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Military

Chapter 1

Introduction

...you will take every step in your power to preserve tranquility and order in the city and give security to individuals of every class and description-restraining as far as possible, till the restoration of civil government, every species of persecution, insult, or abuse, either from the soldiery to the inhabitants or among each other.
 

General George Washington,
19 June 1778

   

GENERAL

 
 

1-1.   The unique skills of the CA soldier are required across the range of full-spectrum operations incorporating all elements of national power. As the primary coordinator of CMO, he must be able to perform effectively in the four types of military action-offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations-in Service, joint, interagency, and multinational environments. His focus, whether contemplating the factors and conditions inherent to the commander's battlespace or physically engaged in battlespace operations, is on the civil component of the operational environment.

 
The focus of CA is to engage the civil component of the operational environment by assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning-both actively and passively-political, economic, and information (social and cultural) institutions and capabilities to achieve U.S. national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation both abroad and at home.
 

1-2.   CA soldiers enter the CA branch (38), functional area (39C), operations career field (39), or obtain the CA skill qualification identifier (D) with a variety of backgrounds, experience, and expertise. Military operational and planning expertise, enhanced by CA training and coupled with the skills and capabilities obtained in the civil sector, make CA soldiers unique in the Army. Individually and collectively, as members of general staffs, planning teams, specialty teams, functional specialty teams, civic action teams, or CA teams, they apply their knowledge and talents in various ways to meet the needs of the supported commander. CA soldiers gain area expertise by maintaining regional focus, cultural awareness, and when possible, language skills. This area expertise helps the commander to assess the impact of civil considerations on military planning and operations.

1-3.   During the planning process, CA soldiers provide the commander with a perspective of the nonmilitary factors-civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (CASCOPE)-that shape the operational environment. In both war and military operations other than war (MOOTW), CA/CMO planners contribute to the common operational picture (COP) by helping the commander and staff to visualize the entire situation. They do this by analyzing the civilian component of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations (METT-TC), as described in FM 3-0, Operations. This analysis includes-

  • Establishing, if needed, a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as early as possible to facilitate collaborative coordination with the nonmilitary agencies operating in the area of operations (AO).
  • Determining what, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered in the AO, what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect the military operation, and vice versa.
  • Determining measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that generate the definition and conditions for success.

1-4.   CA soldiers advise the commander on the operational capabilities of CA planning, tactical, and specialty teams. CA soldiers articulate the value of CA teams and CMO in enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. They also advise the commander on the risks associated with not engaging the civil component of the operational environment through CMO.

1-5.   CA soldiers help shape the environment for successful achievement of the desired end state of an operation. According to FM 3-0, missions in any environment require Army forces prepared to conduct any combination of these operations:

  • Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to impose U.S. will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory.
  • Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone cannot normally achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative.
  • Stability operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable environment.
  • Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. Domestically, Army forces respond only when the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directs. Army forces operate in support of the lead federal agency (LFA) and comply with provisions of U.S. law, to include the Posse Comitatus and Stafford Acts.

1-6.   At the strategic and operational levels of operation, especially during the implementation of geographic combatant command theater engagement plans, the application of some CA activities can mitigate the need to apply other military operations in a crisis response. When a crisis is unavoidable, groundwork laid by those CA activities can also facilitate rapid decisive operations.

1-7.   CMO are inherent to all military operations. Some of the common roles performed by CA soldiers include-

  • Providing the primary interface with all civilian agencies and organizations (indigenous, U.S. government [USG], nongovernment, and international) in the AO.
  • Establishing and maintaining a CMOC to facilitate interagency collaborative coordination.
  • Analyzing the civil component of the AO for CASCOPE to determine the impact of the civil environment on military operations, as well as the impact of military operations on the civil environment.
  • Monitoring operations to minimize the negative impacts of both sides, to identify requirements for follow-on CA activities and CMO, and to identify when MOEs have been achieved.
  • Assisting commanders at all levels to fulfill their responsibilities inherent in CMO directly (by conducting CA activities) and indirectly (in an advisory role).
  • Facilitating transition of operations from military to civilian control.

1-8.   CA soldiers also perform specialized roles. These roles include-

  • Supporting dislocated civilian (DC) operations.
  • Identifying and, if necessary, facilitating negotiations for foreign nation support (FNS) resources and facilities for use by U.S. forces.
  • Enhancing force protection and situational awareness by engaging routinely with local agencies, government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civilian authorities.
  • Assessing conditions in the AO in terms of the 16 CA functional specialties and providing support to civil administration in them, as required.
  • Other tasks described in FM 41-10 and associated joint publications (JPs).

1-9.   During posthostilities operations, which include operations in areas where conflict has subsided while combat operations continue elsewhere, CA soldiers establish and maintain a CMOC, assess current conditions, and determine the requirements for meeting emergency needs. They draw upon civilian-attained skills to assist U.S. and foreign conventional forces, special operations forces (SOF), government agencies, and civil authorities in returning affected areas to normalcy. In doing so, CA soldiers enhance force protection and help set conditions for the transition of day-to-day functions to host nation (HN) or third-nation authorities so that U.S. forces may transition and redeploy.

1-10.   FM 41-10 addresses what CA soldiers are expected to do. This FM addresses how CA soldiers might accomplish the inherent tasks of CA activities across the range of full-spectrum operations.

 

HISTORY

 
However well the functions and responsibilities of the military government of an occupied territory may be enumerated, there must inevitably remain a vast number of problems without precedent, tasks without pattern, administrative pioneering without blazed trails. Many historical principles repeat themselves, but many incidents occur but once. In consequence, the CA "soldier" frequently must thread a way where guideposts are lacking, where common sense and native ingenuity, appreciation of a special environment, adaptability to unwonted concepts of life, all are paramount. This does not mean that intricate maneuvers are required to solve unexpected problems. On the contrary, the simplest and most direct actions often dispose of situations fraught with grave dangers.
 

Civil Affairs Studies: Illustrative Cases from Military Occupations
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
1944

   
 

1-11.   Modern CA forces and activities have their roots in the military governments of World War II. The legacy of these roots is retained in the 16 CA functional specialties found in the specialty teams of the various CA units (Figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1. The 16 CA Functional Specialties

Figure 1-1. The 16 CA Functional Specialties

  1-12.   The unit commander's responsibility for CMO, however, is historically entrenched in the earliest days of the U.S. Army. The quote by General George Washington used at the beginning of this chapter illustrates some of the CA activities outlined in FM 41-10 that support the commander's mission. These activities include operations that-

  • Fulfill responsibilities of the military under U.S. domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations.
  • Minimize civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the civilian populace.
  • Coordinate military operations with civilian agencies of the USG, civilian agencies of other governments, and NGOs.
  • Exercise military control of the civilian populace in occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.
  • Provide assistance to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population.
  • Provide expertise in civil-sector functions normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement U.S. policy to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.

1-13.   Although CA forces have changed orientation and configuration over the years, the CA activities have not. These activities are inherent across offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. History provides us with many examples of the various roles played by CA soldiers in past military operations. The following examples of late 20th century operations illustrate some of the activities listed in the previous paragraph. These examples serve to illustrate some of the challenges CA soldiers encountered in the past, as well as the types of roles CA soldiers can expect to play in operations of the 21st century.

 

Operation URGENT FURY-Grenada, 1983

In October 1983, a power struggle within the Marxist government of the island nation of Grenada resulted in the arrest and subsequent murder of Marxist Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several members of his Cabinet by elements of the People's Revolutionary Army. In response to an appeal from Grenada's governor general and a request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, U.S. forces, in conjunction with contingents of the security forces of several neighboring Caribbean states, invaded Grenada on October 25. The mission was to oust the People's Revolutionary Government, to protect U.S. citizens, and restore a lawful government. All major objectives were accomplished within 3 days.

Although soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Bn) (Airborne [A]) accompanied the invasion force, there was no defined role for CA forces during combat operations. In fact, no CA planners were involved in the planning of this contingency operation. Planners from the 96th CA Bn (A) deployed to the Atlantic Command before D-day to determine and coordinate the role of the CA Bn, but they received no definitive guidance from the Commander, United States Atlantic Command or his staff. This lack of a defined CA mission continued through December when operations transferred to a residual force. Consequently, CA soldiers operated on an ad hoc basis, doing what they felt was best to support the commander in taking care of people and restoring services in a friendly country.

The initial invasion force consisted of the 1st and 2d Ranger Bns, operating on the southern portion of the island, and the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, operating on the northern portion. No CA soldiers accompanied these combat forces. The first CA officer-a first lieutenant from the 96th CA Bn (A)-arrived with the 2d Brigade (Bde), 82d Airborne Division, on 25 October. A three-man team from the 96th CA Bn arrived on 26 October with the 3d Bde, 82d Airborne Division. For the next 3 days, priority of fill for deploying aircraft went to combat forces. Additional CA assets were allowed to deploy only after it became evident that their expertise was sorely needed. Unit commanders, untrained in CMO, found their forces quickly overwhelmed tending to the needs of civilians who were suffering from prehostilities neglect, as well as the results of combat operations.

On 29 and 30 October, soldiers of the 96th CA Bn and 1st Bn, 4th Psychological Operations Group, arrived in Grenada to form what would become the CMOC. The CMOC provided centralized control over damage assessments, DC operations, FNS procurement, and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support to populace and resources control (PRC) activities. It also provided liaison and support to United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United States Information Service (USIS), various government agencies of Grenada, and international relief organizations (IROs). Other soldiers of the 96th CA Bn, assisting the G-5 of the 82d Airborne Division, supervised a prisoner of war camp using a multinational guard force. These soldiers also supervised the restriction of Cuban and Russian officials to their respective Embassies, and tended to the daily health and welfare of all prisoners and restricted personnel.

The 358th CA Bde deployed the first RC CA soldiers to Grenada on 9 November. A public welfare team and a public works and utilities team surveyed and assessed damage to telephone exchanges, water and sewage systems, and electrical power distribution systems. These teams supported USAID by supervising the reconstruction of these public utilities. They also established strong working relationships with various agencies of the Grenadine government while helping to reconstruct the infrastructure of the island. One CA officer, sent to Grenada because of skills obtained as a member of the City of Philadelphia Convention and Business Bureau, was instrumental in helping to revitalize Grenada's tourism trade. Others helped revitalize schools.

CA operations were transferred on 7 December to a residual force CMOC consisting of six Active Army CA soldiers and two RC CA soldiers. CA operations in Grenada ended in August 1985.

 

Operation RESTORE HOPE-Somalia, 1992

Mohamed Siad Barre, president and dictator of Somalia since 1969, fled the country in January 1991, taking with him the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank worth an estimated U.S. $27 million. Bitter dispute over who would legitimately lead the country resulted in a civil war. The intense violence created a humanitarian crisis of great proportions throughout the southern portion of Somalia. United Nations (UN) efforts, which included a small force of military observers in Mogadishu and an airlift of food to the capital and outlying areas, proved ineffective. Interclan violence and bands of armed militia confined the observers to the Mogadishu Airport and hindered the humanitarian relief efforts of international organizations. In December 1992, the United States, along with several other UN members, launched the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to provide security for the humanitarian effort and to return Somalia to normal conditions.

The Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), quickly formed Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, the U.S. portion of UNITAF, in late November. The JTF was organized around the headquarters (HQ) of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Ground forces included Army forces (ARFOR) (10th Mountain Division), Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) (1st Marine Division), SOF (3d Special Forces Group), and the 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM).

The mission of JTF Somalia was to provide security for the overall relief effort and to assist IROs in providing humanitarian assistance (HA). The commander's intent was to avoid involvement in disarmament or in the rebuilding of Somalia. This fact would influence the number and type of CA forces allocated to the JTF.

Planning for CA participation began with the arrival of the commander of Company C, 96th CA Bn (A), at USCENTCOM HQ. He was told that United States Army Reserve (USAR) CA soldiers would not participate in the operation, and that he would have to rely solely on Active Army CA assets. He divided his company's six Civil Affairs direct support teams (CADSTs) evenly between the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Marine Division, and at the direction of the JTF J-3, attached his Civil Affairs tactical headquarters support team (CATHST) to the UN Humanitarian Operations Center. He then deployed directly to Somalia with the JTF staff on 11 December.

The three MARFOR CADSTs arrived in Somalia on 21 December, 12 days after the first Marine elements landed at Mogadishu. The three ARFOR CADSTs arrived on 28 December, approximately coinciding with the arrival of the initial elements of the 10th Mountain Division.

The CADSTs did not receive a clear mission statement until they arrived in Mogadishu and were briefed by the military deputy of operations of the UN Humanitarian Operations Center. The CA mission was to provide liaison between military commanders and representatives of IROs operating in humanitarian relief sectors throughout Somalia. A major factor missing from the mission statement was the relationship between the JTF and the Somali people in returning their country to normal conditions. This oversight would affect the daily operations of the JTF.

Although the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was not deploying RC CA soldiers to this operation, three RC CA officers of 321st CA Bde did obtain deployment orders through the U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center. Affiliated with 13th COSCOM through the Army's Capstone program, these soldiers participated in planning from the time the 13th COSCOM received a warning order to deploy and were included on the COSCOM's time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL). They arrived in mid-January 1993 and redeployed with 13th COSCOM in June 1993. Activities conducted by these few CA forces in Somalia included staffing CMOCs in humanitarian relief sectors throughout Somalia; coordinating and facilitating IRO requests for security escorts, passes and identification cards, space-available seating on JTF aircraft, and other miscellaneous requests, such as the return of confiscated weapons; conducting medical and engineer assessments of orphanages, feeding centers, health clinics, schools, roads, bridges, and minefields; conducting meetings with local Somali groups to identify local elders, assess needs, and determine civilian attitude toward coalition forces; providing liaison between local Somali leaders and IRO representatives; coordinating medical and engineer civic action projects to foster good relations and enhance force protection; training representatives of coalition forces to plan and conduct CMO; and conducting handoff of CA operations to coalition forces.

One deficiency in the JTF organization was the failure to have a trained CMO staff officer at every level from JTF to battalion. With all operations clearly focused on support to civilians, this oversight created a void in CMO planning. Other than the rules of engagement (ROE), the JTF had no centralized CMO plan or policy regarding interaction with civilians and direct requests for assistance by local nationals. Consequently, many subordinate units, left to handle unfamiliar situations without clear guidance, undertook activities on their own accord that were beyond the scope of their mission and that were better suited for IROs. These same units later complained that they were victims of a phenomenon known as "mission creep," which took resources from their primary mission to address unforeseen requirements.

 

Operation SUPPORT HOPE-Rwanda and Zaire, 1994

The JTF of Operation SUPPORT HOPE deployed from the United States European Command (USEUCOM) on or about 22 July 1994 in response to the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda and Zaire. The objectives set for the JTF were to assist efforts to establish water purification and distribution systems in Goma; establish an airhead and cargo distribution capability at Entebbe; provide round-the-clock airfield services at Goma, Kigali, and Bukavu; provide logistics management support to UN and other agencies; and protect the force.

The JTF commander selected an ad hoc team of personnel within his command to run his CMOC, which began operations on 28 July 1994 at Entebbe, Uganda. The selected soldiers had experience in peace operations and expertise as regional foreign area officers, but none had trained or been briefed on how to organize and run a CMOC. CMOC Entebbe's initial focus was strictly on logistics functions.

The initial main effort for international humanitarian response was actually in Kigali, Rwanda. The United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office established the On-Site Operations Coordination Center in Kigali to coordinate the international response.

Meanwhile, soldiers from the 353d CA Command (CACOM) were activated in July 1994, mobilized at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and briefed about CMOC lessons learned by members of C/96 CA Bn who had been in Somalia. They then sat at Fort Bragg for several days because they could not get seats on deploying aircraft. After some attrition, the CA team finally arrived in Rwanda on or about 7 August 1994 and immediately established CMOCs at Goma, Zaire, and Kigali, Rwanda.

The JTF experienced an initial lack of understanding of the situation and inability to effectively interact with NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area. Delayed deployment of trained CA soldiers, therefore, significantly inhibited initial military contribution to the main efforts of HA operations.

 

JTF Operation PROVIDE REFUGE-United States, 1999

In 1999, the United States participated in an international effort to provide safe haven for Kosovar Albanian refugees to relieve the strain on Macedonia, host to approximately 140,000 refugees fleeing death and oppression from neighboring Kosovo. From 5 May to 31 July 1999, Fort Dix, New Jersey, became a reception and processing center for 3,547 Albanians en route to new lives in the United States.

Operation PROVIDE REFUGE was truly an interagency CMO. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) was the LFA that oversaw the reception, billeting, medical screening, and processing of the Kosovar Albanians for temporary resettlement in the United States. Other federal agencies included the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). Nongovernment agencies, known collectively as the Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA), included the Immigration and Refugee Services of America, Amnesty International (AI), and the American Red Cross (ARC).

At the direction of DOD, 1st COSCOM from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed a JTF on 1 May 1999 to Fort Dix to set up and operate the temporary camp while the Kosovar Albanians completed the immigration process. The JTF commander, realizing a need for soldiers knowledgeable in DC camp operations, requested CA support for the operation. His request was denied at United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). To meet the commander's needs, the commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, deployed one member of the Corps G-5 to head up the J-3's CMO section.

Initially one-deep, and later augmented by four soldiers of the 358th CA Bde performing annual training at Fort Dix, the CMO section provided support and advice to the JTF commander and to the representatives of the various agencies brought together for this uncommon domestic operation.

Some of the responsibilities of the CMO section were to-

  • Advise the JTF commander on all CMO issues within the JTF area of responsibility (AOR) and area of interest in accordance with (IAW) the interagency memorandum of agreement (MOA).
  • Provide staff CMO presence, such as attendance at daily interagency meetings (0930), command and staff briefings (1600), and any special meetings called by the military or task force leadership.
  • Conduct daily walk-throughs to assess camp life, monitor morale, and quickly identify problems for referral to the appropriate agency or provider, and exercise diplomacy in identifying shortfalls, developing solutions, and making recommendations.
  • Attend "Village" council meetings and report CMO issues developed or identified at these meetings to the appropriate JTF staff section.
  • Provide interagency liaison between federal agencies, NGOs, and the JTF, and meet briefly each day with representatives of the JVA, DHHS, DOS, INS, AI, and ARC.
  • Identify refugees with English language skills. Forward names, buildings, and room information to DHHS or other appropriate personnel.

 

Operation STABILIZE-East Timor, 1999-2001

The former Indonesian province of East Timor fell into turmoil in September 1999 after the passing of a provincial referendum calling for independence. Due to the organized terrorism by militias, East Timor suffered loss of infrastructure, displacement of the civilian population, and disruption of the economy and agricultural output. Many major humanitarian agencies rushed to provide aid. These agencies included the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), among others.

In reaction to an estimated 2,000 deaths, torching of 75 percent of the country, and displacement of approximately 180,000 civilians, the international community, under a UN resolution, created a peacekeeping force. This force, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), was created to ensure stability and bring security to the province. Australia, United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines comprised the coalition forces.

Recognizing the need for close cooperation with the military to coordinate the humanitarian operation, the UN humanitarian coordinator established a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) component in INTERFET. The CIMIC team developed a one-page conceptual framework for CIMIC and presented it to the force commander. This framework specified two sets of deliverables: (1) coordination arrangements, primarily to deconflict the intended use of the same resources, and (2) specific arrangements to coordinate the use of military resources in direct support of HA operations.

Twelve soldiers from B Company, 96th CA Bn (A), augmented by four RC personnel, deployed to Australia on 21 September 1999 to participate in planning for the peacekeeping mission. Their initial mission was to establish and operate a CMOC for INTERFET. Force protection requirements prevented their immediate departure from Darwin, Australia, but they arrived in Dili, East Timor, on 3 October-several days after the main force.

Once in East Timor, force protection constraints prevented the team from executing the original plan of conducting needs surveys and assessments. For example, the tactical support teams (TSTs) were not allowed to leave the INTERFET compound to conduct HA assessments. This situation did not change for the duration of the U.S. INTERFET deployment and remained in effect even after members of the 322d CA Bde assumed the CA mission on 10 November 1999. Nevertheless, this CA force was successful in two key areas: (1) the coordination of interagency relief to the population, and (2) assisting in the return of over 100,000 refugees from West Timor.

When the UN assumed the role of the administrative interim government of East Timor in the form of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the INTERFET peacekeeping force transitioned to become the UN Peacekeeping Force (PKF). The U.S. presence downsized and, while the United States was not a part of the UNTAET or PKF, the United States maintained an independent presence to show political support for the UN effort. The 322d CA Bde maintained a rotational CA liaison officer (LNO) to the joint staff of United States Support Group East Timor (USGET). USGET CA LNO planned and coordinated ongoing U.S. engineering and medical projects by U.S. military teams in East Timor. The CA LNO served as LNO to the UN PKF and its component forces, as well as the various diverse departments within the UNTAET government, and coordinated relief efforts with many of the NGOs and international organizations in East Timor. At the peak of operations, there were military forces from 24 nations and over 180 NGOs and international organizations in-country.

 

Operation ANACONDA-Afghanistan, 2002

In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom initiated the military phase of the global war against terrorism on 7 October 2001 with Operation INFINITE JUSTICE, later renamed Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. U.S. objectives of this operation included acquiring intelligence on the resources of the al Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban government, preventing the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists, developing relations with groups opposed to the Taliban, supporting opposition forces in their struggle, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian supplies to the Afghan people. Within two months, opposition forces, supported by an international coalition, succeeded in toppling the Taliban government and scattering Taliban and al Qaeda forces. However, the scattered forces still posed a threat, particularly in the eastern part of the country.

Operation ANACONDA developed as part of the ongoing effort to root out Taliban and al Qaeda forces from caves and strongholds dug deep into the Shah-I-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Conducted 1-17 March 2002, it was a combined ground tactical operation that initially involved U.S. and Afghan forces and, later, included coalition forces from Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, and Norway.

Operation ANACONDA called for U.S. special operations and conventional forces, along with Anti-Taliban Forces (ATF), to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) and combat operations to deny egress routes to Pakistan through the Khowst-Gardez area. U.S. forces consisted of elements of 5th Special Forces Group (SFG), known as Task Force (TF) Dagger, and the 3d Bde, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Preparation included organizing and training the ATF for the operation and providing HA to the distressed populace in the area.

The lead planning agent-HQ, TF Dagger-moved from Uzbekistan to Bagram, Afghanistan, to create a forward presence for planning. Since there was no CA/CMO planner on his staff, the commander of TF Dagger requested CMO planning support from the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). The CJCMOTF directed CMOC South, located in Kabul, to provide one CA planner familiar with SF operations to work under the auspices of the TF Dagger information operations section. The CA planner, a member of the 96th CA Bn (A), reported several days prior to execution of Operation ANACONDA and eventually transitioned his duties to a 4-person team from the CJCMOTF.

A Special Forces operational detachment A (SFODA) from TF Dagger was operating in the Khowst-Gardez area for 8 days before Civil Affairs Team A (CAT-A) 41, from 96th CA Bn (A), arrived. The SFODA's focus as on conducting combat-oriented assessments (for example, military capabilities and targeting) and UW training.

The CAT-A's mission was to support UW operations by overseeing HA operations in 17 provinces of the area and to create a positive relationship with local leaders in the area prior to the combat phase of Operation ANACONDA. Over a 2-week period, the CAT-A executed the CA activities of host-nation support (HNS), military civic action (MCA), and support to civil administration. Specifically, it conducted CMO-oriented assessments; facilitated the local hire of cargo vehicles and, in the absence of materiel handling equipment, individuals to transfer cargo by hand from aircraft to the vehicles; supervised an engineer project to repair a bridge required to support the movement of HA supplies; and delicately managed operations in an environment in which political leaders, appointed by the interim government of Afghanistan, and local warlords, who did not necessarily accept the interim government as legitimate, were often at odds with each other.

Elsewhere in the theater, five members of 352 CACOM, working at the CJCMOTF, planned and managed the delivery of HA supplies into the Khowst-Gardez area. They configured pallets (also known as "Home Depot" packages due to the preponderance of building materials) in Bagram and called CAT-A 41 when the supplies were inbound.

At times, the security situation limited CAT-A operations to the vicinity of the supporting airfield. As a force protection measure during the distribution of supplies, the CAT-A moved with ATF, local police, or SFODA forces. Conversely, the HA operations enhanced the force protection of the SFODA by promoting rapport between the SFODA and ATF. When ATF soldiers saw their families were taken care of, absenteeism among ATF trainees was diminished, allowing ATF to focus on the mission. Another benefit of including ATF and local police in HA operations was to promote the legitimacy of the provincial government among the populace.

 

 

1-14.   The historical examples provided general insights for future operations. These insights include-

  • Every command level must have a CMO staff element that is visible and involved in all aspects of preparing for, executing, and transitioning military operations.
  • CA/CMO planners must be integrated early with the supported staff.
  • The commander must have a well-formed intent for CMO that is understood down to the lowest level.
  • CA activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels must be integrated into a centralized CMO plan that supports the combatant commander's plan.
  • Many of the commander's CMO and force protection challenges can be minimized if CA teams accompany or follow immediately behind combat elements.
  • The CMOC should be considered for every operation.
  • CA elements need to be properly equipped to operate successfully in both the military environment and the civil arena (they must have their own vehicles, communications equipment, and digital access to both secure and nonsecure networks).
  • International organizations and NGOs are a reality and must be integrated into the plan to exploit their strengths and minimize their potential negative impact.
 

THE FOG OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

 
It is the responsibility of combatant commanders to plan and conduct CMO. CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting the geographic combatant commander's theater engagement plan.
 

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,
8 February 2001

   
 

1-15.   All units experience a condition or period during which full knowledge and understanding of the total situation in an AO is sketchy. This "fog of military operations" occurs during war as well as MOOTW. It also occurs across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations simultaneously. Initially amorphous, the situation starts to take shape and gradually becomes clearer as operations progress.

1-16.   The fog of military operations contains both military and civil components that are scattered and intertwined within the AO. Dissipating the fog requires the military and civilian participants of an operation to understand their respective roles at each of the levels of operation (strategic, operational, and tactical) to maximize available resources and create a synergistic effect. For example, attack of the fog requires deliberate, on-the-ground assessments of both the military and civil situations; integration of multiple (military and civilian) information sources to identify the various threats to the mission or military force; and simultaneous engagement of both the military and civil centers of gravity.

1-17.   Military forces generally focus their efforts against the military threats and centers of gravity. Civilian (interagency, multinational, HN) participants of an operation generally focus their efforts against the nonmilitary threats and civilian centers of gravity. As operations progress, the priority of effort shifts, based on METT-TC and CASCOPE, between military (mil-mil), CMO (mil-civ), and civilian (civ-civ) operations until, ultimately, the military and CMO efforts are secondary to, and support, the efforts of indigenous populations and institutions.

1-18.   At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation, CA soldiers bridge the gap between the military and civil components during war and MOOTW. Whether functioning as members of an interagency work group, as part of a large military force, or as isolated individuals or teams, they assess and monitor the civil component, engage civil objectives in support of the military operation, and facilitate eventual transition of operations to indigenous civilian solutions. Figures 1-2 through 1-6, depict this concept in a typical operational environment. With modification, these figures can be used to portray general operations during war or MOOTW. Appendix A provides further information on symbology used in graphics.

Figure 1-2. Environment Prior to the Introduction of U.S.-Led Military Forces

Figure 1-2. Environment Prior to the Introduction of U.S.-Led Military Forces

Figure 1-3. Initial Phases of U.S. Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Mil

Figure 1-3. Initial Phases of U.S. Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Mil

Figure 1-4. Subsequent Phases of U.S. Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Civ

Figure 1-4. Subsequent Phases of U.S. Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Civ

Figure 1-5. Subsequent Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Civ and Civ-Civ

Figure 1-5. Subsequent Military Operations-Main Effort Is Mil-Civ and Civ-Civ

Figure 1-6. Subsequent Military Operations-Main Effort Is Civ-Civ

Figure 1-6. Subsequent Military Operations-Main Effort Is Civ-Civ

   

CA METHODOLOGY

 
The problem of achieving maximum civilian support and minimum civilian interference with U.S. military operations will require the coordination of intelligence efforts, security measures, operational efficiency, and the intentional cultivation of goodwill. Failure to use CA assets in the analysis of political, economic, and social bases of instability may result in inadequate responses to the root causes of the instability and result in the initiation or continuation of conflict.
 

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations,
8 February 2001

   
 

1-19.   Commanders seek to achieve national goals and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. The focus of all CA operations is to help commanders to engage the civil component of their operational environment. CA activities and tasks in this effort include assessing, monitoring, protecting, reinforcing, establishing, and transitioning political, economic, social, and cultural institutions. CA soldiers conduct these activities and tasks both actively, through direct contact, and passively, through observation, research, and analysis.

1-20.   The CA methodology describes how CA soldiers, elements, and units approach all CA operations and CMO. It consists of six steps:

  • Assess.
  • Decide.
  • Develop and detect.
  • Deliver.
  • Evaluate.
  • Transition.

The first five steps together are known as AD3E.

1-21.   The CA methodology is applied equally by CA soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation. At each level, it supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, and direct operations in his exercise of battle command while engaging all elements of national power. It also helps present the COP and orchestrate a common operational response (COR) to produce common operational effects (COEs), as shown in Figure 1-7.

Figure 1-7. Depiction of the COP, COR, and COE

Figure 1-7. Depiction of the COP, COR, and COE

 

1-22.   A brief explanation of the six steps of the CA methodology follows. Each step will be covered in detail in succeeding chapters of this manual.

  • Assess: Assess current conditions against a defined norm or established standards. This assessment begins at receipt of the mission and continues through the mission analysis process. This step looks at the nonmilitary factors (CASCOPE) that shape the operational environment. It is conducted for each of the 16 functional specialties as well as the general aspects of the AO. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.
  • Decide: Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and activities toward a COE. This step encompasses CA course of action (COA) analysis, COA decision, and creating the CA/CMO plan. The plan should direct task-organized CA elements to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CA/CMO response. It should also address all CA/CMO activities in civil lines of operations from initial response through transition to other (military or civilian) authorities. The products of this step include the commander's intent for CMO, defined CA priorities of effort, defined MOEs, and the CA annex.
  • Develop and detect: Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including the affected populace) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CA/CMO response. CA elements accomplish this through numerous activities, such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, conducting deliberate assessments, hosting meetings, supporting DC control points, and monitoring public information programs and CA/CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary (FRAG) orders.
  • Deliver: Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CA activities (PRC, FNS, HA, MCA, emergency services, and support to civil administration), as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans. It represents a COR by CA soldiers, non-CA soldiers, international organizations, NGOs, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.
  • Evaluate: Evaluate the results of the executed mission. This step validates the CA/CMO concept of operations (CONOPS) and supports the management of MOEs. Performing this step is akin to conducting a CA "battle damage assessment." Evaluators look at the effects of the operation on each of the 16 CA functional specialties, determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on actions. Products of this step include trip reports, after-action reports (AARs), new mission requirements, and execution orders for transition plans.
  • Transition: Transition CA operations or CMO to follow-on CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and other civilian agencies, as appropriate. This step is CA's direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander's ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on force or organization.

1-23.   Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. The CA methodology takes these processes one step further by focusing on transition-the step that secures the victory. Table 1-1 demonstrates how the CA methodology and these processes are related.

Table 1-1. Comparison of the CA Methodology and the Various Problem-Solving and Decision-Making Processes

 

1-24.   The CA methodology is not necessarily linear. It can be depicted as a spiral in which new missions are spawned during the evaluation phase, starting the process over again. Several spirals may also occur simultaneously and, at times, overlap as operations become more complex (Figure 1-8).

Figure 1-8. Two Ways to Depict the Spiraling Effect of the CA Methodology

Figure 1-8. Two Ways to Depict the Spiraling Effect of the CA Methodology

   

CA AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

 
 

1-25.   Information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others', decision-making processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems (FM 3-0). IO are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. Offensive and defensive IO affect the enemy's ability to execute military actions. In conjunction with the related activities of public affairs and CMO, IO also affect the perceptions and attitudes of indigenous populations and institutions, their leaders, and international nonmilitary participants in an operation.

1-26.   Like CMO, IO is the responsibility of the commander. Many military organizations will have an IO cell within their planning staffs. This IO cell conducts thorough and detailed IO IPB, determines mission-specific IO themes, and coordinates and integrates the various IO elements listed in Chapter 11 of FM 3-0. Although the IO planning cell may be the mission-planning authority for a specific mission, the S-3, G-3, or J-3 remains the sole tasking authority.

1-27.   The CA methodology is the CA contribution to IO. For example-

  • Preliminary and deliberate CA assessments provide the civil perspective of the AO that rounds out IO IPB.
  • The application of CASCOPE during the decide phase focuses CA assets on essential aspects of the IO campaign to which other military assets may not have access.
  • CMOC operations during the develop and detect phase and the application of CA activities during the deliver phase create relationships, detect attitudes, and provide concrete actions that, in turn, contribute to the commander's campaign to mitigate the effects of enemy IO, as well as to mitigate adverse effects stemming from misinformation, rumors, confusion, and apprehension.
  • Monitoring and evaluating MOEs during the evaluate phase provide feedback on the success or failure of specific IO themes.
  • Successful transition to durable and sustainable civil solutions underscores the ultimate message that the United States is not an occupying power.

1-28.   The relationship between CA/CMO planners and the IO cell is strictly a coordinating relationship. At a minimum, CA activities and CMO must be synchronized so as not to violate CA plans, programs, policies, or IO themes established for the mission. Tools, systems, and operations that effectively support the synchronization of CA and IO include-

  • Shared information management tools, such as the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), to include-
    • Global Command and Control System.
    • Synchronization matrix (templating).
    • Fire effects cell and nonlethal effects cell.
  • The Targeting Board (Joint Targeting Coordination Board's Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List).

1-29.   These and other examples of the coordination routinely conducted between CA and IO specialists are addressed below and throughout this manual.

 

CA and IO in Kosovo

The joint operations center (JOC) within NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) at KFOR Main, in the city of Pristina, had an IO cell consisting of U.S. Air Force officers, a U.S. Army PSYOP plans section, and a Norwegian Army public affairs office (PAO) team. Additionally, the KFOR J-9 assigned an operations (OPS) cell consisting of U.S. CA officers to the JOC. At times, the J-9 OPS cell sought the assistance of the IO cell to disseminate information in support of CMO using PAO and PSYOP resources.

For example, during the winter of 1999-2000, CA specialists, working with the UNHCR, would coordinate for shipments of coal to fuel a power plant that supplied power to Serb, Albanian, and Roma communities. The power plant systems were commonly known as Kosovo A and Kosovo B. Each complex had multiple generating plants, where Kosovo A was a 1950s-era system consisting of about a half dozen factory-style smokestacks, and Kosovo B was a newer system built in the late 1970s. Oddly, the older system was the more reliable of the two systems.

It started to become increasingly clear to both the Democratic League of Kosovo and the former Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves (UCK, also known as the Kosovo Liberation Army or KLA), now known as the Kosovo Protection Force (KPF), that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 strictly defined the KFOR mission. As such, Multinational Brigade (MNB) East U.S. forces, specifically those of the 1st Infantry Division, would conduct missions, such as patrolling in the ground safety zone to interdict Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvegja, and Bujanoc weapons smuggled into Serbia's Presevo Valley.

Albanians then began to interdict most lines of communication and main supply routes that included buses from Nis, Serbia, and trains carrying passengers as well as commodities. This interdiction consisted not only of rocket attacks but also crimes of opportunity as criminals seized coal as it came up from the MNB South and MNB West AO.

To facilitate the establishment of a safe and secure environment and to restore Kosovo to normalcy, the J-3, along with the J-5, consisting of one U.S. CA officer in the J-5 Plans, a Norwegian Army officer, and a Turkish Army officer, plus the J-9, consisting primarily of U.S. Army CA officers, requested support through the JOC Director. Specifically, the J-3 wanted a COA that addressed the disruption of the shipment of coal and the increasing tide of violence toward various means of transportation.

The J-9 JOC OPS cell, in conjunction with the IO resources of PAO channels and PSYOP media through PSYOP Plans JOC element, disseminated the message that busing would cease for an undetermined time period until the violence stopped. Additionally, PSYOP disseminated messages that cooperation with the legitimate government was imperative for a return to normalcy.

Through this dissemination of information and closely coordinated actions of the J-9 OPS cell with IO and various MNB HQ and United Nations Mission in Kosovo Police (UNMIK-P) stations, the local populace began to cooperate with UNMIK-P. UNMIK-P were then able to identify the coal thieves so that the amount of available coal to Kosovo A and Kosovo B increased. In turn, rolling blackouts of electricity minimized and heat to key facilities, such as hospitals, also increased.

The increase of heat and minimization of rolling blackouts further restored the local population's confidence in the legitimate government, thus facilitating the restoration of a safe and secure environment.

The J-9 OPS cell maintained this relationship with IO and PSYOP throughout the mission, and would often engage support of IO and PSYOP to stress approved campaign themes that in turn nurtured the CA relationship and rapport with the local community.

   

PREPARING FOR DEPLOYMENT

 
 

1-30.   CA soldiers must be ready for deployment at all times. They must be prepared to accomplish their assigned missions on short notice. They will not have lengthy "train up" periods before deployments and, therefore, are personally responsible for their individual preparedness. In that regard, CA soldiers stay ready for employment by-

  • Staying physically fit.
  • Staying proficient in basic tactical soldiering skills.
  • Maintaining a regional focus according to the planning affiliation of their parent CA unit:
    • Keeping current in regional issues by routinely reviewing open source materials for current information on the region of their CA unit.
    • Reviewing OPLANs of their supported unit or organization for accuracy and inclusion of specialty areas.
    • Participating in overseas deployments for training in-theater.
  • Keeping current in the TTP associated with their assigned position or specialty:
    • Participating in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises, combatant command exercises, and combat training center exercises.
    • Seeking and maintaining certifications.
  • Keeping current in the TTP associated with their basic branch.
  • Keeping personal lives, especially families and finances, prepared for possible deployments.

1-31.   A CA soldier's civilian background may have a bearing on his military position. In some cases, the scope of the position may be focused on areas not normally encountered by the soldier in his daily capacity. To be well-rounded and proficient in all aspects of their military duties, CA soldiers should seek additional training or experience, such as-

  • Affiliating with local specialty groups.
  • Pursuing membership in professional organizations.
  • Subscribing to professional publications associated with the functional specialty.
  • Attending local, national, and international training opportunities in the specialty profession.

1-32.   Appendix B provides a list of affiliations and professional organizations associated with each of the 16 functional specialties that offer the opportunities listed above.



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