The office environment should afford executives the greatest degree of physical security. Executives usually work in facilities where attackers must pass by guards, security checkpoints, office workers, aides, or secretaries before reaching them. Unfortunately, the high media value of attacking executives in security strongholds where they are clearly associated with government activity increases the value of such attacks to terrorists. Hence, there may be a need to add security measures to offset the escalating capability of attack on more secure office areas by terrorist groups.
E-1. A thorough physical-security survey of an office facility should be conducted. Offices of defense components attached to US embassies abroad should have these surveys performed by the DOS. Other DOD facilities should have surveys performed by the cognizant physical-security and facilities-engineering staffs. The best way to approach a physical-security site survey is to think like an intruder. Consider how approaches to the installation or facility could be made, how access to the building that houses executive offices could be gained, and how attacks on offices or other frequently used facilities could be mounted.
E-2. The next step in evaluating the need for supplemental physical-security measures is a thorough and detailed assessment of the weapons and tactics that terrorists might use to attack the structure in which DOD executives work. Security engineers and architects need technical threat data or assessments containing the following information
- The mode of attack, such as
- Standoff weapons (man-portable AT/antiaircraft weapons, sniper rifles, rock grenades, and mortars).
- Close combat weapons (submachine guns, pistols, knives, and garrotes).
- Contact weapons (bombs, incendiary devices, and mines).
- Perimeter penetration aids (such as power tools, hand tools, or explosives), if used.
- The time of attack.
- The attacking force's size.
- The anticipated degree of outside support or autonomy.
- Assess the ability of building components to resist the effects of the threat.
- Identify appropriate security window-glazing materials and window treatments to determine what is required to achieve the desired penetration resistance times for anticipated threats.
- Calculate the total amount of delay time. This time is achieved by using camouflage, deception, barriers, and security devices to permit response forces to reach the scene of a terrorist attack in time to thwart the attack, capture or eliminate the terrorists, and rescue executives and their staffs or dependents.
E-4. After establishing a basic-design threat, engineers need data on the anticipated performance of response forces to be arrayed against the design threat and the expected or desired behavior of the protected executive. Some specific information needed includes
- The response force's size, capability, supporting weapons, response time, and estimated effectiveness against the range of attacks.
- The desired options for the executive's protectionevacuate on warning, on detection, only if attacked, or only if forced to capitulate or do not evacuate.
E-5. Security planners need to know how long the structure that houses executives can withstand an attack before help arrives. Matching threat capabilities and anticipated operations by response forces establishes significant physical-security-system performance parameters. These can be quantified and used to develop detailed plans, drawings, and physical-security equipment-acquisition plans.
E-6. Several physical-security measures intended to provide additional protection for executives can be considered based on the requirements defined through the detailed analyses outlined above. The primary purpose of such measures should be to increase the time required by persons outside an installation to reach the executives housed at an installation. A secondary purpose of such measures should be to reduce or eliminate hazards to executives that might result from violence in the vicinity. Examples of physical-security measures to consider are
- Increase the threat-detection time by installing sensors on perimeters and barriers. This includes
- Combining surveillance systems including seismic, acoustic, and IR sensors at or beyond the outer perimeter.
- Supplementing surveillance systems with CCTV/imaging IR systems tied into the alert response-force staging area.
- Extending restricted areas or exclusion zones and relocating access-control points from the executive office area to a point closer to the installation's boundary.
- Enlarging and extending intrusion-detection sensors from within the installation to its perimeter, allowing the IDS to collect additional data necessary and sufficiently classify and identify an intrusion before the response force arrives.
- Enhancing both the number and the phenomenology of surveillance and detection systems within the executive office area as well as approaches leading to and from it in conjunction with measures listed below.
- Increase the threat's delay time between the perimeter and the executive office building. This includes
- Installing vehicle barriers and realigning roadways to eliminate straight, level stretches of road in excess of 50 meters in length.
- Increasing concentric rings of fences, Jersey barricades, planters, bollards, and vehicle/personnel barriers.
- Enhancing access-control areas supplemented by fire doors/security doors kept in a closed condition between the entrance to the building that houses executive offices and the executive office area.
- Confuse, camouflage, and deceive observers by hiding an executive's location. Accomplish this by
- Relocating executives to buildings not usually associated with office activities (barracks, motor pools, research and development [R&D] facilities, and so forth).
- Constructing office areas in the barracks, motor pool, R&D facilities, and so forth.
- Adding executive styles, decorative lighting, and window treatments to several different areas of office buildings to minimize the differences in external appearances between executive and nonexecutive offices.
- Increase the delay time between the entrance to the building that houses executives and the executive office area. Execute this by
- Adding fire doors, access-control points, dead-end corridors, and midcorridor physical barriers to complicate access to the executive office areas.
- Adding security devices that, when activated, disrupt the intruder's ability to retain his thought processes (for example, flashing strobe lights, fog generators, noise generators, sirens, and fire-extinguishing systems).
- Increase the delay time by making access more difficult within the executive office structure. This may be accomplished by
- Substituting high-security doors and door frames for standard doors in areas leading to or from executive offices.
- Installing high-security grating, wire mesh, or other materials to bar access to the executive office area through utility tunnels or conduits.
- Strengthening walls, floors, and ceilings by substituting steel-plate, concrete-filled, steel-reinforced cinder blocks or other ballistic-resistant materials for plaster/lath or wallboard room dividers, thereby protecting against explosive devices that are used as tools to breach a barrier.
- Increase the protection for building occupants against weapons and explosives effects. This includes
- Substituting blast- or bullet-resistant panels for glass windows or adding a fragment-retention film at least 4 millimeters thick to the interior of glass windows.
- Adding exterior screens/plates to cover window areas and protect against gunfire and grenade/bomb fragments.
- Installing blast curtains, metal blinds, metal shutters, or other window treatments in executive offices to protect interior space from glass shards and other small projectiles.
- Strengthening walls to resist weapons and explosives effects by adding steel plates, reinforced concrete, or other retrofitting measures.
- Adding steel plates or other ballistic materials in crawl spaces above dropped ceilings or extending walls separating the executive office area from other portions of an office building from floor to floor, thereby preventing unobserved and undetected access to the space between dropped ceilings.
- Increase the hold time to contain penetrators by
- Adding positive-action controls to a facility's doors and gates so that gates default to a closed and locked condition unless manually released.
- Adding positive-action controls to access-control areas so that persons inside an access-control area can neither advance nor withdraw without affirmative action by a security officer posted outside the access-control area.
E-7. These measures are used to facilitate the apprehension of terrorists. There may be some instances when defeating terrorist attempts to gain access to the executive enhances the security of the executive and the response force. This is accomplished by channeling the terrorists out of the facility and installation along one route, leaving alternative routes available to evacuate executives and other key personnel.
- Installing helicopter landing aids on a structure's roof or on an adjacent field far removed from parking areas.
- Installing a safe haven or other reinforced security structure adjacent to a helicopter landing facility to provide a secure waiting place for executives until a rescue helicopter with additional supporting air and ground units can extract the executives.
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