Military

(1) Is normally is the controlling headquarters for divisional or corps aviation units.

(2) In this capacity, has limited ground maneuver capability.

(3) Concentrates almost exclusively on air maneuver and ground-delivered logistics with the exception of the ground troops assigned to the cavalry squadron.

(1) Commands and controls aviation units throughout the battlespace.

(2) Has the capability to command and control (C²) attached units and those under its operational control (OPCON).

(3) Must prepare to receive ground maneuver forces-including companies and battalions-when an aviation brigade is employed as a task force (TF) headquarters.

(4) Must integrate these forces-which include light and/or mechanized units-into their scheme of maneuver.

(1) The aviation force attacks by fire while the ground force infiltrates and assaults the objective. This maneuver includes air assault.

(2) The aviation force attacks by fire while the ground force advances for the assault.

(3) The aviation force and ground force approach the objective on different axes.

(4) The aviation force and ground force advance together.

(1) Area defense. An example of an area defense is the defense of the aviation brigade assembly area. This type of defense is most likely during periods of intensive maintenance when aviation soldiers are focused on repairing helicopters for an upcoming mission. Units normally conduct an area defense when-

• Directed to defend specified terrain.
• The enemy enjoys a mobility advantage over the defending force.
• Well-defined avenues of approach exist.
• The defending force has sufficient combat power to cover the likely enemy avenues of approach in sector.

(2) Mobile defense. The mobile defense orients on the defeat or destruction of the enemy force; it allows the enemy to advance to a point where it is exposed to a decisive attack by a striking force. A commander organizes his unit into two forces: the fixing force and the striking force. An example of a mobile defense is the use of a mechanized battalion task force attached to the aviation brigade as a fixing force; it canalizes the enemy. The aviation force would be the striking force; it provides lethal fires to destroy the enemy force.

(1) Differences exist in mobility and firepower between ground units and aviation units.

(2) Ground and aviation units will be maneuvering near each other in a chaotic situation often during limited visibility.

(1) Mandated routes (ground and air).

(2) Specified support by fire or battle positions.

(3) Restrictive fire lines (RFLs).

(4) Airspace control areas (ACAs).

(5) Limits of advance.

(1) Mandated routes-ground and air.

(2) Specified support by fire or battle positions.

(3) RFLs.

(4) Limits of advance as in offensive operations.

(1) TFs and teams may be designated as follows:

• Name of the commander-Task Force Williams.
• Use of code name-Team COBRA.
• Use of numeral-Team 1.
• Use of letter-Task Force ALPHA (Team BRAVO).
• Use of unit designation-TF 2-11.
• Use of branch- Team Mech (TF Tank).

(2) Attached or supporting companies may be renamed to avoid confusion. For example, if the TF has retained its Company A, and another Company A is attached, the attached company could be renamed Company Mech (Tank).

(1) The fire support element (FSE), the ground liaison officer (LO), and the attack battalion LO or S3.

(2) The ground LO.

(3) The attack battalion LO or S3.

(1) Exchange of intelligence, tactical plans, and recognition signals.

(2) Exchange of standing operating procedures (SOPs).

(3) Security measures during movement of the ground unit.

(4) Priorities for use of routes and facilities and provisions for movement control.

(5) FS and other combat support (CS) to be provided by the aviation brigade.

(6) Combat service support (CSS) to be provided by the aviation brigade and the ground unit's parent brigade.

(7) Exchange of liaison personnel.

(8) Collection and exchange of information on friendly minefields and other obstacles.

(9) Command and support relationship between incoming CS and CSS units and facilities and the aviation brigade.

(10) Measures to minimize vulnerability to enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) munitions, as well as indirect fire.

(3) During liaison tour. Take the time to clearly define what you expect of your LO. Use the list below as a starting point. The list you develop may be quite different based on individual capabilities and unit requirements. Keep abreast of the situation of the assigned unit; provide updates to supported headquarters. Monitor and assist in the planning process of supported unit as follows:

(1) Do not accept your LO's only serving as a courier.

(2) Identify your LO and begin training him as soon as possible.

(3) Provide your LO with appropriate equipment, such as radios, vehicles, and a global positioning system (GPS).

(1) Integrate all FS and maneuver assets to maximize combat power for the combined arms team.

(2) Visualize how he will use his FS resources, which subordinate echelon he will weight with FS, and what targets to attack. He visualizes these actions as he develops his battle plan to employ maneuver forces. This helps him establish priorities for engaging targets and allocating fires.

(3) Ensure the FS plan enhances the maneuver plan and all available fire support is considered along with the S3.

(1) The FS system provides close support for maneuver forces, counterfires, interdiction, and other fires, as required. These fires range from suppression of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) to suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD).

(2) Close support fires engage enemy troops, weapons, or positions that are threatening or can threaten the force. These fires are effective in reducing enemy observation, flexibility, and C². Close indirect-FS-

(3) Counterfires must be considered in developing a scheme of maneuver. Counterfires attack enemy indirect-fire systems, observation posts, and FA C² facilities. These fires are planned and executed for offensive and defensive operations.

(4) Interdiction fires disrupt, delay, and destroy threat forces that are beyond the line of sight (LOS) and cannot fire their primary weapon systems on friendly forces.

(1) The aviation brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD)-

(2) The aviation brigade commander and his FSCOORD plan the battle together. This planning includes evaluation and determination of-

• Attack guidance.
• Target selection standards.
• Avenues of approach.
• Interdiction opportunities.
• Weapon systems orientation and task organizations.
• Support of objectives or defensive positions.
• Methods of attack or defense.
• Time of attack or counterattack.
• High-payoff targets.
• Designation of target areas of interest.
• Coverage of obstacles.

(3) In some cases, FS considerations may drive the scheme of maneuver. There may be insufficient maneuver assets to make the mission viable. If so, FS may accomplish a portion of the mission without committing the aviation brigade's assigned maneuver forces. The aviation brigade commander and his FSCOORD plan FS as follows:

(4) The FSCOORD-

(1) FS planning determines how and in what volume fires will be used, what type of targets will be attacked, when, and with what means. When planning fires, the FSCOORD must consider METT-T, the commander's intent, and FS guidance. Planning is enhanced when detailed IPB is conducted to identify high-payoff targets.

(2) The aviation brigade commander's intent determines the specific role that FS will play in the aviation brigade scheme of maneuver. For the aviation brigade, the FSCOORD is critical in developing the Army airspace command and control (A²C²) plan. The FSCOORD plans fires and allocates resources as the aviation brigade commander outlines his scheme of maneuver. He must know and fully understand-

(1) Execution of the FS plan is a combined arms responsibility. The success of the FS plan depends on how well it is understood by subordinate commanders and fire support officers (FSOs). The FS plan and the aviation brigade OPORD must be rehearsed and specific responsibilities assigned.

(2) The aviation brigade FS execution matrix provides subordinate commanders and FSOs a summary of the plan. The plan ties execution of fire support to specific events and assigns specific responsibility for that execution.

(1) Provides the commander continuous planning and supervision of aviation brigade engineer assets.

(2) Operates from the aviation brigade TOC.

(3) Maintains communications with the divisional engineer battalion, assistant division engineer, and engineer assets employed within the aviation brigade sector.

(1) Countermobility operations. Countermobility is obstacle construction. Obstacles are used to decrease enemy mobility without hindering friendly maneuver. In open areas, obstacles extend the amount of time enemy units are exposed to friendly fire.

(2) Mobility operations. Mobility operations reduce the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles. They improve the movement of combined arms forces and critical supplies. Mobility operations are a part of offensive and defensive operations.

(3) Survivability operations. Survivability operations-

(1) The aviation brigade commander has a wide range of FASCAM assets available. Artillery-delivered FASCAM, Army aviation- and Air Force-delivered FASCAM, and engineer-emplaced FASCAM can be integrated into the commander's scheme of maneuver in offensive and defensive operations. Each system has different characteristics in terms of patterns, self-destruct times, and responsiveness. These characteristics must be considered in the planning process. Long self-destruct mines self-destruct in more than 24 hours; short, in less than 24 hours.

(2) FASCAM provides a rapid, responsive obstacle emplacement capability to the aviation brigade. The aviation brigade S3 and aviation brigade engineer plan and coordinate use of FASCAM assets despite the means of delivery. A great deal of planning is required for FASCAM emplacement. FASCAM minefields, like all obstacles, must be tied in with terrain and under observation to be effective. Also mines are not particularly effective in open terrain such as the desert.

(3) The corps commander-

(4) The aviation brigade commander-

(5) The unit emplacing the mines-

(1) VOLCANO gives the aviation brigade the capability to produce large minefields rapidly. Air VOLCANO can produce two minefields per sortie when mounting the M139 mine dispenser system on the UH-60 Black Hawk platform.

(2) The minefields are about 1,115 meters long and 35 meters wide. The minefields are dispensed with their long axis parallel to the route of flight. The mines may be dispensed from both sides of the UH-60 at the same time. If so, two minefields will be created, separated by a mine-free strip of ground about 70 meters wide. These minefields can be useful partcularly in both the offense and defense to support ground maneuver forces. They slow or restrict the enemy's movement; they force him into areas where he can be attacked. They also can be used in conjunction with overwatching aviation fires to protect withdrawing ground forces and allow them to break contact.

(3) Brigade planners must exercise great care when planning Air VOLCANO missions. These missions should not be planned in enemy observation and fire area; the helicopter is extremely vulnerable when flying at the steady altitude, speed, and path required to emplace the minefield. FM 1-113 contains a detailed description of this system and operational planning guidance.

(1) Engineer operations in the aviation brigade area require close coordination among the aviation brigade engineer, aviation brigade staff, and the fire support battalion (FSB) commander for logistics support. The high density of Classes IV and V obstacle material requires early planning; it also requires a coordinated push forward through the brigade support area (BSA). The aviation brigade S4 must forecast mine and barrier materials. The forecast is based on preliminary estimates by the aviation brigade engineer and FA battalion S3.

(2) FASCAM delivery is planned and coordinated between the aviation brigade engineer and the delivery agency. This holds true whether supporting engineer units, artillery, Air Force, or the aviation brigade's organic aircraft are involved.

(3) Maintenance support for engineer units operating in the aviation brigade area must be closely coordinated among the unit, its own parent unit, and the maintenance support elements in the BSA. The supported unit provides common equipment unit-level maintenance. Engineer equipment maintenance is critical to unit survivability. The fire support battalion (FSB) of the parent ground maneuver brigade provides intermediate DS maintenance to rapidly return the equipment to the fight. The supported unit provides medical support.

(1) The main attack.

(2) The supporting attack (committed forces).

(3) The reserve.

(4) Follow and support forces, if any.

(1) Fixing enemy forces to make the main attack easier.

(2) Controlling terrain that facilitates maneuver of the main attack.

(3) Destroying enemy forces that hinder the main attack.

(4) Deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main attack.

(5) Preventing or delaying enemy concentration against the main attack.

(1) Reserves are constituted for commitment at the decisive time and place to exploit success or to ensure mission accomplishment. They should not be used to reinforce failure.

(2) Reserves provide the commander with the flexibility to deal with unforeseen contingencies. They also add to security, although this is not their primary function. Reserves may consist of maneuver units, CS units, or both. Reserves are specifically used to-

(3) METT-T determines the size of the reserve. In general, the more vague the situation, the larger the reserve. Whenever possible, one-third or more of the available combat power is retained in reserve.

(4) Reserves are positioned to-

(5) Reserve missions should be detailed enough to provide the reserve force commander a clear understanding of the aviation brigade commander's intent and commitment criteria. Plans are made to reconstitute a reserve as soon as possible after the original reserve is committed. Designating on-order reserve missions to committed units is a recommended technique.

(1) The aviation brigade commander's guidance to the S2 should contain the commander's priority intelligence requirement (PIR). After coordinating with the S3, additional intelligence requirements may be recommended to the commander during the S2 and staff IPBs.

(2) The aviation brigade S2 must prepare an up-to-date enemy data base during the IPB process. This data base will support offensive operations and answer the commander's PIR. The threat estimate and data base identify specific enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses. This information assists the aviation brigade commander to properly concentrate his available combat power.

(3) Developing PIRs and IPBs is a continual process throughout the planning and execution of the offensive operation. The aviation brigade intelligence section answers PIRs using a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The aviation brigade and TF S2s and S3s develop and coordinate the plan. The aviation brigade S2 requests more information and collection assets from the division when the aviation brigade commander's PIR cannot be met by organic aviation brigade assets. The aviation brigade S2 must ensure integration of the PIR into the higher collection plan.

(4) During the operation, the aviation brigade S2 provides the commander continuous updates of enemy activities and anticipated enemy courses of action. His sources include-

(1) FS can deliver a variety of munitions to support deep, close, and rear operations. FS assets available to the aviation brigade normally are one DS FA battalion and organic battalion mortars. More FS assets may include close air support (CAS); naval gunfire (NGF); and reinforcing, general support (GS); and GS reinforcing FA battalions. Commanders normally allocate more reinforcing and GS reinforcing battalions to augment the fires of the DS FA battalion to the offense than to the defense.

(2) The aviation brigade FSE is the focal point for integrating all fire support for the aviation brigade. To effectively integrate FS into the operation, the FSCOORD-

(3) Specific considerations for employing FS in offensive operations include-

(1) Ground maneuver units from other divisional brigades are placed under the OPCON of the aviation brigade commander. The placement is to accomplish a mission or for the duration of an operation. Placement must be in accordance with the division commander's intent and concept of the operation. These ground units may operate with the cavalry squadron. They may conduct reconnaissance and security operations. They may serve as assault elements and conduct air assault operations with the assault battalion or GSAB. Finally, the units may maneuver as a composite force with the attack battalions against a specified objective.

(2) Ground units under the OPCON of the aviation brigade must be completely integrated into the aviation brigade scheme of maneuver. The IPB process identifies specific potential targets and missions for the ground unit. The ground maneuver commander then gives specific tactical missions to his assets.

(3) Ground units operating with the aviation brigade or in the aviation brigade AO coordinate locations for assembly areas (AA), forward AAs, and arming and refueling points through the depth of the zone with the aviation brigade S3. In offensive operations, these areas are used in sequence as the main body advances.

(4) The parent brigade for logistics support is responsible for ground units placed under the OPCON of the aviation brigade. Efficient distribution of certain critical classes of supply may require coordination with the parent brigade's FSB.

(1) Plans selective attacks against deep, high-payoff targets to create opportunities for offensive action.

(2) Uses attached ground forces, fire support, EW, and maneuver in depth to-

(3) Also may attempt to degrade the enemy's momentum by attacking its follow-on forces, CS, CSS, and C² ; this may make it more difficult to employ artillery or reinforce, resupply, and direct its attacking echelons.

(1) Decides where to concentrate his main defensive effort and where to economize forces.

(2) Then assigns missions; allocates forces, fires, and other support; and sets priorities for resources to fight a combined arms battle.

(1) Sectors-the least restrictive control measures-give battalion TFs freedom to maneuver and decentralize fire planning. TF commanders have total freedom to position or maneuver within their sector but must prevent penetration of their rear boundary.

(2) Battle positions are used when the aviation brigade commander wishes to retain greater control over the maneuver and position of his TFs.

(3) Strongpoints are fortified defensive positions. They essentially are antitank nests that cannot be easily overrun or bypassed by tanks; they can be reduced by enemy infantry only with the expenditure of much time and overwhelming forces. A strongpoint is located on a terrain feature critical to the defense or one that must be denied to the enemy. A strongpoint can be used to shape, contain, or fix the attacker. Extensive engineer support is required to establish strongpoints successfully.

(1) The aviation brigade commander must understand thoroughly the corps and division commanders' intents and align brigade operations with the overall mission. The division commander's detailed intent-issued either in writing or orally-depicts the aviation brigade's role in the division battle. In turn, the aviation brigade commander transmits his intent to his subordinates.

(2) The aviation brigade commander should walk the critical portions of the defensive line with his battalion commanders. This may be impossible. If so, his subordinates should complete a thorough backbrief. This ensures that they understand his intent; that they will implement plans in keeping with the overall defensive concept. As a minimum, the aviation brigade commander must consider-

(1) Monitors the current combat power of assigned subordinate maneuver and CS units.

(2) Closely tracks major weapons systems and personnel fill, especially for maintainers, to ensure proper assignment of missions.

(1) The aviation brigade commander's most critical decision during the defense is committing reserves. Once committed, the reserve becomes the aviation brigade main effort and receives priority of support. Early in the planning process, the aviation brigade commander decides fundamentally about the size, composition, and mission of the reserve. A major purpose of the reserve is to regain initiative through offensive action. The reserve does this by launching counterattacks, spoiling attacks, and raids against the enemy. Other purposes of the reserve are to-

(2) The aviation brigade commander-

(1) In planning contingencies for offensive actions of the reserve, the aviation brigade commander-

(2) Although he plans for the counterattack, the commander must realize that it is unlikely the action will correspond exactly to expectations. Thus, he answers these basic questions as the situation develops:

(1) At times, reserves are used in a spoiling attack role to throw the enemy preparations for the attack off stride. Basic considerations for the spoiling attack are-

(2) Commanders coordinate plans for counterattacks and spoiling attacks using the attack techniques discussed in FM 71-3 and the FM 1-100 series. The spoiling attack has many of the characteristics of a hasty attack, a reconnaissance in force, and raid operations.

(1) The aviation brigade commander may decide that his units cannot counterattack with a reasonable chance of success. In these instances, he may position the reserve to contain or delay the enemy to gain time for the employment of the reserve of the higher echelon.

(2) The reserve is not exclusively responsible for transition from a defensive posture to the offensive. A variety of tactical situations may offer the opportunity for, or even require, defending units to launch hasty or immediate attacks. Such situations include breakout from encirclement, relief of encircled forces, raids and spoiling attacks, and collapse of enemy resistance or unanticipated enemy withdrawal.

(3) As they plan their battle, the aviation brigade commander and his staff consider how combinations of ground units and aviation units will be integrated into the defensive scheme. This planning includes placement of battle positions, routes, and C² arrangements. If a ground unit is identified as the reserve, supporting engineer and military police (MP) assets must maintain route trafficability to enable their timely movement throughout the aviation brigade sector. Positioning and moving reinforcements are enhanced by designating the routes. Providing traffic control personnel and guides at contact points to lead reinforcements and brief them on the situation also helps.

(1) Synchronized employment of organic aviation and ground maneuver forces in the defense begins with coordination between the aviation brigade S3 and the ground unit LO to plan the operations.

(2) The ability of the ground force, light or heavy, to hold ground in the defense makes them an asset to the aviation brigade. This capability allows the aviation brigade to seize and retain the initiative. Ground maneuver units under the OPCON of the aviation brigade can conduct offensive and defensive operations, reconnaissance, and security missions with air operations.

(3) As in offensive operations, ground maneuver units that operate with the aviation brigade or in the aviation brigade area must coordinate continuously for battle positions, AAs, maintenance collection points, and other uses of terrain with the brigade S3.

(4) The parent brigade remains responbile for logistics support of ground units. However, forward support logistics operations are coordinated with the FSB in the parent brigade's BSA.

(1) The aviation brigade S2 must focus on IPB to plan for the defense and analyze the close operation to predict and confirm enemy intentions. Before the battle, the aviation brigade commander requires specific information about-

(2) The aviation brigade and battalion S2s and S3s prepare a detailed reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and surveillance plan. The purpose of the plan is to prevent the enemy from seeing and reporting the strength, composition, and location of the aviation brigade. The reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, and surveillance plan is vital to early detection and identifying enemy reconnaissance in the security area.

(1) The aviation brigade commander-

(2) The FSCOORD-

(3) FA and mortars pre-position ammunition and survey firing positions in advance. Control of FS assets is centralized for defensive operations.

(1) Priority of engineer effort in the security area-

(2) The aviation brigade commander determines the priority for engineer support in the MBA based on METT-T. A tradeoff between countermobility and survivability exists because they both use the same limited earthmoving resources.

(3) Obstacles are emplaced in depth to support the maneuver commander's scheme; they are integrated into the FS plan to maximize the effect of friendly fires.

(4) Counterattacks may require improving mobility corridors to ensure success. Priority of engineer effort in the rear is given to mobility, then to survivability for C³, reserve, and CSS assets.

(5) Defensive operations require intensive management of engineer resources allocated to support the aviation brigade plan. The resources usually consist of a combination of divisional and corps engineer units. The aviation brigade engineer and the aviation brigade S4 coordinate early to forecast and request the large quantities of required Classes IV and V materials and munitions. (NOTE: Aviation units do not always receive engineer support. The aviation brigade staff must ensure the attached ground force is properly supported by the engineers.)

(1) With the increase in weapons of mass destruction, the aviation brigade commander must plan for possible enemy use of NBC weapons and defense units. This is true despite the region where his unit is deployed. The S3 and chemical section must determine how vulnerable the aviation brigade forces are to these weapons. The commander specifies the degree of risk he is willing to accept. The chemical section may suggest changes to the concept of the operation . This occurs when the concept involves unacceptable risks from enemy weapons.

(2) Brigade NBC reconnaissance operations in the defense-

(1) Logistics support to the combined arms team must be coordinated during the planning and execution phases of each defensive operation. The S4 and FSB or MSB commander must understand the aviation brigade commander's tactical intent so that service support priorities can be established and logistics operations planned to ensure the supportability of the defense. All CSS activities must look beyond the defense to support opportunities for maneuver units during the transition to the offense.

(2) The aviation brigade S4 identifies all planned logistics requirements for the ground maneuver force to their parent unit FSB. The FSB TOC evaluates the supportability of the tactical plan. The TOC identifies any shortfalls through a logistics estimate. The aviation brigade commander and S3 use the logistics estimate to evaluate courses of action.

(1) The aviation brigade commander, with key staff, normally fights the battle from the TAC CP. However, his personal presence may be required at critical points, such as battle handover from security forces or commitment of the reserve.

(2) The C² facilities are more static than in the offense; therefore, emphasis must be placed on locating them in hardened areas or protective terrain and reducing electronic signature. The main CP should be located as far to the rear as possible while maintaining reliable communications with the TAC CP and subordinate battalions. The main CP focuses on monitoring progress of the battle, forwarding information and support requests, and coordinating supporting units.

(3) The rear CP anticipates future support requirements; it coordinates with the FSB commander to ensure continuous logistics support to enable friendly units to regain the offensive. Also it focuses on continuity of support for current operations and control of aviation brigade CSS units moving forward from the BSA. The rear CP must continuously monitor the battle and be prepared to immediately assume the role of the main CP, if necessary.

(2) Enemy reconnaissance. The focus of the enemy's reconnaissance is to confirm or deny the intentions and dispositions of the forces it is attacking. The aviation brigade must integrate these measures into a detailed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The plan is designed to prevent the threat from seeing and reporting the strength, composition, and location of the aviation brigade and its obstacles. The aviation brigade's primary focus in counterreconnaissance is in providing and coordinating intelligence and fire support to help its maneuver units identify, fix, and destroy the enemy reconnaissance forces.

(3) Monitoring the suspected threat. During the preparation phase, the aviation brigade S2 and intelligence and electronic warfare support element (IEWSE) continually monitor and track the covering force battle. Their purpose is to update the actual threat reconnaissance situation. Specific PIRs are developed and modified to identify, confirm, or deny the expected threat.

(4) Aviation brigade S2 responsibilities. The aviation brigade S2-

(5) Aviation brigade S3 responsibilities. The aviation brigade S3-

(1) The aviation brigade can perform security force operations as part of a division or corps defense plan. Security force operations include cover, guard, and screen as well as counterattack or defend missions. The most comprehensive mission is the covering force.

(2) The fundamental purposes of the covering force in the defense are to-

(3) To do this, the aviation brigade-

(1) The width and depth of the security force area.

(2) The commander's ability to communicate with subordinate units.

(3) The availability of control headquarters.

(4) The number of battalion-size units operating in the security force area.

(1) The size and composition of the security force depend on the commander's estimate of the situation as influenced by the factors of METT-T. An aviation brigade-acting as the security force of a division-may consist of the cavalry squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, and one to four tank heavy battalion TFs. The task organization would also include FA, AD, intelligence, and engineer units. In light units, the aviation brigade would accept light infantry task forces; it would maneuver these units in the security area with organic assault aircraft or ground transportation. Added CAS may be allocated to augment the combat power of maneuver forces found in the security area. MBA FA units are positioned forward to support the security area.

(2) When the aviation brigade is assigned a security force mission, subordinate units accomplish their missions as determined by the aviation brigade commander. Security is provided by giving MBA forces time to react and room to maneuver; therefore, depth of the security force area influences the allocation of forces and missions. As time versus distance requirements are compared, more forces are allocated to the security force or more distance is provided in the security force area. As a rule in mechanized battle, the minimum defensive security force area should be at least 20 kms in depth. This area forces the enemy to commit combat support forces before its attack into the MBA. For light forces, the security area can be compressed. Enemy repositioning of artillery and air defense artillery (ADA) provides the essential indicators of the main efforts.

(3) The higher commander's overall plan should call for a security force to orient on an enemy force rather than a specific time requirement. The security force area may be relatively shallow. If it is, the force may be able only to provide early warning of the main attack and strip away the enemy's reconnaissance.

(4) Unobserved, urbanized, or forested terrain is an avenue of enemy movement. This is true unless the security force is provided with forces to cover such approaches. The aviation brigade's air and ground security force must prevent that infiltration.

(5) The entire security force is not necessarily withdrawn automatically when the first enemy units reach the MBA. A staggered withdrawal improves the chances for overall success. Even if portions of the security force have withdrawn on some avenues of approach, remaining security force elements continue to fight and maintain surveillance well forward of the MBA. This disrupts the enemy's coordination and reconnaissance efforts. A staggered withdrawal of the security force can facilitate counterattacks forward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). This is done by providing observation of, and access to, exposed flanks of penetrating enemy forces. In some cases, the security force can be used to attack first-echelon forces in the rear. It can be committed between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.

(6) Combat power brought against enemy forces within the security area aids the defense of the MBA. It destroys the enemy force's combined arms integrity and damages its ability to react once it arrives in the MBA. FS tasks in the security area focus on deceiving the enemy about the location of the MBA; they disrupt the enemy's center of gravity before the enemy enters the MBA. FS assists in the defeat of the enemy. FS forces the enemy to commit forces in a piecemeal maneuver and without key functional elements. This is done by-

(1) MBA brigades assume responsibility for the battle. They do so as security forces begin withdrawal of combat elements across the battle handover line (BHL). The higher commander establishes the BHL. The MBA and security force commanders coordinate the exact location of the BH. They recommend changes to the higher commander. The BHL is reflected graphically as a phase line; it is identified in the proper operation plan (OPLAN), OPORD, or FRAGO. The minimum graphic control measures for a rearward passage of lines also must be depicted. The BHL establishes a boundary between the ground owned by the security force commander and that owned by the MBA commander. The majority of MBA forces normally are positioned between the brigade rear boundary and the FEBA. However, the MBA commander controls the ground forward of the FEBA out to the BHL. He can place security forces, obstacles, and fires in this area to canalize the enemy or to make the withdrawal of security force elements easier. The BHL also marks the location where control of the battle will be passed from the security force to the MBA force. The BHL typically is located 2 kms to 4 kms forward of the FEBA. Here MBA forces can bring direct and observed indirect fires to bear on the enemy to make proper security force activities (such as disengagement, withdrawal, or passage of lines) easier. Specific passage lanes and other details are coordinated between security force and MBA units. When possible, the boundaries of security force units coincide with those of the MBA brigades. The same considerations apply when the brigade provides and controls its own security forces.

(2) The security force retains freedom of maneuver before passage through the BHL; it passes through the MBA forces as quickly as possible, using multiple passage points. GS and GS reinforcing FA units in the security area pass through the passage points before DS, reinforcing, and attached FA units in the security area. Once the GS and GSR units are in position to support the units, the remaining FA units pass through the passage points before maneuver forces. After the battle handover, FA organization for combat and FS responsibilities changes to reflect the organization necessary to support the MBA.

(3) Coordination between the commander in contact and the commander out of contact is critical. Contact must be maintained with the enemy so that he is unaware that a battle handover is occurring. At a minimum, these elements must be coordinated-

(4) The rearward passage of lines is the most difficult mission for the aviation/ground TF since the timing of the passage is so critical. The TF must break contact with the enemy to avoid taking major losses during the passage. The most ideal time to execute this operation is between echelons of the attacking enemy force. This natural break-when supported by massed artillery fires, smoke, and CAS from both fixed- and rotary-wing forces-can allow the ground units to execute their passage more safely. Contact points normally are set forward of the BHL on easily identifiable terrain to make coordination between the two units easier. The passage points themselves are both concealed from enemy observation, if possible; they are located where the stationary commander desires the passing unit to enter his sector. Ground and aviation units can use the same passage points or separate aviation passage can be designated. Because of aviation's inherent mobility advantage, it is usually advantageous to pass the ground forces first. An overwatching aircraft or a vehicle on the ground can execute control of a separate aviation passage point.

(5) The forward passage of lines is simply executed in reverse. Release points for the attacking unit should be established behind the BHL to allow the attacking unit to deploy before crossing. Attack positions in the stationary units sector should be coordinated in advance. The TF commander will maintain contact with the enemy force; his XO normally would be the best choice to coordinate the passage with the attacking unit. At no time during this process can contact with the enemy be lost.

(1) The battle almost always is decided in the MBA. Options for both opponents become less numerous during engagements in the MBA. The aviation brigade adjusts the defensive main effort to defeat the attack based on information received during the security force operations. The defending aviation brigade concentrates the strongest possible forces for decisive action against the enemy main effort and commits them with the greatest possible violence when the enemy acts.

(2) In the MBA, the aviation brigade directs and controls its fight using direct and indirect fires and maneuver against the assaulting enemy. The aviation brigade's organic fighting systems, with ground maneuver forces, USAF air support, EW, combat engineers, AD weapons, naval gunfire, and the DS and reinforcing artillery units must focus on destroying the enemy. The division supports the brigade fight by providing combat, CS, and CSS; directs operations involving forward brigades; and commits the division reserve when necessary. At the same time, the division conducts deep operations, directs the division engineer obstacle effort, and conducts counterfire operations.

(3) Brigade operations emphasize execution of battalion plans within the context of the overall brigade concept and use of individual initiative according to mission orders. A brigade's main focus of effort is identified; CS assets and other battalion plans are tailored to support this effort.

(4) Brigade and battalion commanders-

(5) The brigade defends by confronting the enemy with strong combined arms units positioned in the brigade sector. As the enemy attack moves into the defended area, its forces are delayed, contained, separated, and attacked. The brigade uses frontal and flanking fires delivered from well-positioned ground maneuver TFs and attack helicopters; ambushes and employment of reserves against the enemy flanks and rear; and massed fire support. Obstacles are used to slow, canalize, and disrupt the enemy's timetables. Obstacles and fires are critical to fragment enemy mass, degrade trafficability, and confuse enemy command and control by causing the enemy to fight in multiple directions.

(6) The brigade commander's plan often combines the defense of open spaces and choke points. Counterattacks are developed to exploit the separation of enemy forces that occurs naturally because of the terrain.

(7) Commanders and planners must recognize the likelihood of penetrations in the MBA. When fighting large, mobile forces, the commander may permit a partial penetration as part of the operational concept; he may then counterattack the flank and rear of the penetration. Penetration of the MBA or separation from adjacent units may occur. If so, MBA forces continue to fight within the commander's intent; they protect their own flanks while striking at the enemy's. When possible, they reestablish contact across areas of penetration. The commander rapidly shifts FS to limit the ability of the enemy commander to capitalize on a penetration. Preparation of counterattack plans are integral to the MBA fight.

(1) The ADA battalion or battery commander coordinates for the TF to resupply ADA units in direct support with some classes of supply. This may be directed in higher headquarters SOPs and usually includes Class I, III, and V, and common item IX.

(2) The aviation brigade provides engineer materials (Classes IV and V) to supporting engineer units. In addition, engineer units under OPCON of the aviation brigade receive Class I, III, V, and IX support to the greatest extent possible. This support is coordinated through or directed by brigade before the OPCON directive becomes effective.

(3) The parent unit S4 or company commander of the supporting element coordinates with the aviation brigade S4 or headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander on resupply of the forward elements. Normally, the supporting units' resupply elements assemble in the BSA; they move to the TF field trains area. The HHC commander then dispatches these resupply elements forward-along with the TF logistics packages ( LOGPACs)-to the LRP. At the LRP, the platoon sergeant of the forward supporting element takes control of the resupply element. These resupply elements maintain contact with the combat trains CP while forward in the FS area. If coordinated between the supporting parent unit and the TF, the resupply of these forward elements is directly managed by the TF. The parent unit must provide the additional logistical assets necessary to supplement the aviation brigade's capabilities. It does not matter how support was coordinated. Any element within the TF AO must be either under the aviation brigade commander's control or at least remain in contact with the combat trains CP to avoid interfering with TF maneuver.

(1) Positions these elements.

(2) Tasks the MEDEVAC team.

(3) Establishes priority of work for the company maintenance team.

(1) Communications are required between the combat trains CP, the main CP, the field trains CP, aviation brigade rear CP, and forward units.

(2) Room for dispersion and cover and concealment from both air and ground observation are desired.

(3) The ground must support vehicle traffic.

(4) A suitable helicopter landing site should be nearby.

(5) Routes to logistical release points or to company positions must be available.

(6) Movement into and out of the area must not be restricted.

(1) Elements from the ground unit's parent brigade FSB.

(2) Maneuver and CS unit field trains.

(3) Selected corps (corps support command (COSCOM)) and division (division support command (DISCOM)) resources.

(1) Unit supply truck. This vehicle contains the Class I requirements based on the ration cycle- normally, one hot meal and two meals ready to eat (MREs) per soldier. The supply truck tows a water trailer and carries some full water cans for direct exchange. In addition, the truck carries any Class II supplies requested by the unit, incoming mail, and other items required by the unit. The truck may also carry replacement personnel.

(2) POL trucks. Bulk fuel and packaged POL products are on these vehicles.

(3) Ammunition trucks. These vehicles contain a mix of ammunition for the weapons systems of the company team. The unit SOP establishes a standard load; reports and projected demands may require changes to this standard load.

(4) Vehicles carrying additional supplies and replacements. These vehicles join the LOGPAC as coordinated by the support platoon leader and supply sergeant.

(1) Changes in logistical requirements reflecting any last-minute task organization.

(2) Reports on personnel, logistics, and maintenance from the first sergeants.

(3) First-hand updates on the tactical situation and logistical status.

(4) Delivery, receipt, and distribution of unit mail.

(1) The platoon sergeant of these elements or senior NCO at a facility must report his requirements to the HHC first sergeant or to the combat trains CP. The most desirable method of resupply is to form small LOGPACs for these elements, which the platoon sergeant picks up at the LRP in the same way as a company first sergeant. Attachments larger than a platoon must come to the task force with sufficient CSS vehicles to carry their LOGPACs.

(2) In some cases, the HHC first sergeant delivers the LOGPAC to the main CP, combat trains, and scout and mortar platoons. Attachments can receive resupply at one of these locations or as previously coordinated.

(3) Another option is for attachments to be resupplied from a nearby company team LOGPAC. The S4 coordinates this resupply before the LOGPACs are dispatched.

(1) Resupply from the combat trains (emergency resupply). The combat trains has a limited amount of Class III and V for emergency resupply. The S4 coordinates emergency resupply from the combat trains and then refills or replaces the combat trains' assets.

(2) Pre-stocking. Pre-stocking is placing and concealing supplies on the battlefield. This normally is done during defensive operations when supplies are placed in subsequent battle positions.

(3) Mobile pre-positioning. This is similar to pre-stocking except that the supplies remain on the truck, which is positioned forward on the battlefield.

(1) MP patrolling and reconnaissance operations

(2) Hardening and dispersal actions.

(3) Cover and concealment.

(4) Deception.

(5) Immediate reaction to enemy threat or attack.

(1) All units must have routine techniques for conspicuously marking cleared rooms, floors, and buildings as they progress through an urban area.

(2) Marking procedures must be automatic, practiced, and discernable at night. Soldiers must be able to understand these procedures with limited preparation time.

(3) During MOUT operations, units should develop a numbering and marking system for all buildings and landmarks to simplify coordination of maneuver and supporting fires.

(1) Use engineers to emplace mines, boobytraps, barbed wire, trip flares, or other obstacles to deter use of the sewer system.

(2) If necessary, remove manhole covers, lower lights on wires, and maintain a 24-hour watch over the open holes. Use 20-minute shifts to maintain soldier alertness.

(3) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of underground facilities.

(1) Treat rooftops as danger areas.

(2) Maintain dispersion and cover while on rooftops. Designate weapon systems to provide covering and suppressive fire, if needed.

(3) Expect the possibility that one sniper might be luring soldiers into the sights of another sniper in a nearby building.

(1) To avoid interference with the communications of host nations, frequencies must be cleared with the host government. Because of this there is a security risk. Direct references to the identity of call signs and codes can compromise security. Any breach must be reported to the force headquarters. Most peacekeeping forces normally use fixed call signs and frequencies. Remember that this allows the belligerents to monitor and/or jam communications.

(2) In multination operations, each national contingent of the peacekeeping force is responsible for providing its own internal communications systems. Because these systems are for national use only, the nation's native language and radio procedures are used. Normally, one nation will be tasked to furnish communications to the joint force headquarters and common communications equipment to all nations in the force for C².

(3) For SASO, deploy with redundant communications assets. Be prepared to provide communication packages to liaison personnel. For peace enforcement operations, be prepared to employ normal US secure communications to protect forces and to control combat operations.

(1) Operators must use the upper end of the VHF band and high-power switches on radios to improve communications.

(2) Commanders must be prepared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communication. They must set limited objectives, covering a small area, and plan for the frequent relocating of rebroadcast stations to ensure communications.

(3) Ground and heliborne retrans stations must be used to maintain communications.

(4) If time and the battle situation allow, maximum use should be made of the civilian telephone system, if it is operational.

(5) EW may be used as a major part in the urban environment.

(1) The sniper rifle can best be used to pick off belligerent leaders or key individuals and to keep armored vehicles buttoned up. Also it can be used effectively in a countersniper role.

(2) Machineguns are the main supporting weapon in urban fighting. About 100 rounds of 7.62 millimeters (mm) can create a hole 1 foot in diameter in a brick wall 20 inches thick. Another 300 rounds can enlarge the hole to 2 feet by shifting the point of aim and firing in a spiral method.

(3) The 60mm mortar is effective in providing smoke; it can be fired low angle against the sides of buildings to achieve a shorter range than would otherwise be possible. The high explosive (HE) round is invaluable for firing over buildings and reaching dug-in belligerents in gardens and similar types of enclosed cover.

(4) The grenade is a basic tool for house and room clearance. The destructive effect is determined by the type of construction in the structure. Grenade launchers also are extremely valuable in urban areas because of the variety of rounds available.

(5) The light antitank weapon (LAW) and antitank (AT)-4 weapons have a primary purpose of disabling or killing lightly armored vehicles. They can be fired through windows or doors to eliminate snipers. High explosive antitank ( HEAT) rounds are unsuitable for making entry holes through brick or concrete walls.

(6) Claymore mines are well suited for protective obstacles. They are suited for not only above ground but also on rooftops and in underground facilities such as sewers and subways. They cannot breach wire obstacles such as chain-link fence.

(1) Adapt the building for multilayered fire. Most weapons, including antitank and medium machineguns, will be on the ground floor and in the semi-basement. Snipers and automatic riflemen (with grenades and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs)) will fire from upper stories. Attics can be used for mortar positions and for AD weapons (heavy machineguns and hand-held surface-to-air-missile systems (SAMSs)).

(2) Block doors and windows with sandbags, bricks, or earth-filled furniture. Fire from openings created in the sandbags or cut through walls. Create false openings to draw fire; cover real ones when not in usewith suitably painted plywood.

(3) Reinforce floors and firing positions to reduce the effects of collapse as a result of shell fire. Cover floors with up to 1.5 meters of earth or two layers of sandbags.

(4) Remove stairways to complicate enemy clearing. Use ladders for Internal movement between floors. Outside fire escapes should be blocked with wire or booby traps.

(5) To reduce the effect of flame attack, remove combustible materials or cover them with earth. Shields can be placed in front of openings. Underground shelters should have 15 to 20 centimeter-high walls of earth in front of their entrances to stop napalm.

(6) Make basements, storerooms, medical points, and command posts into shelters against bombardment. Every underground facility must have at least two exits. The exits should go in different directions; at least one should be in the form of a covered connecting passage whose exit is beyond the possible distance of collapsing rubble (i.e., two thirds the height of the nearest building).

(7) Give ground floor exits blast-proof protection and have them lead to a communications trench.

(1) While well-meaning, commanders must focus on the primary mission; they must not be distracted by missions that correctly belong to the HROs.

(2) Assisting the HROs in their efforts-not usurping the HROs mission-is the best way commanders can perform their mission and assuage their conscience.

(3) Soldiers of all ranks and responsibilities, as well as the suffering population, should be reminded of their obligation to accomplish the mission, and where the dividing line falls.

(1) Units will have to conduct patrols during peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping patrols perform a dual mission of showing the flag and monitoring any agreements. The patrols may move on foot, be mounted in vehicles or in light aircraft or utility helicopters. Peacekeeping patrols normally will be only overt and conducted during the day. When planning for peacekeeping patrol, remember-

(2) Major considerations for peacekeeping patrols include-

(1) Use the normal combat patrolling techniques and procedures during peace enforcement operations.

(2) Apply aggressive patrolling tactics to deter hostile acts by the belligerent forces.

(1) Peacekeeping officers may find themselves in the role of negotiator, mediator, and even arbitrator at the point of confrontation. If possible, negotiations on matters affecting both parties should be carried out jointly with the two sides. On occasion, relations between them may be so strained that the peacekeeper has to serve as an intermediary. A peacekeeping negotiator must be firm, fair, and polite if he is to gain and keep the trust of both parties. The negotiator must be amaster of detail, tact, and patience. He must have a sense of proportion, resourcefulness, objectivity, and impartiality. On matters of principle, he must be insistent without being belligerent. He must be careful not to pass the confidences of one side on to the other. If officers become negotiators in a tense situation, they must remember the following lessons:

(2) Some helpful hints for conducting negotiations are as follows:

(3) Prepare for the negotiation:

(4) Conduct negotiations:

(1) Select sites for the firefinder radars that are on prominent terrain. This is necessary to get the screening crest as low as possible. The Firefinder Q-36 radar may need to be placed in a city or town. If so, it may have to be air-lifted onto the top of a building to gain coverage of the surrounding area.

(2) Redundant overlap coverage of firefinder systems may be required. It is difficult to obtain a low and consistent screening crest in mountainous terrain. A too low screening crest drives the search beam into the ground. A too high screening crest allows the belligerents to fire under the beam and avoid detection. The Q-36 system will not accept more than a 30-mil variance in the screening crest. The Firefinder Q-37 radar system will not accept more than a 54-mil variance.

(3) Ensure that firefinder radars in the area do not face one another and radiate at the same time. This causes interference and emissions burnout; it results in equipment failure. If radars need to face one another to accomplish the mission, coordinate to ensure they do not radiate at the same time.

(4) Use digital radar maps to minimize the time required for height correction of the weapon system. Digital maps allow the firefinder systems to initially locate weapon systems to within 250 meters. This allows the operator to make only two or three visual altitude adjustments to accurately locate the weapon system.

(5) Mountainous areas have unique weather conditions that affect ballistics drastically. Wind speed and direction can vary considerably depending on datum plane and which side of the mountain you occupy. Frequent meteorological (MET) messages are essential; the FDO should consider registering to improve accuracy.

(6) Consider angle of fall in each fire mission to determine the best method of engagement and unit to fire. When firing against the opposite slope of a ridge or mountain, the angle of fall can be critical to successful target engagement. When shooting, low-angle, large-range probable errors may be caused by the terrain.

(1) Suppression of artillery used to harass population centers and airfields will be a formidable task during peace enforcement operations. It cannot be suppressed by air power alone. When faced with an air threat and counterbattery threat, belligerents will seek to protect their artillery by exploiting its high mobility (especially the mortars) and using concealment offered by terrain. Weapons may be deployed individually, rather than in batteries. Weapons may re-deploy from one camouflaged position to another after firing a few rounds. Weapons may be located in populated areas such as near schools, hospitals, or other restricted fire areas. This complicates the delivery of counterbattery fire through fear of inflicting civilian casualties and collateral damage.

(2) To deal with such an artillery threat, the force should deploy artillery-locating radars and howitzers, as well as artillery forward observers. These, in turn, will require considerable numbers of infantry to protect them. The forces required to achieve and maintain suppression of belligerent artillery to a distance of 20 km of their target areas could be very substantial; they could impose a logistic burden that would threaten to use up the resources needed for security of any humanitarian relief operations.

(3) The Firefinder Radars (Q36/Q37) are effective in the detection of belligerent indirect fire units. They are positioned in a manner to ensure the immediate detection of units firing on critical facilities such as embassies, headquarters, airfields, and hospitals. The radar's position requires careful coordination with coalition radars and any joint or combined targeting cells.

(4) Techniques for suppressing artillery follow.

(1) The aviation LO should coordinate flight corridors between each cease-fire sector. Expect limitations on the use of flight corridors times such as from 0700 to 1900 each day. Coordination must be made with belligerent military forces and with normal civilian air traffic controllers. Consider linking the flight corridors to the friendly convoy routes. They can be mutually supporting to peacekeeping operations.

(2) The night infrared (IR) archlight mounted on a helicopter should be used to enhance the visibility of soldiers with NVDs. The use of regular white-light searchlights also can enhance night operations depending on the ADA threat.

(3) Navigation is crucial and often difficult. Expect existing navigational aids to be either turned off or destroyed. Fit all aircraft with GPS to assist with navigation.

(4) Helicopters should have the usual indentification friend or foe (IFF) transponder codes for AD and air traffic control (ATC). One of the problems they have is that nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying could be construed by ground forces as aggressive. So they may have to fly high, out of range of small arms fire.

(5) C² aircraft communications assets will be upgraded based on METT-T. Some systems may work better in mountainous terrain than in desert environments. Consider using INMARSAT, TACSAT, and high frequency (HF) radios.

(1) Landmines will continue be a significant threat to future force projection operations and stability and support operations. In every major peacekeeping arena from Cambodia to Bosnia, mines and fabricated explosives continue to take a toll on troops and civilians.

(2) Units should train on detection, removal, cleared route marking, proofing and area clearance operations. Develop unit drills for dealing with mines and unexploded ordnance.

(3) Heavy mine-clearing capability-such as mine plows and mine-clearing line charges (MICLICs)-may not be appropriate during SASO, when MSR road surfaces should not be destroyed.

(4) Exploitation of human intelligence (HUMINT) is a good source of information of suspected minefield locations.

(5) Look for signs of mining activities, which include dead animals, craters, blown vehicles, disturbed soil, etc.

(6) Helicopters trying to find a suitable landing zone should consider landing in fields with grazing animals. If the animals move about the field without detonating mines when the helicopter begins its approach, the field should be considered safe for landing.

(1) Antitank and antiarmor.

(2) Intimidation of belligerent forces.

(3) Heavy weapons support to infantry fighting vehicles.

(4) Target acquisition especially at night using thermal sights.

(5) Survivable to mines and light AT weapons.

(6) Provide advanced guard support to convoys.

(7) Provide support during search and attack operations.

(8) Protect infantry against automatic weapons fire.

(1) Armor/Mech can be rapidly emplaced at decisive points throughout sector to support threatened United Nations (UN) forces.

(2) Heavy forces have extremely high visibility; they can deter aggression by belligerent forces (consider firepower demonstrations as a show of force).

(1) The enemy can focus on, isolate, and destroy armor forces in a piecemeal fashion.

(2) Tanks have limited bunker and building destruction capability.

(3) Tanks and other armored vehicles destroy the secondary roads and MSRs.

(4) The size of armored vehicles often block narrow country roads and can destroy private property during movement (may offset attempts to gain support of local civilians).

(1) Mobility is restricted because tanks are confined to roads or streets that often require clearance of debris, and possibly mines.

(2) When possible, tanks should take advantage of parks and gardens that offer the best fields of fire.

(3) Buildings may restrict the full traverse of the turret; therefore, elevation of the main armament may be insufficient to reach top floors and rooftops. However, the commander's machinegun is not so restricted.

(4) Tanks are particularly vulnerable to short-range antitank weapons. Their crews, if exposed, may become casualties from snipers. Tanks must, therefore, move through builtup areas buttoned up. They must move in short bounds using suppressive fire and be supported by other tanks.

(1) Clarify the commander's intent.

(2) Expose flaws or disconnected activities in the plan.

(3) Reinforce the scheme of maneuver.

(4) Focus on actions and decision points critical to accomplishing the mission given the unit's current state of training and expected terrain and weather conditions.

(5) Ensure that subordinate commanders explicitly understand their missions, how their missions relate to each other, and how each mission relates to their commander's plan.

(6) Provide feedback to the senior commander.

(1) Gives participants faith in their own plan's success as well as in their commander's plan.

(2) Provides subordinate commanders with purpose, direction, and motivation.

(3) Enables leaders to execute missions with speed, flexibility, and audacity.

(1) Full rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of the mission. However, it consumes the most time and resources; it involves every soldier and system taking part in the operation. If possible, units should conduct full rehearsal under the same conditions (weather, time of day, terrain, etc.) as the unit will encounter during the actual operation. For example, for range operations, units can conduct a full rehearsal over the actual terrain either in vehicles or in aircraft.

(2) Of all the rehearsal types, full rehearsal is the most difficult to accomplish.

(1) This rehearsal takes less time and resources than a full rehearsal, because it involves only the unit's key leaders. During key-leader rehearsal, the commander first decides the level of leader involvement he desires. His selected leaders then rehearse the plan using their assigned tactical vehicles or helicopters while traversing the actual terrain. Terrain requirements are the same as for a full rehearsal; only the number of participants changes. For example, the unit company commanders conduct a rehearsal for their companies at the range complex with the battalion commander.

(2) Because of the reduced number of participants, the key-leader rehearsal usually takes less time. In the training environment, commanders use the tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) technique as one way of conducting a key-leader rehearsal.

(1) This rehearsal takes less time and fewer resources than a key-leader rehearsal. If the modeler constructs the terrain model accurately, this rehearsal technique can significantly help subordinate leaders execute the training according to their commanders' intentions.

(2) When possible, place the terrain model where it overlooks the actual terrain of the AO. The model's orientation should coincide with the actual orientation of the terrain to help participants orient to the actual area of operations.

(3) The size of the terrain model can vary-from a simple table-top arrangement to a large model on which the participants can walk. A large model helps reinforce participants' perception of relative positions of units on the actual terrain. This rehearsal technique also helps participants visualize the execution of the mission.

(4) To create an accurate terrain model, the modeler (designated by the commander) completes the following steps:

(1) A sketch rehearsal takes less time and resources than a terrain-model rehearsal. Units can conduct this rehearsal almost anywhere, day or night. The procedures are the same as for a terrain-model rehearsal, except the commander uses a sketch for a model.

(2) Sketches must be large enough for all participants to see as the commander and his staff talk each subordinate leader through a sequential, interactive, verbal execution of the operation.

(1) A map rehearsal takes even less time and resources than a sketch map rehearsal. The unit can conduct a map rehearsal day or night. The procedures are similar to the sketch map rehearsal, except the commander uses a map and operation overlay of the same scale as he used to plan and control the operation. Using the map, the commander and his staff walk each subordinate leader through a sequential, interactive, verbal execution of the operation.

(2) To ensure clarity, the commander should conduct this rehearsal at a vantage point overlooking the terrain of the AO. He can use one of two commonly used map-rehearsal techniques. One has each subordinate leader following the rehearsal on his own map and overlay; the other involves laying the map and overlay horizontally, moving unit symbols across the map as in a wargame to show the planned sequence of action-reaction-counteraction following the range synchronization matrix.

(1) Communications are critical during range operations. The commander may decide to exercise communications links between various facilities (TAC CP, TOC, Rear CP, etc.) using a radio rehearsal.

(2) The commander and his staff conduct radio rehearsals by interactively and verbally executing critical portions of the operation over established communications nets. This is accomplished in a general sequence of events that the range operations order establishes. When used, these rehearsals should include all communications facilities and equipment necessary to conduct that actual portion of the operation. To be effective, all participants must have working communications equipment and a copy of the OPORD and synchronization matrix.

(3) This type of rehearsal generally takes less time and fewer resources than other types of rehearsals (except for the backbrief); however, this may not always be the case at higher command echelons.

(1) This type of rehearsal takes the least time and resources. The commander, along with his subordinates, can use it to identify flaws or problems in the operation but to a lesser degree than in other types of rehearsals. Also, this technique allows the commander to clarify his intent early in his subordinates' decision making process. A backbrief is effective when used with another type of rehearsal. The commander can conduct the backbrief day or night, in person, or by radio or landline.

(2) During the backbrief, each subordinate commander briefs the commander on how he intends to accomplish his mission before be issues his OPORD to his respective unit. By briefing and explaining his intent and concept of operation to his higher commander, the higher commander ensures that his subordinate commander's intent is properly nested with that of his own. Flaws or potential problems with the operation may also be revealed at this time.

(1) Orient participants to the training aid and the terrain.

(2) Define the standard (that is, what the commander will accept as satisfactory performance for the rehearsal).

(3) Visualize and synchronize the concept of operation. Verbally walk through the concept of operation. Subordinate commanders should interactively verbalize their unit's actions, entering or leaving the discussion at the time they would expect to begin or end their tasks or activities during the operation. This will help the commander assess the adequacy of synchronization.

(4) Focus on the key events and the synchronization required to achieve the mission.

(5) Address any points in the operation where the execution of branches or sequels are likely to occur. This includes critical points where slowdowns will likely occur and influence the operation.

(6) If the standard is not met and time permits, rehearse again.

(7) For feedback, make the necessary changes to the synchronization matrix.

(1) The rehearsal leader introduces himself and all other participants as appropriate. He then-

(2) If the subordinate unit recommends a change to the existing plan, the commander or the S3 acts on what he recommends before the rehearsal begins (when possible). However, before the rehearsal ends, a decision will resolve the recommendation.

(3) The rehearsal leader gives an orientation to familiarize participants with the terrain or scale model in use. He also issues supplemental materials, if appropriate. He identifies magnetic north on the terrain model or scaled terrain and points out objects and terrain features representing actual terrain features. He also explains whatever graphic control symbols, obstacles, or FS targets are represented. The rehearsal leader always concludes the orientation with a call for questions.

(1) This meeting also allows the commander to issue instructions or reminders and to reiterate his intent. Subordinate commanders incorporate any changes the commander makes to the existing plan into their units' orders and plans. Such changes are also briefed to any key leader or unit that did not take part in the rehearsal.

(2) Changes to the plan should serve as refinements to that plan; they should not be characteristically radical or significant. Changes that are not critical to the execution of the operation can confuse subordinates and desynchronize the plan and, therefore, should be resisted. Before the rehearsal is ever executed, the plan or order should be developed with at least the basic five paragraphs and necessary overlays issued or published. Publication of all annexes may not yet be completed; however, the details should already be developed.

(1) A vehicle's first-aid box painted brown on the outside except for the two locking tabs that are white. White tabs on the kit box enable a user to quickly open and close it in the dark.) The box's interior is also white.

(2) A small-arms repair parts box. This small box fits inside the first-aid kit; it can hold miniature vehicle replicas and map symbology such as-

• AAs.
• Checkpoints.
• CPs.
• Coordinating points.
• Decontamination points.
• Engagement areas.
• Passage points.
• Objectives.
• Unit symbols.

(3) Miniature vehicle replicas, like those used in the Dunn-Kempf simulation (micro armor).

(4) A map protractor to which is attached a brightly colored (orange, red, yellow) thread about 1/2-meter long.

(5) Cotton balls, to simulate smoke.

(6) String (gridlines).

(7) Lacing wire, to simulate wire obstacles.

(8) Tongue depressors, to simulate bridges and breaches.

(9) Pipe cleaners, in assorted colors.

(10) Powdered chalk, in watertight containers such as tubes. The kit must contain blue, red, white, and black (charcoal) chalk.

(11) A pencil sharpener, to grind stick chalk into powder.