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Army Operations in War

The NCA may exhaust its options to achieve vital national interests with the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power. Such would require the NCA to use the military element of national power as a primary instrument for protecting national interests.

When the military element becomes the predominant element for the execution of policy in a particular theater, the Army may enter the third state of the range of military operations--war. This chapter discusses modern warfare and the transition to war from peacetime or conflict. The chapter closes with a short look at the termination of war.


War is a state of hostile, armed combat. War is characterized by the sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation. War involves regular and irregular forces in operations to achieve vital national security objectives. War may be limited or general in the resources employed and the risks of survival at stake.

Modern warfare may be nonlinear, thereby making air operations increasingly vital to the effectiveness Or ground operations. The commander may, by choice or by lack of maneuver forces, place his force in dispersed noncontiguous areas from which he can operate to destroy enemy forces. Nonlinear operations require commanders to seize the initiative through offensive action, to force the pace of battle, and to retain the flexibility to bring overwhelming force to destroy the enemy at a time and place where he is most vulnerable.

The long-term aim is to regain the initiative and flexibility needed to quickly destroy the enemy force. At the operational-level, this involves an appreciable amount of risk but offers an opportunity for high-payoff success. The Army organizes in war to fight effectively both linear and nonlinear operations.


During peacetime, the Army trains to deter war and, if necessary, to fight the nation's wars. The ASCC must ensure that during realistic training for war his subordinate units consider the effect of training on the environment and the effect of the environment on training. Federal laws require that Army activities conducting training and operations during war and MOOTW comply with all federal, state, and local (to include host nation) environmental and pollution abatement requirements and standards. Environmental pollution standards cover solid waste management and control of pollutants in the air and water and on terrain. Other legal requirements cover resources such as endangered species and wetlands. Other environmental areas that must be addressed concern noise, terrain damage, ecological areas, and historical/archeological sites. Still, the environment should be treated as a resource, not a constraint.

The CINC structures the army in theater to transition to war, to receive reinforcements, to conduct major operations, and to terminate war on favorable terms. The CINC fixes area and organizational responsibilities for the Army in consonance with the theater strategy, the threat, available forces, and existing or prospective alliances. These responsibilities evolve significantly during the transition from peacetime to wartime.

Unity of Effort

At the operational level, Army operations in war are always part of unified and joint operations and often part of multinational operations. Therefore, the Army commander must have a unified, joint, and multinational view of operations. Army cooperation with the other components is necessary to produce unity of effort. Military operations are more than just combat operations and do not necessarily end with the cessation of hostilities. Some of the military operations that occur during and after combat operations include--

  • Processing and return of enemy prisoners of war (EPW).

  • Return of displaced civilians.

  • Transfer of responsibilities to peacekeeping forces.

  • Restoration of basic life support services.

  • Battlefield policing.

Units conduct these operations until acceptable peacetime conditions are achieved and the force is redeployed.

The Range of Military Operations

All states of the range of military operations may exist within the theater of war. Peacetime activities may characterize a portion of the theater, while other areas may experience conflict. Thus, the principles and operations that apply to peacetime and conflict discussed in previous chapters may apply to the theater of war. The primary focus of the war environment, however, remains on combat operations and those activities that ensure success.

Organizational Changes

When the Army in theater transitions to war, significant changes occur in Army organizations. Such changes require a rapid expansion of the Army in order to introduce large numbers of maneuver and support forces to reinforce the theater. The ASCC evolves and expands to cope with the increased tempo of operational and support missions. The Army may introduce additional operational-level headquarters to assist the CINC in controlling the increased number of tactical organizations.

Depending on the analysis of METT-T and the extent of global conflict, the CINC may organize several theaters of operation within the theater of war. This has not been done since World War II. The CINC may form JTFs for specific missions in theater, as was done during Operation Desert Storm. Each of these will most likely include ARFOR. In theater, more than one Army commander may have operational-level responsibilities. These operational-level Army commanders sequence operations over space and time to attain operational or strategic objectives. The principles outlined in Chapter 3 for the design and execution of operational art apply to these commanders.


The desired end state of war is the rapid return to peacetime on terms favorable to the US and its allies. This end state includes setting the conditions to prevent future war or conflict. Postwar or military consolidation operations may be necessary to ensure that the theater transitions to peacetime and remains there for the foreseeable future. Diplomatic and economic considerations may predominate during this process, with military operations supporting these elements of national power.


The ASCC's primary mission is to contribute to the success of the joint or multinational commander's major operation. The ASCC must envision the long-range strategic objective in formulating his initial plans for positioning forces. Army service component functions during war include movement and maneuver, fires, protection, deception, C², joint information systems interface, IEW, and support.


The CINC requests forces stationed in CONUS or from other theaters. USTRANSCOM has overall responsibility to move forces into the theater of war via strategic lift. Based upon operational requirements, the ASCC influences this process through JOPES, AMOPES, and TPFDD. He ensures that the proper types of Army personnel and materiel flow into the theater to conduct and support major operations. The CINC sequences this flow to ensure that it supports the concept of operations for current and future missions. Within the AO, movement and maneuver must be well-coordinated, integrated, and synchronized to maximize the combat power available to the theater commander. This coordination and synchronization is conducted on an area basis through maneuver control, movement control, and battlefield circulation control.

Theater Commander

The CINC may designate the ASCC as a senior support headquarters without responsibilities for conducting combat operations. This becomes highly probable as the requirements for support increase and the CINC becomes more involved in directing Army combat operations.

Army Service Component Commander

The reception, preparation, and flow of ARFOR in the theater is a primary function of the ASCC. The ASCC sets clear movement priorities within the context of the current major operation and in preparation for future major operations. The ASCC uses the senior movement control agency (MCA) to provide the movements program, which allocates transportation support based on these priorities to support reception and onward movement activities. Execution of the program provides for the movement of units, supplies, and equipment from support areas forward to the deployed forces and ultimately retrograde of materiel from these forces.

The ASCC concentrates forces and creates economy of force through the use of intratheater movement. Through intratheater movement, the ASCC develops positional advantage in relation to the enemy to support the campaign. The ASCC carefully weighs the risks of concentration against the protection of forces, installations, and the infrastructure on which future operations depend.

The ASCC visualizes maneuver in the operational sense. His visualization is from the perspective of the entire theater army, not just one or several of its elements. Divisions, separate brigades, or regiments are the level of resolution of his perspective. An early decision is imperative. Once initial corps and division positions are selected, the ASCC will find it difficult to change the initial set.

Army Operational-Level Commander

Planning offensive and defensive operations and maneuvers to achieve the CINC's campaign plan is a primary function of the ARFOR operational-level commander. In addition, he plans large-scale operations and directs maneuver of subordinate forces.

Plans Offensive and Defensive Operations

The ARFOR commander at the operational level plans offensive operations in war to secure or retain the initiative, to exploit or pursue the enemy, and to prevent the enemy from regrouping and regaining the combat initiative. He also plans defensive operations to gain time or space to conduct decisive offensive actions. Even in the defense, the ARFOR commander seizes opportunities and plans for offensive maneuver, counterattack, and deep operations whenever possible.

Plans Large-Scale Operations

The ARFOR commander at the operational level plans large-scale maneuver of assigned forces to support the theater campaign, with a view to the theater CINC's ultimate objectives. The CINC sequences and/or integrates major operations by assigning zones or sectors, boundaries, objectives, priorities, resources, and phases. He integrates within his battle space resources such as space-based systems and information warfare assets. Planning responsibilities center on analyzing the assigned mission, visualizing major combat operations and logistical requirements, and disseminating plans and directives. The plans generally project future operations and provide details on mission accomplishment as directed by the CINC.

Directs Maneuver of Subordinate Forces

The Army operational-level commander directs the maneuver of subordinate forces to support the theater campaign plan. This direction is tied to the overall concept of operations and the estimate of the situation at key decision points during the operation. The primary emphasis of operational maneuver is on the concentration of combat power through the exercise of large land formations on broad fronts.

Synchronization of operational movement, fires, and support produces a series of operational maneuvers that provide the Army operational-level commander and subordinate commanders with the necessary leverage to shape the battle space to gain, retain, and sustain the initiative. The ARFOR commander synchronizes attacks on the enemy throughout the battlefield to counter known or anticipated enemy efforts, to exploit success, and to hasten the total collapse of enemy forces.

Tactical execution focuses on destruction of the enemy throughout his battle space through use of depth and simultaneity. The Army operational-level commander, while sensitive to these immediate engagements, cannot allow himself to be preoccupied with the close operations and be distracted from the larger perspective. He reallocates forces, reprioritizes efforts, and conducts a continuous estimate throughout the battle space to react to current and future decisive points.

The Army operational-level commander initiates changes designed to facilitate the execution of current operations, with due consideration to the impact on future operations. He directs the movement of subordinate forces to ensure that after a distinct phase of the operation they are positioned in a manner that will enable rapid transition to subsequent phases.

Normally, deciding the specific form of maneuver to be used against tactical or operational objectives is left to the judgment and discretion of subordinate tactical commanders. Directing a tactical form of maneuver at the operational level reduces the flexibility of subordinates, narrows options, and may unnecessarily restrict subordinate commanders in developing optimum COAs.

To defeat the enemy's center of gravity, the commander can synchronize maneuver, fires, and operations simultaneously in depth against enemy forces at all levels. This synchronization is one of the most dynamic concepts available to a commander. Maneuver and fires should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the commander's objectives. The commander phases the operation against the enemy's decisive points at successive depths. This phasing helps him determine the most advantageous simultaneous employment of forces and firepower for decisive engagement to achieve the end state.


JFCs use a variety of firepower means to divert, disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the enemy's air, surface, and subsurface military potential. This paragraph discusses how the JFC thinks about applying joint fires to support his concept of operations.

The Firepower Model

Joint firepower can be classified as tactical, operational, or strategic, based on its intended effect.

Tactical Firepower

The primary purpose of tactical firepower is to directly and immediately support tactical operations of the joint force against appropriate tactical decisive points. Therefore, maneuver commanders exercise control over tactical firepower that supports their maneuver operations. Tactical firepower includes the coordinated and collective use of target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, armed aircraft (both fixed- and rotary-wing), and other means against enemy elements in contact or imminent contact. Included are artillery, mortars, other nonline-of-sight fires, naval gunfire, CAS, attack aviation assets, and electronic attack. Tactical firepower also could include the means for surface-to-air and air-to-air engagements.

Interdiction operations conducted by all elements of the joint force can also be designed to achieve or support tactical objectives. Some interdiction missions may therefore be considered as tactical. All interdiction missions affecting the land battle require coordination between several levels of command, both within and across service lines (see Figure 5-2).

Operational Firepower

Operational firepower achieves a decisive impact on a subordinate campaign or major operation. Operational firepower is joint and multinational. It is a separate element of the subordinate JFC's concept of operations (addressed separately from operational maneuver) but must be closely integrated and synchronized with his concept for maneuver. In that regard, operational firepower is integrated normally with operational land maneuver for synergistic effect, staying power, and more rapid achievement of strategic aims. Operational firepower is not fire support, and operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent upon operational firepower. Still, operational maneuver can be affected by such fires and can exploit opportunities created or developed by the JFC's operational firepower.

Today, all services contribute capabilities that can be used for operational firepower. To synchronize operations, the JFC may task one component to provide fires to support another component's operations. Still, as service means for operational firepower may be used for tactical firepower, the JFC should preserve that tactical capability as he develops his concept of fires.

Operational firepower includes targeting and attacking land and sea targets whose destruction or neutralization will have a major impact on a subordinate campaign or major operation. Operational firepower includes the allocation of joint and multinational air, land, sea (surface and subsurface), and space means. In a war involving WMD, fires could be an operational instrument at decisive points that leads to the enemy's strategic center of gravity. Operational firepower can be designed to achieve a single, operationally significant objective that could have a decisive impact on the campaign and major operation. Operational firepower may include the interdiction of a major enemy force or forces to set the conditions for subsequent, decisive operations.

Operational firepower is planned top down. The operational commander establishes objectives, identifies targets, and then passes them to subordinate joint or multinational units for execution. Subordinate nominations contribute to this top-down approach. Operational firepower focuses largely on one or more of the following:

  • Destruction of critical functions, facilities, and forces having operational significance.

  • Isolation of a specific battle within the battle space.

  • Facilitation of maneuver to operational depths.

Systems capable of providing operational firepower generally include land- and seabased airpower and surface-to-surface, long-range missiles.

The ASCC has various means with which to execute operational firepower. He may mass fires, concentrate long-range missile fires, employ attack helicopters, or coordinate the use of air forces with Army resources. Application of operational firepower is a primary means for concentrating combat power.

Strategic Firepower

Strategic firepower is intended to achieve a major impact at the strategic level and thus an impact on the course of the theater campaign or war as a whole. Strategic firepower includes selection and assignment of strategic targets to attack capable forces. Strategic firepower also makes the forces and resources available for attacking those targets according to the theater strategy and campaign plan.

Systems capable of providing strategic firepower are generally those also capable of providing operational firepower. The intended effect or outcome qualifies a system, weapon, or operation as either strategic or operational. Nuclear munitions, because of the escalation they signal, are normally categorized as strategic firepower--whether they are delivered by aircraft, missile, or other means--and are closely controlled through a system the theater commander establishes.

Army Interface

The Army operational-level commander is the critical link for coordination of joint support for Army operations and Army support for joint operations. The Army operational-level commander has a key role in ensuring that ground and air operations, as devised by the JFC, complement and reinforce each other. The Army operational-level commander begins coordination with the JFC and ACC early in the operational planning process. During the operational planning process, the Army operational-level commander, in coordination with his subordinate commanders and staff, identifies Army requirements for air support (reconnaissance, CAS, air interdiction, and airlift). He also participates in the targeting process by nominating targets for Army and Air Force engagement.


Interdiction contributes substantially to operational firepower, although it also can have tactical and strategic effects. Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy's surface or subsurface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Although interdiction can have tactical effects, it generally applies forward of or beyond units in contact or imminent contact. Its effects must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose with other supporting or supported operations of the joint force. Interdiction-capable forces include, but are not limited to--

  • Fighter or attack aircraft and bombers.

  • Ships and submarines.

  • Conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces.

  • SOF.

  • Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines.

  • Artillery and naval gunfire.

  • Attack helicopters.

  • EW systems.

  • Antisatellite weapons.

  • Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver is critical to the successful execution of the campaign or major operation. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather complementary operations designed to achieve the JFC's campaign objectives. Moreover, interdiction could be a maneuver itself to gain positional advantage over an enemy.

Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the friendly maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction; if the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in gaining the greatest leverage against the enemy at the operational level.

The ARFOR operates within the theater operational battle space that the JFC establishes for the conduct of all operations. Strategic, political, and internal boundaries are examples of the further subdivision of the battle space that must be considered by the operational commander. The JFC establishes operational boundaries to facilitate the synchronization of maneuver and interdiction. Synchronization of efforts within these boundaries is of particular importance.

According to Joint Pub 3-0, the operational land commander is the supported commander for air interdiction in his AO, and he therefore specifies the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations therein. While this may mean specifying individual targets or target sets and the desired effects to be achieved in attacking them, the often preferred method is for the land commander to specify the operational-level effects he intends the interdiction to achieve, the target priorities to achieve those effects, and the date/time by which the effects are required (for example, eliminate the counterattack capability of X Guard's corps by destroying artillery, armor, and soft-skinned vehicles not later than D+7).

Interdiction operations, whether by land, air, or naval forces, complement overall maneuver to destroy the enemy's center of gravity. The ARFOR commander may choose to use interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with his subordinate forces supporting the component leading the interdiction effort). For example, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to abandon or reveal covered positions or attempt rapid resupply. These reactions provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.


Targeting by the ARFOR staff follows the same targeting process used at subordinate echelons. This process is detailed in FM 6-20-10. The targeting process is an important part of the military decision-making process described by FM 101-5.

At the operational level, the focus of the targeting effort is more on planning and coordination, rather than on execution of operational firepower. Typically, when the ARFOR staff identifies high-payoff operational targets, it will coordinate with subordinate units for acquisition and attack by systems allocated or organic to the corps. There will be some critical targets that subordinate units are not capable of acquiring or engaging. The critical nature of these targets--and the requirement to coordinate and synchronize the employment of several joint acquisitions/attacks as quickly as possible--requires the ARFOR commander to establish a staff section to support the associated targeting effort. This section is the DOCC.

The DOCC is organized with appropriate joint service, multinational arms, and coalition force representatives. The primary functions of the DOCC are situational awareness, planning and coordination, targeting, and control of designated operational firepower. A description of the DOCC functions is shown in Figure 7-1. The primary mission of the DOCC is to provide centralized coordination and management of ARFOR deep operations. The DOCC ensures effective and efficient employment of critical assets and facilitates synchronization of joint operations. The primary functions of the DOCC apply across the range of military operations.

FIGURE 7-1. Deep Operations Coordination Cell Requirements

Fire Control Measures

JFCs employ various fire support coordination measures to facilitate effective joint operations. Many maneuver control measures have fire coordination implications. Specific joint fire support coordination measures and the procedures associated with those measures also assist in preserving the fluidity and flexibility of successful joint operations.

Fire Support Coordination Line

The ARFOR may establish an FSCL within the AO to support his concept of operation. The ARFOR must coordinate the FSCL's location with the appropriate ACC and other supporting elements. If an FSCL is established, its purpose is to allow the ARFOR, its subordinates, and supporting units, such as Air Force, to swiftly attack targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL. Such attacks by Army assets must be coordinated with all other affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary action to avoid friendly casualties. This coordination includes informing and/or consulting with affected commanders (that is, supporting air components). The inability to effect this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL; however, failure to coordinate this type of attack increases the risk of friendly casualties and could waste limited resources through duplicate attacks. If the land force commander desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his lateral boundaries, he must first coordinate with the appropriate commander. The interface within the DOCC among the various fire support representatives provides an excellent means of initially coordinating the attack of targets in the area.

The FSCL must complement the ARFOR commander's concept for deep operations and optimize the synergy between operational maneuver and operational firepower. To achieve this synergy, supported and supporting commanders must have clearly defined responsibilities, selective targeting, and coordinated operations. As the supported commander, the ARFOR provides necessary guidance (restrictions, constraints) for all operations in the area beyond the FSCL and within the designated ARFOR AO. The ARFOR commander does not necessarily have to control the supporting operations or joint service activities in this area. Still, supporting commanders must follow the ARFOR commander's intent and guidance for activities in this area. Control of interdiction provides a functional example.

Interdiction occurs both short of and beyond the FSCL. Attack of planned interdiction targets on either side requires no further coordination, assuming the attack is proceeding as planned. Deviation from the plan requires coordination with affected commanders. Attack of interdiction targets of opportunity short of the FSCL requires coordination with the affected commanders. Before attacking targets of opportunity beyond the FSCL, supporting commanders should coordinate with the ARFOR commander. However, if he cannot effect coordination, the supporting commander controlling the attack must follow the ARFOR commander's guidance for attacking targets in this area. Thus, the ARFOR commander need not directly control the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but, as the supported commander, he exercises general direction over interdiction and other activities of supporting commanders in his AO.

Besides the FSCL, other fire support coordination measures may be used to facilitate or restrict operational firepower. These include restrictive fire areas (RFAs) and no-fire areas (NFAs) to protect friendly elements on either side of the FSCL. If ROE permit, commanders should consider the use of free-fire areas (FFAs) to expedite fires or the jettisoning of ordinance in specific areas.

Whether attacking or defending, the ARFOR commander usually designates an initial FSCL and plans for a subsequent series of on-order FSCLs. Execution of on-order FSCLs must be transmitted in sufficient time to allow higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters time to effect necessary changes.

Warfighting Airspace

Warfighting airspace is the airspace directly above the ground commander's AO that provides for freedom of maneuver for those forces operating in the third dimension. Commanders in the field use various means to gain freedom of maneuver in this area, especially in the conduct of deep operations. Warfighting airspace uses the coordinating altitude to define this area. The coordinating altitude is an airspace permissive control measure designed to coordinate airspace between high performance fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The JFC has already designated the AO. The warfighting airspace presents a three-dimensional view of the battlefield. In the warfighting airspace, the ground commander retains freedom of maneuver without overly restricting any of the other users of airspace.


To coordinate operational-level fires, the DOCC interacts with multiple Army, Air Force, and sometimes Naval aviation organizations. The DOCC works very closely with the command's MI organization and the echelons above corps (EAC) analysis and control element (ACE). They are the DOCC's main source of targeting data.

To ensure that targeting data is developed into target lists the manning of the section must include MI officers. The DOCC works with the command's subordinate unit's fire support element (FSE) to deconflict targets and targeting information, to task corps for operational fires support, and to forward air support requests to the AOC. The DOCC also provides the corps with target feedback, especially BDA received through the BCE. Assignment of artillery, WMD target analysts, and maneuver arms (especially aviation) officers to the coordination section is crucial to its effective coordination with the tactical-level headquarters.

The Army DOCC effects coordination with the US Air Force through the BCE located at the Air Force AOC, the ground liaison officers at the wings, and the Army liaison officer aboard the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). Similar functions are performed within the Navy Tactical Air Control System, (NTACS) by its tactical air control center. These assets receive information from and provide feedback directly to the DOCC. An automated targeting support system to transmit targeting priorities, targeting lists with supporting intelligence data, and targeting damage assessments are essential to this coordination.

Joint Interface

The DOCC provides the Army members to the JTCB and the joint command, control, and communications countermeasures (C3CM) cell.

Joint Targeting Coordination Board

The CINC or JFC may establish a joint targeting coordination board to direct the theater targeting process, to include special operations targeting. The board consists of members of the joint staff and representatives of each subordinate command. The JTCB ensures the effective employment of all theater-level deep surveillance and attack resources, including SOF. It coordinates targeting information, provides targeting guidance and priorities, prepares or refines joint target lists (JTLs), and deconflicts lethal and nonlethal assets. The JTCB is usually chaired by the J3 or his representative.

Its organization reflects theater force composition, strategic objectives, geography, and the threat. The JTCB includes representatives of the land component commander, air component commander, naval component commander, special operations component commander, AOC, and marine, air, and electronic planning cells. Input from the joint staff element is used also to prepare the JTL.

The JTCB normally meets daily to ensure that JFC targeting and EW guidance is disseminated, to monitor the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal targeting efforts, to coordinate and deconflict joint force operations, to validate fire support coordination measures, and to approve new target nominations for inclusion in the JTL. JTCB results are provided to the supporting forces. Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-09 discuss the purpose and functions of JTCBs. Joint Pub 3-05.5 contains discussion of SOF mission tasking as part of the JTCB process.

Joint C3CM Cell

The JFC usually organizes a joint C3CM cell to coordinate EW targeting information, provide EW targeting guidance and priorities, prepare or refine JTLs, and compile a list of crucial friendly assets that must be protected from joint EW operations. The C3CM cell is normally chaired by the J3 or his representative and has representatives of the J2, J6, operational fires coordination section, and other staff elements and service components as appropriate.

The ASCC establishes a C3CM plan, in coordination with the CINC's plan, to attack high-value targets. The EAC C3CM plan, developed from the ASCC's intent, focuses on subordinate unit operations and complements joint operations with other component commands within the theater.


Operational fires organic to the joint force are key in protecting the rear area from ground threats. A vital mission of Army ADA is to protect the force and critical theater assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance during warfighting operations. The priorities may shift to protecting major concentrations of combat forces and supplementing protection of maneuver forces. Protection of LOCs remains critical as they extend to support maneuvering forces.

Army commanders are often responsible for the security and protection of facilities and units that support joint or multinational commanders conducting close and deep operations. Additionally, Army commanders may be tasked to provide security for air bases located within their AO. ARFOR commanders must continuously employ risk-management approaches to effectively preclude unacceptable risks to personnel and property, including protecting forces preparing for or en route to combat.

Risk management is the recognition that decision making occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions must remain consistent with the commander's stated intent and offer a good expectation of success. The risk-taking skill requires competency as a prerequisite. Risks from WMD must be continually assessed to ensure force protection and deterrence and should be addressed in plan synchronization and force resourcing. Trained and disciplined organizations lessen risk.

Rear Operations

Rear operations include those activities that allow freedom of maneuver, continuity of support, and uninterrupted C². In linear battle terms, these action, occur behind forces engaged in active combat. The rear operations procedures discussed herein focus on operations during war. Similar actions could be required in MOOTW. Joint Pubs 3-10 and 3-10.1 and FMs 90-23 and 90-12 provide additional coverage of rear operations. Rear operations has four functions: sustainment, movement, terrain management, and security. An Army commander may execute these rear operations functions in a COMMZ/JRA or CZ.

Communications Zone/ Joint Rear Area

A JFC normally establishes a theater base communications zone (JRA) and the CZ within the territory of a sovereign host nation. Unlike the CZ, most host nations whose sovereignty remains viable maintain some level of control in a COMMZ.

The host nation may retain overall responsibility for security, movement, and terrain management. In such cases commanders of US forces in the COMMZ own only the bases they physically occupy. They are responsible for the security of bases and coordination with the host nation for additional security assistance or other rear operations support. HNS agreements, SOFA, or other legal instruments guide the US and host nation relationship. The US commander in the COMMZ directs and coordinates rear operations, using a single command headquarters. At this echelon, support is the principal operation. Several US organizations work with the host nation to execute each rear operation function.

Separate US functional commands and agencies control the movement of US assets in the COMMZ and coordinate these movements with host nation and US area commanders. The army organization with responsibility for rear operations is usually responsible for coordinating terrain management and security with host nation agencies in its AO.

  • Rear Area Operations Center. A rear area operations center (RAOC) is a subordinate CP within the ARFOR's CP. The RAOC is responsible for collecting rear area information, managing terrain, controlling area damage, determining the impact of weather, and synchronizing the rear area battle plan to facilitate responses to enemy threats in the rear area. FMs 100-15, 90-12, and 90-23 detail these rear operations activities.

  • ARFOR Support. The ARFOR designates a support organization (corps support command [COSCOM]) to execute the support function and assist in movement and terrain management. In contingency operations, ARFOR may hand off these rear operations responsibilities as the lodgment or AO expands. EAC organizations assume these responsibilities, thereby allowing the corps to focus on tactical operations.

Combat Zone

In a CZ, the ARFOR commander usually owns all the terrain on which his forces conduct operations and is responsible for synchronizing all rear operations. This discussion characterizes rear operations at corps and below in contingency situations with no developed COMMZ and environments with no viable HNS.

Chain of Command

Command and control of rear operations is the key to success across the width and depth of the battle space. To ensure overall security of the rear area, commanders at all levels must clearly understand C², C² responsibilities, and C² elements. Each unit in the rear area, regardless of its support function, should be able to defend itself. Ideally, threats to the rear should be engaged and defeated before they can affect rear operations. When they must be fought in the rear, a system of incremental responses must be able to eliminate the threat as quickly as possible.

The chain of command for rear operations is embodied in area commands for security, area damage control (ADC), and terrain management functions. Any unit in the COMMZ uses this channel to report information of intelligence value and to request engineer, chemical, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), military police (MP), and host nation assistance.

The COMMZ tactical chain of command for rear operations flows from the theater CINC to the ASCC, to rear operations centers (ROCs), to base clusters, and to bases. This chain of command is used to coordinate protection of units and facilities within geographical areas of the COMMZ.

Commander in Chief

The CINC is responsible for rear operations. He normally designates a JRAC, often the ASCC. 'The ASCC as the JRAC would then assume US responsibility for coordinating rear operations in the COMMZ, which includes coordination with the host nation. The JRAC is responsible to his US superiors for the development and maintenance of US installations, control of US movements, administration of the US support effort, and overall security of all US forces and resources present in or transiting the COMMZ.

Army Service Component Commander

The ASCC would likely delegate the responsibility for rear operations planning to his deputy chief of staff for operations. At theater, operational-level planning is conducted to sequence future rear operations, coordinate HNS, and synchronize the four rear operations functions (support, movement, terrain management, and security). The ASCC uses a decentralized control system of area commanders for rear operations covering large areas of the theater COMMZ. The area commander usually designates his deputy commander as the rear operations officer who, in turn, often executes this responsibility through the security, plans, and operations (SPO) officer.

Rear Operations Centers.

The ROC (as depicted in Figure 7-2) collects information and plans and coordinates security, ADC. and terrain management. The ROC is composed of functional sections that work closely with their area command structure. The ROC sections coordinate with host nation liaison elements in addition to NBC, EOD, MP, engineer, and other technical organizations.

The ROC maintains multiple communications channels using switched telephone services and combat net radios (CNRs) with higher and adjacent headquarters and units. The ROC conducts vulnerability and threat assessments within its AO. It then plans and coordinates protection of designated critical facilities and resources. It also advises MCAs of security issues, area surveillance responsibilities, response (combat) operations, positioning of units, and ADC. The ROC reacts to incidents most of the time but also looks to short-term planning. It has an FSE and mobile base defense coordination teams (BDCTs) to assist in detailed rear area defense planning.

The ROC's most important contribution to COMMZ/JRA security is the establishment and coordination of base defense plans. The ROC coordinates base siting with the technical chain of command and then organizes these bases into base clusters to provide mutual support. The rear operations commander, with ROC recommendation, designates base and base cluster commanders to coordinate defensive plans. Sometimes the ROC identifies single bases that are isolated, such as a specialized fixed facility, or clearly independent, such as an air base, and treats them as separate base clusters.

Base Cluster Commander

The base cluster commander communicates with all bases in his cluster through a base defense operations center (BDOC). Each base and base cluster is responsible for preparing its own defense plans. The ROC sends a BDCT to the base cluster commander's base cluster operations center (BCOC) to assist in consolidating individual base defense plans into a coordinated base cluster defense plan. Assets for forming the BDOC and BCOC are gathered from available base or cluster assets. See Joint Pub 3-10.1 for a detailed discussion of base defense. The BDCT reviews and assists in coordinating all needed US and host nation security and damage control support, to include fire support and ADA support. It then ensures the completed defense plans are brought to the ROC for record and integration with the total protection concept.

Host Nation

The host nation, when capable, retains responsibility for security and ADC of all areas outside US bases. Despite the status of HNS, US commanders are always responsible for the defense of their base. They take measures to avoid detection by reducing the base signature, most notably through OPSEC, and the use of camouflage and concealment. US commanders take protective measures to withstand enemy attacks and employ measures to speed recovery and return to full mission capability should an attack occur. Measures include the emplacement of protective obstacles, fortification of critical facilities, and installation of NBC defense systems.

US commanders also plan graduated levels of response to enemy attack to defeat Level I threats and to delay and disrupt Level II and III threat forces until outside assistance arrives. See Table 7-1. If the host nation has limited capabilities to fulfill its rear operations responsibilities, or the AOR is hostile, the JFC or ASCC may designate US assets to execute these functions. The commander could require additional US engineer forces for ADC and other sustainment engineering tasks. He might provide more CSS and CS organizations for supply, movement, and terrain management. Without HNS, the ASCC may assume responsibility for overall security of the COMMZ/JRA, addressing all three levels of threat. All US commanders would concern themselves with greater security roles beyond their normal self-defense responsibility.

Table 7-1. Threat Levels
Level Threat Response
Agents, saboteus, sympathizers, terroists Unit, base, base cluster self-defense
Small tactical units, unconventional warfare
forces, guerrillas
Self-defense measures and response
forces with supporting fires
Large tactical force operations, including
airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltration,
and major air operations
Commitment of tactical combat force

Units in the COMMZ are especially vulnerable to enemy attack because of their focus on support and limited combat capabilities. Combat units located in the COMMZ are usually newly arrived or regenerated and thus have limited combat potential. The ASCC must coordinate responses to all three levels of threat to prevent disruption of support activities, interdiction of LOCs, demoralization of forces, and diversion of combat forces.

In the COMMZ, US response forces handle Level II and III threats. Response forces are generally tactical combat forces (TCFs) and/or host nation forces, depending upon the viability of the host nation and established host nation agreements. In the COMMZ/JRA, security operations are economy-of-force operations. US MPs provide security support to all Army operations through execution of their battlefield mission of area security. MPs are normally designated as the rear operations response force to defeat Level II threats. The ASCC normally designates a TCF to defeat level III threats. The ASCC may designate a TCF from any of the following:

  • Tactical units passing through the rear area to the forward-deployed force.

  • Units assigned or reconstituted in the rear area. The ASCC may already have units assigned rear security operations (an MP brigade task force augmented according to the factors of METT-T).

  • Tactical units of other service components or allies within the theater army under OPCON of the senior army commander.

  • Tactical units from forward-deployed elements.

  • A task-organized force from assets disembarking in the theater.

The theater commander's campaign would require significant change should the threat in the rear area grow to a level that required diverting combat units. The German Army experienced this situation during World War II on the eastern front. German rear area commanders--confronted with large numbers of partisan forces--bypassed enemy units and inserted conventional and special operations forces, disrupting their operations. This threat ultimately required over 25 German divisions dedicated to rear area security. Table 7-1 lists the three levels of response and typical threats that can trigger the response.


In war, the Army commander integrates Army deception plans with joint force deception plans to ensure unity of effort. The better the enemy is deceived, the more protection is provided to the friendly force. Deception operations must be closely coordinated with the JFC's deception staff element (DSE) and support the JFC's deception plan. The Army commander attaches representatives to the DSE to participate in deception planning. At the operational level of war, the Army commander uses deception as one of his major force multipliers. This is particularly important when the relative strength differential between opposing forces favors the enemy. In war, the Army commander finds deception particularly attractive as a means to influence the decisions of an opposing commander.

Deception requires planners to view the friendly force from the perspective of its opponent. That perspective and a notion of how that opposing commander believes the friendly force will act are key to the deception strategy. The purpose of the deception operation is to cause the enemy to act in a way prejudicial to his best interests. A deception plan seeks to exploit the expectations of the opposing commander by offering confirming evidence of those expectations. The resultant enemy action must be to his disadvantage as the actual friendly force plan unfolds. While deception can have a high payoff, it is difficult to execute successfully.

The Army operational-level commander blends his deception plans into the concept of operation. The deception plan is a viable COA that was considered but not selected. At the operational level of war, the commander forms a deception cell that includes functional representation from the entire staff. This cell requires considerable resources to be an effective element of the major operation.

The commander may execute the deception COA as a branch of the major operation. This execution requires the positioning of forces and the allocation of materiel. If required, the Army operational-level commander may execute the deception branch of the concept of operation if his selected COA is compromised. The deception operation must be a viable COA. To be successful, it must cause the enemy to confirm its preconceived ideas of friendly force actions.


Command relationships in war may evolve during the transition to war to be substantially different from those exercised during peacetime or conflict. This evolution is the result of several factors, to include additional ways and means available to the CINC to prosecute the war effort.

Developing the Chain of Command

During the transition from peacetime to wartime, a theater undergoes a process of development. As the theater expands, the purpose of combat operations grows in complexity and the size and scope of combat and support force structures increases. This may result in organization of the theater into theaters of war or theaters of operation as discussed in Chapter 2.

Intermediate Army Headquarters

The requirement to establish an intermediate Army headquarters between the ASCC and the corps depends on characteristics of the theater environment based on METT-T and the reasons identified in Section III of Chapter 2. The number of subordinate headquarters that a higher headquarters can control depends on a number of factors; mission, experience, training, communications abilities, and logistics are a few. The span of control will be as broad or narrow as the situation dictates.

Numbered Army

The ASCC, with the concurrence of the CINC, establishes a numbered army, designates a numbered army commander, and provides him with the directive or order that forms his command. This directive specifies the rationale for establishing the numbered army, the objectives it should meet, and the forces involved. Numbered armies plan and direct major operations. operations at this level involve the deployment, movement and maneuver, and fires of land combat power over extended terrain and the integration of all Army and other service support into the operation. Subordinate tactical commanders determine the specific tactics in maneuver, fires, intelligence, force protection, C², and allocated support. Primary emphasis at the numbered army level is on planning for future operations.

Exercising Control Through Planning

The Army operational-level commander actively participates in developing the subordinate JFC's theater of operations campaign plans. He interfaces with the commanders of the other services and directs the preparation of the Army's major operations to support the plan. He issues planning guidance, weighs various COAs, and develops and coordinates a concept of operations. The Army operational-level commander ensures that his concept is aligned with that of his superior commander. He coordinates vertically with senior and subordinate commands and horizontally with adjacent and supporting commands and activities. With representatives from the other services, the Army commander incorporates sea and airpower in the concept early in the planning process. This power includes fire support, reconnaissance, sealift, air defense, and airlift.

Planning in wartime at the operational level is continuous and more complex than in other environments for the following reasons:

  • The synchronization of functions in large areas over greater periods of time introduces additional variables.

  • The presence of an enemy with possibly equal or greater capabilities, pursuing actions independently, causes continuous updating of planning efforts.

  • The planning process remains relatively the same, while the requirement for joint planning increases dramatically at nearly all echelons.

  • The Army operational-level commander must plan for a large number of branches and sequels to help simplify decisions in a time-sensitive war environment.

Establishing Command Relationships

In the directive that creates the Army operational-level echelon, the theater commander establishes command relationships. These relationships are responsive to the needs of the theater of operation commander and are unique to the environment in which the echelon is created. This operational-level echelon may be a numbered army, a designated corps, or any other Army organization that meets the needs of the JFC. The Army component designs the operational-level echelon to maximize unity of effort, to allow flexibility in employing subordinate echelons, and to effect a rapid response to changes in friendly and enemy situations. As the theater expands, the CINC may--

  • Separate the Army's operations and support functions.

  • Designate the ASCC as a support headquarter, with OPCON of Army support organizations.

  • Maintain control of major maneuver forces, or put maneuver forces under OPCON of subordinate joint commanders.


The JFC's staff maintains joint communications interfaces through the JCCC. The ASCC's communications staff participates in theater joint and multinational communications network planning and management through its interface with the JCCC. In cases where the ASCC provides the bulk of the joint force headquarters staffing, the ASCC may be required to operate an integrated JCCC/ASCC communications management center. Key duties center on network management of voice, data, and video systems signal interoperability. Frequency and COMSEC management are also key duties. Joint Pub 6-05.1 provides a detailed description of JCCC organization and functions.


IEW is the commander's key to victory on a battlefield and to success in MOOTW. Intelligence enables commanders to focus, leverage, and protect the combat power and resources at their disposal to win decisively on the modern battlefield and succeed in endeavors short of war.


Army MI is commander-driven, synchronized, disseminated, split-based, and tactically tailored.


The commander drives the intelligence effort. He focuses the intelligence system by clearly designating his PIR, targeting requirements, and priorities. He ensures that the intelligence efforts are employed fully and synchronized with maneuver and fire support. He demands that the intelligence battlefield operating systems provide needed intelligence in the correct form.


The G2/S2 synchronizes intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations to ensure the commander receives the intelligence he needs, in the form he can use it, in time to influence the decision-making process. Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps IEW operations tied to the commander's critical decisions and concept of operations.


Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the simultaneous broadcast of near real-time intelligence from collectors and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders at all echelons to simultaneously receive the same intelligence, thereby, providing a common picture of the battlefield. It allows commanders to skip echelons and pull intelligence directly from the echelon broadcasting it.


Split-based intelligence operations provide deploying tactical commanders with high-resolution intelligence until their organic intelligence collection assets are employed. These operations augment organic intelligence production and employ collection and analysis elements from all echelons--national to tactical--to support bases from which they can operate against the target area.

Tactically Tailored

In force-projection operations, the commander tailors IEW support for each contingency, based on the mission and availability of resources. He must decide which key intelligence personnel and equipment to deploy early and when to phase in his remaining MI assets. The ASCC serves as the intelligence integration headquarters for the Army operational-level commander. The ASCC must have timely intelligence on the enemy, weather, and terrain; the conditions of the AOR; the civil population; and related environmental factors. The collection of information and the production and dissemination of intelligence are continuing processes during peacetime as well as during war.


The ASCC processes and refines intelligence information from many sources to the degree of resolution necessary to support theater army operations. Sources include the Army, the US command's JIC, DIA, CIA, NSA, other services, allied forces intelligence agencies, and other federal intelligence investigative and law enforcement agencies. These sources produce intelligence information on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs of the armed forces of foreign nations and other force, they may sponsor. The ASCC accomplishes his intelligence mission through the ACE.

The intelligence support elements (ISE) of the MI organization provide 24-hour liaison with the US Army; with joint, multinational, and allied military organizations with intelligence services; and with US corps. These liaison elements assist supported organizations in identifying IEW requirements, establishing priorities, and interfacing directly with the operational-level MI organization. The ISEs serve as extensions of the ACE and are collocated with the supported organization. These elements provide a mechanism for US and allied commands to request information on the enemy.

The ISEs facilitate the production and exchange of intelligence, as well as the coordination for EW support, to include civil broadcast jamming. ISEs also work with unit intelligence officers and assist with intelligence input to operational planning, situation and target development, and IPB. These support elements are located at such distances from the ACE that they operate independently. They respond to the needs of their counterpart agencies and commands at least as often as they respond to the needs of the ACE.

Operational-level MI organizations support operational planning at ASCC level. This planning provides predictive intelligence as the ASCC link to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict intelligence support, intelligence asset management, deep targeting priorities, and SOF operations conducted by subordinate units.

Direction and Coordination

The CINC provides overall direction and coordination of the intelligence effort of assigned forces. Through the ACE, the ASCC maintains the means of executing his intelligence function. However, the theater commander may establish an intelligence organization to perform theater intelligence functions. When established, this organization also provides the ASCC with the intelligence information required to supplement the component's organic intelligence capability. In war, Army operational-level commanders concentrate on several specific areas of intelligence to facilitate military combat operations. These include--

  • Identifying enemy capabilities and likely COAs that could affect future major operations.

  • Targeting specific enemy commanders and echelons for deception.

  • Determining the best way to protect friendly vulnerabilities and exploit enemy weaknesses.

  • Updating the PIR.

  • Using all sources of intelligence efficiently by integrating collection assets to produce operationally useful products.

Operational Protection

The commander uses the entire intelligence system to support force protection. The intelligence system is active and proactive, identifying, locating, and targeting an enemy's ability to target and affect friendly forces. Force protection intelligence products--

  • Identify and counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities.

  • Assess friendly vulnerabilities from the enemy's perspective.

  • Identify the enemy's perception of friendly centers of gravity and how he will attack them or influence them.

  • Identify risks to the force.

  • Identify potential countermeasures to deny enemy access to friendly critical areas.

  • Contribute to threat avoidance once the risk is identified.

  • Enable the commander to plan for both passive and active OPSEC, deception, and other security/ measures.

With this intelligence, the commander decides which countermeasures he must use to shield his intentions, present false images to the enemy commander, and protect his force.


CI operations counteract foreign intelligence and terrorist threats to the friendly force. Their specialty is support to force protection.

Rear Area Operations

IEW contributes to the rear battle by helping to identify, analyze, wargame, and provide early warning of potential threats to the friendly rear area. IEW also contributes by identifying terrain that supports friendly rear area operations.


In war, the CINC may designate the ASCC to have a predominately support focus. In this role, the ASCC has a number of logistics and support responsibilities. The ASCC may also have support responsibilities for other US and allied forces as a result of established agreements or as assigned by the CINC. The ASCC provides primary support within the theater through subordinate groups, brigades, and commands specifically organized and allocated to accomplish the theater support mission. The ASCC maintains organizational flexibility by tailoring the type and number of support units to the mission requirements and by planning for the expansion of the support capability. Some specific support requirements the ASCC commander executes are base development; engineer support; replacement training; support; reception, staging, and onward movement; and reconstitution.

Base Development

The ASCC role in base development is key in the operational support capability because it focuses on long-term support. The ASCC is responsible for a portion of the joint sustainment base (LOCs, ports, bases airfields, and units responsible for operating each). The CINC assigns the Army's portion of the sustainment base.

Engineer Support

The ASCC supplies engineer support to provide the facilities needed in the COMMZ to receive, stage, move, and support combat forces. The ASCC must ensure that his LOCs remain open. He must either establish or maintain his supporting base and provide engineer support to other services. Engineers in the theater give priority to general engineering and survivability functions.

Replacement Training

The ASCC provides the means to train replacements. Normally, he establishes a training center that is the focal point for regeneration. The center trains replacements and assigns them individually or as crews, squads, and platoons. Resource constraints may require the commander to delay the training of replacements.

Responsiveness and Suitability

The ASCC ensures that support is suitable and responsive to the priorities of the CINC and to subordinate commands. At this level ASCC resource management (prioritizing, stockpiling, and so forth) has a long-range perspective. The ASCC forms a logistics operations cell to orchestrate elements of the support process. This element ensures that current priorities, intentions, and operations support the requirements of the ARFOR in theater. This organization balances the needs for current operations against the needs for future operations and advises the ASCC accordingly.

Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement

The ASCC is normally responsible for reception and onward movement of Army forces. As the ASCC conducts reception operations, he receives forces at aerial ports and seaports and equips, fuels, fixes, arms, moves, decontaminates, if required, and protects these forces as they pass through the support base to their tactical assembly area. Operational-level army logistics commanders, support elements, and advance parties for incoming units must ensure that augmentation forces are equipped rapidly and deployed to designated marshaling areas. Incoming forces are required to perform many of their support functions, receiving only minimum-essential services and support from the ASCC. Reception operations may begin before hostilities start and continue until hostilities cease. Reception operations and support operations are similar and occur concurrently.


The ASCC plans and conducts operational-and tactical-level reconstitution operations. FM 100-9 defines reconstitution as "extraordinary actions taken by commanders to restore combat-attrited units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources." The ASCC is concerned primarily with the regeneration option of reconstitution--the rebuilding of a unit through the large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; the establishment of C², and the conduct of mission-essential training for the newly rebuilt unit. The ASCC must ensure time and resources are allotted to conduct reconstitution operations. The ASCC draws from the CONUS base, using intertheater and intratheater assets based upon the mission of the JFC. Reconstitution is normally done in preparation for future operations in the operational sequence. If regeneration of a unit is undertaken, the ASCC must understand the effects those operations may have on established support operations. Reconstitution may adversely affect both support and reception operations.

A reconstitution planning cell is located in the ASCC operations section. Assignment of this task to the G3 (operations) section reveals that reconstitution is first and foremost an operational decision. This cell plans for the reconstitution operations in preparation for future operations. The ASCC employs the cell as part of the reconstitution assessment and evaluation team (AET) that performs liaison functions and assists the ASCC in implementing detailed reconstitution efforts. The reconstitution planning cell may be employed as part of the C² of the reconstitution task force.

The ASCC synchronizes reconstitution with all other functions within the theater. Properly planned and executed reconstitution actions do not detract from combat efforts but enhance them. In the offense, well-executed reconstitution efforts maintain the momentum of the attack by prolonging the unit's arrival at its culminating point. In the defense, reconstitution preserves combat power potential and allows the operational-level commander greater freedom of action.


Upon successful termination of combat operations, the deployed forces transition to a period of postconflict operations prior to redeployment. This transition may occur even if residual combat operations are occurring in other parts of the theater of operations. Anticipation and early planning for postconflict operations eases the transition process. The JFC must determine the conditions to which the operations area is to be returned.

According to the CINC's directives, the ASCC must oversee the orderly transition of authority to appropriate US, international, interagency, or host nation agencies. The ASCC and subordinate commanders emphasize those activities that reduce postconflict or postcrisis turmoil and help stabilize the situation. Commanders must also address the decontamination, disposal, and destruction of war materiel; the removal and destruction of unexploded ordnance; and the responsibility for demining operations. The consolidation of friendly and available enemy mine field reports is critical to this mission. Additionally, the ASCC must be prepared to provide health service support (HSS), emergency restoration of utilities, support to social needs of the indigenous population, and other humanitarian activities as required.

The US historical perspective Upon the successful termination of past conflicts has been rapid redeployment and demobilization. Redeployment and demobilization should occur at a pace that does not disrupt the ability of the ASCC to execute continuing missions. The successful termination of war activities leads to transition to the state of peacetime. Still, the possibility always exists that resumption of hostilities may occur. Thus, units must rapidly convert to a wartime posture and be prepared to conduct wartime operations. During this period, force protection is vital in order to prevent undue harm to US forces.

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