FM 1-111 Appendix C

Appendix C

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

This appendix serves as a planning guide by which commanders and staffs may employ their aviation forces in an nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment. Aviation forces, typically, may be the first to encounter NBC conditions on the battlefield. Aviation brigades can expect to conduct all or part of their operations in an NBC environment. Therefore, brigade commanders must develop an internal organization that not only will support the unit's mission but also its operations in such an environment. To accomplish the mission, commanders must prepare their soldiers to fight and win in an NBC environment. They must also train their personnel to exploit friendly nuclear strikes once the threat employs NBC weapons.

SECTION I. NBC Threat

C-1. THREAT DOCTRINE AND PREPAREDNESS

a. The NBC threat can exist anywhere, including Third World countries that have an NBC capability. Threat employment doctrine stresses offensive operations; it emphasizes the use nuclear and chemical weapons to win. Threat leaders know these NBC weapons may alter tactics, advance rates, force and power ratios, and logistics. Threat can produce and stockpile NBC weapons; they can employ them with a variety of delivery systems.

b. Threats classify nuclear and chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction when relating them to troop protective measures. However, they consider chemical weapons as conventional when relating them to employment doctrine. Threats have many options for employing nuclear and chemical weapons. Thus, any future conflict involving threats should be considered likely to include employing NBC weapons.

c. Threats have developed and fielded a large inventory of defensive equipment; they have well-trained chemical personnel. As part of their overall preparedness, threats conduct extensive, realistic training. However, NBC warfare imposes the same constraints on threat soldiers as it does on US soldiers. Individual protective clothing and psychological factors also degrade the performance of both threat and US soldiers in an NBC environment.

C-2. NUCLEAR WARFARE

a. Threats have a wide range of systems that can deliver nuclear weapons. As illustrated in Figure C-1, no area on the battlefield is free from the threat of a nuclear strike. Threats have stated priorities for nuclear strikes. They include the following in the order of priority:

Enemy nuclear delivery means, aircraft, field artillery, missiles, and rockets.
Airfields.
Division and higher level headquarters.
Defensive positions.
Reserves and troop concentrations.
Supply installations, especially nuclear ammunition storage points.
Command, control, and communication (C³) systems.

Figure C-1. Range of threat delivery systems

b. Aviation brigade elements are not directly targeted for a nuclear strike. However, the brigade's mission may place elements in an area where they would become a target for nuclear weapons.

C-3. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

a. Biological warfare is the intentional use of biological agents to cause death or disease in people, animals, or plants. Examples of these living organisms-called germs-such as viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Germs can be dispersed by artillery, rockets, aircraft, sprays, vectors, or covert operations. The possibility of biological warfare exists even though treaties prohibit it. US policy is never to engage in biological warfare.

b. The Army classifies a biological agent as any living organism, toxin, or other agents of biological origin that can incapacitate, seriously injure, or kill personnel. The threat considers toxins to be chemical agents. The agents covered by biological treaties are bacteriological agents.

C-4. CHEMICAL WARFARE

a. Some threats classify chemical agents in six major types: nerve, blood, blister, choking, psychochemical, and irritant. The United States classifies chemical agents by physiological effects and/or military use in three major categories: nerve, incapacitating, and riot control. In a nuclear war, chemicals may be used to complement nuclear weapons. Normally, chemicals would be employed after a nuclear strike when protective equipment has been damaged and personnel are physiologically weak. A combination of agents can be used to complicate medical treatment and compound the effects of individual chemical agents. FM 8-9 describes the effect that agents have on the human body. Chemicals do not require pinpoint targeting because of the potential for contaminating a wide area downwind of the attack.

b. Threat targeting priorities for chemical agent attack are nearly identical to threat priorities for nuclear strikes. Threats may target airfield and rear area lines of communication (LOCs) to disrupt US resupply and reinforcement operations. However, they might keep these points intact for later use by their forces. Threats may target frontline troops-such as reconnaissance or attack forces-with nonpersistent agents. The agents may be delivered by multiple rocket launchers. Threats may also target the flanks with persistent agents to act as obstacles and the intermediate rear area with semipersistent attacks to delay the retrograde of friendly forces.

SECTION II. Nuclear Weapons

C-5. THERMAL RADIATION EFFECTS

The energy released from a nuclear detonation interacts immediately with the surrounding air. Almost instantly with the detonation, an intense light pulse is emitted. Also, the air is heated to thousands of degrees Celsius, vaporizing even the unreacted bomb material. The sphere of super-heated air is called the fireball; the heat and light are referred to as thermal radiation. Thermal radiation will continue to be emitted from the detonation for several seconds to tens of seconds, depending on the yield of the weapon.

a. Heat Effects. Heat can affect personnel as well as equipment, supplies, and the environment.

(1) Skin burns.

(a) Unprotected or exposed skin is susceptible to thermal radiation burns. These may be first-, second-, or third-degree burns. First-degree burns are similar to a sunburn; they involve injury to the epidermis. In second-degree burns, the epidermal layer is destroyed but some viable tissue remains. These burns usually form blisters. In third-degree burns, the thick epidermis and underlying layer, or dermis, are destroyed. These burns have a dark brown or charred appearance.

(b) The severity of the burns depends on the yield of the weapon, proximity of personnel to ground zero, and level of individual protection. For example, from a 1-kiloton (kt) explosion, unprotected skin would receive third-degree burns at 600 meters; second-degree burns at 800 meters; and first-degree burns at 1,100 meters. Wearing clothing that does not leave the skin exposed reduces the chance of severe burns. However, the dark color of the battle dress uniform causes it to absorb more thermal radiation; therefore, early warning and defensive measures must begin as soon as a nuclear threat is discovered. Nomex flight suits somewhat protect aircrews from skin burns.

(2) Materiel damages. Thermal radiation is hazardous to ground support equipment and supplies as well as personnel. Fuel stored in blivets is especially vulnerable. The black rubber in the blivets will absorb thermal radiation and may become heated and hardened. The blast may also puncture or stress the blivets, causing them to leak. Burning rubber, leaves, or grass might ignite the fuel, causing explosions and fires. Personnel (fuel handlers) at forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) must protect the blivets by burying them or covering them with tarpaulins.

(3) Fires. The heat from thermal radiation may cause fire storms in forests and urban areas. These fires may affect aviation units directly if they are in the path of the storm. Fires will affect aviation units indirectly if they are used to evacuate ground units. Ground personnel may be unable to evacuate such areas with their ground transportation assets because of obstacles such as fallen trees.

b. Light Effects. Light mainly affects personnel. The effects of light on aircrews range from flash blindness to retinal burns.

(1) Flash blindness.

(a) The retina may receive more visible light from a fireball than is needed for light perception but not enough to cause permanent damage. Visual pigments of the photoreceptors bleach out; vision is briefly impaired. This effect is called flash blindness; it is sometimes referred to as dazzle. Flash blindness is more of a hazard at night than during the day, because the pupil is larger and admits more light at night. How flash blindness affects military operations depends on the tasks of affected personnel. While the temporary loss of vision may be hazardous to ground soldiers, it could be fatal for aircrews.

(b) The severity of flash blindness is related directly to the yield of the weapon, distance between the fireball and personnel, and atmospheric conditions. Low visibility will reduce the magnitude of the visible light pulse. In the daytime, a 1-kt weapon could cause flash blindness from a distance of 6 kms. At night, the same weapon would produce flash blindness from a distance of 51 kms.

(2) Retinal burns. An excessive amount of light focused on the retina can cause retinal burns. The intense light burns the photoreceptors and causes a blind spot. The damage is permanent, because photoreceptors cannot be replaced. The degree of incapacitation would vary. For example, a person looking directly at the explosion could suffer destruction of the fovea centralis and be considered functionally blind. Another person with a burn in the periphery of the retina might not be aware of the blind spot. Soldiers facing a 1-kt detonation could receive retinal burns from as far away as 6.7 kms.

C-6. BLAST EFFECTS

The rapid expansion of the fireball creates a wave of compressed air. This is referred to as a shock wave or a blast wave. The blast wave causes damage by two kinds of pressure: dynamic pressure, referred to as winds; and static overpressure, referred to as overpressure. The compressed gases produced by a nuclear explosion expand outward in all directions from the point of detonation. This wave travels at about the speed of sound.

a. Dynamic Pressure.

(1) Wind velocity. The wind velocity can range from a few miles per hour (m/hr) to hundreds of m/hr. The velocity depends on the yield of the weapon, height of the burst, and distance from the point of detonation. The wind velocity decreases with distance. For example, a 100 m/hr wind occurs about 10 kms from a 1-megaton (Mt) detonation, 6.5 kms from a 300-kt detonation, or 1.5 kms from a 5-kt detonation. However, when a nuclear burst first detonates, the observer is unable to predict the wind force because he does not know the yield of the weapon or the location of ground zero.

(2) Drag forces. The winds cause damage by drag forces. Drag forces cause buildings to collapse and vehicles to overturn; they create missiles from flying debris such as rocks, sticks, or glass fragments. They also hurl exposed personnel against structures and solid objects; they blow down trees. For nuclear weapons, the time from the initial blinding flash of light until the blast wave reaches the area can be several seconds or longer. For large-yield weapons at great distances, the time can be longer than 30 seconds. Thus, personnel will have some time to seek shelter before the blast wave hits.

(3) Wind phases. Winds have both a positive phase and a negative phase. During the positive phase, winds travel outward from the point of detonation. As the fireball rises, a slight vacuum is created. This will cause the winds to reverse and blow back toward the detonation. The velocities of this reverse wind are mild compared to the positive phase. The reversal of the winds will keep missiles in the air longer and possibly cause more damage. The missiles may fall back to the ground and settle after the positive phase; they are then picked up again by the negative phase. Because of the turmoil, ground troops may not even notice the negative phase. Aircrews may notice it more because wind reversal will create more air instability for them to overcome.

(4) Aerodynamics. The effects of high winds on fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have been studied in wind tunnels and in open-air testing. Nuclear blast winds have the same effects on aerodynamic surfaces and airframes as any other type of high wind. Nuclear weapons can produce enormous wind velocities, extreme turbulence, and wind shear. The winds persist longer than those produced by conventional munitions. Rotary-wing aircraft may experience sudden yaw, pitch, roll, and lift changes. Extreme effects can include blade flapping and bending, mast bumping, loss of tail rotor effectiveness, flameout, and airframe crushing.

b. Static Overpressure.

(1) Overpressure force. The compressed gases create a force that causes the ambient air pressure to increase; this is overpressure. A conventional high-explosive munition also has an overpressure effect; however, it is not as powerful and lasts only microseconds. The nuclear explosion creates overpressure that can be hundreds of times greater than the ambient air pressure. As with the winds, the overpressure decreases as the distance from the point of detonation increases.

(2) Aircrew injury. Wind velocity and overpressure are interrelated. For example, the wind velocity is about 35 miles per hour at 1 pound per square inch (psi) overpressure and about 160 miles per hour at 5 psi. At overpressures of .5 psi and greater, windscreens begin to shatter and flying fragments can injure aircrews. At 35 miles per hour, glass fragments are a significant hazard to the eyes and the throat. At higher pressures, the wind velocity can cause casualties from fragments penetrating the flight suit and skin. Also, with the windscreen gone, external missiles may enter the cockpit and cause injuries. The best protection available to aircrews is receiving an early warning by radio. Thus, the aircrew can land in the lowest terrain possible; they can place the rear of the aircraft in the direction of the expected blast. This method increases the aircrew's survivability. The distance from the blast determines the degree of damage to the aircraft.

(3) Airframe damage.

(a) Airframes are vulnerable to overpressure effects. Glass-Plexiglas, safety Plexiglas, or safety glass-begins to shatter at .5 to 1 psi overpressure. At .5 to 2 psi, larger windows that face the point of detonation shatter first. As the overpressure increases (2 to 5 psi), all windows shatter. Overpressure may cause glass to implode initially. Then the positive wind phase creates missiles of the glass fragments.

(b) Overpressure initially affects only the side facing the detonation. However, the blast wave envelops the aircraft within microseconds, exerting forces on the opposite side as well. The sequential occurrence creates buckling and twisting forces, resulting in skin wrinkling and internal frame stresses.

(c) Light damage to the airframe, other than glass, begins to occur at 3 to 5 psi overpressure. On rotary-wing aircraft, the tail boom weakens and may undergo slight separation. Subsequent severe flight maneuvers may result in tail boom failure. On all aircraft, the fuselage and internal frames undergo substantial stresses and skin panels rupture. Longerons, stringers, and frames may fail at these pressures.

C-7. NUCLEAR RADIATION EFFECTS

Nuclear radiation consists of all types of ionizing electromagnetic and particulate radiation; specifically, alpha, beta, neutron, and gamma. FM 8-9 describes the effects of each type of radiation on the human body. Nuclear radiation travels outward in all directions from the detonation point. The effects of nuclear radiation are categorized as initial and residual.

a. Initial Effects. The initial effects are those manifested within 60 seconds after detonation. They consist of all types of electromagnetic and particulate ionizing radiation. For small yields, the initial radiation will cause numerous personnel casualties. However, an aircraft flown close enough to the nuclear detonation for the aircrew to receive incapacitating dosages would probably not survive the blast damage anyway. This initial radiation remains a concern for aircrews on the ground and personnel in FARPs, aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) units, and headquarters.

b. Residual Effects. The residual effects are those that remain hazardous after 60 seconds. The most important residual effects are fallout and induced radiation or neutron-induced gamma activity.

(1) Fallout. The fireball continues to grow after a nuclear detonation, stabilizing within several minutes. Because hot air rises, it also gains altitude as it grows. The rising and cooling of the fireball create an area of low pressure directly beneath the fireball. If the point of detonation is close to the earth's surface, then dirt and debris are drawn up into the fireball. Vaporized bomb material then mixes with the dirt and debris. The mixture of radiological dirt and debris-called fallout-begins to fall back to earth and may cover hundreds of kms as it travels downwind. Fallout can result in significant radiation dose-rate levels and communication blackouts from large quantities of dust and debris in the atmosphere. Large particles may also cause structural damage and foreign object damage (FOD) to aircraft.

(2) Induced radiation or neutron-induced gamma activity. Neutron radiation occurs only during the initial nuclear reaction. However, neutrons can cause other elements to become radioactive. The ground directly below the point of detonation will most likely become radioactive. This induced pattern-usually not exceeding 4 kms in diameter-will present a significant radiation hazard for ground personnel for 2 to 5 days after the burst. The extent of the hazard can be determined by reconnaissance or survey teams.

c. Radiation Exposure and Sickness. Aircrews exposed to radiation may exhibit certain symptoms. The onset of radiation symptoms, their severity, and their duration generally depend on the amount of radiation the individual receives and variables such as health, previous exposure, and injury. Before directing aircrews into areas of suspected or known radiation contamination, aviation commanders must evaluate the essentiality of the mission. Aircrews can use radiac meters and dosimeters in aircraft to measure radiation total dose and dose rates. Commanders can then evaluate the effects of aircrew exposure and anticipate aircrew ability to perform future missions. Figure C-2 shows the biological effects of a range of radiation doses. The table also shows the effects of mid-range doses on performance. An individual exposed to radiation may have alternating periods of performance degradation, combat effectiveness, and combat ineffectiveness. For example, an undemanding task in the 500- to 800-cGy range may cause an individual's performance to be degraded initially for up to 2 days; then the individual briefly regains combat effectiveness; thereafter, the individual's performance is again degraded and deteriorates until he becomes combat ineffective.

(1) Radiation exposure. Radiation exposure considerations are much the same for aviation personnel as for ground personnel. However, the aviation commander has the more difficult job of determining when an aircrew becomes ineffective from radiation exposure. FM 101-31-1 contains additional information on radiation effects.

(2) Radiation sickness. Aviators must be alert to symptoms that impair their ability to fly. Leaders should observe their personnel closely to detect behavior that may necessitate grounding them. Initial symptoms of radiation sickness-such as nausea, fatigue, and listlessness-may mimic those of other illnesses. Flight surgeons should monitor radiation exposure and provide appropriate guidance to the commander.

Table E-1. Expected response to radiation

Free-in-Air Dose Range cGy (rads)	Initial Symptoms	Performance (Mid-Range Dose)	Medical Care and Disposition
0 to 70	From 6 to 12 hrs: none to slight incidence of transient headache and nausea; vomiting in up to 5 percent of personnel in upper part of dose range.	Combat-effective.	No medical care; return to duty.
70 to 150	From 2 to 20 hrs: transient mild nausea and vomiting in 5 to 30 percent of personnel.	Combat-effective.	No medical care; return to duty; no deaths anticipated.
150 to 300	From 2 hrs to 2 days: transient mild to moderate nausea and vomiting in 20 to 70 percent of personnel; mild to moderate fatigability and weakness in 25 to 60 percent of personnel.	DT: PD from 4 hrs until recovery. UT: PD from 6 hrs to 1 day. PD from 6 wks to recovery.	In 3 to 5 wks: medical care for 10 to 50 percent. At low end of range, death may occur for more than 5 percent; at high end, death may occur more than 10 percent; survivors return to duty.
300 to 500	From 2 hours to 3 days: transient moderate nausea and vomiting in 50 to 90 percent of personnel; moderate fatigability in 50 to 90 percent of personnel at high end of range.	DT: PD from 3 hrs until death or recovery. UT: PD from 4 hrs to 2 days. PD from 2 wks until death or recovery.	In 2 to 5 wks: medical care for 20 to 60 percent. At low end of range, death may occur for more than 10 percent; at high end, death may occur for more than 50 percent; survivors return to duty.
500 to 800	Within first hour; moderate to severe nausea, vomiting, fatigability, and weakness in 80 to 100 percent of personnel.	DT: PD from 1 hr to 3 wks. CI from 3 wks until death. UT: PD from 2 hrs to 2 days. PD from 7 days to 4 wks. CI from 4 wks until death.	In 10 days to 5 wks: medical care for 50 to 100 percent. At low end of range, death may occur for more than 50 percent in 6 wks; at high end, death may occur for 90 percent in 3 to 5 wks.
800 t0 3,000	Within first 3 mins; severe nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness, and disorientation; moderate to severe fluid imbalance and headache.	DT: PD from 45 mins to 3 hrs. CI from 3 hrs to death. UT: PD from 1 to 7 hrs. CI from 7 hrs to 1 day. CI from 1 to 4 days. CI from 4 days until death.	Medical care from 3 minutes until death. 1,000 cGy: 100 percent deaths in 2 to 3 weeks. 3,000 cGy; 100 percent deaths in 5 to 10 days.
3,000 to 8,000	Within first 3 mins; severe nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness, disorientation, fluid imbalance, headache, and collapse.	DT: CI from 3 to 35 mins. PD from 35 to 70 mins. CI from 70 mins until death. UT: CI from 3 to 20 mins. PD from 20 to 80 mins. Cl from 80 mins until death.	Medical care from 3 minutes until death. 4,500 cGy: 100 percent deaths in 2 to 3 days.
Greater than 8,000	Within first 3 mins: severe and prolonged nausea, vomiting, fatigability, weakness, dizziness, disorientation, fluid imbalance, headache, and collapse.	DT and UT: CI from 3 mins until death.	Medical care needed immediately. 8,000 cGy: 100 percent deaths in 1 day.

LEGEND:

CI-combat ineffective (less than 25 percent performance)
DT-demanding task
PD-performance degraded (25 to 75 percent performance)
UT-undemanding task

C-8. ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE EFFECTS

The electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects is a wave of electromagnetic energy produced by a nuclear detonation when gamma rays make contact with the atmosphere. The wave occurs immediately after nuclear detonation and travels outward in all directions. EMP presents no significant biomedical hazard to humans. However, it can damage electronic components. Because EMP is a form of electromagnetic energy, it will follow the path of least resistance into electrical equipment.

a. Component and Aircraft Systems Damage.

(1) Component damage. EMP can affect any electrical component. A sudden surge of EMP will cause overvoltage, shorting out wiring and transistors. Vacuum tubes may be somewhat affected by EMP, but more energy is required to destroy them. EMP can enter through the casing of radios and destroy them. It can destroy circuitry even with radios turned off and antennas disconnected. The severity of the damage depends greatly on component design. Testing continues to determine the extent to which a system can be disabled by EMP damage. Not every electrical component will be destroyed by EMP. Some components may only be temporarily disabled.

(2) Aircraft systems damage. Aircrews should know which aircraft electrical systems are critical and how failure of those systems will affect the flight. For example, some aircraft instruments may be disabled, radios or navigational aids may not work, or visual or targeting aids may fail.

b. Communication Net Impairment. EMP will affect the nets of the aviation brigade. Because the brigade is highly mobile and dispersed over a wide area, radio is the primary means of communication. Commanders must be prepared for EMP degradation by training with backup units and alternate means of communication. FM 101-31-1 contains additional information on electrical effects.

SECTION III. Biological Agents

C-9. LIVING ORGANISMS

Classical biological agents include those causing the disease of anthrax, plague, smallpox, botulism, and typhoid fever. The agents causing these diseases are living organisms that usually require a host body to mature. Because the effects of these agents are usually delayed, a natural outbreak may be difficult to differentiate from a covert attack. Some agents are highly persistent, while others have a short life span outside the host body.

C-10. TOXINS

Toxins are poisonous chemical substances produced by living organisms. They are found in nature but only in small quantities. Microorganisms, plants, animals, reptiles, and insects produce toxins. By weight, most toxins are thousands of times more toxic than standard chemical agents.

a. Common Toxins. Some commonly known lethal toxins that microorganisms produce are botulism, staphylococcus, and tetanus. Other toxins are produced by poison ivy, snakes, poisonous frogs, bees, spiders, and scorpions. Their toxicity ranges from extremely lethal to simple harassment such as an ant bite.

b. Yellow Rain. Tricothecene toxin is also known as yellow rain. T2-as it is commonly called-is a by-product of the respiration process of an organism that grows on decomposing grains. Individuals exposed to large doses of T2 soon experience an onset of violent itching, vomiting, dizziness, and distorted vision. Within a short time, they vomit blood-tinged material and later larger quantities of blood. The affected individuals die within hours, manifesting shock-like symptoms. Personnel may be exposed to smaller doses directly or indirectly through consumption of contaminated water or food. These individuals experience a slower onset of similar symptoms along with bloody diarrhea. Many die eventually of dehydration. Survivors may take several months to heal.

c. Botulism. Another highly lethal toxin is the by-product produced by clostridium botulinum. This agent causes botulism and is extremely lethal to humans. It is several times more lethal than any of the standard chemical agents.

C-11. EFFECTS

Mild exposures to biological agents can severely degrade performance. Many of the classical diseases have delayed effects, whereas the effects of most toxins are immediate. Toxins can create area contamination as well as downwind and vertical vapor hazards. Medical personnel, especially flight surgeons, must constantly monitor aviation personnel to detect unusual symptoms that may indicate exposure to a biological agent. FM 3-9 and FM 8-9 contain detailed information about the effects of biological agents.

C-12. PROTECTION

Commanders must be prepared to protect against biological agents used by an enemy. The United States has immunization programs for many of these agents to help protect personnel against the diseases.

SECTION IV. Chemical Agents

C-13. NERVE AGENTS

a. Effects.

(1) Even extremely low dosages of nerve agents can disable personnel. The dosages can degrade the ability of aircrews to operate aircraft and ground personnel to support aviation operations. Nerve agents will severely disable personnel in any occupation requiring dexterity and high-mental function. Nerve agent exposure is cumulative, so repeated exposure to low dosages will result in a cumulative increase in personnel disabilities.

(2) Nerve agents are lethal in either vapor or liquid form; they can be employed as nonpersistent or persistent agents. They cause casualties through any portal of entry: respiratory tract, skin, eyes, or mouth. (They usually are ingested by mouth with contaminated food or water.) After aircrews have flown into a vapor cloud, within one two breaths, they can inhale sufficient agents to cause initial convulsive movements of extremities within 30 seconds; progressively, to collapse and become unconsciousness within 1 minute; and to experience flaccid paralysis, respiratory failure, and die within 2 to 3 minutes. When agents are ingested in contaminated food or water, symptoms may vary or be delayed.

(3) Low dosages of a nerve agent also will cause miosis. Symptoms of miosis are pinpointed pupils, blurred vision, and eye pain. The victim cannot adapt to night vision because the dark adaptation of the rods in the peripheral portion of the retina is restricted. Miosis may last for hours or several days. Full recovery may not occur for weeks. Symptoms of miosis may be evident in the absence of any other nerve agent symptom.

(a) The absence of miosis does not exclude nerve agent poisoning, especially in cases of ingestion or skin exposure. Miosis may occur almost immediately after exposure, or it can be delayed 30 minutes or longer after a mild exposure. When drinking with the M24 mask on, personnel must shut their eyes until the mask is cleared. This will lessen the chance of the eyes absorbing tiny doses of nerve agents. Eye drops may be administered to relieve pain, but they do not return vision to normal. Recovery time depends on individual reactions. Near vision, night adaptation, far vision, and accommodation will slowly return to normal in varying degrees.

(b) During bright daylight, the only effect of miosis on vision may be dimness of vision. During periods of low visibility and at night, dusk, and dawn, the impact of miosis may be significant. Aircrews may not be able to fly.

(c) The impact of miosis on personnel is not limited to aircrews. Ground support personnel in air traffic services (ATS) and AD units and C² facilities will also be affected by miosis. This degradation of support capability will affect all aviation missions.

b. Antidotes. The nerve agent antidote treatment available for soldiers is the nerve agent antidote kit (NAAK). Each NAAK includes one atropine autoinjector and one pralidoxime chloride autoinjector. STP 21-1-SMCT, FM 8-285, and FM 21-11 describe the procedure for administering the nerve agent antidote.

(1) The NAAK will keep a nerve agent victim alive; every soldier must be thoroughly trained in its use. Nerve agents are powerful; they require powerful antidotes to keep the victim alive. The NAAK must not be used on a person unless he has actually been exposed to a nerve agent. However, some personnel may panic during the initial encounter of chemical warfare on the battlefield. Many symptoms of other chemical agents, especially toxins, overlap nerve agent symptoms. Therefore, soldiers may misdiagnose the symptoms.

(2) The effects of atropine and pralidoxime chloride on aircrews are being studied. Serious side effects may impact on a person's fitness for flying duty. When an adequate dose of atropine is injected for lifesaving measures, dryness of the mouth is a side effect. This side effect will also occur even if no agent is present in the body and atropine is injected. Three autoinjections may cause hallucinations. One autoinjection probably will not seriously degrade an aircrew's ability to function. Some side effects of atropine are denial of illness, loss of insight, and loss of consciousness. Other symptoms include perceptual difficulty, judgment and memory impairment, confusion, short attention span, slurred speech, and restlessness. These reactions are also similar to the symptoms experienced from incapacitating agents such as psychochemicals, cocaine, and cannabis.

(3) The current nerve agent pretreatment drug is pyridostigmine. The pretreatment is taken every 8 hours. The unit commander will determine when personnel will begin taking the pretreatment. FM 8-285 contains pretreatment procedures.

C-14. BLOOD AGENTS

a. Effects. Blood agents are nonpersistent agents. They have an effective duration of from 10 minutes to 2 hours. Within one or two breaths, individuals can inhale a lethal dose of blood agents. Death may follow within 1 minute. Mild exposure will result in the same symptoms as those experienced from lack of oxygen. Soldiers who survive moderate to severe exposure may not be able to return to flying status for several weeks or longer. The damage to cells caused from lack of oxygen may result in persistent fatigue, irrationality, loss of coordination, vertigo, and headaches. One type of blood agent, CK, causes chronic bronchitis.

b. Antidotes. No current self-aid/buddy aid antidote exists for blood agents.

C-15. BLISTER AGENTS

Blister agents cause severe skin blisters and respiratory damage. These persistent chemical agents can cause injury in both liquid and vapor forms. These blisters damage the subdermal layers of skin and cell protein structure; the skin and cells take from weeks to months to heal. Very low concentrations of blister agents cause painful eye damage-to include conjunctivitis, edema of the lids, and a feeling of grit in the eye. In large concentration, mustard agents can cause permanent damage, corneal scars, or opacity. A tiny amount of liquid droplet (Lewisite or phosgene oxime) in the eyes may cause permanent injury or blindness. Blister agents cause systemic poisoning throughout the body and can impair performance. Some symptoms are blood pressure decrease, nausea, malaise, and dehydration. Blister agents are not usually lethal, but severe respiratory damage, secondary infection, or dehydration may cause death. FM 8-285 contains treatment procedures for blister agents.

C-16. CHOKING AGENTS

Choking agents are nonpersistent agents that can cause injury to unprotected personnel. The injury may result in mild eye irritation and damage to the lungs and respiratory tract. The initial choking effect may cause loss of aircraft control. In severe cases, membranes swell, the lungs fill up with fluids, and death results from a lack of oxygen. FM 8-285 contains treatment procedures for choking agents.

C-17. INCAPACITATING AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

Irritating agents and psychochemical agents employed by the threat are not usually lethal. They should not cause death unless personnel are exposed to much larger concentrations than normally would be employed on the battlefield. FM 3-9 describes these agents in detail. FM 8-285 describes the effects of these agents and treatment procedures.

C-18. PROTECTION

Even a mild exposure to agents may be fatal to aircrews, because aircraft control may be lost. Also, the long-term, systemic effects of agents and treatments can degrade performance, causing aircrews to be grounded. Flight surgeons must carefully monitor aircrews for symptoms of exposure to agents and advise the commander. When personnel are not wearing NBC protection and exposure to agents is suspected, they may be temporarily grounded and observed for symptoms. However, in the absence of actual symptoms, the tactical situation may preclude preventive grounding. Aircrews should wear full mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) 4 gear during flight; ground troops must also have adequate protection. Local commanders will make this decision based on METT-T and a risk analysis.

SECTION V. NBC Defense Fundamentals

C-19. CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE

Contamination avoidance-the first fundamental of NBC defense-means taking the appropriate action to reduce NBC hazards. The term avoidance does not necessarily mean aborting a mission or canceling an operation just because contamination is present. The factors of METT-T are considered for all operations, to include entering contaminated areas and preparing to encounter unknown contaminated areas. Soldiers go into hazardous areas only when necessary. Aviation brigades use the NBC warning and reporting system and reconnaissance, monitoring, and survey to help locate contaminated areas.

a. Contamination Transfer.

(1) All soldiers should understand how they and their equipment become contaminated and how contamination spreads to other personnel and equipment. Contamination refers to the deposit or absorption of hazards. A unit may be the target of a threat NBC attack, or the downwind hazard from a contaminated unit may cause agents to drift into another unit's area. Also, a unit may move or fly into contaminated areas from which aircraft can transport contaminated equipment or personnel.

(2) Rotary-wing aircraft can transfer contamination from the ground into the aircraft or vice versa. This transfer occurs when the rotor wash picks up dust, sand, leaves, or other contaminated debris. The debris or liquid droplets are then scattered throughout the aircraft. Some agents are like a fine spray. Although suspended in the air, they can settle on personnel or equipment like dew. Aircraft vibrations increase the settling of agents in remote areas of the airframe such as panel points or rivets. Also, the type of paint on the aircraft affects contamination. Alkyd-based paints absorb the agents like sponges. Newer paints are being developed, such as agent-resistant coatings, that resist chemical agent absorption.

b. Principles. The principles of contamination avoidance are applying passive defensive measures; warning and reporting; locating, identifying, and marking NBC hazards; limiting the spread of contaminants; and avoiding contaminants.

(1) Applying passive defensive measures. Passive defensive measures reduce the chance of being hit by an NBC attack or, if hit, the aftereffects of the attack. They are not direct reactions to a specific attack but rather are measures taken to reduce vulnerability to being targeted. Each unit must apply the principles of detection avoidance, dispersion, and training to protect personnel and materiel.

(a) Detection avoidance. Commanders must train their units in the principles of detection avoidance. If the Threat does not know the location of aircrews, it cannot target them for an NBC attack. Commanders should carefully choose unit positions and CP locations. They must ensure that their troops are protected as much as possible from Threat detection by using natural concealment, cover, and camouflage. In addition, aviation units can use air routes and firing positions that take advantage of natural vegetation and terrain features. These same principles apply to ground units.

(b) Dispersion. In some cases, the terrain will not be suitable for concealment. However, commanders can disperse their assets so that the unit presents a less lucrative target. By constantly varying the pattern of unit deployment, the commander avoids stereotypic patterns that allow the threat to identify the type of aviation unit being observed.

(c) Training. Units must train to survive initial NBC attacks and to continue their missions with minimal slow down. One goal of this training is to render threat weapons ineffective.

(2) Warning and reporting. Once an NBC attack has occurred and personnel have located an area that is contaminated or is threatened by downwind hazards, they must inform affected units without delay. Early warning will give personnel time to protect themselves against the hazard. The warning and the reporting of attacks are done by simple, standard messages with the NBC warning and reporting system (NBCWRS). The NBCWRS consists of standard reports, system management, and attack warnings. A chemical downwind message gives surface meteorological data so that personnel can prepare fresh chemical downwind hazard predictions. FM 3-3 shows report formats.

(a) Collection sources. NBC information is collected from numerous sources. It may be obtained from a direct attack on a unit or after an attack through reconnaissance, monitoring, and survey operations conducted by the aviation brigade or a subordinate unit. Units in attack or hazardous areas will forward monitoring reports.

(b) Observers. For nuclear weapons, only designated observers will automatically forward reports on burst parameters. Nondesignated observers collect the information and hold it until it is requested. The squadron commander may select several aircrews as designated aerial observers. Their mission-like that of ground observers-is to obtain nuclear burst information. Aviation units can obtain good visual data such as cloud parameters, approximate ground zero location, and crater size. However, the designated aerial observer team does not necessarily comprise the same personnel as the survey team. Troop commanders determine the composition of the team. Utility or observation aircraft are probably best suited for the designated aerial observer mission.

(c) FARP elements. The commander must forward hazard information to FARPs and other separate activities. These elements need hazard information for selecting routes, setting up sites, and selecting clean areas for rest and relief. Unit SOPs should address how messages will be forwarded. Radio communications with ATS facilities may be used as an alternate method of relaying hazard information to FARPs. The FARP probably will become contaminated while support aircraft will remain clean. However, the opposite may also occur. Therefore, aircrews and FARP personnel should establish a standard method of communicating NBC hazard warnings between them. Hand-and-arm signals, panels, flags, or any other type of standard signal should be included in unit SOPs.

(d) Attack warnings. Nuclear weapons pose significant hazards to aircraft, whether they are fired by threat or by friendly forces. Therefore, commanders must have a thorough understanding of the attack warnings so that the capabilities of aviation assets are not degraded. Warnings of friendly nuclear attacks ensure that friendly forces have time to protect themselves from the attacks. These warnings are called STRIKWARNs. FM 3-3-1 outlines the message formats. The executing commander will start the warning. Messages must be sent to adjacent units and to the subordinate headquarters whose units are likely to be affected by the attack. When a nuclear strike is canceled, units warned previously must be notified without delay. Local policies may specify a wait time after the planned time of detonation when the message is automatically canceled. Aviation assets are dispersed throughout the battlefield. The supported unit may not be inside a STRIKWARN zone; therefore, it may not receive the warning. However, aircraft supporting that unit may be where overpressures will cause damage. Because of the long-distance hazard of nighttime flash blindness, aviation units must know when friendly nuclear weapons will be fired. For these reasons, executing commanders should send the attack warning to all aviation units. This message should include the limited safe distance for aircraft or the 1-psi overpressure radius. The limited safe distance is not included in the standard format for STRIKWARNs, but it can be added. Aviation assets, including ground support, must receive information about friendly nuclear strikes. ATS facilities will be used to the maximum extent to relay STRIKWARNs to aircraft operating within the effective ranges of nuclear detonations. Units should develop alternate methods of passing an immediate warning to aircraft during flight.

(3) Locating, identifying, and marking NBC hazards.

(a) Once personnel detect an NBC hazard, they must mark and identify the hazard. Units must plan their AO outside of the contaminated area when possible. The unit has three methods of determining the limits of a contaminated area: reconnaissance, monitoring, and survey. Contaminated hazards may be the result of enemy or friendly forces. In either case, the effects are the same; they will affect either threat or friendly operations equally. Therefore, hazardous areas must be located, identified, and marked especially along defiles, routes, and point hazards. Marking may be immediate or hasty. Hazardous areas may be permanently marked later with standard NATO signs.

(b) Aviation assets ideally are suited for conducting reconnaissance and radiological surveys. FM 1-117 and FM 3-3-1 discuss radiological surveys.

(c) Chemical agent detectors or alarms are not mounted on aircraft. Using aircraft with point detectors in this role is not considered a feasible mission. Chemical reconnaissance with aircraft will be limited to flying a chemical detection team to selected areas. NBC detection equipment consists of standard issue items such as radiological detection and monitoring devices, total dose instruments, and chemical agent detection kits and alarms.

(d) Aircrews can help identify contamination on or in the aircraft. They can mount M8 or M9 chemical agent detection paper on the inside or the outside of the airframe at various locations. Because the paper does not stick to the paint on the aircraft, it should be wrapped around a painted area with the ends of the paper overlapping. Recommended areas for mounting this paper include the inside and outside of Plexiglas, seat frames, landing gear, floor panels, or other areas where agents are likely to collect. When the paper is placed on exterior Plexiglas, the spots can be seen from inside the cockpit during the day. Ground support personnel can read the paper on other exterior surfaces. Personnel should not use the paper in a way that creates a FOD hazard.

NOTE: M9 paper detects liquid agents; however, the M9 paper may not react significantly to a vapor or an aerosol hazard.

(4) Limiting the spread of contaminants.

(a) When operating in a contaminated area, all personnel must take steps to limit further exposure to the hazard. One solution is to move personnel out of the contaminated area if the factors of METT-T permit. Aviation assets can often find clear routes through a contaminated area so that exposure to NBC hazards is reduced. If movement is not possible, the unit must employ individual and collective protection measures to prevent casualties. Almost any shelter that protects from the weather will also protect somewhat from fallout and liquid chemical agents.

(b) Personnel can cover ground equipment in the FARP and rear areas to avoid direct contact with contaminants and then discard the covers to operate the equipment. Examples of covers are tarpaulins, plastic bags, and cardboard boxes. If possible, personnel should keep equipment in original containers; for example, ammunition cans. Personnel can also place equipment in covered vehicles or shelters and operate it from these locations. These measures decrease the amount of contamination transfer and may reduce the need for decontamination.

(c) Protective measures for aircraft are like those for ground equipment. Areas that provide natural cover should be used for unit locations. Aircrews can park aircraft near buildings in built-up areas for limited protection. If assault or medium helicopter units pick up or deliver troops in contaminated LZs, aircrews must ensure that doors, vents, and windows are closed to reduce contamination transfer.

(d) Placing a cover on the floor of the cargo area also helps reduce the amount of contamination transfer to the interior of the aircraft. Plastic covers, tarpaulins, paper, cardboard, clothing, or even leaves can aid in limiting contamination transfer. However, covers must be secured so that they do not present an FOD hazard. When flying rotary-wing aircraft out of contaminated areas and into clean areas, aircrews should open all doors and windows. About 20 minutes of flight will rid the aircraft of accumulated vapor hazards, but liquid contaminants will remain a hazard.

(5) Avoiding contaminants.

(a) The best way aircrews can keep aircraft free from contamination is to avoid flying them into contaminated areas. However, aircrews have no onboard means of determining, in the air or on the ground, which areas are contaminated. Therefore, they may be unable to avoid contaminated areas. Contamination avoidance also applies to ground support locations such as FARPs. FARPs are vulnerable because of their mission, but their mobility may lessen the chance of their being targeted by Threat forces. Aircraft are also vulnerable while being serviced at FARPs.

(b) Commanders must rely heavily on the NBCWRS and intelligence reports to learn what battlefield areas are contaminated. However, some areas may not be reported and new attacks may occur at any time.

(c) Another source of information comes from the supported unit. Commanders should select alternate locations where they can complete their mission if the AO becomes contaminated. The flexibility of aviation assets allows aircrews to "fly around" known contaminated areas and still accomplish the mission. When choosing among options, however, the commander knows the primary consideration is always mission accomplishment.

C-20. PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Protection-the second NBC defense fundamental-is both individual and collective. When the unit cannot avoid contamination, or is under direct attack, soldiers must take appropriate actions to survive. Specific actions are taken before, during, and after an attack. To sustain operations in an NBC environment, unit personnel must understand and practice individual and collective protection. Individual protection involves those measures each soldier must take to survive and continue the mission. These include acting immediately upon observing a nuclear detonation, donning MOPP gear, and wearing other protective equipment and devices. Collective protection provides a contamination-free working environment for selected personnel and precludes the continuous wear of MOPP gear.

a. Individual Protective Equipment and Clothing.

(1) MOPP gear. Soldiers are issued MOPP gear to protect themselves from a chemical or biological hazard. MOPP gear consists of the CB protective mask, hood, overgarment, overboots, protective gloves, individual decontamination kit, detection equipment, and antidotes. FM 3-4 describes each item, to include service life and proper use.

(2) Nomex flight suit and gloves. Until a fire-retardant overgarment is fielded, aircrews will continue to wear the Nomex flight suit and gloves under the overgarment and protective gloves. When aircrews wear the Nomex gloves, they do not need to wear white cotton inserts.

(3) Aviation life support equipment. All soldiers must be issued a mask, an overgarment, chemical protecting gloves and chemical protective overshoes in the correct sizes. Soldiers should ensure that they have the correct glove size so that their tactile sensitivity is not degraded. The size of the overgarment depends on the unit's policy for wearing aviation life support equipment (ALSE). Usually, soldiers will wear the ALSE over the over garment. During an emergency in a CB environment, aircrews need access to the contents of the survival vest. If the vest is worn under the overgarment, the soldier risks contamination to get to the vest. Commanders should carefully evaluate their policy and requisition overgarment sizes accordingly.

(4) Night vision devices. Current procedures state that aircrews should wear the mask hood over the flight helmet. When flying with night vision devices (NVDs) that attach to the flight helmet, aircrews will have to wear the hood under the flight helmet. Units preferring this procedure should procure the hood for the M25 mask, which is designed to be worn under the helmet. Wearing the hood under the helmet creates more hot spots; individuals may need to be refitted with a larger size helmet.

(5) M10A1 canister. Commanders should carefully evaluate whether individuals should change their own canisters. Changing the M10A1 canister is currently an organizational-level maintenance task. However, aviation personnel are widely dispersed on the battlefield; maintenance or NBC personnel may not be available to change the canisters. Blood agents will degrade the canister, requiring the operator to change it after an attack. Therefore, aircrews should receive training in the procedure for changing the canister.

(6) M24 mask. When wearing the M24 mask while operating the AH-1 Cobra telescopic sight unit, aviators should be careful not to scratch the mask lens. They should use a clear visor over the mask lens to prevent scratches. Some aviation units will receive M43 masks to replace the M24 masks.

(7) Mask carrier.

(a) In some aircraft, aircrews may not have room to wear the mask carrier during flight. If not, the items from the carrier that are needed during flight should be stored in the aircraft or in the protective clothing. Units should establish a policy so that aircrews know what procedures they are to follow. The procedures will vary with the type of aircraft; therefore, units are encouraged to examine several possibilities and then establish standard procedures for each aircraft.

(b) Some of the items that will be needed during flight are the antifog kit, M291 or M258A1 skin decontamination kit, antiglare shield, and antidotes. Soldiers can take the packets of the decontamination kit from the hard plastic container and put them in overgarment pockets. Also, personnel can make a storage area inside the cockpit for the carrier or the M258A1 kit and antidotes.

(8) Skull cap. Some personnel have procured the skull cap, a small cap of Nomex material worn under the flight helmet to keep the helmet from irritating the scalp. The skull cap can be worn under the mask head harness if it does not interfere with the seal of the mask about the face. If the cap is worn inside out, the seams will not dig into the scalp and cause more irritation.

(9) Overboots. Overboots can present a safety hazard (foot slippage) if personnel use laces stretched from wear or do not tie the laces properly during training. The green vinyl overshoe (GVO) will be worn for actual operations until the multipurpose light overshoe (MULO) is fielded.

(10) Gloves. During maintenance-such as preflight, postflight, and FARP operations-personnel can easily tear their protective gloves on the aircraft. When personnel perform maintenance tasks, they should consider wearing a leather glove over the chemical biological (CB) protective glove; but they should remove the leather glove before they fly.

(11) CB mask. The CB mask is required for protection against chemical agents. However, it also can protect aircrews from radioactive dust while they conduct aerial surveys or other missions over radiologically contaminated areas. The mask filters out dust or dirt that has radiological agents. In the absence of a CB threat, soldiers may wear other protection such as surgical masks or handkerchiefs. Aircrews may elect to wear the CB mask to keep the large amounts of dust that are present from irritating the eyes.

(12) Faceform. A faceform is used to store the aircrew protective mask to prevent face set. Units may elect to keep the faceform in place to lessen the damage when the mask is being carried. The unit SOP should specify when to carry or remove the faceform.

(13) External drinking adaptor. TM 3-4240-280-10 and STP 21-1-SMCT describe the procedures for drinking water when personnel wear the M24 mask.

b. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture. Commanders select a level of protection based on the chemical or biological threat, temperature, work rate, and mission. The levels of protection are MOPP zero through MOPP4 plus a mask-only and a MOPP-ready option. FM 3-4 describes the MOPP levels and option. Aircrews fly in MOPP4 gear when a high threat of CB agent use exists or when agents have been used on the battlefield. Aircrews also fly in MOPP4 gear when they conduct NBC reconnaissance operations. Some of the reasons for this are as follows:

(1) Personnel cannot detect agents with their senses.

(2) Agent clouds travel vertically as well as horizontally.

(3) Aircrews exposed to CB agents may be grounded for an extended period.

(4) Aircraft are not equipped with advanced warning or detection devices.

(5) It is not practical to don CB equipment, including the mask, during flight.

(6) Aircrews exposed to sublethal dosages of CB agents during flight may lose control of the aircraft and crash.

(7) Rotor wash may transfer droplets or contaminated dust inside the cockpit, creating a skin contact hazard.

(8) Aviation mission.

NEWSLETTER

Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list

Military