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Military

Appendix I

Executive Protection

DOD Directive 2000.12 recognizes a need to provide protection to military officers and DOD civilians who are assigned to high-risk billets, who are (by the nature of their work) high-risk personnel, or who are assigned to facilities identified as high-risk targets. The directive defines these terms as follows:

  • High-risk billet. Authorized personnel billet (identified and recommended by appropriate authority) that because of grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make personnel filling them an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.
  • High-risk personnel. US personnel and their family members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make them an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.
  • High-risk target. US facilities and material resources that, because of mission sensitivity, ease of access, isolation, or symbolic value may be an especially attractive or accessible terrorist target.

NOTE: For purposes of this appendix, the term executive will be applied to all persons requiring additional security protection who are assigned to high-risk billets, designated as high-risk personnel, or identified as high-risk targets.

Supplemental Security Measures

I-1. The specific supplemental security measures that may be furnished to executives are subject to a wide range of legal and policy constraints. US law establishes stringent requirements that must be met before certain security measures may be implemented. DOD regulations, instructions, and legal opinions may further constrain the implementation of some protective measures described in this chapter. The SOFAs and MOUs between the US and a foreign government will also limit the use of some supplemental security measures. Leases and other conditions imposed by contract for purchase of land or buildings by the US for DOD use may also limit the application of certain security techniques. All of these constraints should be carefully considered when conducting security surveys, developing plans, and implementing additional security measures to protect high-risk personnel.

Executive Protection Goals

I-2. In the discussion that follows, several measures are outlined that can afford senior military officers and DOD personnel additional protection against terrorist acts. The purpose underlying these measures is to—

  • Increase the interval of time between detecting a threat and the onset of hostile action against executives and their dependents.
  • Increase the amount of time required by terrorists to gain physical access to executives from the onset of hostile actions, whether the executives are at home, at the office, or in transit.

I-3. The implementation of supplemental security measures should strive to achieve the following prioritized goals:

  • Enhancements should hold the terrorist threat at bay until a response force arrives (delay at a distance).
  • Enhancements in physical security should enable executives to flee to safety (delay to permit flight).
  • Enhancements should permit the executive to retreat into a safe haven of sufficient strength and survivability. This should enable a response force to wage an effective counterattack to liberate executives and others accompanying them to a safe haven, including family members at home and colleagues and visitors at work (delay, hold, and counterattack).

I-4. The following supplemental measures should be applied with care. There is a clear trade-off between increasing the level of physical security at the office and at home and preserving the anonymity of executives, thereby avoiding telltale signs of activity that point to prominence or criticality. These measures can be expensive. Expense can be measured not just in terms of dollars, but also in terms of changes to organizational routine. Therefore, three questions must be resolved before implementing bold, disruptive, and expensive supplemental security enhancements:

  • What are the most cost-effective means of enhancing the security of executives at risk?
  • How many changes in organizational routines and personal behaviors will have to be made for security measures to be effective in reducing the risk of terrorist attacks and the vulnerability of executives to such attacks?
  • What are the anticipated costs of additional security measures in terms of dollars, organizational functionality, and mission capability?

I-5. Security enhancements can be made to improve the security of executives and can be even more effective if executives and their families take full advantage of and reinforce those measures. If executives do not change their behavior to accommodate additional security and protective measures, then the behaviors can effectively defeat the purpose of additional protection. Additional increments of security can be obtained to defeat virtually any threat. However, there is a point at which it is no longer cost-effective to add layer upon layer of protective measures to defeat a threat.

Residential Security Measures

I-6. While terrorist groups conduct intelligence operations to identify targets, mistakes have been made in the past. DOD personnel should avoid leasing residences previously used by representatives of governments or organizations known to be targets of various terrorist groups. DOD personnel leasing residences formerly used by representatives of such governments may be placing themselves unnecessarily at risk of being attacked as a result of mistaken identity.

I-7. An executive's entire lifestyle should be included in security surveys used to assess the need for supplemental physical-security measures at the office. The executive's home and transportation from home to office and back should also be examined for risk and vulnerability. The same principles used to identify supplemental security improvements in an office environment apply to an executive's home environment as well. The purposes of physical-security enhancements are to—

  • Increase the amount of time terrorists need to initiate and complete an attack on executives while at home, thereby giving response forces more time to rescue executives and their dependents.
  • Reduce potential harm to executives and their families because of a terrorist assault mounted against the residence.

I-8. The goals of enhanced residential physical-security measures are to—

  • Increase the amount of time between detection of a threat and the onset of hostile actions.
  • Delay the terrorists as long as possible. Prevent terrorist access to executives and their family members and make it difficult to leave the scene to escape prosecution. These measures should not further jeopardize the lives of executives and their family members.
  • Provide a safe haven where executives and their family members may flee for security pending the arrival of a response force on the scene.

I-9. The following measures can be implemented selectively to help security personnel achieve these objectives:

  • Increase the time interval between threat detection and the onset of hostile terrorist acts by—
    • Ensuring that all door locks and window clasps are working.
    • Ensuring that all doors and windows are properly secured to their frames and that the frames are properly anchored to the residential structure.
    • Locking driveway gates with a security lock to prevent entry.
    • Installing a through-door viewing device or visitor intercom.
    • Installing security lights to aid in viewing entrances.
  • Increase the number of physical barriers between the outer perimeter of the residence and the interior of the residence by—
    • Adding heavy, remotely operated gates to all fences, walls, and perimeter barriers consistent with the penetration resistance of the barrier between the residence, the street, and adjacent neighbors.
    • Creating a vestibule or air lock between living quarters and the exterior of a residence, ensuring that no one can enter the residence directly from the outside.
    • Adding fire doors or security doors or gates between the residence's bedrooms and living areas.
  • Increase the time required to penetrate exterior structural walls by explosives, hand-held power tools, and hand tools by—
    • Adding additional armor covered by aesthetically pleasing materials to exterior walls.
    • Adding a separate reinforced masonry wall around the residence.
  • Increase the surveillance of the residence and decrease response time by—
    • Installing CCTV systems to permit remote viewing of all doors and windows accessible from the ground, nearby structures, trees, or easily acquired platforms (such as a van parked next to a wall).
    • Installing area IDSs between the residence's perimeter and the residence itself, varying the number and types of sensors, and adding backup communication channels between the IDS and a surveillance assessment/response dispatch center.
  • Increase the residence's durability and survivability to a terrorist attack by—
    • Fitting windows with either venetian blinds or thick curtains to reduce the observability of activities within the residence and to reduce hazards of flying glass in case of nearby explosions or gunfire.
    • Installing backup power systems for security devices (surveillance systems, communication systems, and access-control systems).
    • Ensuring that backup communication is available with the installation or embassy's security department via a secure landline or two-way radio.
    • Fitting a panic-alarm bell to the outside of the house with switches on all floor levels. Such an alarm should also annunciate at the local police and cognizant DOD or DOS security office.
    • Installing a safe haven in the home.

Transportation Measures

I-10. High-risk personnel are most accessible to terrorists while in transit in official or privately owned vehicles. Specific steps can be taken to reduce the vulnerability of executives in transit.

Special transportation in transit from domicile to duty

I-11. As a rule, Congress has strongly opposed the provision of domicile-to-duty transportation by the federal government to its officers and employees. Only 16 officials are entitled by statute to such assistance. Congress did, however, grant authority to the President and the heads of executive agencies and departments to provide domicile-to-duty transportation under certain circumstances. According to the statute, "a passenger carrier may be used to transport between residence and place of employment an officer or employee with regard to whom the head of a Federal agency makes a determination, [provided] that highly unusual circumstances present a clear and present danger, that an emergency exists, or that compelling operational considerations make such transportation essential to the conduct of official business."

I-12. The phrase "highly unusual circumstances which present a clear and present danger" is understood to mean that—

  • The perceived danger is real, not imaginary.
  • The perceived danger is immediate or imminent, not merely potential.
  • Proof is provided that the use of a government vehicle would provide protection not otherwise available.

I-13. Such a danger would exist where there is an explicit threat of terrorist attacks or riot conditions and such transportation would be the only means of providing safe passage to and from work.

I-14. The phrase "emergency exists" means that there is an immediate, unforeseeable, temporary need to provide home-to-work transportation for an agency's essential employees. The phrase "similarly compelling operational considerations" means that there is an element of gravity or importance for the need of government-furnished transportation comparable to the gravity or importance associated with a clear and present danger or an emergency. Congress suggested further, "in such instances, [it is expected] that home-to-work transportation would be provided only for those employees who are essential to the operation of the government."

I-15. The Secretary of Defense has the statutory authority to allow a CINC to use government-owned or -leased vehicles to provide transportation in an area outside of the US for members of the uniformed services and other DOD personnel under certain circumstances. These circumstances include and are limited to a determination by the CINC that public or private transportation in the area is unsafe or is not available. Under these circumstances, DOD may provide transportation (usually in government buses or passenger vans) to personnel and their family members if it will help the CINC and his subordinate commanders maintain the capability to perform or undertake assigned missions. This transportation is not intended for transporting personnel from their residences to their places of work. The Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries also have the statutory authority to provide transportation from home to duty stations and back on a limited basis. This authority is usually implemented by providing a nontactical armored vehicle (NTAV) to protect personnel.

I-16. It is a DOD policy to make NTAVs available where necessary to enhance the security of DOD personnel consistent with the requirements and limitations found in the statute. DOD issuances, service regulations, and CINC guidance stipulate detailed procedures by which DOD manages NTAV programs. The statute also establishes a procedure for Presidential waiver of the "buy American" requirement; DOD and service regulations provide for the delegation of Presidential authority from the President to the Secretary of Defense; to the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency; and to the Director, DIA. DOD Instruction 5210.84 authorizes DOS acquisition and installation of light vehicle armoring to DOS specifications in local defense-component vehicles on a reimbursable basis. The level of protection provided to the Defense Component Office will comply with approved overseas security policy group armored-vehicle standards.

I-17. The DOD recognizes two classes of NTAVs—heavy and light. Heavy NTAVs are fully armored vehicles intended to protect occupants from attack by bombs; IEDs; grenades; and high-velocity, small-arms projectiles. Light NTAVs are less than fully armored vehicles and are intended to protect occupants from attack by medium-velocity, small-arms projectiles and at least some types of IEDs.

I-18. The dividing lines between heavy and light NTAVs have become less distinct over time as armoring techniques and materials have given greater capability to NTAVs that are not classified as heavy. As a practical matter, add-on vehicle-armoring kits are now in production which (when properly installed in an appropriately powered and suspended vehicle) will provide a level of protection approaching that of the heavy NTAVs.

Heavy NTAVs

I-19. Heavy NTAVs may be assigned to US personnel upon certification by a Service Secretary only under the following conditions:

  • Highly unusual circumstances present a clear and present danger to the health and safety of a nominated protectee.
  • Compelling operational considerations make such transportation essential to conducting official business.

I-20. If the physical-security survey concludes that a heavy NTAV is warranted, the nominated protectee's Service Secretary shall, on the advice and recommendation of a combatant commander, determine whether the use of a heavy NTAV is warranted. If so, the Service Secretary shall authorize the use of a vehicle for a renewable 90- to 360-day period. At the end of the period, the requirement will be reexamined and a recertification for the protection shall be issued by the Service Secretary.

I-21. Each of the services manages a portion of the DOD's NTAV program. Each service has issued supplementary mandatory guidance for processing requests for, as well as allocation and use of, these scarce assets.

I-22. Heavy NTAVs are complex systems requiring specialized maintenance and operation. Normally, they will be assigned to DOD personnel with a driver who has been properly trained in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle. The operator is not a chauffeur; he is an integral part of a supplemental security package provided by DOD to meet its obligations in protecting key assets.

Light NTAVs

I-23. Light NTAVs may also be provided to US employees and officers where highly unusual circumstances present a clear and present danger to the health and safety of a nominated protectee or compelling operational considerations warrant their use. This category of NTAV features add-on armoring. While they are a less-complex armoring system than those used in heavy NTAVs, light NTAVs afford substantial protection to occupants against a variety of threats. New developments in after-manufacture armoring kits for vehicles are occurring at a rapid pace, increasing the number of vehicle manufacturers and models for which other NTAV modifications are suitable. Each service and the DIA have instructions for implementing DOD policy that authorizes the use of other NTAVs to enhance personnel protection of high-risk persons.

Privately Owned Vehicles

I-24. High-risk personnel may wish to forego the use of POVs during periods of extreme risk. Considerations include selecting measures that—

  • Deter secret entry, making undetected placement of IEDs in or under the vehicle difficult for terrorists to accomplish.
  • Enhance the vehicle's ability to increase distance between it and pursuers.
  • Assist response forces in case of an incident.
  • Make the vehicle appear little different than its standard models.

Individual Protective Measures

I-25. Executives can enhance their personal security in the office environment by—

  • Discouraging staff members who are taking telephone messages from disclosing their whereabouts.
  • Ensuring that caution is used when opening mail and being especially careful with letters or packages that might contain IEDs.
  • Ensuring that access is strictly limited to their office area.
  • Limiting publicity and keeping official biographies short. This includes using outdated photographs if a publicity photograph is essential.
  • Ensuring that they are not working alone late at night and on days when the remainder of the staff is absent.
  • Working in conference rooms or internal offices where outside observation is not possible if late-night work is necessary. Security officers should be notified of the work so that they can periodically look in.
  • Ensuring that office furnishings are not placed directly in front of exterior windows.

Official Business Away From the Office

I-26. The following suggestions reinforce efforts by executives to maintain the high level of security provided in the home or office environment while on official business outside of these locations:

  • Discuss security requirements with the person planning the function.
  • Travel to and from the function with escorts.
  • Choose the route carefully.
  • Avoid publicizing planned attendance at official functions (unless required).
  • Attempt to sit away from both public areas and windows.
  • Encourage the function's sponsor to close the curtains to minimize the likelihood that anyone outside will be able to see inside and determine who is attending the function. This is extremely important for an evening function, when a well-lit interior can be easily viewed from a darkened exterior.
  • Request that external floodlights be used to illuminate the area around the building where an evening function will occur.

Local Official and Unofficial Travel

I-27. Executives can greatly enhance their personal security when conducting official and unofficial travel by following these general practices:

  • Vary daily patterns, such as leaving and returning at different times.
  • Consider escorts to and from work or travel with a neighbor.
  • Establish a simple oral or visual duress procedure between executives and drivers (for example, a phrase or movement used by the executive or driver only if something is amiss).
  • Vary taxi companies. Ensure that the ID photo on the license matches the driver. If uneasy for any reason, take another taxi.
  • Attend social functions with others, if possible.
  • Examine the car before entering to see if there has been any interference. A small mirror on a rod is a cheap and effective method to inspect underneath cars. Do not touch the vehicle until it has been thoroughly checked (inside, around, and under).
  • Avoid leaving personal items exposed in the car (uniform items, service-issued maps, official briefcases, and so forth).

Security Practices While Driving

I-28. Executives can take the following measures to enhance security while driving:

  • Keep car doors locked. Do not open windows more than a few inches.
  • Avoid overloading a vehicle, and wear seat belts.
  • Park vehicles in parking areas that are either locked or monitored. Never park overnight on the street. Before entering vehicles, check for signs of tampering.
  • Keep the trunk locked.
  • Drive in the inner lanes to keep from being forced to the curb.
  • Use defensive and evasive driving techniques. Drill with your driver by watching for suspicious cars and taking evasive action.
  • Avoid driving close behind other vehicles (especially service trucks), and be aware of activities and road conditions two to three blocks ahead.
  • Beware of minor accidents that could block traffic in suspect areas such as crossroads. Crossroads are preferred areas for terrorist or criminal activities because they offer escape advantages.

I-29. If a terrorist roadblock is encountered, use the shoulder or curb (hit at a 30- to 45-degree angle) of the road to go around it or ram the terrorist's blocking vehicle. Blocking vehicles should be rammed in a nonengine area, at a 45-degree angle, in low gear, and at a constant moderate speed. The goal is to knock the blocking vehicle out of the way. In all cases, do not stop and never allow the executive's vehicle to be boxed in with a loss of maneuverability. Whenever a target vehicle veers away from the terrorist vehicle, it gives adverse maneuvering room and presents a better target to gunfire.

Interurban, National, and International Travel Security Practices and Procedures

I-30. To enhance security in interurban, national, and international circumstances, executives should—

  • Book airline seats at the last moment. Consider using an alias.
  • Restrict the use of ranks or titles.
  • Avoid allowing unknown visitors in the hotel room or suite.
  • Keep staff and family members advised of the itinerary and subsequent changes. Clearly and emphatically restrict this information to those having a need to know.

Home Security Practices and Procedures

I-31. To enhance security at home, executives should—

  • Check the ID of persons entering the premises (electricians, plumbers, telephone-maintenance personnel, and so forth). When in doubt, call their office to verify their identity before allowing them in your home.
  • Avoid opening the door to a caller at night until he is visually identified through a window or a door viewer.
  • Close curtains in a room before turning on lights.
  • Consider placing the telephone where you will not be seen from doors or windows when answering.
  • Investigate the household staff (especially temporary staff members).
  • Stay alert and be on the lookout for the unusual. Ensure that the home is locked and secure whenever the residence is unattended. Be cautious upon return and look for the movement of furniture or the placement of unusual wires.
  • Note and report suspicious persons.
  • Control house keys strictly.
  • Park the car in a locked garage.
  • Consider installing a panic-alarm bell to the outside of the house with switches located on all floor levels.
  • Clear the area around the house of dense foliage or shrubbery.
  • Test duress alarms (if available). Make certain that family members understand how they work as well as the importance of their use.
  • Cooperate with law-enforcement personnel, and abide by their security recommendations.

Security at Social and Recreational Activities

I-32. The risk of terrorist incidents is always present for high-risk personnel or personnel assigned to high-risk billets. The following measures are intended to permit executives to live a close-to-normal life while still remaining mindful of the risks to their security.

  • Ensure that the host is aware of and takes appropriate measures for your security.
  • Have your personal staff assist a civilian host, if required.
  • Arrange for visitors to be subject to adequate security control.
  • Screen the invitation list, if possible.
  • Vary the times of sporting activities (golfing, jogging, and so forth).

Combating-Terrorism Training for Executives

I-33. Combatant commanders annually compile a list of high-risk billets in their AO. These lists are forwarded through the appropriate service personnel channels, enabling each service to identify, plan, and provide resources to meet training requirements. All personnel and adult family members en route to high-risk billets must attend the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course (INTAC) conducted at the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During this one-week course, personnel will receive instruction in defensive-driving techniques and survival shooting as well as individual protective measures and hostage survival. These individuals should also attend the appropriate regional orientation course (Middle East, Asia/Pacific, Latin America, or Africa) offered at the US Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. The service member whose duties will require frequent vehicle operation should attend an appropriate evasive-driving course. Information on current offerings may be obtained by contacting the service representative to the DOD Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee or the Combating Terrorism Branch in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC).

Travel to Potential Physical-Threat Risk Areas

I-34. Personnel en route to potential physical-threat risk areas (as identified by the OASDSO/LIC) should attend one of the following courses:

  • The Dynamics of International Terrorism Course conducted at the US Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt AFB, Florida. During this one-week course, personnel will receive lectures on threats by region (Europe, Middle East, Latin America, Asia/Pacific, and Africa), the history and psychology of terrorism, personnel combating-terrorism measures (vehicle, personal, airline, and physical security), and hostage survival.
  • A Regional Orientation Course (Middle East, Latin America, Africa, Asia/Pacific) at the US Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt AFB, Florida. This one-week course offers personnel instruction in cultural, political/military, and individual security factors associated with the region.

I-35. Installation security personnel may also receive the above training if they have completed the Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification Course (AIQC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Protective Security Details

I-36. Each service can provide bodyguards for key senior military officers, DOD civilians, other US officials, or foreign dignitaries requiring personal protection. Each Service Secretary is responsible for assigning protective security details (PSDs) to service members based on the recommendation of their counterintelligence and/or law-enforcement investigation staffs. The PSDs are assigned to DOD personnel who meet requirements established by service regulations. In general, PSDs may be assigned only to those personnel whose position or assignment places them at risk and whose continued availability to the National Command Authorities and the CINCs is vital to DOD's mission execution.

I-37. A PSD provides high levels of security to an executive by establishing a series of protective cordons around him. The establishment of defense in depth often means that the innermost protective layer is in close contact with the executive at all hours of the day and night.

I-38. A PSD is trained to maintain a low profile. It is concerned about the executive's visibility and its ability to blend into his surroundings. There is nothing more damaging to the security of an executive than the obvious, detectable presence of a PSD when all other measures to have him blend into the local environment have been successful. A PSD will strive to keep travel routes and means of transportation from being publicized. If this cannot be accomplished, the PSD may suggest editorial changes to the itinerary scheduled for release to limit details of planned travel from public disclosure. For example, routes to and from announced appointments usually do not need to be revealed.

I-39. During the course of a PSD's mission, its members may be asked to perform several different security functions. They may, for example, perform direct or indirect protection or escort duty. Direct protection is open and obvious; indirect is generally a surveillance measure. The security-guard unit may operate as an interior guard and may consist of one or more men stationed at fixed posts. A PSD's members should know the identity of each individual in the party of a protected official; executives can help by introducing them to each member of the official party.

I-40. The protected person's attitude is critical to the success of the PSD's mission. Executives have a right and a responsibility to make their wishes known with respect to their personal security. They also have an obligation to listen carefully to the head of the PSD who is trained and highly qualified to help make reasonable judgments about manageable risks. A PSD's members understand that their function is inherently intrusive and that executives can easily resent the loss of privacy that accompanies the protection offered. On the other hand, PSDs have jobs to do, not merely to protect executives, but to help safeguard mission-critical assets—senior military and civilian leaders.

I-41. One of the most demanding functions placed on a PSD is to limit the ability of individuals to circulate and approach the executive. This is often very frustrating to executives who wish to shake hands, engage in close conversations with visitors, and move freely and without impediment in a social situation. The PSDs are trained to strictly enforce limitations on the circulation of individuals, carefully checking each person for ID and ascertaining that he is authorized to be present at the occasion.

I-42. DOD personnel who are provided with PSDs and must conduct official business or hold social engagements in large rooms can take steps to minimize the disruptions to such functions. These steps include—

  • Providing advance attendee lists to the head of the PSD.
  • Having one or more members of the staff who know the attendees stand with PSD members and identify the attendees as they arrive.
  • Informing attendees that they will be admitted only at specified entrances.

I-43. The PSD's members are highly trained security specialists. While in the company of executives, they will be accommodating and helpful. Executives should remember, however, that the primary function of the PSD's members is to protect them, not perform errands or carry out personal services. A PSD's members who are performing valet or other chores cannot effectively protect the senior officers or civilian officials to whom they have been assigned.

Executive-Protection System Integration

I-44. This appendix has focused on supplemental security measures used to address terrorist threats to senior high-risk personnel within the DOD. Various methods and measures have been discussed that provide increments of security over and above the base level of security provided to all DOD personnel assigned to an installation, facility, activity, or unit. In making decisions to allocate protective resources to enhance the security of senior officers and senior DOD officials, it is essential to remember that measures must be applied systematically. Additional security measures implemented to protect high-risk personnel in the office environment must be carried over to official functions conducted outside the office. The security measures must also be extended to protected persons' private lives and, depending on the nature of the threat, the lives of their family members.

I-45. The converse is equally true. It makes no sense to provide domicile-to-duty transportation for a high-risk person and make no provision for additional protection at home, at the office, and at official business and social functions. In view of the total costs of security measured in dollars, time, and inconvenience to protected persons, their staffs, colleagues, and families, it may be more prudent to radically alter living and working arrangements than to try to augment security in a piecemeal manner. For example, it might be prudent to house high-risk personnel within a DOD installation rather than to try to secure a detached, private residence at a substantial distance from the operations base of a response force. The key to successful executive protection is to ensure that the level of protection afforded by physical-security measures, operational procedures in the office and at home, and PSDs is constant. The level of protection must be matched to the threat and must be sustainable. Executives have a special responsibility to set a personal example of combating-terrorism awareness; of attention to personal, family, office, information, and OPSEC concerns; and of combating-terrorism security measures implementation. By doing so, they make their colleagues and subordinates more aware and more conscious of their security environment and less likely to be victimized by terrorist attacks.



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