additionally, each service component is responsible for upgrades that may be required to conduct theater distribution in accordance with, and in support of, the concept of operations for each theater. It is critical that the capabilities for theater operations be interoperable, flexible, responsive, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable. The geographic combatant commander designs theater distribution information to provide the visibility he requires.

Figure 5-3. Distribution Operations.

Figure 5-3. Distribution Operations.


5-78. Joint information systems are essential to theater distribution. To ensure success, commanders and staffs must have the ability to communicate among themselves and with other services and forces. This capability is made possible through links between the global combat control system (GCCS) and the global combat control system--Army (GCCS-A). GCCS-A links the Army's operational and tactical command and control systems to the strategic level-GCCS. GCCS-A is a component of the ABCS. ABCS is comprised of eight separate systems to support key command and control functions of maneuver, fire support, air defense, intelligence, air support, battle command, and CSS. While each command and control system provides detailed support of its battlefield functional area to the other ABCS systems, it also receives the relevant information from the other command and control systems to provide the commander with a common operational picture of the battlefield. At the strategic level, the CSSCS is the CSS component of ABCS. CSSCS provides a concise picture of unit maneuver sustainment requirements and support capabilities by collecting, processing, and displaying information on key items of supply, services, and personnel that the commander deems crucial to the success of the operation. CSSCS does not duplicate STAMIS functions. The management of all items within a class of supply or support function remains a STAMIS function. Other emerging systems are GCSS, GCSS-A, transportation coordinators automated information for movement system II (TC-AIMS II). These systems are discussed later in this chapter.

5-79. Staffs must quickly and accurately distribute information to elements within the distribution system. Some examples of the communications systems to accomplish this are area common user system (ACUS), warfighter information network-tactical (WIN-T), and garrison communications.



5-80. Ongoing developments in CSS activities support the Army role in theater distribution as it moves to distribution-based CSS. These include establishing distribution management centers/elements (DMC/E), developments in information systems, advancements in configured loads, emphasis on maximizing throughput, and enhancing capabilities to operate intermodal terminals.

Distribution Management


5-81. To facilitate distribution management, the Army is creating distribution DMC/Es within theater, corps, and division support commands. For Army forces, the key link to the theater system is the TSC DMC. It develops the ASCC's piece of the distribution plan in coordination with the ASCC G4. It also exercises staff supervision of Army EAC materiel managers and movement controllers. Using liaison elements in the DMCs is a critical factor in ensuring that the ASCC's piece of the theater distribution system is as responsive and efficient as possible. To facilitate distribution management operations, other CSS commands/units routinely provide liaison elements to the DMC to ensure that the support their organizations are responsible for is fully synchronized into the overall distribution system for all supplies and services. FM 4-93.4 describes the full role of the TSC DMC. Some key functions are-

  • Maintain visibility of locations of support activities and customers. STAMIS can provide some of this information. However, current systems are not programmed to provide it. Systems under development will provide this information much more effectively. Until GCSS-A and the movement tracking system (MTS) are in place, the DMC gets much of its information from information systems such as CSSCS or from nonautomated reports.
  • Maintain information on support relationships. If directed by the ASCC/ARFOR G4, the TSC DMC can provide support relationship information directly to the combatant command/JTF J4 staff.
  • Effect cross leveling. The DMC currently can obtain on-hand and due-in status to support cross-leveling through the Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARSS-O), Standard Army Ammunition System-Modified (SAAS-MOD), and the Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS). If no assets are readily available from the wholesale system, the DMC inquires into asset tracking services (joint total asset visibility [JTAV], Army total asset visibility [ATAV], GTN) to find a match for high-priority requirements from inbound materiel. For Army materiel, the DMC instructs movement controllers to divert shipments or redistribute assets to the appropriate SSA. For non-Army owned materiel, the DMC coordinates with the applicable lead service or joint board/staff to affect cross-leveling. The TSC DMC coordinates with COSCOM and DISCOM DMCs to synchronize cross-leveling assets across all Army echelons, as necessary.

5-82. Loads configured by Army and other elements also enhance the efficiency of the joint distribution system.

5-83. Theater and corps hubs provide the basis for the theater distribution pipeline. Hubs receive and stage all supplies, personnel, and units moving into the theater and prepare them for onward movement to their final destination. FM 100-10-1 lays out the flow of supplies and services through the theater hub, from reception in the theater hub to delivery at DS activities in the combat zone. Within the distribution hub at each echelon, the Army establishes one or more intermodal terminals for cargo. These terminals segregate, consolidate, manifest, and stage cargo for delivery. They use cross-dock operations to segregate and ship cargo to satellite nodes in the system. More details on nodes in the distribution system, as well as other information on the Army's role in theater distribution are in FM 100-10-1.

Information Systems to Support Distribution


5-84. Information technology improvements are revolutionizing CSS. Distribution managers require timely and accurate TAV information to manage the distribution pipeline efficiently and effectively to build and sustain combat power. This includes information about warfighter requirements, tactical operations and the overall situational awareness from the ABCS (such as CSSCS) and the on-hand, in-transit and in-maintenance TAV information. The ability to receive the logistics portion of the COP in the form of TAV enables CSS operations to build and sustain combat power efficiently and effectively for the warfighter. This section discusses the integrated role of information systems in the distribution system. The functional chapters of this manual and/or proponent doctrinal manuals address the specific functional capabilities of these information systems.

5-85. TAV has three primary components: asset visibility, in-transit visibility, and in-maintenance visibility. The Army is developing a variety of information systems to better support total asset visibility. GCSS-A and the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) capture asset visibility of personnel and materiel. TC-AIMS II, and MTS provide in-transit visibility of personnel and materiel. These information systems have an integrated suite of radio frequency (RF) technology. Together, these systems provide the total asset visibility capability to support CSS operations. These capabilities are critical in executing distribution operations. CSS personnel supporting distribution operations and equipped with these information systems support the force commander with greater responsiveness, anticipation, and agility from a smaller CSS footprint. Visibility of all unit equipment, personnel, and supplies enable CSS operations to leverage limited CSS capabilities to support Army forces.

  • Asset visibility involves the ability to see what is on-hand and on-order. In-theater asset visibility begins at the SSA for cargo and at replacement centers for personnel. The SSA and DMC track cargo receipt, storage, and issue functions using GCSS-A and radio frequency data collection (RFDC). Information from RF tags required for receipt, storage, and issue processing passes to the GCSS-A management module. The replacement centers and DMC track personnel using SIDPERS and smart cards. Information from smart cards for personnel processing passes to the GCSS-A management module.
  • In-transit visibility is the ability to see what is moving in the distribution pipeline. In-theater in-transit visibility begins at the POD during RSO&I. Reception at the POD involves receiving strategic lift manifest information of unit equipment, personnel, and sustainment cargo-the source data for in-theater total asset visibility. USTRANSCOM information systems, worldwide port system (WPS), and the Global Air Transportation and Execution System (GATES) process receipt of unit equipment, personnel, and sustainment cargo from strategic lift vessels. This information is forwarded to the GTN. Information from WPS and GATES passes to the Army theater-level information system-TC-AIMS II (when fielded). Unit equipment and sustainment cargo is tracked using RF tags attached to equipment, containers, and pallets in the port marshalling area. Information from RF tags passes through TC-AIMS II to the GCSS-A management module onward movement in the AO from port marshalling/staging areas and personnel-holding areas is supported by the MTS at the platform level. This provides modal visibility for moving cargo. The TC-AIMS II provides nodal visibility of moving cargo. Transportation control and movement document (TCMD) information moves from the RF-tagged, MTS-equipped distribution platform up to the GCSS-A management module via the TC-AIMS II system. Critical nodes along the distribution pipeline will be equipped with the TC-AIMS II to move TCMD information from the RF tags to the GCSS-A management module.
  • In-maintenance, visibility refers to the ability to see what is being repaired. In-maintenance, visibility begins with current shop status of equipment at direct support maintenance locations in the AO. Maintenance status information passes through GCSS-A to the GCSS management module. RF data collection bar code scanners are receipts of parts for maintenance operations. Future uses of RF technology include tracking internal maintenance shop workload and equipment history.



5-86. Army CSS units normally provide the backbone of support to Army forces in full spectrum operations. However, CSS commanders and staffs also integrate the efforts of DA civilians and contractors. Civilian personnel provide essential CSS for military operations in peacetime as well as during operations.

5-87. Identifying requirements for civilian personnel (governmental or nongovernmental agency civilians and contractors) and identifying qualified personnel to fill those requirements are essential when planning for operations. Appropriate proponents must ensure that civilians are incorporated into deliberate planning so they are trained and ready in a timely manner. Four reasons for employing civilians are that they-

  • Complement military capabilities, thus freeing soldiers for other duties as assigned.
  • May be employed without a mobilization to perform functions that may otherwise require an AC or RC unit to perform.
  • Have technical skills that are not available in the uniformed components.
  • May be required in place of military support personnel/units to meet military personnel force caps.



5-88. Fifteen hundred DA civilians in more than 100 different occupational specialties deployed from commands throughout the world to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. In future operations, DA civilians will continue to play an important role in Army operations, fulfilling critical functions on the battlefield. The functional proponent for Army personnel support to DA civilians (appropriated and nonappropriated fund [NAF] employees) is Headquarters, Department of the Army, G1. Contracting activities and contracting officers provide contractual oversight for contract civilians. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) performs NAF civilian personnel management for AAFES personnel.

5-89. Civilian personnel who provide essential CS and CSS roles in a theater are a key part of the Army. For example, civilian members of the logistics support element (LSE) provide national-level supply, maintenance, and technical assistance; AAFES deploys civilians to run exchange systems for everyday necessities. This civilian workforce includes CONUS expansion and OCONUS requirements to support military operations.



5-90. Contracted support is an effective force multiplier. It can bridge gaps before military support resources arrive and when host-nation support is not available. It also augments existing support capabilities. Theater support contracts may provide effective support thus allowing the combatant commander to better operate within the limits of strategic lift or military force caps realities, particularly in stability operations and support operations.

5-91. The type and quantity of support a contractor provides is similar to that provided by a military support unit, when considered from a customer perspective. However, commanders and staffs must remain aware of some fundamental differences. For example-

  • Contractors perform only the tasks specified in the contract. Other duties as assigned does not apply in a contract environment, thus reducing the flexibility of support.
  • Contractors and their employees are not combatants, but rather civilians accompanying the force. This status must not be jeopardized. They cannot man the security perimeter, possibly increasing force protection requirements when compared to using military CSS capabilities.
  • Contractor status in a combat environment as civilians accompanying the force is clearly defined in the Hague and Geneva Conventions and other international agreements. If captured, they are entitled to prisoner of war status.
  • Contractor activities are managed through the command's contracting structure, not the operational chain of command. Commanders do not have command of contractor employees; contractor personnel are not government employees. Only contractors manage and supervise their employees. Commanders manage contractors through the contracting officer and contracting officer's representative (COR) in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.

Types of Contractors


5-92. There are three types of contractors. They are characterized by the general type of support provided and by the source of their contract authority.

5-93. Theater Support Contractors. Theater support contractors support deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts, or contracts awarded from the AO, by contracting officers serving under the direct contracting authority of the theater principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC). Theater support contractors provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders.

5-94. External Support Contractors. External support contractors provide for deployed forces support, separate and distinct from either theater support or system contractors. They may be associated with prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency. Contracting officers who award and administer external support contracts retain distinct contracting authority to organizations other than the theater PARC. USAMC, for example, provides commercial depot support through contracts by its commodity commands. Other organizations provide external support contracts. For example, the LOGCAP program office administers its prearranged umbrella contract, commonly referred to as LOGCAP, and USTRANSCOM provides the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and commercial sealift supporting the theater. In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) procures leased real property and real estate.

5-95. System Contractors. System contractors support deployed forces under prearranged contracts awarded by program executive officers (PEOs), program managers (PMs), and the USAMC to provide specific support to materiel systems throughout their life cycles, during both peacetime and contingency operations. These systems include, but are not limited to, vehicles, weapon systems, aircraft, and information systems infrastructure and equipment. Contracting officers working for the PMs and USAMC subordinate commands administer their system contractor functions and operations via their contracts.

Contractable Functions on the Battlefield


5-96. Depending on the situation and associated risks, a contractor may augment or provide a variety of support functions on the battlefield. All Army functions, other than those inherently governmental in nature (armed combat, command and control of U.S. military and/or civilian personnel, and government contracting) or functions covered by HNS agreement may be suitable for contractor support.

5-97. Supply and Field Services. Contractors can provide the full range of supply and field services, including item management, stockage, and delivery of all classes of supply. Contractor support may also provide field services (such as, laundry, shower, clothing exchange and repair, water purification, waste disposal, portable latrine support, and mortuary affairs), within specific parameters.

5-98. Transportation Support. Contracts may support all modes of transportation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Transportation is required everywhere within the theater, from the POD into the combat zone. Contractor support may include all mode and terminal operation functions.

5-99. Maintenance Support. Because of the increasing sophistication of equipment and weapon systems, they are a prime area for contractor support. Development and production contractors provide follow-on maintenance and technical support to the systems they have developed and built. This support includes sustainment maintenance on specified equipment and weapon systems and subsystems and associated software, and extends over the entire life cycle of the system, in peace and war. Contractors (other than system contractors) may also be involved in routine maintenance, repair, rebuild, and overhaul programs for equipment that is not the responsibility of a system contractor.

5-100. Medical/Dental. Contractors can support health care for contingency operations. An assessment of the capabilities and standards of care provided by the host-nation medical treatment facilities determines the extent of HSS capabilities required to support military operations.

5-101. General Labor. Under the staff responsibility of the G1/S1, unskilled labor may be contracted on a daily basis. This satisfies government labor needs that do not require military skills or a skilled contractor workforce.

DA Civilian and Contractor Risk Assessment


5-102. Properly evaluating the use of DA civilians and contractor support to a military operation requires a risk assessment. (FM 100-14 contains risk management doctrine.) There are two aspects of risk assessment related to the use of DA civilians and contractors. The first focuses on the threat to the contractor employees' physical safety. As part of his campaign plan, the JFC plans for contractors on the battlefield and establishes guidelines/restrictions on location of these personnel within the AO. With use of contractors in high-risk situations, contract solicitations must clearly identify the services needed and the conditions under which they will be performed. When contractors are willing to perform under dangerous conditions, the degree of risk involved substantially influences the cost of a contract. The second aspect of risk assessment focuses on the impact of DA civilian and contractor support on mission accomplishment (or, more importantly, the potential for mission failure if civilian employees cannot or will not perform functions due to the level of hostilities). In some situations, the risk or cost of using DA civilians and contractors may not warrant their use in certain operations, locations, or functions. For more detailed information on contractor support to military operations, consult JP 4-0, FM 100-10-2, and FM 3-100.21.


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