CHAPTER 3
EMPLOYMENT OF THE DRAGON
This chapter discusses considerations for and techniques of employment for the Dragon during offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations. This chapter is keyed to the Dragon as an infantry weapon; however, the infantry techniques discussed apply to any situation for all types of units. Specific areas of discussion include selection and preparation of firing positions, target engagement techniques, and fire control procedures. To fully understand and properly integrate the Dragon into tactics and techniques, leaders must be familiar with FM 7-7, FM 7-7J, FM 7-8, or FM 7-10, whichever applies.
Section I. DRAGON ROLE AND PERSONNEL DUTIES
The Dragon's role, location within the organization, and personnel duties are discussed in this section.
3-1. DRAGON ROLE
The Dragon's primary role is to destroy enemy armored vehicles. When there is no armored vehicle, the Dragons can be employed in a secondary role of providing fire support against point targets such as bunkers and crew-served weapons positions. Combat and CS units normally use the Dragon in a self-defense role during rear operations.
3-2. ORGANIZATION WITHIN ANTIARMOR SECTION
In the nonmechanized and nonairborne infantry organizations, Dragons are in the antiarmor section of the headquarters platoon of each rifle company. (See Figure 3-1.) The antiarmor section has 13 personnel and six medium antitank weapons. It is organized into three teams of four men with two medium antitank weapons each. The section leader is a SSG and each team is led by a SGT. The section provides medium-range antiarmor support to the company. It can be employed under company control or as separate teams attached to platoons. When no armored threat exists, the antiarmor section fights as infantry under the control of the company commander or attached to one of the platoons. It can be employed as a fourth maneuver element, or as a reconnaissance element.
NOTE: Airborne, air assault, motorized, and ranger-type organizations are basically organized the same as nonmechanized and nonairborne infantry organizations. (See FM 7-8.) The discussion in this paragraph is keyed to the nonmechanized and nonairborne infantry antiarmor sections. However, the principles also apply to the units with similar-type organizations.
a. Antiarmor Section. The antiarmor section can be positioned in several ways, depending on the tactical situation, armor avenues of approach, and assigned mission.
(1) If they are used in the antiarmor role, they may be attached in part or whole to platoons. This is because they have more equipment than is feasible for them to carry, and the platoon can assist them. Also, by spreading the antiarmor weapons throughout the company, the commander ensures that each element has increased antiarmor capacity.
(2) As an alternative, the antiarmor section can overwatch the company's movement as a separate element. This method is easiest if the movement is short and good overwatch positions are available near the LD; some difficulties exist with this method. The section leader must rely on PRC-68s, with limited range and reliability, to control his teams. Also, the day and night tracker and multiple rounds of Dragon ammunition are hard to carry. These problems are partly solved by choosing overwatch positions near the LD, and then choosing new ones by map reconnaissance. These must be confirmed as the company moves past them.
(3) The first teams emplaced join the rear of the company formation when it passes a predetermined point. This bounding method provides limited security for the antiarmor teams during movement and emplacement and ensures continuous antiarmor support for the company during movement. However, the Dragon equipment's weight will hinder their movement.
(4) The commander can consider forming armor-killer teams by task-organizing a Dragon team and a fire team or squad. These teams overwatch the company's movement under control of the antiarmor section leader. This gives the antiarmor section both load-carrying capacity and local security, although it decreases a rifle platoon's strength.
(5) When antiarmor section personnel are acting as riflemen, they may travel separately or as an element in the company formation. They may be in reserve, serve as a reconnaissance element, be attached to a platoon to form a fourth squad, or combined with the mortars to provide local security and to help carry ammunition. In this case, a leader, such as the XO, should lead. When serving as riflemen, it is not recommended that the antiarmor section be attached by teams to the platoons because this has a piecemeal effect. It also does not use the leadership ability or communications assets of the section leader.
b . Command and Support Relationships. The antiarmor section normally operates under control of the company commander. This allows the commander to effectively mass the effects of Dragon antiarmor fire by giving mission-type orders to his antiarmor section leader. However, the commander can choose to task-organize in a variety of ways.
(1) Having part or all of the section attached to an element, led by the 1SG or XO, aids greater supervision, control, and coordination of the section. The commander is then free to command. Examples might be a support or overwatch element consisting of the antiarmor and mortar sections, a DLIC in a withdrawal, or an antiarmor ambush led by the XO or 1SG.
(2) Having part or all of the section attached to a platoon(s) adds combat power to the platoon. It also allows platoon members to assist the antiarmor section to carry their weapons and equipment and gives the antiarmor section local security. When the antiarmor teams are spread out among the platoons, it ensures that each platoon has some antiarmor capability. This may be necessary for movements (both for cross-loading and load-carrying purposes) and for providing supervision and control to the antiarmor section, especially during infiltrations. Examples are a platoon antiarmor ambush, a platoon as the DLIC in a withdrawal, and a platoon tasked to provide antiarmor fire into an engagement area.
(3) Having a part(s) of the section attached to a squad(s) forms either a squad-size antiarmor ambush or squad-size or fire team-size armor-killer teams. These teams may operate independently within the company and platoon operations, or as part of a larger element (several armor-killer teams as part of an antiarmor ambush).
c. Mechanized/BFV Organizations. In mechanized and BFV organizations, Dragons are assigned to the rifle platoons in each rifle company and to the scout section in headquarters company. Normally, a rifleman in each squad is designated and trained as a Dragon gunner.
(1) The Dragon gunner carries the tracker and one round. The Dragon rounds and the frequent need for them may make it necessary to form a Dragon team when the squad dismounts the carrier. Such a team consists of the gunner, with a tracker and one round, and one or more additional riflemen to carry rounds and the night tracker, if available, to assist in target acquisition. This provides a measure of local security.
(2) Dragon teams, if formed, are combined into the squad or platoon organizations for command, control, and security. Units should cross train as many squad members as possible on the Dragon in case the gunner becomes a casualty.
d. Command and Control. Since the Dragon is one of the principal armor-defeating weapons in the platoon, its use is governed by the platoon leader's assessment of the tactical situation. The platoon leader has three control options:
(1) Centralized control (heavy units only). The major advantage of centralized control is the platoon leader's positive control of one of his primary armor-defeating weapons. This gives the platoon leader the flexibility to quickly mass the fires of the Dragons to meet a changing threat. Its major limitation is that the platoon leader, during contact with the enemy, must be able to communicate with the Dragon gunners and teams, either directly or indirectly, and control their fires in all situations besides his other duties.
(2) Decentralized control. The major advantage of this method of control is all-round antiarmor protection for the platoon and a relatively quicker response time for individual target engagements. Its major limitation is the lack of positive control by the platoon leader, resulting in his inability to quickly mass Dragon fires when and where needed. It also burdens the squad(s) with tracker and rounds that are not needed for all situations, yet must be carried at all times. This results in a dissipation of the squad's other capabilities.
(3) Combination of control. To quickly influence an action, the platoon leader should normally keep at least one Dragon under his control. In effect, he is employing a combination of centralized and decentralized control. When properly applied, this method combines the advantages of centralized and decentralized control and lessens their limitations. Regardless of the form of control used, the overall responsibility for the proper employment of the Dragon rests with the platoon leader. The platoon leader should ensure that as many members of the platoon as possible are cross trained on the Dragon system. They must maintain a high degree of proficiency, establish command and control procedures (SOPs, communications, and so forth), and conduct unit training with the Dragon. Once in combat, the platoon leader decides when and where to employ Dragons, how many should be used, and the method of control. He must also supervise all aspects of Dragon employment and remain abreast of the tactical situation to react accordingly.
3-3. PERSONNEL DUTIES
Individual tasks that must be performed to successfully employ the Dragon in the defense are in Table 3-1. Although some tasks are listed for one or more leaders, the tasks differ in scope and degree of proficiency.
a. Antiarmor Section Leader (Nonmechanized and Nonairborne Infantry). The antiarmor section leader is responsible for the overall performance of the section. He is both a planner and a leader, and must be prepared to execute the following tasks with his section:
(1) Becomes the principal advisor to the commander on employment of all organic and attached antiarmor assets.
(2) Provides antiarmor support to the company during defensive and offensive operations, to include preparing an overall plan, reconnoitering tentative Dragon firing positions, and controlling antiarmor fires.
(3) Plans and leads reconnaissance, security, and combat patrol operations, either as the leader of a single element or using the separate antiarmor sections in coordinated actions.
(4) Participates in or leads the company reserve or CP security element.
b. Squad Leader/Team Leader. The squad leader of an infantry rifle squad or team leader of an antiarmor section (operating independently of the section) is in command of the team and is responsible for--
- Observing adjusting controlling, and supervising the conduct of fire of the Dragon.
- Employing the Dragon according to the platoon leader's orders.
- Informing the platoon leader of the status of the ammunition supply.
- Supervising resupply.
c. Gunner. The gunner acquires the target, and determines if it is within range, to track and fire on designated targets. He maintains the weapon. The gunner carries the tracker in the carrying case and one round.
d. Assistant Gunner. The assistant gunner prepares a second round for firing if the need arises and assists in construction of the fighting position. He ensures the backblast area is clear before firing and assists the gunner in maintenance of the Dragon. He carries one round and the night tracker (if available).
NOTE: The team leader in an antiarmor section also performs duties as assistant gunner.
Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF DRAGON IN THE DEFENSE
This section provides guidance for the platoon leader, the section/squad leader, and the Dragon gunner and team in employing the Dragon in defensive operations. These provisions apply to the rifle platoons of all types of infantry battalions and sections/platoons of other types of units.
3-4. CONSIDERATIONS
The guidelines herein are for use as a foundation for specific tactics or techniques. Before employing the Dragon, the number of trackers and rounds must be determined for carrying and proper positioning and how to protect them before, during, and after firing. When operating in an armor environment, carry two trackers (day and night) to maintain antiarmor capabilities should one tracker be destroyed or become inoperative. To determine the round distribution (that is, which portion of the unit's basic load is carried with the platoon), the company commander (light) or the platoon leader (mechanized or BFV) considers the following variables that impact on his decision:
- Mission. Are we attacking, defending, or conducting a retrograde operation? Are we mounted or dismounted?
- Enemy. Large numbers of enemy armored vehicles in the vicinity may mean the need for all Dragon rounds.
- Terrain. Suitable fields of fire and trafficable terrain increase the likelihood of engaging enemy armor with Dragons at long ranges, possibly allowing more than one shot for each gunner.
- Troops Available. The capability to carry extra rounds (dismounted) is directly in proportion to soldier strength; that is, the larger the platoon, the more soldiers are available to carry rounds.
- Antiarmor Fire Support Available. When other forms of antiarmor frees (TOW, tanks, attack helicopters) are available, Dragons may assume a secondary role. This decreases the need for a large number of rounds, especially during dismounted movements.
Target engagement during darkness, haze, smoke, or fog is limited. The platoon/company must have a simple and quick procedure or SOP that aids quick engagements and includes provisions for--
a. Target Acquisition. Target acquisition can be initiated by the gunner using his tracker, RSTA devices, designated individuals using binoculars or NVDs, or a combination of these devices.
b. Communications. The platoon leader ensures that communications exist for the rapid issue of target acquisition data, illumination requests, and fire commands. SOPs, signals, and fire commands are essential. When in a static position, one method is to "hot loop" all essential personnel on wire communications.
c. Illumination. If natural or battlefield light sources (for example, burning vehicles) is insufficient for target illumination, the gunner uses the AN/TAS-5 tracker to engage targets without illumination. Responsive artificial sources of illumination may be available and dedicated to support antiarmor fires. Artillery and mortar illumination are examples of illumination available to platoon leaders. (AN/TAS-5 operational capabilities are discussed in Chapter 1.)
3-5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
In infantry units, the platoon's mission in the defense is to repel the enemy's assault by fire and close combat. The Dragon has combat characteristics that are of major importance in the defense. Control of Dragon fires may be centralized, decentralized, or a combination of these methods. Dragon(s) can--
- Destroy or immobilize armored vehicles, depending on type.
- Deliver accurate fire, day or night.
3-6. FIRING POSITIONS
The Dragon is employed to provide antiarmor protection for the platoon area and as part of the coordinated company antiarmor defense plan. The platoon leader selects the general firing position and a sector of fire for each Dragon.
a. When choosing a firing position for the Dragon, certain basic considerations must be observed to increase its effectiveness. These considerations apply to the selection of primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. (See Figure 3-2.)
(1) The primary position is one from which a gunner or team can cover its sector of fire. It should have observation, cover and concealment, and a good field of fire.
(2) The alternate position is to a flank or slightly to the rear of the primary position. The gunner or team must be able to cover the same sector of fire from the primary position. It is occupied when the primary position can no longer be occupied.
(3) The supplementary position covers avenues of approach and any remaining TRPs other than those covered by the primary and alternate positions. It is usually close enough to the primary position to have mutual support with other positions.
b. The Dragon gunner may have to displace often from firing position to firing position in the attack and retrograde and from primary to alternate and supplementary positions in the defense. Whether mounted or dismounted, certain basics apply when moving into and out of firing positions.
(1) Move into the positions from the rear. In the defense, only movement forward of the position should be the gunner and other individuals clearing fields of fire. The leader checks for cover and concealment, and paces distances for the range card.
(2) Select good covered and concealed routes. Gullies and reverse slopes offer excellent routes to move in and out of position. These aid in movement and protection.
(3) Refrain from disturbing natural foliage.
(4) Keep movement in and around the position to a minimum.
3-7. DRAGON POSITIONING
The main factors when positioning the Dragon for employment are two-fold: gunner protection and the best use of weapon capabilities. The gunner must remain exposed while tracking his targets since he is susceptible to counterfires for as long as 12 seconds if engaging at maximum range. (See Figure 3-3.)
NOTE: Avoid selecting a position that would cause or require the gunner to fire into the sun, which could affect his ability to track the target.
a. Many of the steps for protecting gunners also optimize their fires.
b. Mission accomplishment can be enhanced by some basic rules when selecting positions:
(1) Use natural cover and concealment. Use the terrain for cover from enemy fire and for concealment from enemy ground and aerial observation. (See Figure 3-4.)
(2) Engage the enemy with flank or rear shots from behind frontal cover whenever possible. (See Figure 3-5.) It is extremely difficult for the enemy to retrace the flight path of a round to its launch site and to reorient his weapons to the firing position when the round moves obliquely across his front, as opposed to being launched from a head-on position. When firing to the oblique, the gunner is protected from enemy fire to his front by constructing a parapet or using natural cover that adds to the enemy's problems in detecting the launch signature. Gunners must never be positioned where they must engage a frontal target.
(3) Avoid positioning gunners so that they must engage targets, mainly tanks, from the front. The missile will probably not defeat a tank hit in the frontal 60-degree arc. Other targets (APCs, CFVs) are also easier to kill from the flanks and rear.
(4) Employ Dragons so they are mutually supporting to provide some degree of protection for the Dragon gunner by ensuring continuous coverage of enemy armor vehicles. It consists of two parts:
(a) Employ Dragons so that their fires interlock with and support other Dragons, TOWs, or tanks. Ensure that sectors of fire overlap and cover the sector by more than one antiarmor weapon.
(b) Position Dragons so they can engage enemy armored vehicles that are assaulting another Dragon, TOW, or tank position.
c. Dragon gunners must integrate with nearby infantry for security. If the Dragon is employed away from the squad or platoon, provisions should be made to provide the Dragon gunners with local security. Such security includes forming a Dragon team and an armor-killer team (FM 7-8).
d. The enemy should be engaged within the gunner's and weapon's capabilities. Dragon gunners should be instructed not to engage targets immediately when a target comes within range (1,000 meters). Targets at this range appear to be about the size of a postage stamp in the gunner's sights. He will have more difficulty if he is engaging with the night tracker because of the thermal image. The Dragon's best engagement range against moving targets is from 200 to 800 meters. First, the gunner will probably not use all of the rocket motors (thrusters) within these ranges; second, his vulnerability to enemy counterfire is reduced because of the shorter flight time; third, the target will be larger in the sights. The level of proficiency of the gunner reflects in his ability to track and hit the target.
e. Deception must be used to confuse the enemy as to the true location of the Dragon. The enemy is prevented from detecting the Dragon launch signature (backblast) by clearing away loose debris behind the launcher, wetting down the backblast, and covering the ground with shelter halves. Movement is reduced in and around the position to prevent detection. Indirect fires (HE, smoke, and WP) and small-arms weapons are used to distract the enemy as long as the target is not obscured. Other deception measures include preparing partly visible dummy positions to draw enemy fire away from the actual positions and positioning Dragons on less obvious or prominent firing positions.
3-8. POSITIONING CONSIDERATIONS
During reduced visibility (darkness, fog, smoke, rain, snow, sandstorms), the Dragon is repositioned closer to armor avenues of approach. (See Figure 3-6.) This compensates for the reduced range of the Dragon if it is not equipped with the AN/TAS-5. Armor avenues of approach can change at night. To maintain control and orientation at night, armor units must use roads or open terrain. A lightly wooded area that is not an obstacle to daylight movement becomes an obstacle at night. When repositioning the Dragon, security is still a requirement.
a. Covering Minefields. When Dragons cover minefields, position them to engage approaching formations before reaching the minefield. This technique could cause the formation to deploy and enter the minefield at multiple points.
(1) Dragons engage an approaching column of tanks before they enter the minefield. (See A, Figure 3-7.)
(2) Tanks continue to deploy into the minefield and are destroyed by mines and Dragons. (See B, Figure 3-7.)
b. Using Obstacles. Obstacles are used as part of the overall defense plan to slow, canalize, stop, and kill enemy armor and protect friendly forces. Natural obstacles can enhance man-man obstacles. Dragon positions are selected to drive attacking tanks into these obstacles and to take the most advantage of flanking fire when tanks attempt to bypass them. Dragons can be placed to cover gaps and lanes in obstacles.
c. Resupplying and Prestocking Ammunition. Gunners request a resupply of rounds and other essential items through their chain of command, which in turn passes on the request. During the course of an enemy attack, resupply of Dragon rounds to the platoon is often difficult. Therefore, extra rounds can be prestocked on the platoon's position. LAW and other ammunition can also be prestocked. Alternate and supplementary Dragon positions should be stocked with rounds to aid movement (rounds do not have to be carried) of the Dragon gunner to these positions. The unit should also plan for resupply of the AN/TAS-5 coolant cartridges and batteries.
3-9. PREPARATION OF DRAGON FIGHTING POSITIONS
The Dragon fighting position must have unobstructed fields of fire, mask clearance (minimum dead space in the sector that could hide targets), and a clear backblast area. Like other weapons organic to the platoon, the Dragon can be employed from either hasty or improved positions. A fighting position is sited and oriented to cover a sector of fire
a. After receiving a sector of fire and firing location from the squad leader, the gunner constructs the Dragon position to cover the sector. When required, he clears fields of fire and only what is absolutely necessary. He camouflages the position using available materials, and improves the position as time permits.
b. The backblast and the muzzle blast must be considered when employing the weapon. To prepare a fighting position for the Dragon, the gunner uses the following guidelines:
(1) When the weapon is fired from an improved position, the muzzle end of the launcher must extend 15 centimeters (6 inches) beyond the front of the hole. The rear of the launcher must extend out over the rear of the hole. As the missile leaves the launcher, the unfolding stabilizing fins require at least 15 centimeters (6 inches) of clearance above ground. The position should be protected to the front by a parapet or by natural or man-made cover.
(2) The ground in front of and behind the position should be free of rocks, sand, and debris to prevent a dust cloud (caused by firing) from obscuring the gunner's vision, marking the location to enemy observers. When the Dragon is to fire in only one direction, a one-man fighting position is best. (See Figures 3-8 and 3-9.)
(3) The Dragon should be positioned to fire to the oblique so that its position can be protected from frontal fire while the target is being engaged from the flank. If necessary, the Dragon can fire to the front as well as to the oblique from a one-man fighting position.
(4) The two-man fighting position is wedge-shaped and it is best suited for use when more than one sector of fire can be covered from a single position. The design of the position gives the gunner frontal protection and allows the targets to be engaged from the oblique or flank. Construction includes the following factors:
(a) The trench position (A, Figure 3-10) should be constructed about three M16s long and in an inverted V-shape, waist-deep, and waist-wide, plus about 6 inches.
(b) The front parapet (B, Figure 3-10) should be one M16 long, one M16 wide, and two helmets high. It is placed in front of the trench.
(c) The grenade sump (C, Figure 3-10) should be one entrenching tool length long, one entrenching tool deep, and one entrenching tool blade wide. The floor of the main trench should slope gently from each end to the center and from the rear to the front.
(d) The overhead cover (D, Figure 3-10) at each end of the trench should be large enough to provide protection for one man and extra rounds and be 12 inches deep, 18 inches over the sides, and 3 feet wide.
(e) Flank parapets (E, Figure 3-10) are at each end of the trench and should be one M16 wide, two helmets high, and long enough to provide good flank protection. The flank parapets are built on top of the overhead cover to increase overhead protection.
(f) Biped trenches (F, Figure 3-10) for each sector of fire should be dug with the back of the biped trench 4 to 6 inches forward of the main trench. The biped trench should be two helmets long, one helmet wide, and 6 inches deep.
(g) At times, the Dragon may be able to fire in only one direction (Figure 3-11); therefore, the position should have cover to the front and targets should be engaged from the flank. The position is constructed to have cover and concealment from all other directions.
3-10. FIRING FROM THE M113 APC
The primary method for firing the Dragon from a stationary M113 APC in a hull-defilade position is with the M175 mount. (See Figure 3-12.) The Dragon can also be fired using field-expedient methods from a stationary M113 in a hull-defilade position.
WARNING: To ensure the safety of personnel in the track, the driver's and cargo hatches must be closed. |
a. Without using the M175 mount, the gunner stands in the track commander's hatch and places the bipod legs in the grill to fire the weapon. (See Figure 3-13.) The gunner can also sit on the closed cargo hatch and fire the Dragon as if on the ground. (See Figure 3-14.)
b. The Dragon can also be dismounted from the APC and fired, using either the M3 or M122 machine gun tripod. (See Chapter 7.)
3-11. PREPARATION OF RANGE CARDS
Range cards are essential for the rapid engagement of targets during all conditions of visibility and for quick resumption of a mission if the gunner becomes a casualty.
a. When the Dragon is ready to fire, the gunner normally prepares range cards in two copies: one copy is kept at the position and the other copy is given to the platoon leader. The gunner should also prepare range cards for alternate and supplementary positions.
b. A range card is a sketch of the terrain that a weapon system was assigned to cover by fire. It contains information that helps to plan and control fires, to quickly detect and engage targets, and to orient replacement personnel or units. By using a range card, a gunner can quickly and accurately determine the information needed to engage targets. Two types of range cards are standard and field-expedient--both must include the following items:
- Weapon symbol, position, or both.
- Sector of fire.
- Maximum engagement line.
- Range and azimuth TRPs.
- Dead space.
- Distance and azimuth from a known point (gunner reference point).
- Magnetic north arrow.
- Data section.
(1) Standard Range Card. Once the leader provides the necessary information, the gunner prepares a standard range card (DA Form 5517-R). (See Figure 3-15.) The gunner prepares two copies of the range card.
(2) Field-Expedient Range Card. In combat, a standard range card may not be available. The gunner may then draw a range card on anything available. Preparation of the expedient range card (Figure 3-16) follows the same procedures as for any range card, but the weapon symbol must be used to indicate the location of the weapon system.
3-12. TARGET IDENTIFICATION
Potential targets are identified as enemy by their activity, location, or signature (visual or otherwise) before they are engaged. To properly identify a possible target, squad members, and especially Dragon gunners, must be trained to recognize types of targets by their size, shape, and thermal image. (Particularly important is the size and shape of turret or main gun.) Friendly vehicle identification becomes more difficult when friendly foreign units are operating with or adjacent to US forces. The ability to identify friend, foe, and types of vehicles is essential when a commander establishes target priorities. These target priorities require antiarmor weapons to engage specific types of enemy vehicles based on the enemy situation. The gunner must know the difference between tracked and wheeled vehicles since this can identify the type of unit: BTR-equipped or BMP-equipped. Each unit has its own organization and value to the gunner, S2, and intelligence community. The gunner should simultaneously recognize the vehicle as friendly or threat and by nomenclature. He uses four basic STEPs to achieve target identification, combining the first three STEPs to achieve the fourth.
STEP 1. To detect (determine the presence of a vehicle).
STEP 2. To classify (determine if the vehicle is tracked or wheeled).
STEP 3. To recognize (determine if the vehicle is friendly or threat).
STEP 4. To identify (determine the nomenclature: T72, Vickers, M1).
a. Most weapons and vehicles have telltale signatures. Most tracked vehicles use diesel fuel, which emits a large amount of black smoke. They tend to make more noise than wheeled vehicles. Antiarmor units can use the different signatures to assist them in locating and in identifying enemy targets.
b. Target signatures are detected mainly by sight, sound, and smell. If anything suspicious or unusual is detected, it should be thoroughly investigated. The sun shining off a flat surface, such as a windshield, the sounds of diesel or turbine engines, or the clanking or squeeking of end connectors helps to detect and locate targets.
(1) Soldier signatures.
- Fighting positions.
- Trash.
- Cut or missing vegetation (cleared for fields of fire or camouflage).
- Freshly dug earth (may indicate a fighting position).
- Noise from equipment or talking.
- Light from a match, cigarette, or fire.
(2) Tracked vehicle signatures.
- Large dust clouds.
- Diesel smoke.
- Noise made by tracks and engine.
- Vehicle tracks on the ground.
- Distinctive silhouette or shape.
(3) Antitank weapon signatures.
- "Swish" of missile launch.
- Long, thin wires in brush, trees, or along the ground.
- Dismounted soldier looking through a periscope-type device. (Launcher could be up to 100 meters from the gunner.)
(4) Aircraft signatures.
- Reflection of the sun from aircraft canopies and rotor blades.
- Vapor trails.
- Dust and movement of foliage caused by a hovering helicopter.
- Sound of a turbine engine (high-pitched whirring sound).
(5) Obstacles and mines.
- Loose or disturbed dirt in a regular pattern.
- Areas where large trees were removed.
3-13. TARGET RECOGNITION BY TYPE (FRIENDLY OR THREAT)
Learning to recognize targets by type is not a difficult task, but identifying them as friendly or enemy requires careful study and attention to detail. This is especially true of tanks, because both friendly and threat tanks are quite similar in design. Side by side, they may appear different, but if camouflage is added and at a distance of 1,500 or 2,000 meters, the difference is unclear. Soldiers must know which friendly and threat armored vehicles could appear on the battlefield. Training aids, such as GTA 17-2-13, can be used to study the armored vehicles of other nations (Figure 3-17).
NOTE: Characteristics of common enemy armored vehicles are contained in STP 21-1-SMCT.
a. The type, location, and absence or presence of certain equipment in the suspension system, turret, or main gun aid in identifying most armored vehicles or tanks. Threat forces, however, also practice camouflage and deception procedures.
b. Reactive armor and increased use of sandbags can nullify antiarmor weapons and greatly alter the shape of vehicles.
(1) Suspension system. This is the least reliable area for identification as it is often concealed by vegetation or by terrain. Characteristics of the suspension system that can be used to distinguish tanks are--
- Road wheels and support rollers.
- Road wheels only.
- Number of road wheels.
- Spacing between road wheels.
- Armored skirt.
(2) Turret. Characteristics of the turret that can be used to distinguish tanks are--
- Position on the hull: well forward, center, or to the rear.
- Presence, absence, or location of searchlight.
- Shape of turret, rounded, elongated, or boxy.
- Externally mounted storage racks and other equipment.
(3) Main gun. Characteristics of the tank main gun that can be used to distinguish tanks are--
- The presence and location along the gun tube of a bore evacuator.
- The presence of a muzzle brake or blast deflector.
- The presence or absence of a thermal jacket.
(4) Commander's station (some tanks). This is usually a simple hatch or a cupola. A cupola is a small turret-like projection on the top of the turret that houses the commander's station either on the right or left side.
3-14. THERMAL IDENTIFICATION
Identifying targets with the AN/TAS-5 by thermal signature is extremely difficult and requires extensive training. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion on identification of targets using thermal signature. The four STEPs of vehicle identification that the gunner uses during the day are also used for thermal identification.
Section III. TARGET ENGAGEMENT
Before a Dragon missile is fired at an enemy target, it must be determined if the target can be engaged. A target can be engaged if it--
- Is within the range of the missile.
- Is exposed so that it can be identified and tracked by the gunner.
- Will remain exposed for the time it takes the missile to fly to the target.
3-15. TARGET ENGAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Target engagement is affected by firing limitations (power lines, smoke, fog, and ground clearance). The gunner assumes a firing position to observe the assigned sector of fire. Then he sights through the tracker to observe for enemy targets. Once he sights a target, the gunner makes adjustments to his tracker as follows:
a. Day Tracker. The gunner focuses the sight by holding the reticle adjustment ring stationary while rotating the eye guard to fit the eye.
b. Night Tracker. The gunner adjusts the reticle focus adjustment, range focus lever, and contrast and brightness controls for the best possible picture of the stadia lines, target area, and target.
3-16. RANGE DETERMINATION
The Dragon gunners use the stadia lines in the day and night trackers to determine if a target is within range. Three different types of moving and stationary targets are flank, oblique, and frontal or rear. (See A, Figure 3-18.) A target 20 feet (6.09 meters in length) completely fills the area between the stadia lines at maximum range (1,000 meters) and exceeds the stadia lines at a closer range.
a. Flanking Targets (Full Stadia). Adjust the sight picture by moving the launcher to center the target between the stadia lines. (See B, Figure 3-18.)
b. Oblique Targets. If more of the flank is visible, use the full-stadia method. (C, Figure 3-18). If more of the front or rear is visible, use the half-stadia method. (See D, Figure 3-18.)
c. Frontal (Head-On) on Rear (Going Away) Targets (Half-Stadia). Adjust the picture by moving the launcher to align the vertical cross hair and one of the stadia lines on the target. (See E, Figure 3-18.)
3-17. TIME/SPACE FACTOR
The gunner uses the time or space factor to determine if a target can be engaged.
a. A moving target may be able to find a covered position if the gunner can judge whether the missile will successfully hit the target after launch. The tracker sight helps make this determination. The gunner lines up the tracker sight directly in front of the target. If there are no obstructions or covered areas along the expected path of the target and the target is moving 35 kmph or less, the gunner can successfully launch and destroy it. (See A, Figure 3-19.)
b. The gunner places the cross hairs center of mass and fires--the target will not be able to reach the protection of the hill in time. (See B, Figure 3-19.) If the gunner does fire - the target will reach the protection of the hill before the missile hits. (See C, Figure 3-19.)
3-18. VULNERABLE POINTS OF ARMORED VEHICLES
After the gunner decides that a target can be engaged, he should strive to hit enemy targets in their weakest points. Leaders can assist by positioning Dragons to take advantage of these weak points.
a. Most threat armored vehicles are rugged, simple in design, and operationally effective. To increase the lethality of antiarmor weapon systems, the gunner must attempt to engage the threat vehicle in its weakest point, which includes the internal fuel and ammunition areas, as well as the engine. Destruction of the engine not only immobilizes the vehicle, but possibly ignites ruptured fuel lines to cause a fire.
b. Armored vehicles are built with the greatest armor protection on the front glacis of the tank. Moving from the front of the vehicle to the oblique and flank areas of an enemy armored vehicle increases the probability of a kill. The armor plating is not as thick in these areas, and the angle causing projectile deflection is less pronounced. Also, visual observation by the enemy crew is degraded. Flank areas can be exposed when the threat vehicle attempts to bypass an obstacle or to evade an oncoming ATGM.
c. Frontal fire is usually avoided. An antitank weapon firing frontally is an exception. A tank's firepower and observation are oriented to the front. This makes it difficult to detect and retrace an ATGM launched from its flank. Firing at frontal targets lowers the odds for a mobility kill, which can be acquired by hitting the vehicle's wheels, track, or suspension system. The highest-percentage of mobility kills result from flank and oblique target shots. (See Figure 3-20.)
d. The armor and the angle causing projectile deflection are minimal to the rear of the threat armored vehicle. The engine compartment of the vehicle is extremely vulnerable to antitank weapons fire.
e. Other areas where a threat armored vehicle is weak are the top and bottom (belly). These areas may become exposed while the vehicle is breaching an antitank ditch, fording a river with steep banks, or traversing a shallow valley. Careful terrain analysis of assigned sectors of fire by friendly antiarmor elements can identify areas where approaching armor units must expose their weaker areas.
3-19. FIRE CONTROL
The platoon leader normally controls Dragon fires by assigning sectors of fire for each Dragon gunner. Once the initial command to fire is given, gunners can engage any enemy armor vehicle in this sector. The platoon leader gives fire commands to shift Dragon fires from other than the primary sectors. Well-planned and executed fire control measures are critical to the effectiveness of Dragon fire. Dragon positions should not be endangered by premature fires in which either the range is excessive or the target is not in position to ensure a high probability of a first-round kill. Proper fire control ensures that Dragons engage targets at optimum times. Only the best sited weapon in relation to the target opens fire. Uncontrolled firing decreases the effectiveness of the unit's overall antiarmor capabilities. Dragons that are dispersed as much as 1,600 to 2,000 meters can, under ideal conditions, concentrate their fire on the same group of targets. (See Figure 3-21.)
a. Fire Control Methods. To exploit the capability to concentrate Dragon fire from widely dispersed firing positions and to overcome possible difficulties caused by a limited communications capability, effective fire control methods must be practiced when employing a Dragon. (See Figure 3-22.) Effective fire control methods prevent the wasteful firing of more than one Dragon missile at the same target and prevent premature firings. These fires might unnecessarily disclose the location of the defensive positions. The primary control methods used to control the fire of one or more Dragons are sectors of fire, TRPs, engagement priorities, fire patterns, and fire commands.
b. Sector of Fire. A sector of fire is an area, limited by boundaries, assigned to a unit or a weapon to cover by fire. (See Figure 3-23.) A gunner needs to know how many TRPs are in and around his sector and where they are located, if other sectors need assistance.
c. Target Reference Point. A TRP is an easily recognizable point on the ground, either natural or man-made. The TRP is used as a reference point for locating targets and controlling fire. They are normally all referenced by a lettering or numbering system. TRPs are also used to control and shift fires; that is, "Dragon One, engage west of ALPHA. Dragon Two, engage east of ALPHA, on my command." (See Figure 3-24.)
d. Engagement Priorities. Engagement priorities are the priorities by which types of vehicles in a formation are engaged. Dragons are better suited to killing command and control vehicles, APCs, and CFVs because of the improvement in threat tanks' armored protection. When available, units should kill enemy tanks with TOW and tanks. However, any type of enemy armor vehicle is a suitable target and should be destroyed. Once the battle is joined, each gunner covers his assigned sector or portion of a kill zone. If multiple targets appear in his area, he takes the best shot for a first-round kill. A priority of engagement by type of vehicle can be assigned by the commander; for example, if enemy antiaircraft fire prevents the Air Force or attack helicopters from operating in the forward battle area, destruction of antiaircraft weapons may be given priority; if long-range enemy ATGMs reduce effective employment of friendly tanks, they may be assigned as a priority target.
e. Fire Patterns. Fire patterns describe the relationship between firing Dragons and their targets. These patterns can be used in fire commands or fire plans, within the section or within the team. They can also be used with other control measures such as priority of fires. Two basic patterns are cross fire and depth free. (See Figure 3-25.)
(1) Crossfire. Cross fire is used when targets are dispersed laterally or obstructions prevent the Dragon from firing to the front. When using cross fire, gunners must stagger their fires. When the first missile impacts, the next gunner may fire. Cross fire prevents either gunner from picking up the other missile's infrared flare (trying to guide two missiles or the wrong missile). Cross fire is also used to obtain flank shots, which are desirable; it increases the chance of a kill and assists in avoiding detection when the enemy is moving straight at the Dragon. Each Dragon engages a target at a diagonal to its position, with flank Dragons engaging targets on the opposite flank. As targets are destroyed, fire is shifted to the center of the enemy formation. (See A, Figure 3-25.)
(2) Depth fire. Depth fire is used when targets are exposed in depth. Dragons on one side engage the nearest targets, while Dragons on the other side engage the farthest targets. Fire is then shifted toward the center of the formation. This can be done by unit SOP or as specified in the section leader's order. (See B, Figure 3-25.)
(3) Changing or concurrent fire patterns. Fire patterns are changed or used concurrently with another fire pattern. This may be necessary when the enemy adjusts his formation after being engaged to ensure maximum coverage of an enemy formation. (See Figure 3-25.)
f. Fire Commands. Fire commands speed the execution of target engagement when unforeseen circumstances arise during engagements that are not covered by SOPs or the fire plans. Under normal circumstances, the few seconds available to the gunner to engage targets prevent his listening and reacting to a lengthy fire command sent by radio.
- Alert: Warns the gunner(s) of a fire mission.
- Target description/location: A brief description of the target location given either from a TRP or as direction and distance from the gunner.
- Method of engagement: Tell the gunner(s) how to engage a formation, cross or depth--front to rear or left to right.
- Execution: Command to fire.
g. Emergency Fire Signals. Radio communications can fail. Therefore, fire control is difficult. The use of sectors of fire and alternate signals with pyrotechnics is often the only quick method available to control the fire of Dragon gunners, Units must establish SOPs and practice lost communications procedures.
h. Range Cards. It is often not practical to prepare range cards such as when moving from position to position to cover the movement of an advancing force or during retrograde operations. Then, the use of TRPs is the primary method to control the distribution of fire. Time permitting, range cards are prepared for primary, alternate, and supplementary positions, and they are designed to aid the gunner in engaging targets.
3-20. PLATOON FIRE PLAN
The fire plan (overlay and target list) is used by the company commander or platoon leader as a ready reference tool. It allows him to shift the fires of weapons distributed throughout the sector into an area. This can be done without moving to determine which weapons can fire into that area, which could be time-consuming and risky under fire. If a portion of the platoon sector is in danger, the platoon leader consults his fire plan to quickly determine which weapons can cover the threatened area and from which positions they can do so. He then directs (by radio, voice commands, or SOP signals) that fires be shifted to the threatened area. He also includes instructions to move to alternate or supplementary positions. On the fire plan, TRPs outside the platoon's assigned sector of fire are included that can be covered by the platoon's weapons. This allows the platoon leader to quickly respond to calls for assistance from adjacent units.
a. A platoon defensive fire plan consists of a target list for indirect and antiarmor fires and an overlay drawn to scale, showing the platoon sector and the positions of the Dragons and machine guns.
b. The FPL or PDF location of major obstacles, mortar or artillery FPFs, sectors of fire for Dragons, and all TRPs that the platoon can cover are also shown on the overlay. Figure 3-26 is an example of a two-platoon fire plan.
NOTE: Refer to either FM 7-7, FM 7-7J, FM 7-8, or FM 7-10 for a detailed discussion of fire plans.
c. The platoon fire plan should be incorporated into the company FSO's fire support matrix. Once the fire plan is incorporated, FIST personnel can call for and adjust fire on enemy concentrations or call for FASCAM.
3-21. ARMOR-KILLER TEAM
When a Dragon team is enlarged with added security personnel and a leader (command and control element) and given an independent mission; for example, an antiarmor ambush, falling in gaps at night, or during reduced visibility, it becomes an armor-killer team. Normally, an armor-killer team (with Dragon[s]) is a team or larger unit (squad-size or larger when mounted). This provides for enough personnel to carry the trackers and extra rounds, to acquire targets, to provide supporting fire and local security, to maintain communications, and to control the team. (See Figure 3-27.)
a. Mission. The primary mission of an armor-killer team is to destroy enemy armor vehicles without becoming decisively engaged. They are also used to call for and adjust indirect fires and to report on enemy movements.
b. Employment. The company commander often directs his platoon leaders to place armor-killer teams throughout the battle area--
- To cover dead space.
- To add depth to the battle area.
- To gain flanking fire into armor avenues of approach.
- To ensure mutual support between platoons. (See Figure 3-28.)
They are also employed along armor avenues of approach at night and during other periods of reduced visibility (Figure 3-29) to replace less effective ATGM fires. Such armor-killer teams are often armed with Dragons and LAWS (M72s and AT4s).
(1) The platoon's Dragons are often positioned at locations different from those of the machine guns and rifle positions. Rifles and machine guns are positioned to protect the platoon's sector from dismounted attacks. Dragons are positioned to fire into armor avenues of approach in the platoon or company sector.
(2) The platoon leader ensures that Dragon positions are provided with close-in security from dismounted infantry attack and mounted armor attacks. He does this by--
(a) Employing armor-killer teams with Dragons if the best firing position is located where it cannot be supported by other platoon positions.
(b) Ensuring that LAWs (either AT4s and or M72s) are provided to the security elements to protect against close-in armored attacks.
(c) Positioning the Dragons close enough to the squad positions so that the squad provides protection against ground attack for the gunner and team.
c. Composition. Armor-killer teams may be fire-team size or squad-size. (See Figure 3-30.)
d. Terrain. Normally, teams are employed on ambush positions that place a tank obstacle, such as a gully or swamp, between them and their target. Position the armor-killer team where the actual engagement does not put the team in danger of being destroyed by other enemy armored vehicles.
e. Engagement Techniques. Individual enemy armor vehicles are engaged when there is a high probability of hit or kill. Armor-killer teams are armed with M72s and or AT4s when operating in areas with restricted vision, fields of fire (dense woods), and a mix of M72s, AT4s, and Dragons in areas with intermittent open spaces or LOS down a road. (See Figure 3-31.)
f. Control and Mobility. Teams should be under control of the commander who is responsible for the sector they are occupying. The Dragon section leader or team leader will be in control of his element. He makes recommendations to the commander about employment and or deployment. Mobility of the armor killer-teams should be equal to or greater than the enemy's mobility. Mobility may be gained by the use of M113s or by well-planned routes for dismounted teams through terrain that restricts vehicular movement. (See Figure 3-32.) Teams may also be delivered into and extracted from their ambush positions by helicopter.
Section IV. EMPLOYMENT IN THE RETROGRADE
The primary consideration for the employment of Dragons in support of a retrograde operation against an armored enemy is to ensure antiarmor weapons are in a position to cover all movement. These antiarmor weapons may be organic Dragons and M72s/AT4s or the antiarmor weapons of another unit. The techniques discussed in this section are intended only as a guide to assist in correctly employing Dragons.
NOTE: Further instructions are outlined in either FM 7-7, FM 7-7J, FM 7-8, or FM 7-10 for your particular unit.
3-22. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
All retrograde operations involve movement away from the enemy. The platoon itself conducts two types of retrograde operations: delay and withdrawal. Retirements are conducted as a part of a larger force.
3-23. DELAYING OPERATIONS
In a delay, a unit trades space for time. The intent is to slow the enemy, to cause enemy casualties, and, if possible, to stop him without becoming decisively engaged. This is done by defending, disengaging, moving, and defending again. Platoons do not conduct delays alone but fight as part of their company in a delay. The delay positions are organized like the defense, except that it may be necessary to extend frontages and reduce the depth of the position.
a. Infantry. When dismounted infantry elements delay against an enemy with an armored capability, they use the tactics of defense and withdrawal to effect delay. At platoon level, there are some differences in the selection of delay positions and defense positions. The presence of covered and concealed routes of withdrawal take on added importance to the delay force. When delaying over restricted terrain, an infantry platoon is often directed to set up armor-killer ambushes. Dragons should be emplaced where they can slow or stop advancing armored vehicles by blocking roads or avenues of approach. The Dragons withdraw by bounds, covering the withdrawing force and each other.
b. Mechanized Infantry. The employment of Dragons by the mechanized infantry platoon depends on the amount of available tank and TOW support. Without such support, the mechanized platoon, like the dismounted platoon, uses the tactics of defense and withdrawal; or, terrain permitting, breaks down into armor-killer teams. The Dragon is then the platoon's primary antiarmor weapon. When the mechanized unit has TOWs and tanks attached or when it works as a part of a combined-arms team, the Dragon becomes a secondary weapon--
- To support the fires of tanks and TOWs.
- To cover secondary armor avenues of approach.
- To provide an antiarmor capability to OPs and or LPs.
The following applies to the employment of Dragon in the delay.
(1) In the delay, targets are normally engaged at the maximum effective range (METT-T dependent); therefore, delay positions are normally on or near the topographical crest of a hill. This location takes advantage of long-range observation and fields of fire, and immediate masking of enemy observation and direct fires when the withdrawal from the position is ordered.
(2) As enemy armor comes within effective range according to METT-T, Dragon gunners engage the leading element at maximum range in an attempt to force the armor units to deploy or mass on roads and trails. If the enemy allows his force to mass, the delaying force calls for all available means to destroy him in this weak position. If not destroyed, the enemy is forced into the time-consuming task of deploying his force to attack the delay position.
(3) The extended frontages, normal with the delay, require the leaders of the company to give careful consideration to positioning Dragon weapons to cover armored avenues of approach into their delay position. Mutual support between Dragons in all of the platoons will be more difficult to achieve. It requires added emphasis by the company commander to ensure that all antiarmor fires are coordinated to achieve maximum delay.
(4) When maximum delay is achieved, Dragon weapons are withdrawn with their squads for movement to the new delay position. When enemy armor forces or distance between delay positions are considerable, armor-killer teams may be formed with Dragon weapons. The armor-killer teams are positioned in ambushes between delay positions to delay the enemy's advance.
(5) Planning considerations include reconnaissance, prestocking or pre-positioning of Drag on ammunition, and construction of obstacles.
(a) Reconnaissance. Leaders must give special attention to choosing Dragon positions along the routes of withdrawal and at the next delay position during their reconnaissance. This is critical because of the rapid movement in the delay and the possibility that Dragons may be employed between delay positions.
(b) Dragon ammunition. Because of the high volume of ammunition use in delay operations, plans must be made to increase the number of rounds available to the Dragon gunner. It may be necessary to dedicate a vehicle to carry extra Dragon missiles.
(c) Obstacles. As in defensive operations, Dragon fires are combined with natural and man-made obstacles. In the delay, this become seven more important because of the extended frontages normal in the delay.
3-24. WITHDRAWAL
In a withdrawal, a company disengages from the enemy and repositions for another mission. That mission may be to delay the enemy, to defend another position, or to attack someplace else. If a withdrawal is called for, it must be well planned.
a. Types of Withdrawal. There are two types of withdrawal: under enemy pressure and not under enemy pressure.
(1) Conduct of withdrawal under enemy pressure. This is the most difficult and least desired method (Figure 3-33). In this type of withdrawal, the platoon, employing fire and maneuver, literally fights its way back from the enemy. The use of Dragons to support this type of maneuver is slightly different from employment in offensive maneuver. There is a need to have Dragons with both covering and maneuvering elements to ensure continuous antiarmor coverage.
(a) As in the delay, after withdrawal from the position, the platoon moves to and occupies either a delay position, a defense position, or an assembly area to prepare for future operations. The withdrawal under enemy pressure is the most dangerous and difficult to control of all tactical maneuvers. It is characterized by the forward elements fighting as they withdraw.
(b) When conducting withdrawals, the control of the Dragon's fires is usually divided between the platoon leader and the PSG. The platoon is normally broken into two elements- part of the platoon covering and part moving. The platoon leader controls one element, the PSG the other. Within each element, Dragons are normally directly controlled by the platoon leader and PSG.
- Length of bound. When bounding back using maneuver and providing organic support (Dragons, M72s and or AT4s, and machine guns fire as the only supporting weapons), the length of the bound cannot exceed the effective range of these weapons on the terrain over which the withdrawal occurs. If given outside antiarmor fire support, the distance may be increased.
- Use of artillery to cover a withdrawal Advances of the enemy's armor cannot be stopped by artillery fires, even though such fires slow their rate of movement to a large extent. Use of smoke often allows disengagement from an armored enemy because smoke--
--Slows down the movement of tanks.
--Reduces the sighting range of tank gunners.
--Increases the vulnerability of tanks to armor-killer teams (M72s, AT4s, Dragon).
--Does not hamper the mobility of the withdrawing infantry (as could regular artillery fire).
(2) Withdrawal not under enemy pressure. A withdrawal not under pressure (Figure 3-34) is conducted with speed, secrecy, and deception. It is best done at night or during other reduced visibility (fog, snow, rain, or smoke). Usually, all elements move to the rear at the same time. The company leaves a security force to cover the withdrawal by deception and maneuver, when required. The security force normally consists of a squad from each platoon and no more than half the company supporting weapons. The commander designates a security force commander, normally the company XO or a platoon leader. The Dragons left behind should be those in the best position to cover the armor avenues of approach.
(3) Sequence of withdrawal. For Dragon teams, the sequence of withdrawal depends on the amount of antiarmor support available to the platoon and the threat. The Dragon teams may withdraw first if facing a limited armor threat or if heavily supported by tanks and TOWs. If facing a strong armored threat and unsupported by other antiarmor weapons, the Dragon teams are probably the last element to withdraw. If tanks are attached, tanks are normally part of the security force. When the withdrawal of the security force is ordered, Dragons are withdrawn with their squads.
b. Selection and Preparation of the Next Subsequent Position. During the company commander's reconnaissance, he selects assembly areas for the platoons. Platoon advance parties should select Dragon firing positions at the next subsequent position. These positions will be confirmed and adjusted, as necessary, by the platoon leader after the arrival of the platoon's main body at the position.
Section V. EMPLOYMENT IN THE OFFENSE
In the attack, the Dragon is used to provide antiarmor fire to assist the platoon's advance and to protect it from armored counterattacks. In the absence of armored targets, the Dragon can be used to eliminate enemy crew-served weapons, fortifications, and other suitable hard targets.
3-25. MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
The dismounted infantry platoon moves to contact, using the techniques outlined in FM 7-8. The mechanized platoon uses the techniques outlined in FM 7-7, FM 7-7J, and FM 7-10. In both cases, the Dragons are employed to provide protection and support for all elements of the platoon against antiarmor threat.
a. Dismounted Infantry Platoon. When moving to contact using traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch techniques, the platoon leader organizes his platoon to provide for centralized Dragon control (if assigned) and maximum flexibility. The tactical situation dictates employment of the Dragons within the platoon. The primary consideration to determine which squad the Dragon will be assigned for movement is the availability of fields of fire and the armor threat.
(1) The bulk of the Dragon rounds combined with the minimum effective range (65 meters) of the weapon and the exposure of the gunner during firing, limit the ability of Dragon gunners and teams to participate in a maneuver or effectively use the individual movement techniques necessary to the survival of the assaulting riflemen.
(2) The dismounted infantry platoon uses Dragons and machine guns as the main elements of its base of fire. A rifle squad is often assigned as the base of fire, which the PSG normally controls. The PSG coordinates the supporting fires with the platoon leader, using radio and visual communications. The base of fire can be employed from a stationary position (Figure 3-35) or moved by bounds behind the maneuver element. If required to engage a target of opportunity, the Dragon gunner selects the best covered and concealed position.
NOTE: When a stationary base of fire is used, one Dragon normally moves with the platoon leader to provide immediate protective fires for the maneuver element.
b. Mechanized Infantry Platoon. The mechanized infantry platoon employs its Dragons differently than the dismounted infantry platoon, because the mechanized platoon has a greater capacity to carry Dragon rounds and the vehicle presents more of a target to the enemy. The mechanized platoon usually employs a Dragon with its leading squad to increase the squad's overwatch capability. Also, the platoon leader normally maintains only one Dragon directly under his control.
(1) When the mechanized infantry platoon attacks without tank support, most of the employed Dragons are collocated with the vehicles to provide the base of fire. They are controlled by the PSG. The number of Dragons employed with the base-of-fire element is determined by the nature of the enemy resistance. The exact method used is based on the need for supporting fires. As with the dismounted infantry platoon, one Dragon may accompany the maneuver element.
(2) When the mechanized platoon attacks as part of a combined-arms team, the primary antiarmor weapons are TOWs and tanks since there is less of a requirement for employment of Dragons, Therefore, the advantages of employing the Dragon must be carefully weighed against the reduction in rifle strength as a result of this weapon employment.
3-26. CONDUCT OF THE DAY ATTACK
The following techniques of a day attack govern the employment of the Dragon in the offense.
a. Movement from the assembly area to the LD. The Dragon may precede the rest of the platoon by moving to overwatch positions on or near the LD.
(1) The nature of the threat on or near the objective and along the route of attack; that is, known or suspected locations of suitable targets, and enemy armor approaches into the route of advance.
(2) Observation and fields of fire from the LD over the route(s) to the objective.
(3) The availability of firing positions that provide good observation and fields of fire along the route(s) to the objective.
(4) The availability of antiarmor fire support from other sources.
b. Movement from the LD to the assault position. The leader and gunners watch the progress of the maneuver element, shooting targets that threaten it. The leader anticipates the masking of friendly fires and displaces the weapons one at a time. When the weapons are separated, each crew may displace under control of its gunner when its fire is masked or when it can no longer support the movement, The displacement of all weapons in the fire support element must be timed so that the platoon has ongoing fire support.
(1) If the LD is close to the assault position or the initial objective and good firing positions are available, some Dragons may occupy positions on or near the LD.
(2) Where the LD is too far from the assault position or objective or when suitable firing positions do not exist, the Dragon gunners should accompany the maneuvering elements across the LD until the mission is accomplished. In mechanized units, Dragons can provide covering fire from the dismount point. When centrally controlled, Dragons normally displace by bounds to ensure continuous overwatch of the advance (Figure 3-36).
c. Movement from the assault position to the objective. As the platoon nears the assault position, the fire element maintains a rate of fire to suppress the enemy. As the fire of the platoon fire clement is masked, the platoon leader shifts fires or displaces the weapons. The fire element is quickly moved to positions for consolidation, covering likely armor approaches into the area to repel counterattack.
(1) During the assault, the Dragons are in position to best assist the advance of the elements. They arc employed as far forward as possible, consistent with their ability to provide accurate fire during the assault. Some Dragons may be employed in an overwatch role; however, one or more should accompany the assaulting element to provide ongoing long-range fire beyond the objective.
(2) Dragons employed in an overwatch role are employed with a team to provide communications and security. The platoon leader positions gunners in the assault element where he can best control them and direct their fires.
3-27. CONDUCT OF THE NIGHT ATTACK
The AN/TAS-5 allows the Dragon to be used during reduced visibility the same as during normal visibility. Under artificial illumination, the techniques of daylight operations also apply. This paragraph discusses a nonilluminated, nonsupported night attack by stealth.
a. Night combat is characterized by--
(1) A decrease in the ability to place well-aimed fire on the enemy.
(2) An increase in the importance of close combat, volume of fire, and by the fires of certain weapons laid on targets during daylight.
(3) Difficulty of movement.
(4) Difficulty in maintaining control, direction, and contact.
Despite these problems, the night attack gives the attacker a psychological advantage by magnifying the defender's doubts and fears of the unknown.
b. The conduct of the attack by stealth requires that the attacking elements reach the probable line of deployment with out being discovered. Before this, the unit commander can call for illumination and planned supporting fires. If he does call for illumination, the attack then continues, using the tactics and techniques for a daylight attack.
c. The attacking units move from the assembly area in a column formation. The Dragon gunners are in the platoon formation where they can best deploy into the assault formation or can separate themselves from the assaulting element if their mission is to support by fire.
d. Firing positions for support weapons forward of the LD are chosen during daylight. Characteristics and limitations of the night tracker in regard to range are carefully considered when choosing these positions. Signature effects of the missile must also be carefully considered; the Dragon missile leaves a distinctive launch signature and flight path at night because of the action of the side thrusters. Therefore, quick displacement to selected alternate firing positions prevents accurate counterfire from the enemy.
e. If it is not possible to select firing positions during daylight, Dragon gunners should accompany the maneuver element, unless the nature of terrain, such as desert, provides a clear flight path for the missile.
f. Dragons employed in the assault element are employed the same as during daylight; the command to fire is given by the platoon leader. If the attack is discovered, gunners provide accurate fire support on the platoon leader's command. Maximum use should be made for other antiarmor weapons to engage close-in targets to prevent unnecessary identification of Dragon positions due to launch signature cue.
3-28. CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION
Immediately after seizing the objective, the Dragon gunners are displaced to positions that afford long-range fires beyond the objective. This provides for antiarmor defense in depth and covers the most likely avenues of armor approach into the position. The use of guides to direct those gunners displacing from overwatch positions into new positions speeds the operation. Reorganization is an ongoing process; however, it is given special emphasis on seizure of the objective. Dragon gunners are assigned positions and defensive sectors, and they begin preparing for all-round antiarmor defense.
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