Military

INTRODUCTION

I-1.   People may become dislocated from their homes or villages for a variety of reasons in both war and MOOTW. The following are some examples:

• Destructive forces (both natural and man-made) cause people from a devastated area to pursue sources of basic needs, such as food, water, shelter, security, and health care.
• Anticipation or expectancy that basic needs will not be met by the existing government or infrastructure in an impending disaster cause voluntary or forced evacuation.
• Political or ethnic persecution force portions of a population to seek a friendlier environment.
• Enemy forces deliberately use civilians as shields, countermobility barriers, or disruptions to friendly operations.

I-2.   Based on national policy directives and other political efforts, the theater commander provides directives on the care, control, and disposition of DCs. The operational force commander integrates the theater commander's guidance with the ground tactical plan. At division, COSCOM, and other subordinate command levels, the DC plan must-

• Allow for accomplishing the tasks assigned by the higher command echelon.
• Be within the restrictions imposed by the higher HQ.
• Guide the subordinate commands in the handling and routing of DCs.
• Ensure that all concerned parties (including the fire support coordination center and the S-3 or G-3 air) receive information on DC plans, routes, and areas of concentration.

I-3.   DC plans support the OPLAN and require extensive coordination among operational, legal, logistics, interagency, HN, and IC planners. As a minimum, DC plans must address-

• Authorized extent of migration and evacuation.
• Minimum standards of care.
• Status and disposition of all DCs.
• Designation of routes and control measures for movement control.
• Cultural and dietary considerations.
• Designation and delegation of responsibilities.

DC TEMPLATING

I-4.   There is no doctrinal template or rule of thumb for determining how many people of a certain area will leave their homes in response to actual or perceived threats and disasters. As illustrated above, every situation is different. Some people may be able to survive the situation in relative comfort and safety, while others may choose or be forced to leave their homes for relative comfort and safety elsewhere.

I-5.   In the absence of a doctrinal template, DC planners conduct comprehensive civil IPB, using all the factors of METT-TC and CASCOPE, to analyze the DC situation. They consider the civil centers of gravity, civil decisive points, and civil lines of operation in their analysis.

I-6.   DC planners use this analysis to create a series of civil SITTEMPs. The first of the civil SITTEMPs describes civil dispositions under normal conditions and circumstances. The remaining civil SITTEMPs describe the possible COAs a populace, or portions of a populace, may take given certain criteria or stimuli. Ideally, the SITTEMPS will indicate the anticipated speed, direction, and flow pattern of DC movement, which are described later in this appendix.

I-7.   DC templating is more of an art than a science. Planners will often need to call on knowledgeable representatives of various CA specialties to fully understand the civil environment. Appendix H contains some of the strategic, operational, and tactical considerations in planning DC operations. Examples of additional information requirements that may result from brainstorming are-

• What is the status and resiliency of the civilian support infrastructure in the area?
• What is the level of preparedness for this type of situation (for example, how effective are the area's emergency management or civil defense plans and resources)?
• Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may leave their homes?
• Are there any political, economic, military, informational, demographic, historical, or other reasons that indicate the populace, or portions of the populace, may remain in or near their homes?
• What conditions or actions might mitigate a DC problem and how can we influence the realization of those conditions or actions?

I-8.   DC planning cannot occur in a vacuum. DC planners must make the DC templates available to other operational planners during problem-solving and decision-making processes. They must also coordinate with interagency, HN, and IC planners and participants as the situation and OPSEC requirements permit.

DC MOVEMENT PLANNING FACTORS

I-9.   DC planners must consider several variables, or factors, when creating SITTEMPs for DC movements. These factors assume a controlled movement and apply to all DC movements regardless of type or size. Planners assume values for the variables, based on common sense, until verified by observation. For DCs moving through denied areas, planners should consider requesting unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support to determine actual values. DC movement planning factors include the following:

• Distance factors:
• Dislocated civilian road space (DCRS): Used in determining time length of the DC column. DCRS consists of two parts: the space occupied by one DC alone and distance between another DC, and the sum of the distance between elements of a number of DC foot columns. (Total DCRS = RS [individual DC] + DCRS column distances).
• DC column gap: The space between two organized DC elements following each other on the same route.
• DC traffic density: The average number of DCs that occupy 1 kilometer, expressed in DC/KM (DCs per kilometer).
• Length of DC column: The length of roadway occupied by a column, including gaps, measured from front to rear inclusive.
• Road gap: The distance between two DC march elements.
• Rate factors:
• Speed: The actual rate of speed at a given moment.
• Pace: The regulated speed of a DC column or element set by the column.
• Rate of march: The average number of kilometers traveled in any given period of time, including short delays or periodic halts. Expressed in kilometers per hour (km/h).
• Time factors (must be adjusted for demographic of column, health, and weather conditions):
• Arrival time: The time when the head of the DC column arrives at a designated point.
• Clearance time: The time when the last of a DC column passes a designated point.
• Completion time: The time when the last element of a DC column passes a designated point.
• Extra time allowance (EXTAL): Time added, based on assessment of situation, to the pass time.
• Pass time: Actual time required for a DC column, from the first to the last element, to pass a given point.
• Road clearance time: The total time a DC column requires to travel over and clear a section of road.
• Time distance (TDIS): The time required to move from one point to another at a given rate of march.
• Time gap: Time measured between rear and front of successive DC columns as they move past any given point.
• Formulas:
• Distance = Rate x Time.
• Distance/Time = Rate.
• Distance/Rate = Time (or TDIS).

EXAMPLE: Determine TDIS of a DC column moving on foot traveling 20 kilometers at a rate of 4 km/h.

TDIS = 20 km/4km/h = 5 hours.

NOTE: An EXTAL of 3 hours is added based on assessment of demographic (women, children, elderly) composition of the DC column and weather conditions. It is anticipated that the head of the DC column will arrive at completion point in approximately 8 hours.

• Completion Time = SP (Start Point) + TL (Time Length) + Scheduled Halts + EXTAL.
• Time Length, Foot Column (Rate Formula):
• .0 km/h   TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0150.
• 3.2 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0187.
• 2.4 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0250.
• 1.6 km/h TL (min) = RS (meters) x .0375.

NOTE: DC movement rate 4 km/h during day slows to 3.2 km/h at night. Cross-country DC movement rate 2.4 km/h during day slows to 1.6 km/h at night.

• Formation            2 meters per DC       5 meters per DC
• Single file             2.4                            5.4
• Column of twos   1.2                            2.7
• Column of fours   0.6                            1.3

NOTE: Distance between DCs during day is 2 to 5 meters, 50 meters between columns. Distance between DCs during night is 1 to 3 meters, 25 meters between columns.

I-10.   A DC movement graph (Figure I-1) is a time-space diagram that visually depicts a DC movement from start point to completion point. It is used during the DC movement planning phase to integrate, coordinate, prevent congestion along the route of march, and deconflict route usage with the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. It is also used to prepare or check the DC road movement table. It shows the relative time and location of the head and tail of each DC march column at any point along the route, arrival and clearance times of DC columns at critical points, and restrictions and congestion in the network.

I-11.   DC planners transfer information derived from march formulas or obtained from DC march tables directly to the graph. To complete the DC movement graph, planners must determine time-distance, arrival time, and pass time for each identified DC column based on data collected on organized DC columns.

I-12.   A DC movement table is a convenient way of transmitting time schedules and other essential details of a DC move. The accompanying example (Figure I-2) of a DC movement table is a general use blank form. The following notes assist in the use of this form:

• Only the minimum number of headings should be used. Any information common to two or more movements under general data paragraphs of the DC movement annex should be included.
• Because the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. Including dates and locations may not be desirable.
• If the table is issued by itself and not as an annex to a detailed order, the table must be signed and authenticated in the normal way.
• A critical point is a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions, coordinating for required support, and decon-fliction, as required. It includes start points, completion points, and other points along a route where interference with military movement may occur or where timings are critical.
• The DC movement number (Column) identifies a DC column (or element of a column) during the whole movement.
• To obtain due times for DC columns, DC planners transfer directly from the road movement graph or calculate using time-distance table and strip map.
• To obtain DC column clear times, DC planners add march unit pass time to due time.
• To complete the schedules for successive DC columns, DC planners add pass time plus graph time to due time.

MITIGATING THE DC PROBLEM - DC CONTROL TECHNIQUES

I-13.   Once DC planners have identified the parameters of the expected DC situation, they must determine how to deal with the DC problem. Potential COAs include-

• Prevent or minimize dislocations.
• Bypass or ignore DCs.
• Control DC movement using various techniques.
• Any combination of the above.

PREVENT OR MINIMIZE DISLOCATIONS

I-14.   This COA involves executing populace control measures, such as a stayput policy, curfew, and controlled evacuations. Each measure requires detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the IC. Public information and PSYOP assets will increase the chance of success.

I-15.   A stayput policy is, essentially, an order to citizens to stay within the confines of their homes, communities, or other defined boundaries. Successful execution of a stayput policy requires that the citizens be provided with sufficient necessities of life (food, water, shelter, security, and health care) (according to accepted international standards; for example, the Sphere Project), during and after the period the policy is in effect. Mitigation measures conducted during predisaster emergency services programs (building individual and community survival shelters, stockpiling food and medicines, and conducting preparedness exercises) will enhance the willingness of citizens to abide by stayput policies. Emergency response activities, such as the airlift of disaster relief into the populated area, may also be required.

I-16.   The policy is designed to minimize civilian interference with military operations and, just as importantly, to minimize civil collateral damage. HN authorities should enforce a stayput policy whenever possible. When enforced by military forces, the policy requires an agreement among participating nations and the appropriate military command. This section provides guidance on what such agreements should or could contain.

I-17.   This agreement should state that in matters concerning population movement, military commanders will always deal through and with the appropriate national commanders or authority.

I-18.   "Stay put" means that civil authorities will do everything in their power to stop DCs (also known as internally displaced persons, or IDPs) in their own country-especially preventing them from passing from one country to another. Neighboring countries should cooperate closely to help in the implementation of this policy within common frontiers. If, for whatever reason, some movement does take place, the receiving country should do all in its power to hold DCs in appropriate areas and return them to the country from which they were displaced, as soon as circumstances permit. Any such movement might gravely prejudice national, multinational, or coalition operations and the possibility of civilian survival.

I-19.   In crisis and wartime, indigenous national authorities retain full responsibility for their populations, institutions, and resources unless otherwise arranged for by special agreement.

I-20.   Evacuations of populations in times of crisis short of war may become a necessity to ensure the population's survivability and no less to ensure freedom of military operations.

I-21.   During crisis or wartime, civilian populations may start to move of their own volition and thus become DCs. Unless such movements are fully controlled by proper authorities and agencies, they may lead to chaos. National authorities shall take all possible steps-

• To prevent unauthorized population movement.
• To control and organize DCs should such movement occur.

I-22.   Should refugee movements occur, commanders must cooperate with and assist national authorities in preventing such movements from interfering with military operations. National law normally dictates whether and under what conditions commands can take control of DC movements, if that is necessary for the achievement of their operational mission and for the protection and safety of the population. If such control has been granted to commanders, it will be handed back to the proper national authorities as soon as possible.

I-23.   All actions taken with respect to DCs must be in consonance with the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and other rules of the International Law of War, especially The Hague Land Warfare Conventions.

I-24.   Commanders and national authorities must consider the overall problem of population movements against the background of the circumstances likely to prevail at the time. Panic and fear among the civilian population caused by weapon effects-including WMD-may induce large numbers of civilians to flee their homes and take to the roads. Should this happen, DCs would use all means of transport available. Unless controlled, they may-

• Interfere with military operations.
• Risk their own lives.

I-25.   All commanders must be aware of-

• The responsibilities of national authorities. The responsibility for all planning and implementation measures concerning population movements rests with the national authorities.
• Their own responsibilities. Commanders will-
• Contact and assist national authorities to coordinate military planning with national planning and national implementation of measures concerning the evacuation of the civilian population and the control of refugee movements, as appropriate.
• Assist, on request, national authorities in the implementation of the above plans, as long as they are compatible with the existing operational situation.
• Assume control of population movements if so granted as described above.
• Keep the appropriate national authorities advised of the development of operations.
• Provide appropriate national authorities with information concerning the adverse effect of the refugee situation on the preparedness or operations of the military forces under their command.
• Work with national authorities to obtain information concerning the population movement situation and associated matters, which could have adverse effects on the preparation and conduct of operations.

I-26.   In the event the military assumes direct control of the population, which is the last resort to ensure the safety of the population and the conduct of operations, the military commanders will inform higher HQ of the following:

• Period of assistance.
• Composition of military forces to be provided.
• C2 of these forces.
• Powers granted to the commanders of these forces (should be the same as those held by equivalent national authorities and must in any case ensure the security of the military forces).
• Any restrictions on the employment and conduct of military forces.
• Logistic support for the assistance of military forces where special measures are necessary.

I-27.   Curfews and other movement restrictions discourage unauthorized civilians from moving during certain time periods or into certain areas. These restrictions should be codified in a policy that is legal, practical, enforceable, and well publicized. Exceptions to the policy may be granted using a strict identification or pass system. In addition, restrictions should be enforced by a system of measures, including patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, or any combination thereof.

I-28.   Controlled evacuations are a way of minimizing the chaos that exists when civilians will not or should not stay where they are. Forced dislocations may be appropriate to protect civilians from combat operations, as well as impending natural disasters, such as hurricanes or volcanic eruption. They also may be appropriate to protect military operations, as in the removal of civilians from port areas or areas adjacent to main supply routes to promote the efficiency of logistics operations and minimize the possibility of sabotage.

DC AVOIDANCE

I-29.   Some military operations may dictate that DCs can or must be ignored or bypassed to ensure military success. An example is rapid offensive operations in which maintaining momentum is required. Commanders should consider the use of PSYOP leaflets or loudspeakers to instruct or bolster the morale of bypassed DCs.

I-30.   The decision to bypass or ignore DCs depends on the factors of METT-TC and may require the approval of the chain of command. Bypassed or ignored DCs must eventually be controlled by some military or civilian organization in the AO. Since bypassed groups of DCs may include enemy infiltrators attempting to pass through friendly lines, the military or civilian organization must be prepared to take security and force protection measures when assuming this control.

DC MOVEMENT CONTROL

I-31.   DC movement must often be controlled to minimize interference with planned or ongoing military operations. Planners may use several techniques to control the movement of DCs. These techniques require detailed assessment and planning, as well as coordination with and support of HN civil authorities and, at times, the IC. These techniques include blocking, clearing, and collecting (Table I-1).

I-32.   Blocking uses roadblocks, which may be supported by checkpoints, to prevent DCs from flowing onto roads or into areas essential for the conduct of military operations. Blocking involves preventing DCs from entering those areas and redirecting them to some other area, such as back to their homes or along a designated DC route. Depending on the security situation and other factors, civilians and their means of transport may or may not be searched at the blocking position.

I-33.   The following questions must be considered when planning DC blocking operations:

• What is the likely timing, direction, route, rate, and flow of DCs? (This is required to mass forces when and where they are most needed.)
• Where is terrain that canalizes DCs?
• Does the ability exist to reinforce a roadblock under pressure?
• Does the flexibility exist to disengage on order?

I-34.   Clearing directs DCs from main supply routes, alternate supply routes (ASRs), and other areas of military significance to keep them from interfering with operations. Clearing is conducted at the small unit level by ordinary soldiers or by small, specialized teams whose sole purpose is to confront DCs, remove them from their current location, and orient them toward the location to which the commander wants them to go. In some cases, this may simply be the shoulder of the road.

I-35.   Clearing is intended for fast-paced, unit-level operations. It is not an effective method for large-scale DC operations. It must be deliberately planned and integrated with other control techniques. Clearing is merely intended to push or direct DCs in specified directions, away from military operations, installations, or encampments, until they can be picked up by more organized DC operations, such as collecting.

I-36.   Some of the challenges of clearing operations include the following:

• Clearing is temporary in nature; units must continually sweep or chase new or returning DCs.
• External support is often required to transmit the intended message in a way that the DCs will understand.
• DCs present a continuing security concern for friendly forces (for example, potential for terrorist acts, such as car or suicide bombings).
• A unit's resources can be quickly overwhelmed if the numbers of DCs are great or the DCs need emergency assistance.

I-37.   Collecting provides positive control of concentrations of DCs at various holding areas to prevent them from interfering with operations and to foster care and processing. The collection plan is resource-intensive and must be coordinated and synchronized with operations, logistics, and security plans. Whenever possible, existing facilities, such as barns and warehouses, should be considered.

I-38.   Collecting must also be planned and executed in collaboration with HN authorities and NGOs that specialize in public health, public safety, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, and mass care and feeding. Its main features are collection points, DC routes, assembly areas, and DC camps.

I-39.   These are temporary holding areas for gathering small numbers of DCs before moving onward along DC routes to assembly areas or DC camps. Units establishing DC collection points (commonly known as CIV on operational graphics) provide minimal emergency relief supplies that address only short-term (less than 1 day to 3 or 4 days) immediate needs (for example, water and trauma first aid).

I-40.   DC routes are routes that offer protection to DCs by moving them away from the main effort of military combat and logistics operations.

I-41.   Assembly areas are larger and more elaborate than collection points. They provide DCs with emergency relief, such as food, intermediate medical care, and temporary shelter. Designated personnel (military or civilians of the United States, HN, or IC) begin screening and registering DCs to identify family groups, determine points of origin and intended destinations, and other pertinent information. They also begin to segregate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), hostile civilians, and deserters. Assembly areas are typically located in division rear areas and may host DCs for a week or longer. Authorities may decide to send DCs from assembly areas to camps, allow them to continue to their intended destination, or to return home. Assembly areas may evolve into DC camps, if required.

I-42.   DC camps are semipermanent, carefully planned facilities where administrators prepare DCs for the return to their homes, resettlement, repatriation, or other disposition. Host country authorities, NGOs, or international organizations normally administer DC camps. U.S. forces may temporarily administer them or assist when necessary. Designated personnel continue to detect hostile civilians who should be interned. Camp administrators also begin examining and monitoring the DC population for disease. DCs should receive identification cards, records, food, clothing, and medical care in the camp. Camps are generally located in the division or corps communications zone or theater rear area. Figure I-3, shows a typical DC collection plan.

I-43.   Ideally, HN authorities handle mass DC operations by implementing planned and rehearsed evacuation plans. When a military force assumes responsibility for planning DC operations, DC planners should consider incorporating HN assets in the planning and implementation of DC plans.

I-44.   Considerations with respect to the movement of civilians are as follows:

• Selection of routes. All DC movements take place on designated routes that are kept free of civilian congestion. When selecting routes for civilian movement, CA personnel must consider the types of transportation common to the area. They coordinate these routes with the traffic circulation plan proposed by the transportation officer and MP personnel.
• Identification of routes. After designating the movement routes, CA personnel mark them in languages and symbols the civilians, U.S. forces, and allied forces can understand. U.S. PSYOP units, HN military, and other allied military units can help mark the routes.
• Control and assembly points. After selecting and marking the movement routes, CA and HN authorities establish control and assembly points at selected key intersections. The G-5 or S-5 coordinates with the provost marshal, the movement control center, and the G-4 for the locations of these points for inclusion in the traffic circulation plan.
• Emergency rest areas. CA personnel set up emergency rest areas at congested points to provide for the immediate needs of the DCs. These needs include water, food, fuel, maintenance, and medical services.
• Local and national agencies. Use of local and national agencies is essential for three reasons. First, it conserves military resources. Second, civilian authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Third, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

I-45.   When routing DC movements, CMO planners should consider three fundamentals and four principles that govern routing. The three fundamentals that govern routing are-

• Balance: The process of matching DC column characteristics with route characteristics. Balance ensures that DC traffic never routinely exceeds the most limiting features of a route. Balancing also identifies requirements for upgrading routes or ordering cautions for certain areas along the route. Route characteristics are identified during the planning process.
• Separation: The process of allocating road space for movements to ensure that movements do not conflict. The goal of separation is to reduce the potential for congestion.
• Distribution: The process of allocating as many routes as possible to reduce the potential for congestion. Distribution also promotes passive security by distributing and separating traffic.

The four principles that govern routing are-

• Assign highest priority traffic to routes that provide the minimum time-distance.
• Consider sustainability of route network when assigning movements.
• Separate motor movements from pedestrian movements.
• Separate civilian traffic (vehicular or pedestrian) from military movements.

I-46.   Effective routing of DCs requires a detailed understanding of the military highway regulation and traffic circulation plan. Route classification and traffic control measures currently in use by military movement control agencies are applicable during the planning and execution of DC operations. These measures include-

• Open routes.
• Supervised routes.
• Dispatch routes.
• Reserved routes.
• Prohibited routes.

I-47.   OPSEC considerations are important. Planned DC routes may be an indicator for the location of the main effort in the attack or defense. By attempting to minimize interference by DCs with military operations, planners may inadvertently disclose the location of the main effort. Because opposing forces seek to discover seams and boundaries to exploit them, DC planners should not consistently move DCs along seams or unit boundaries. The following example discusses DC road space usage calculations.

COMBINED DC CONTROL METHODS

I-48.   An analysis of METT-TC may indicate that several of the DC control methods may be required simultaneously or sequentially. In a port city, for example, the people in a predominantly neutral area may be ordered to stay in their neighborhoods and conform to such restrictions as curfews. Meanwhile, civilians in a hostile section of the city may be quarantined (no one may enter or leave without permission and escort), and those in the areas closest to critical port facilities and adjoining the main inland supply routes may be selectively evacuated.

TASK FORCE CONTROL

I-49.   One technique for controlling DCs in a tactical AO is to organize organic forces into a task force specifically tailored for this mission. Known generically as TF DC Control, this task force has four imperatives:

• Implement an integrated system of control.
• Help provide life saving and life sustaining care, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and water.
• Help process civilians to determine their identity and status and to collect military and civil-military information.
• Transition control activities in an orderly manner.

Table I-2, depicts a generic organization for TF DC control.

I-51.   The basic action element for blocking and collecting is the same-a GP block/collect team of one infantry squad with organic armored vehicle (if mechanized), one MP team with organic vehicle, one tactical PSYOP team (TPT), and one tactical CA team or several CA-trained personnel. The basic action element for clearing is the GP clearing team, consisting of one MP team with organic vehicle and one TPT. TF DC Control may modify one or more GP teams based on the civil-military situation and/or its tasks, the terrain, and the assets available (for example, using an MP squad instead of an MP team as a basic building block of all GP teams and/or augmenting the teams with combat engineers).

I-52.   Generic TF DC Control also has five special purpose teams, each designed to accomplish particular missions requiring special training and/or equipment:

• Negotiation team. The primary purpose of the negotiation team is to assist in intense negotiations that have a potential for creation or expansion of unrest or may result in highly adverse public perceptions beyond the battlefield. Negotiations include meetings with civil leaders, but not hostage incidents-hostage rescue and similar means of resolving a hostage situation are beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control. Instead, the goals of negotiation are to contain the incident or issue so that the populace is not adversely and unduly influenced by it and, if possible, to resolve it peacefully so that civilian lives are not unduly jeopardized and the incident does not become a focus of the local or international news media.
• Special reaction team (sniper). The primary purpose of the special reaction team (sniper) is to neutralize special threats effectively and safely as they arise in blocking, clearing, and collecting operations. Another purpose is to support the apprehension of troublemakers and ringleaders by a team assigned to snatch them from a crowd. However, apprehending a suspect in other circumstances is beyond the scope of generic TF DC Control.
• Special reaction team (armored vehicles). The primary purposes of the special reaction team (armored vehicles) are to conduct show-of-force operations (especially at road blocks), protect task force elements and any civilians in their charge, and assist the task force, as needed, to include the execution of snatch apprehensions in crowds.
• Medical care team. The primary purposes of the medical care team are to respond quickly to civilian mass casualties (MASCALs) to begin triage and coordinate further MASCAL response with the parent unit's surgeon and medical operations center, or the equivalent, and to provide medical care above the level of emergency first aid, as needed by the task force.
• Counterintelligence (CI) team. The primary purpose of the CI team is to exploit the potential for military and civil-military information from civilians encountered by the task force. CI agents are often fluent in the primary language of the AO or come with a translator, and the task force always needs a few translators. Moreover, there is a synergy to be gained when CI and CA work together. CA, CI, and PSYOP form a strong triad within TF DC Control and for the parent JTF.

Table I-3, depicts the basic equipment the various teams should have to perform their tasks.

PLANNING DC CONTROL MEASURES

I-53.   The senior commander in the AO provides guidance pertaining to the designation of DC control measures. Typically, this guidance provides for bottom-up or top-down planning.

I-54.   In bottom-up planning, each subordinate unit commander selects routes for movement of DCs and tentative DC collection points within his designated unit boundaries. His staff sends this information up to the next level commander for consolidation into his DC plan. The senior commander's staff deconflicts duplication and sends the approved plan back to subordinate commanders for implementation.

I-55.   The senior commander may designate and assign specific routes and collection points to subordinate units for implementation based on METT-TC. This action does not preclude the subordinate commander from adding to the plan as he sees fit. The subordinate commander's staff forwards additional control measures to the senior commander to allow the senior commander's staff to refine his plan.

I-56.   Whatever the planning method, commanders responsible for implementing DC control measures ensure the measures are known to all participants and, as applicable, are fully resourced for their intended purpose. Commanders also ensure those soldiers and civilians who man DC collection points, areas, and camps are trained and rehearsed to perform their duties. Figure I-4, provides a sample DC plan format.

DC COMMUNICATION

I-57.   Persuading people to comply with the terms of a DC plan is often a difficult endeavor. HN public information programs and PSYOP assets may assist by providing mass media broadcasts, loudspeakers with prerecorded messages, signs (with culturally correct graphics), and leaflets.

I-58.   The following messages, prerecorded in the dominant language of the AO, are useful for controlling civilians in tactical situations:

• Standard roadblock recording:
• This is a roadblock.
• For your safety, you will not be allowed to pass this point.
• Return to your homes.
• Standard clearing recording:
• Stay off the road. or Get out of this area.
• If you do not comply, you will be detained or arrested.
• Return to your homes.
• Standard recording for a DC collection point:
• This is a civilian collection point.
• You will not be harmed.
• Everyone will be searched. Vehicles will be searched and parked. Some belongings may be taken from you temporarily for everyone's safety.
• Water and emergency medical care will be provided to you after you have been searched.
• If we take any of your belongings, you will receive a receipt. If any of your belongings for which you have a receipt are not returned to you, you will be compensated for them.

I-59.   These words should also be printed in English and the predominant language of the AO on 3x5 cards which can be used to "point and talk" by number. A well-prepared DC control site will have the same words in the same order on a large sign.

I-60.   There are 10 words or phrases that every soldier should be able to say in the dominant language of the AO. "Put down your weapon" and other phrases are also important, but "hands up" is a simpler way to express surrender, control, and related concepts. The ten words or phrases are-

• Go.
• Stop.
• Hands up.
• Right.
• Left.
• Stand.
• Sit.
• Yes.
• No.
• Water.

TECHNIQUES FOR DC COLLECTION POINTS

I-61.   A technique for designating hasty sites to control noncombatants and other groups is the quadrant method. By this method, each quadrant of a crossroads may be designated for a likely group or purpose, as depicted in Figure I-5. In this example, West is designated as a hasty collection point (CIV); Northeast is designated as a hasty EPW or detainee (DET) site; Southeast is designated as a hasty casualty collection point (CCP); and Southwest as a multipurpose quadrant for maintenance, supplies, and other purposes.

I-62.   Each control point is located 50 to 100 meters from the roads to keep the groups sufficiently separated. This distance improves the safety and security of each group, minimizes manpower requirements, and reduces potential for terrorism by keeping people a reasonable distance from passing troops. Prior training and rudimentary supplies, including water cans or water bottles and large quantities of chemical lights, facilitate the day and night operation of a hasty DC collection point.

I-63.   Upon activation of a hasty DC collection point, designated personnel transform the site into a deliberate DC collection point. There are five key tasks that must be accomplished at a deliberate DC collection point. These tasks are illustrated in Figure I-6, and explained in detail in the following paragraphs.

I-64.   The collection point should be located so that DCs will not suffer any greater exposure to the effects of combat than would exist for them away from the collection point. Local security should be established to protect the occupants, persons operating the collection point, and friendly troops adjacent to or passing by the collection point. Guards should be posted at the entrance and exit of the collection point and given special orders, as required.

I-65.   This task requires setting up special purpose areas within the collection point and following certain procedures. CA personnel-

• Ensure that all private autos, public conveyances, and the like (including livestock and carts) are parked outside or on the fringes of the collection point in the vehicle search area until they have been searched, and make all passengers dismount.
• Direct passengers to the DC search area.
• Make the driver remain with the vehicle until it is searched. Designated personnel search the vehicle. If an undercarriage observation device is available, it is used. When the search is over, the driver and the searchers together move the vehicle, livestock, or cart to the vehicle hold area.

I-66.   Many vehicles will contain household goods, suitcases, and other items. These vehicles should be searched for bombs and other dangerous items if the vehicle holding area is within 50 meters of the people holding area. Searching for contraband is not standard procedure, but it may be mandatory under the OPORD or if given special orders. Searchers inform the driver that once the vehicle is searched, it will be secured and placed off limits so that no DC will be allowed to retrieve any of the items in the vehicle. Searchers communicate as described above. Searchers treat livestock as vehicles, and treat pets as livestock if this does not create more problems than it avoids. A searcher then escorts the driver to the DC search area. Designated personnel-

• Search DCs and their belongings for prohibited items.
• Vary search methods. A quick pat down is used for some people. A more invasive search is done for others. If a handheld metal detector is available, it should be used to expedite the searches. Any property taken under the searcher's control should be tagged and a copy given to the owner. A Field Property Control Card should be used, as well as an Explanation Card, as necessary.
• Always use trained personnel to perform searches. If possible, females are used to search females, infants, and little boys. If a female searcher is not at the collection point but is close enough to get there in a reasonable time, these searches are deferred until she arrives. The unsearched people are set aside until then so that they do not pose a clear and present potential danger to others. If a female searcher cannot be obtained, a trained male searcher should do the search using the back of the hand technique if its use is not contrary to orders and special security concerns require a search.
• Always use a searcher (unarmed) and an over watcher (armed). They must be trained in these skills and to work together.

I-67.   This part of operating a deliberate DC collection point may be deferred for a while, but full waiver is not advisable as a general practice. DC processing consists of two stages. All persons go through stage one. Stage two may be deferred or delayed, reserved for certain people, or not take place at all.

I-68.   This is the quick screen to identify EPWs and others (civilian internees and detainees) that must be segregated immediately from everyone else. This processing may be done without a translator. Searchers should beware of irregulars and infiltrators trying to pass as civilians. Upon discovery, all EPWs, civilian internees, and detainees are placed in the short-term detainee holding area. Normally, anyone who is causing a problem at the collection point is detained. Although civilian internees and detainees should be further segregated from EPWs, rarely is the time or resources available to do this.

I-69.   Consistent with orders, searchers take control of all items that may cause harm to the team, friendly forces passing the collection point, or the DCs. In addition, searchers confiscate and tag all items that noncombatants are not permitted to have according to U.S. or HN policy.

I-70.   If available, a Field Property Control Card is affixed to the vehicle or animal. The Field Property Control Card contains, at a minimum, the following information: the DC collection point number, the date, the seized item quantity, the seized item description, and a signature block for the collection point officer in charge (OIC) or NCOIC. A copy is given to the driver.

I-71.   This stage is intended to help more finely categorize DCs (for example, determining if anyone is a U.S. citizen), to reunite families within the collection point, to identify persons of influence, and to obtain information (from equipment, weapons, papers, and discussions) that may have intelligence value. This processing is done when the time and resources are available-it is not a high priority. A translator is almost always required.

I-72.   Services at a DC collection point may range from immediate care (attention to life-threatening conditions) to ancillary care (including food), depending on need and resources. However, only water and immediate medical care, to the extent they are emergency services provided consistent with the legal and moral obligations of the commander, are mandatory. Services are not provided to a DC until after he has undergone the quick-screen stage of processing, except for emergency care needed to prevent loss of life (death imminent). CA personnel should-

• Treat life-threatening emergencies, such as first aid for traumatic injuries and ORT for dehydrated infants.
• Provide water as a preventive measure if an adequate supply is available for this purpose.
• Allow occupants to relieve themselves. CA personnel should provide one place for males and one for females and basic equipment (such as shovels and latrine screen expedients) to permit and encourage the occupants themselves to prepare rudimentary sanitation facilities (slit trenches). Occupants must be supervised.
• Give out food only to occupants who have been at the collection point 24 hours or more. Food handed out more generously can become a "pull factor." Also, CA personnel should be aware that certain meal, ready to eat (MRE) items may be forbidden or inappropriate by religion or culture, or too rich for malnourished people and cause immediate sickness. (Yellow-packaged international humanitarian rations are safe.)
• Provide other services consistent with the commander's legal, moral, and mission-specific obligations and requirements.

I-73.   The following historical example discusses sanitation and is taken from notes of a CA soldier who served in Operation DESERT STORM.

I-74.   Once a DC collection point is operational, there are four possible outcomes for the collection point operators:

• Retain control of the collection point, recognizing that moral obligations to DCs at the collection point increase with time.
• Close down the collection point by releasing the DCs from it, if warranted by the tactical situation and other factors.
• Arrange for movement of the DCs to another holding area, such as a civilian assembly area.
• Hand off collection point operations to other operators (such as a support unit or the HN), which is the mostly likely outcome for infantry units on the move.

I-75.   As a unit moves out of an area, it must be prepared to hand off (transition) any active DC collection point to follow-on forces. Ideally, these forces will include trained CA operators; however, they may not. In either case, the outgoing unit must be prepared to fully brief the follow-on forces on the operation of the collection point.

I-76.   The DC collection point OIC/NCOIC should personally brief the OIC/NCOIC of follow-on forces. He should note the date-time group of the handoff; the name, rank, and position of the person to whom the handoff was made; and a summary of the information provided. The transition briefing should cover-

• EPWs.
• U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers.
• Civilian internees and detainees.
• Civilians who are U.S. citizens or contractors.
• Civilians who may be useful as centers of influence.
• The tactical situation and intelligence (or unprocessed information) as they concern threats to the DC collection point.
• Medical emergencies.
• Controlled property.
• Any special, additional information peculiar to the DC collection point.

I-77.   Units have several disposition options for controlled property. Depending on the property category, units may retain control of it, return it to the persons from which it was taken, do a combination of all three, or hand it over to other forces or agencies (such as local law enforcement or follow-on forces taking control of the DC collection point). Unit commanders act according to their moral and legal obligations, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

I-78.   Transferring Control. To transfer control of this property, units must fill out a property control register listing all the items controlled and have an official of the follow-on forces sign for the items and a copy of the register itself by using DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In.

I-79.   Retaining Control. If units take the property with them (it must be taken if no one will sign for it and return is not an option), they should give the owner an official receipt (such as DA Form 3161), explain the unit's intention for the property, and explain the owner's rights and procedure requirements for compensation. This reiteration of rights is intended to reassure the owners and may be needed to ensure a smooth handoff.

I-80.   Evacuation creates serious problems and should only be considered as a last resort. U.S. doctrine states that only a division or higher commander can order an evacuation. When the decision is made to evacuate a community, CA planners must make detailed plans to prevent uncontrolled groups from disrupting the movement of military units and supplies. Considerations in mass evacuation planning include-

• Transportation. CA planners plan for the maximum use of civilian transportation.
• Security. CA personnel help the G-2 in security screening and documentation of evacuees. Since the civilians are being removed from the area where they can best take care of themselves, the military provides security for them after evacuation. The military also provides for the security of all civilian property left behind, including farm animals, pets, and other possessions.
• Documentation. In some circumstances, evacuees may need identification documents showing, as a minimum, the name and locality from which they were evacuated. As a control technique, CA personnel may prepare a manifest that lists evacuees for movement.
• Briefing. Before movement, the movement control officer briefs evacuees. The briefer uses leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, or other means available. This briefing explains the details of the move, such as restrictions on personal belongings, organization for movement, and movement schedules.
• Rations. For a movement lasting no more than 2 days, supply personnel issue rations to each evacuee at the time of departure or at designated points en route.
• Health care. The public health team makes maximum use of civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies to care for the health and physical well-being of the evacuees. Military medical personnel, equipment, and supplies can be used as supplements, if necessary. The public health team or surgeon's staff takes proper steps before the movement to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.
• Return. Evacuation plans also provide for the evacuees' eventual return and criteria for determining the duration of their absence.

DC CAMP CONSIDERATIONS

I-81.   Successful camp operations depend upon many considerations that CA personnel must take into account. These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

I-82.   When large groups of civilians must be quartered for a temporary period (less than 6 months) or on a semipermanent basis (more than 6 months), CA units establish camps. HN personnel usually direct the administration and operation of a camp. CA units provide technical advice, support, and assistance, depending on the requirements. They may also furnish additional detachments and functional teams or specialists to resolve public health, public welfare, or public safety problems at any particular camp. Minimum considerations include-

• Camp control, construction, administration, screening, medical care, and sanitation.
• Security.
• Supply.
• Transportation.
• Information dissemination.
• Liaison with other agencies.

I-83.   Control of the people is the key to successful camp operations. To meet U.S. obligations under international law, CA personnel ensure the efficient and effective administration of camps. Camp control also includes measures to reduce waste and to avoid duplication of effort. CA personnel must quickly and fairly establish and maintain discipline when administering DC camps. They must publish and enforce rules of conduct for the camp as necessary. Camp administrators serve as the single point of contact, coordinating all camp matters within the camp and with outside organizations or agencies. Camp rules should be brief and kept to a minimum.

I-84.   The most manageable number of people in a camp is 5,000. This number helps enforce control measures. It also lets CA personnel efficiently administer the camp and its population. The location of the camp is extremely important. Engineer support and military construction materials are necessary when camps are in areas where local facilities are unavailable-for example, hotels, schools, halls, theaters, vacant warehouses, unused factories, or workers' camps. CA personnel must avoid those sites near vital communication centers, large military installations, or other potential military targets. The location of the camp also depends on the availability of food, water, power, and waste disposal. Additional considerations include the susceptibility of the area to natural or man-made disasters (for example, flooding, pollution, and fire) and the use of camp personnel as a source of local labor support.

I-85.   The physical layout of the camp is important. The main principle is to subdivide the camp into sections or separate compounds to ease administration and camp tension. Each section can serve as an administrative subunit for transacting camp business. The major sections normally include camp HQ, hospital, mess, and sleeping areas. The sleeping areas must be further subdivided into separate areas for unaccompanied children, unattached females, families, and unattached males. CA personnel must also consider cultural and religious practices and make every effort to keep families together.

I-86.   CA personnel must also consider the type of construction. Specific types of construction necessary to satisfy the needs of the particular DC operation vary according to the-

• Local climate.
• Anticipated permanency of the camp.
• Number of camps to be constructed.
• Availability of local materials.
• Extent of available military resources and assistance.

I-87.   Whenever possible, the DCs themselves or local agencies or government employees should construct the camp. Local sources provide materials whenever possible IAW legal limitations. The supporting command's logistics and transportation assets are used to acquire and transport required resources to build or modify existing facilities for DC operations. The supporting command also furnishes medical, dining, and other supporting assets to establish DC camps.

I-88.   Because of the large numbers of DCs for whom control and care must be provided, using HN civilians as cadre for the camp administration is preferred. DCs should become involved in the administration of the camp. Past military experience in DC operations shows that about 6 percent of the total number of DCs should be employed on a full-time basis. If possible, CA personnel organize and train the cadre before the camp opens. Whenever possible, civilians should come from public and private welfare organizations and be under military supervision. Other concerns are problems that might stem from the state of mind of the DCs. The difficulties they have experienced may affect their acceptance of authority. They may have little initiative or may be uncooperative because of an uncertain future. They may be angry because of their losses, or they may resort to looting and general lawlessness because of their destitution. The camp administrator can minimize difficulties through careful administration and by-

• Maintaining different national and cultural groups in separate camps or sections of a camp.
• Keeping families together while separating unaccompanied males, females, and children under the age of 18 (or abiding by the laws of the HN as to when a child becomes an adult).
• Furnishing necessary information on the status and future of DCs.
• Allowing DCs to speak freely to camp officials.
• Involving the DCs in camp administration, work, and recreation.
• Quickly establishing contact with agencies for aid and family reunification.

I-89.   Screening is necessary to prevent infiltration of camps by insurgents, enemy agents, or escaping members of the hostile armed forces. Although intelligence or other types of units may screen DCs at first, friendly and reliable local civilians under the supervision of CA personnel can perform this function. They must carefully apply administrative controls to prevent infiltration and preclude alienation of people who are sympathetic to U.S. objectives. The insertion or the development of reliable informants is important in all but the most temporary camps. Intelligence collection by CA personnel is under the staff supervision of the G-2. The screening process also identifies skilled technicians and professional specialists to help in camp administration-for example, policemen, schoolteachers, doctors, dentists, nurses, lawyers, mechanics, carpenters, and cooks.

I-90.   The need for medical care and sanitation intensifies in camp environments because of the temporary nature of the facilities and the lack of sanitation by the people. Enforcement and education measures are necessary to ensure that the camp population complies with basic sanitation measures.

I-91.   The camp supply officer or CA civilian supply specialist must coordinate in advance for food, water, clothing, fuel, portable shelter, and medical supplies. CA supply personnel must make sure U.S. medical personnel inspect all food and water, particularly civilian and captured stocks. USAID and security assistance officers (SAOs) can be helpful in U.S. efforts to provide aid to the country. International organizations and NGOs may also be useful. Support from U.S. military stocks should only be considered as a last resort, however, and CA supply personnel should not rely upon that support.

I-92.   The camp security officer, supervised by the public safety team, provides camp security and enforces law, order, and discipline. Sources for security officers include local police forces, HN paramilitary or military forces, and U.S. military forces. Another potential source may be the camp population itself. Police personnel within the population could supplement security teams or constitute a special camp police force, if necessary. Internal and external patrols are necessary; however, security for a DC facility should not give the impression that the facility is a prison.

I-93.   The efficient administration of a DC camp requires adequate transportation assets. The camp movement officer or CA transportation specialist determines the types and numbers of vehicles required and makes provisions to have them on hand. He uses civilian or captured enemy vehicles whenever possible.

I-94.   In the administration of any type of camp, dissemination of instructions and information to the camp population is vital. Communications may be in the form of notices on bulletin boards, posters, public address systems, loudspeakers, camp meetings and assemblies, or a camp radio station. An example of barracks rules is shown in Figure I-7. CA civil information teams and area PSYOP units may be able to help.

I-95.   Liaison involves coordination with all interested agencies. USG and military authorities, allied liaison officers, and representatives of local governments and international agencies may help in relief and assistance operations.

I-96.   The final step in DC operations involves the ultimate disposition of the DCs, although this consideration must occur early in the planning phase. The most desired disposition is to return them to their homes. Allowing DCs to return to their homes as quickly as tactical considerations permit lessens the burden for support on the military and the civilian economy. It also lessens the danger of diseases common among people in confined areas. When DCs return to their homes, they can help restore their towns and can better contribute to their own support. If DCs cannot return to their homes, they may resettle elsewhere in their country or in a country that accepts them. Guidance on the disposition of DCs must come from higher authority, under coordination with U.S. forces, national authorities, and international agencies.

I-97.   Death from dehydration (extreme loss of fluids), especially of infants, the elderly, and the sick or injured, is a constant threat in war and MOOTW. People tend to experience extreme loss of fluids from diarrhea, bleeding, and hot weather. CA soldiers must be aware of this threat and be prepared to respond to it effectively, especially when operating a DC collection point.

I-98.   Soldiers operating a DC collection point must be especially aware of-

• Infants.
• Nursing mothers.
• Very thin people with sallow eyes.
• Persons who are heavily bandaged.
• Persons on litters.
• The elderly.

I-99.   People suffering from dehydration require more than just water. Soldiers should consider the following information when providing oral rehydration:

• World Health Organization ORT formula:
• 1 quart water.
• 3.5 grams of sodium chloride (table salt).
• 2.5 grams of sodium bicarbonate (Arm & Hammer).
• 1.5 grams of potassium chloride (Lite Salt).
• 20 grams of sugar.
• U.S. military field expedients for ORT:
• MRE salt pack = 4 grams of table salt.
• MRE beverage base pack = 32 grams of sugar.
• MRE cocoa pack = 1.4 grams of potassium.
• Water is most important, then salt, then potassium, then sugar.
• Water and salt alone are okay in a pinch.
• In extreme cases, do not "load up" the patient with fluids, especially if the water is cold; the patient could vomit and lose even more fluid. Small amounts of room temperature water should be given frequently.
• Babies will want to suck (not drink) the formula. Ice chips or a wet, porous rag should be used.
• Dehydration causes the blood pressure to be low. The patient should get in the shade with feet up, if possible.
• Pedia-Lite is a brand name ready-mix ORT formula for infants.