IN0822 Lesson 2

LESSON 2

CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

TASK

Identify the considerations and techniques for planning, preparing, and conducting tactical defensive and retrograde operations, and joint, combined, and contingency operations.

CONDITIONS

Given the subcourse material for this lesson, a training scenario and extracts, as applicable, the student will complete the practice exercise at the end of this lesson.

STANDARD

The student will demonstrate his comprehension and knowledge of the task by identifying the considerations and techniques for planning, preparing, and conducting tactical defensive and retrograde operations, and joint, combined, and contingency operations.

REFERENCE

FM 71-1

FM 71-2

FM 100-5

GENERAL

During this lesson, you will learn about the conduct of defensive operations. In addition, you will study the considerations and techniques for conducting retrograde operations. Finally, you will learn of the standing arrangements for joint and combined operations and some of the considerations involved in contingency operations.

Learning Event 1:
IDENTITY THE CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The defender uses his prepared positions and knowledge of the ground to slow the attacker's momentum and to strike him with repeated, unexpected blows. He disrupts the attacker's synchronization, and degrades his strength and ability to concentrate forces. The attacker's force is then defeated with effective maneuver supported by flexible firepower. The defender need not kill every enemy tank, squad, or fieldpiece. He need only destroy the ability of the enemy force to sustain forward movement.

TACTICAL DEFENSE

Tactical defenses will occur in both offensive and defensive campaigns. Subordinate units of a defending force may be ordered to attack, delay, withdraw, screen, or defend. This is accomplished in execution of the overall commander's plan. The purpose of the force's operations, however, will remain to stop or to defeat the attacker.

Defensive doctrine is not prescriptive. Area and mobile defense are the two general forms of defense at the tactical level. This leaves the commander great freedom in formulating and conducting his defense. He may elect to defend well forward by striking the enemy as he approaches. He may opt to fight the decisive battle within the main battle area; if he does not have to hold a specified area or position, he may draw the enemy deep into the area of operations and then strike his flanks and rear. He may even choose to pre-empt the enemy with spoiling attacks when conditions favor such tactics. In the past, all four methods have proven effective.

Brigades and divisions perform major defensive tasks for their superior headquarters. They are normally responsible for substantial sectors of a defense or serve as reserves. Brigades, like cavalry regiments, may also serve as covering forces or security elements, operating forward or to the rear of the main battle area (MBA). Maneuver battalions defend as part of a larger force. They perform a single task as part of their brigade's mission. They defend, delay, attack, or screen. Battalions provide for their own security and support in any operation, and may retain reserves. Their main role is to coordinate with other battalions in the brigade's defense.

Success is based on a simple concept of operations, flexible enough to meet the enemy wherever he chooses to attack. The commander tailors his defensive concept to his specific situation, paying particular attention to the wise use of available time.

PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE

Planning for defense begins when a commander receives a mission to defend, or perceives a need to do so. The commander then formulates a plan for the defense which is guided in the design of his plan by the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The plan is further refined by other considerations developed in his estimate of the situation.

Mission

The first consideration in planning the defense is the mission. It defines the area to be defended or the force to be defeated. It must be analyzed in terms of the higher commander's overall scheme. Defending broad frontages forces the commander to accept gaps. Defending shallow sectors or positions reduces flexibility. It requires the commander to fight well forward. Narrow frontages and deep sectors increase the elasticity of the defense. It also increases the number of options available. In planning his defense, the commander also considers possible subsequent missions.

Enemy

The enemy's doctrine, habits, equipment, and probable courses of action must also be considered in planning the defense. Defending commanders must look at themselves and their sectors through the enemy commander's eyes. They must look for vulnerabilities that the enemy may exploit and must act to counter them. They should also identify probable enemy objectives and approaches to them. In a defense against an echeloned enemy, they must know how soon follow-on forces can join the attack. If enemy follow-on forces can be delayed, the attack may be defeated in detail, one echelon at a time. If the defender can force the enemy to commit follow-on echelons sooner than planned, the attacker's timetable can be upset. This creates exploitable gaps between the committed and subsequent echelons.

Terrain (and Weather)

Terrain and weather also play a vital role in planning for the defense. The enemy seeks to maintain the momentum through mass and maneuver. The defending force exploits any aspect of the terrain that interferes with this action. Defenders must engage the attacker at points where the terrain puts him at the greatest disadvantage. Controlling key terrain is vital to a successful defense. Some terrain may be so significant to the defense that its loss would prove decisive. In a division or corps sector, decisive, terrain is made a focal point of the defense.

Weather and visibility affect how defenders organize the ground. Commanders at all levels must take its effects into account as they analyze terrain. The defending commander should use reinforcing obstacles to improve the natural structure of terrain. Reinforcing obstacles are also used to slow or canalize enemy movement, and to protect friendly positions and maneuver.

Troops

The commander must also consider the nature of his force. The mobility, protection, morale, and training of his troops determine, to some extent, how he will defend. Armor and mechanized forces can move on the battlefield even under artillery fire. The infantry cannot. Infantry can fight effectively in close terrain and urban areas which limit mounted units. Differences in mobility, training, and leadership make some units more suitable for some missions than for others. The defender has a relative strength/skill advantage over the attacker. Relative strengths, such as skill in night combat, infiltration, long-range fires or air assault, may give the defender an advantage over the attacker. This possible advantage should be exploited in designing the defense.

Time Available

The amount of time to prepare is a crucial factor in organizing a defense. When time is available for reconnaissance and occupation of positions, for fortifying the ground, for fire planning, for installing obstacles, and for coordination of maneuver, fires, and logistic support, the defense will be far more effective. To gain time for organization of the main battle area (MBA), the commander may order a delay by a covering force. Lack of time may cause a commander to maintain a larger-than-normal reserve force or to accept greater risks than usual. Time is a critical element for the defender and cannot be wasted. Small units must be capable of defense with minimal preparation. Commanders must recognize, however, that strong defenses take time to organize and prepare.

Formulating a Defensive Plan

Based on his analysis, the commander completes his estimate of the situation and formulates a concept of defense. He decides how to defeat the enemy. He also determines where to concentrate his effort, and where to take risks. He then assigns missions and allocates forces based on tasks within the framework of the overall defense. At this time, combat support and combat service support resources are apportioned.

A defensive plan is based on locating, containing, and defeating the attacker's main and supporting efforts. The commander must make use of every resource available to him to offset the attacker's numerical advantage. The defender must use all available assets to identify dangerous threats, and mass combat power against the vulnerabilities of the enemy force. The enemy has the ability to project combat power in the defender's rear area by using long-range fires, infiltration, air mobility, and unconventional warfare. Defensive planners must anticipate these threats and develop their plans accordingly.

Defensive planning should accentuate the natural strengths of the defending force and terrain. Mechanized forces should use their mobility, protection, and long-range fires to fight fluid defenses. They should avoid the enemy's strongest forces and strike at those least prepared to fight. Infantry forces should capitalize on their ability to hold ground and mass fires. They should seek to stop the enemy in restrictive terrain and destroy him while he is bogged down. Mixed forces should combine the advantages of light and heavy units. Infantry units are used in static positions to break the tempo of the attack. Mechanized forces and aviation units are used to strike at vulnerable spots. Air assault forces can be inserted between enemy units. Artillery and air fires can magnify the effects of direct fires or isolate segments of the attacking force.

The terrain of the sector influences the design of the defense. Natural obstacles and available cover, concealment, and movement must be exploited. The natural obstacles of a sector must be reinforced with man-made obstacles. This will enhance the strength of defensive positions and protect the defender's maneuver. The effects of terrain in the deep and rear battle are equal in importance to the effects of terrain in the covering force area (CFA) and MBA, and must not be overlooked.

The commander implements his concept of operations by assigning missions to subordinate units. Missions for divisions and brigades generally require subordinate units to perform a single function in the defense. Examples include delaying the enemy, stopping the enemy forward of a key feature, or counterattacking in a specified area.

Commanders task organize based on the missions they have assigned their subordinates. Corps and division commanders divide their sectors into a security area, MBA, and rear area. Their deep operations are well forward of the security area. They assign sectors within the security area and MBA to their maneuver units. Obstacles are planned throughout the sector to support the concept operation.

Brigades and battalions commonly use sectors and battle positions to control their maneuver units in defense. Divisions and corps rely chiefly on sectors and phase lines to control their operations. They may designate, on occasion, battle positions or strongpoints in vital places. Reserve positions are designated at all levels. Plans are developed for reserve maneuver and aviation units. These plans include counterattack or blocking options with necessary control measures and fire support plans.

Fire support planning in defense must be flexible enough to permit the massing of fire on any approach in the sector. Usually, the unit making the main effort has the initial priority of fires. Fire planners make provisions to shift that priority to other sectors or to the rear area if necessary.

The commander plans deep operations to support his specific concept of defense in all its phases. Because the enemy has the initiative in the first stages of battle, plans for deep operations must be flexible enough to support a defense in any sector.

Whatever technique of defense the commander may choose, his overall scheme should maximize the use of maneuver and offensive tactics. The full advantage of awaiting the attack is realized once the enemy has committed his forces. The defender's chief advantage then becomes his ability to seize the initiative and to counterattack over familiar ground while he is protected by his own defensive positions, artillery, obstacles, and ADA.

Because the effective use of time is so important in defense, commanders must use warning orders. Current task organizations, unit locations, and the natural obstacles available in their locations, and the natural obstacles available in their sectors are considered as they plan the defense. Unnecessary changes in organization and time consuming movements should be avoided. Subordinates must receive orders as quickly as possible if they are to gain the full benefit of time.

Finally, defending commanders must mask their preparations from the enemy. They should mount active deception and counterreconnaissance operations as they prepare. Commanders must assume that the enemy will have sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition means. Therefore, they should deploy their units in ways that conceal the design of the defense.

THREAT ATTACK PLANNING

When planning, preparing, and executing the defensive operation, the commander must know how the threat will attack. This knowledge leads to an identification of probable courses of action, weakness, and vulnerabilities of the threat attack.

THREAT OFFENSIVE TACTICS

The following principles guide the Soviet tactical offensive operations:

Mass. Victory is most easily and economically achieved by overwhelming the enemy with numbers.

Momentum. Numbers with speed destroy an enemy quickly. Although losses may be high at first, quick collapse of the enemy makes the mass-speed combination more economical in the long run. Soviet forces will bypass significant resistance and reinforce success to increase momentum.
Continuous combat. By applying mass continuously--night, day, bad weather, limited visibility--he expects to achieve and sustain momentum, overwhelm our forces, and destroy our ability and will to defend.

To achieve mass, momentum, and continuous combat, Soviet forces rely on intelligence provided by reconnaissance units. His reconnaissance will be the first enemy you see unless our security elements have destroyed them. Soviet reconnaissance forces are task-organized into reconnaissance groups and patrols:

A reconnaissance group is a temporary tactical subunit formed from a reinforced platoon or company. Reconnaissance groups normally conduct reconnaissance by a combination of observation and fighting for information.

A separate reconnaissance patrol is a temporary tactical subunit composed of a reinforced squad or platoon. A separate reconnaissance patrol accomplishes its mission by observation, but may use reconnaissance by fire to obtain information.

A combat reconnaissance patrol is a small reinforced subunit used to gain information by causing the opposing force to react, revealing his dispositions, strength, and fire plan. This type of patrol conducts its reconnaissance by employing fire and maneuver against known or suspected opposing positions.

Soviet reconnaissance units generally seek to avoid sustained combat. They cross open areas at high speeds, using bounds to cross compartmented or broken terrain. At vantage points, observers dismount from their vehicles to get better observation. They may use feints and flanking maneuvers to try to determine your strength, composition, and disposition, and find a way to bypass your positions.

Soviet forces use three basic formations to conduct offensive operations: march, prebattle, and attack.

March formation normally consists of the following elements:

Reconnaissance.

Advance guard and forward security elements (figure 5).

Flank security elements.

Main body.

Rear security element.

When moving as an advance guard, a Soviet battalion deploys a combat reconnaissance patrol ahead of its forward security element. The company reconnaissance patrol's mission is to find the company teams' positions, the number and type of the company team's weapons, and the location of the company team's obstacles. The combat reconnaissance patrol belongs to the lead company in the battalion. It normally consists of a tank or motorized squad. The combat reconnaissance patrol moves 5 to 10 kilometers forward of the forward security element (forward of the forward edge of the battle area [FEBA]) when a meeting engagement is anticipated.

The next element in the battalion march formation is the forward security element. It normally consists of a reinforced company capable of fighting independently for a limited time. In addition to tanks and motorized rifle troops, the forward security element normally has an attached artillery battery, engineer platoon(-), chemical defense platoon(-), and possibly a mortar battery. When you can identify artillery and engineer vehicles, you have made contact with the forward security element. Report this to the task force commander. Reporting contact with the forward security element tells the task force commander where the enemy's initial main effort is coming from. It may also trigger other actions in the task force commander's scheme of maneuver.

Flank and rear security elements move up to 3 kilometers from the march column. The mission of the flank and rear security elements is to provide early warning to the main body and give the main body enough time to deploy.

The advance guard battalion main body consists of the remaining elements of the tank and motorized rifle companies that are not contained in the security elements. The advance guard also contains an artillery battalion (minus the battery attached to the forward security element), an antiaircraft section, an antitank platoon (if the advanced guard is part of a motorized rifle regiment), and the battalion rear services.

Once the advance guard battalion is committed, the battalions in the regiment main force begin to deploy and prepare to attack. When Soviet battalions in a march formation deploy for an attack, they assume the prebattle formation.

When deploying into prebattle formation, the Soviet battalions disperse laterally and in depth. Lateral deployment is conducted so companies and platoons can assume attack formation without further lateral deployment. While in prebattle formation, Soviet units use the terrain to mask movement. Soviet units travel along covered and concealed routes to minimize their exposure to long-range weapon systems. Dispersion between Soviet companies is normally 500 to 800 meters, depending on the terrain. Deployment into company columns is normally completed 4 to 6 kilometers from the opposing positions. (Figure 6 shows examples of typical Soviet battalion prebattle formations.)

Soviet companies deploy into company columns initially, then form platoon columns. Company prebattle formations are shown in figure 7. Companies deploy into platoon columns 1.5 to 4 kilometers from the opposing positions.

Attack formation is assumed 1,000 meters or less from opposing positions, depending on the terrain. Platoons disperse laterally into line formation. Figure 8 shows different company attack formations. Tank platoons lead, followed by BTRs and BMPs at a 100- to 400-meter distance. Motorized rifle platoon frontages are normally 100 to 200 meters. Tank platoons reinforcing a motorized rifle company may occupy up to a 400-meter frontage.

SOVIET ATTACK OF A DEFENDING ENEMY

Battalions attacking in the regimental first echelon normally have the mission to attack through defensive positions to continue the attack in an assigned direction. As shown in figure 9, a battalion can attack with three reinforced companies in a single echelon, plus a small (platoon-size) reserve. It can also attack in two echelons, with 1 to 3 kilometers separating each echelon in depth. The overall battalion frontage ranges from 1 to 2 kilometers, with companies attacking on a 500- to 800-meter front.

CS for the battalion attack is provided by organic mortars, ATGM, and attached artillery, air defense, and engineers. Regimental antitank subunits are normally held back as an antitank reserve to react to counterattacks on the flanks of the line of attack.

An artillery battalion may be attached to a battalion attacking in the regimental first echelon. This artillery fires and displaces at the direction of the maneuver battalion commander and is often used in the direct-fire role.

First echelon battalions may also have two to four self-propelled antiaircraft guns (ZSU) attached. The ZSUs follow about 400 meters behind the battalion first echelon, with 150 to 250 meters between vehicles. If you have attack helicopters or close air support, these are priority targets; otherwise, you can ignore these vehicles until more dangerous systems have been eliminated.

Attached engineers provide sappers and line charges to clear minefields. These troops normally ride in BTR-60 type vehicles, dismounting to clear and mark obstacles. Additionally, mine rollers and mine plows may be mounted on tanks to conduct breaches. Kill them first and you seriously reduce the enemy's ability to breach your obstacles.

PLANNING FOR TASK FORCE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The defense is planned in detail, but the commander must remain flexible and willing to deviate from the plan when circumstances dictate or opportunities present themselves.

Planning

The brigade order must be analyzed not only for specified and implied tasks but also for intent and the maneuver required to accomplish that intent. The following questions may assist the planner in this analysis.

Is decisive engagement to be accepted, or is freedom of maneuver to be retained?

How are the brigade and division going to create weaknesses? How and with what forces are they going to attack weaknesses?

How are counterattacks to be conducted, coordinated, and supported?

How is the task force to tie in with adjacent units?

Is there decisive terrain to be retained?

What are subsequent missions? Contingency plans?

General battalion task force defensive missions include defend, delay, and counterattack.

The mission to defend can apply to a sector, a battle position, or a strongpoint.

Defense in sector requires the task force to defeat the attacker forward of the rear boundary. The task force may fight the battle using the entire depth of the sector consistent with the intent of the brigade commander and the requirement to tie in with adjacent units.

Defense of a battle position requires the task force to occupy a general location from which it can block an avenue of approach, fire into an assigned area, retain key terrain, or perform other tasks.

Defense of a strongpoint implies defense of an extensively fortified position that holds or controls decisive terrain or blocks an avenue of approach.

Delay missions allow the forfeiture of terrain to gain time. Delays shape and deplete the enemy while giving other friendly units time to prepare.

Counterattack can be by fire or maneuver (fire and movement).

Counterattack by fire requires movement to a position to destroy the attacker by fire. The enemy force is the primary objective. Terrain seized is important only for as long as the enemy can be engaged from that location.

Counterattack by maneuver implies the intent to close with and destroy the enemy or to capture key terrain.

Besides the basic mission of defend, delay, and counterattack, numerous other tasks may be specified or implied in the brigade order. Examples are assisting the passage of covering or security forces, providing security, preparing obstacles, and providing surveillance or intelligence.

DEFENSIVE IPB

During IPB, the commander and his staff consider weather, enemy, and terrain to determine and analyze ground and air avenues of approach. Specific considerations for the analysis of avenues of approach include the following.

Determining primary and secondary avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

Determining key and decisive terrain. The staff identifies areas along the avenues of approach where speed and deployment of enemy formations is limited and where formations are broken up and exposed to counterattack. Key and decisive terrain will facilitate blocking the avenue of approach.

Determining FROM THE ENEMY'S POINT OF VIEW--

Maneuver space. Considering choke points and natural obstacles how many armored vehicles and, hence, what size unit does each avenue of approach support?

Trafficability. How do soil trafficability, ruggedness of terrain, weather, and limited visibility affect movement rates?

Cover and concealment. What terrain allows movement as close to the defender as possible using column formations before deploying into assault formations?

Observation and fields of fire. What terrain is suitable for supporting direct fire by tanks, ATGMs, attack helicopters, or self-propelled artillery?

Key/decisive terrain. What terrain gives the enemy a decided advantage over the defender?

Limited visibility effects. Smoke, dust, fog, and darkness all affect movement. During such periods, roads, ridgelines, and other features that facilitate navigation increase the value of an avenue of approach.

Enemy air avenues of approach.

Determining possible and probable enemy courses of action.

Developing named areas of interest and target areas of interest to determine the attacker's intent and lessen friendly reaction time.

UNIT POSITIONING

The commander decides where to defeat the enemy based on IPB determination of avenues of approach, key terrain, and enemy vulnerabilities. He and his staff then develop course of action and determine tentative unit positions.

The task force commander arrays company-size forces against battalion-size avenues of approach. In doing this, he considers the positioning of platoons. The positions must provide for an integrated defense so that all available weapons systems can cover the approaches. Positioning should allow the shifting of fires and forces to meet enemy actions during the battle. Once this is completed, consideration is given to the formation of company teams.

The task force organizes and assigns missions in the defense based on the factors of METT-T and considers the following:

Dispersion. Units and weapons are dispersed laterally and in depth to reduce the enemy's ability to suppress, and to hit the enemy from multiple directions.

Cover and concealment. Elements are placed in positions where cover and concealment are available; obvious terrain is avoided. Hide positions are used. A technique to check the adequacy of concealment is to travel approaches from the enemy's direction of movement. Covered routes must be available to allow movement in and between positions and for maneuver against the enemy.

Flanking fire. Flanking fires are far more effective than frontal fires. Initial positioning of antiarmor weapons for long-range engagements is considered, but primary positions are normally picked to allow flanking fires from defilade positions.

Security. Position security must include patrolling, OPs, and other measures to provide security. Scouts may be augmented to perform counterreconnaissance tasks or company teams may be given security missions forward of the FEBA.

Ability to maneuver. Units must be able to concentrate on the avenues of approach being used by the enemy. To do this, on-order positions with sectors of fire and positions in depth are used.

Range of weapons systems. When selecting tentative positions for weapons systems, the task force commander must also consider the effective range and acquisition capabilities of each system. Tanks are positioned to begin engagement of enemy tanks at 2,500 meters. ITVs engage tanks out to 3,750 meters (3,000 preferred). GLLDs with their long-range designation capability (3,000 to 5,000 meters for moving or stationary targets respectively) and their requirement to be within 800 mils of the gun-target line may compete with ITVs for positioning. The BFV's 25-mm gun is effective against BMPs, BTRs, and BRDMs with a planning range of 1,700 meters. Dragons allow infantry to defeat flanked armor at ranges up to 1,000 (800 preferred) meters and light antitank weapons at ranges of 200 meters (150 preferred). Attack helicopters in an antitank role have a maximum range of 3,750 meters for the AH-1S and 5,000 meters for the AH-64. The commander considers these capabilities when selecting engagement areas, positioning obstacles, designing his defense, and issuing his engagement and withdrawal criteria.

Transition to limited visibility fighting positions. An attacker uses smoke and suppressive fire to limit visibility. The defenders must anticipate and be prepared to move rapidly to predetermined, limited visibility fighting positions.

Subordinate missions. The task force commander sets his scheme of maneuver into motion by assigning missions to company teams. He task-organizes to give each team the required assets. He allocates space using sectors, battle positions, and strongpoints, and gives specific tasks for each. Engagement areas, TRPs, terrain that must be held, and counterattack missions are also included as required. The task force commander states whether his company teams may accept decisive engagement. When explaining his concept, the task force commander states disengagement criteria. He informs each company team commander of the conditions under which to disengage (for example, when the enemy reaches a point on the ground, or after destroying a certain number of vehicles, or at a certain time or event, or do not disengage until ordered to do so).

In assigning a mission of holding terrain, the task force commander considers that significant time is required to hold a battle position and that more time and resources are required for a strongpoint. Infantry-pure companies or infantry-heavy teams are best suited for retain missions.

If there are more missions than combat elements available to perform them, a reserve may be designated and tasked to be prepared to perform these missions.

When assigning space, the task force commander ensures that company teams have room to position weapons and to disperse from enemy direct and indirect fires and observation. In relatively open terrain, the distance between ITVs, BFVs, and tanks should be about 150 meters. The commander must consider space requirements for alternate and supplementary positions when he allocates space.

Subordinates must know how the battle is to be fought and what their roles are to be. This includes knowledge of fire control measures (TRPs, EAs), areas to be covered by fire, requirements for obstacle emplacement, security, and be-prepared missions in priority.

The defense plans include the rapid maneuver of forces to attack the enemy's flanks and rear. Maneuver also serves to confuse the attacker, as when a unit moves from a position occupied initially with no intent to fight from it. The task force commander must plan and rehearse maneuver to the extent that time allows.

Tanks are a key element in counterattacks. They can fire on the move and have a faster rate of fire and shorter engagement time than missiles. Tanks should be used to cover the most dangerous armor avenues of approach, and the reserve force should be built around tanks.

Antitank missiles provide long-range fires but are limited by rate of fire and time of flight. They are positioned to maximize their standoff capacity, normally from flanking positions into relatively open areas that allow tracking. They may also be used as "sniper" weapons for destroying enemy reconnaissance or advance guard elements from alternate and supplemental positions without disclosing the defender's primary positions. ITVs should be employed in mass (in at least platoon strength) to maximize their effectiveness.

BFVs are used to provide TOW and 25-mm fires, but the need to keep them accessible to dismounted elements must be considered. The highly mobile BFV should be positioned to kill BMPs and BTRs both from defensive positions and in counterattacks. The scheme of maneuver should enhance the standoff, maneuverability, and night fighting advantage of the BFV over the BMP and BTR.

In defensive operations, the commander attempts to maximize the combat power of both the BFV and dismounted elements. Dismounted infantry defensive positions are selected to--

Defend positions against enemy infantry attack.

Provide security and gather intelligence by patrolling and establishing OPs, antiarmor ambushes, and roadblocks on secondary approaches.

Emplace, close, and defend obstacles.

Ambush and or destroy enemy armored vehicles with handheld antitank weapons.

Clear fields of fire.

Battle positions for dismounted infantry are chosen to hold, or deny, mounted and dismounted avenues of approach to key terrain. Positioning dismounted infantry on forward slopes may needlessly expose them to long-range direct and observed indirect fires. Positions well forward, to the flanks, or on reverse slopes that deny approaches to key decisive terrain avoid exposing dismounted infantry and provide cover and concealment. Dismounted infantry is best suited for close-in fighting on restrictive terrain with limited fields of fire. Dismounted infantry should be positioned so they can only be threatened inside the ranges of their antitank weapons.

When good infantry terrain is not available, but the terrain must be held and armor defeated, the infantry must have time to construct obstacles and strong fighting positions. This time factor must be considered in assigning on-order and subsequent battle positions to infantry. BFVs may be positioned on the forward slope, then displaced to positions on the flanks to overwatch the rear of the dismounted elements, where they can support by fire. BFVs may also be assigned separate sectors of fire. When separated from their dismounted infantry, BFVs must have routes that allow the elements to rejoin. These routes should be reconnoitered for day and night linkup.

Based on the TF reconnaissance and security plan, infantry provides OPs and patrols between battle positions to augment the efforts of the scouts. Infantry can be used to provide manpower for constructing obstacles, clearing fields of fire, securing obstacles, and closing lanes and gaps in obstacles. When assigning infantry additional tasks outside of their battle positions, the time to construct individual positions must be considered.

COMBAT SUPPORT

Fire Support.

Supporting fires are planned and used--

At long range to disrupt, slow, and disorganize the enemy and force him to button-up.

On likely enemy overwatch positions.

To provide illumination.

To cover disengagement, movements, and counterattacks.

Along covered avenues of approach to destroy enemy dismounted infantry. Mortars and field artillery are particularly effective against dismounted infantry. FPFs used to destroy assaulting infantry are planned close-in to battle positions and are fired to break the assault.

To defeat dismounted breaching.

To provide smoke for disengagement.

To deliver scatterable mines (FASCAM) on avenues of approach where movement is choked, and to close lanes, gaps, or enemy breaches in obstacles. FASCAM is most effective when tied in with other obstacles and covered by observation and direct fire.

To suppress enemy forward air defense.

The task force commander develops the fire support concept and tasks concurrently with the scheme of maneuver. The FSO then coordinates with the engineer, mortar platoon leader, FAC, S3 Air, and aviation liaison officer to develop an initial fire plan. This plan is refined based upon input from company commanders and FSOs. The company FSO executes fires. The task force commander and FSO may orchestrate this by establishing an event-oriented scheme of fire support. For example, "When the enemy lead MRC reaches Phase Line Red, Team A will fire target AB4200; when the enemy reaches and attempts to breach the obstacle, Company C will fire target AB4400; if the enemy attempts to bypass on the left, Company D will fire FASCAM at target AB4500."

If the task force is allocated field artillery priority targets, they are planned on the most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. They may be suballocated to units on these approaches. Priority targets are shifted as the battle develops. The commander also designates priority of fires, normally to the forward security force initially, then to the unit designated as the task force main effort.

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability.

Engineers. The commander establishes an overall priority of engineer tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved. Specific priorities may be further assigned to key pieces of engineer equipment. As an example, bulldozer priority may go to key tank fighting positions (survivability). While engineer squads begin work on obstacles (countermobility) and CEVs, bucket loaders, or back-hoes dig other fighting positions or clear routes between them (mobility). Priority tasks and allocation of engineer assets must support the main effort and work must begin as soon as possible.

The task force may provide manpower, additional equipment, and supplies to support the engineer effort. Obstacles support the main effort in the defense. An obstacle is any obstruction that delays, canalizes, or restricts movement or maneuver. Obstacles are grouped into two categories -- existing and reinforcing. Considerations in the use of obstacles are

Obstacles are integrated into the scheme of maneuver and used by defending forces to canalize the enemy into areas where he is the most vulnerable to concentrated direct fires and to hold him there as long as possible.

Obstacles are planned where they can be observed and covered by direct fire and are designated as indirect fire targets. A specific company team is assigned responsibility for protecting each obstacle. This includes protecting the obstacle during limited visibility, and checking it at first light to ensure that it has not been breached.

Point obstacles placed at irregular patterns can be used along secondary restrictive approaches to slow movement. These might not always be covered by direct fire.

Emplacement time is reduced and effectiveness increased when obstacles reinforce natural or cultural obstacles. Each individual obstacle must be carefully designed for the location it will occupy, and must overlap on each side with the existing obstacle it will complete. The critical width of an obstacle is the distance from an existing obstacle to another existing obstacle (or to another reinforcing obstacle), and not the width of a road or highway through the existing obstacle.

Obstacles must not hinder friendly movement. Lanes and gaps through obstacles may be needed to allow movement. If so, a plan must prescribe who closes the lane or gap, the criteria, the signal, and when and where to report the closure. Company team commanders usually control and close gaps and lanes in their areas.

Obstacles are employed in depth. Obstacles must be far enough apart so that each one will require a new deployment of the enemy's counterobstacle force and equipment.

Hasty protective minefields are used for short periods or for specific missions. They can be laid by company teams without regard to any standard pattern or density. Mines must be readily detectable and removable by the installing unit. Normally, mines carried on fighting vehicles are used for hasty protective minefields.

Obstacles are emplaced to surprise the enemy. Security forces must be forward to deter enemy observation of obstacle construction. Obstacles should be in defilade and camouflaged if possible.

Dummy obstacles can be used to confuse the enemy.

The exact position of obstacles is coordinated between the engineer, company team commander, and the FSO to ensure adequate coverage. Since planned obstacle sites are often adjusted on the ground to accommodate direct fire coverage, the FSO must reconfirm target locations after obstacles are emplaced.

In addition to siting obstacles to increase the effectiveness of direct fires, the commander maximizes the effectiveness of the obstacles by use of indirect fire support.

-- Smoke can be used to conceal the location of obstacles.

-- FASCAM, planned by engineers, can be used to cut escape routes or reinforce obstacles already in place.

-- FA and mortars can slow or stop dismounted breaching efforts.

If covered routes out of and into battle positions are not available, these may receive a priority as well. Emphasis is on improving or maintaining existing routes rather than constructing new ones. Selective cutting in forests can provide an umbrella over the routes to keep them from being seen from the air.

Protective positions for infantry and dismounted TOWs are constructed using available material that will support at least 18 inches of sandbags, rock, or dirt on top. This will protect against shrapnel from air bursts, but not direct hits. Fighting positions for vehicles are constructed with both hull-down and turret-down locations. Berms are not created since the freshly dug ground can be easily detected, and berms are not effective against kinetic energy rounds. Hull-down vehicle fighting positions take about one hour to complete, depending upon the type of soil. (Turret defilade positions take about two hours to construct and a two-step hide position requires about three hours).

NBC. NBC operations in the defense concentrate on survivability. Rehearsals are conducted in full MOPP. Plans are made for employment of smoke and to counter enemy use of smoke.

Air Defense Artillery. During preparation of the defense, ADA priority normally goes to units preparing positions and obstacles. Once the defensive positions are prepared, priority goes to the main CP, combat trains, and UMCP. When maneuver is required, priority shifts to the maneuvering elements. In each situation, air defense assets focus on the main air avenue of approach.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Security. The task force must locate and destroy the enemy reconnaissance elements early. The enemy's ability to bring overwhelming force against friendly defenses is directly tied to the effectiveness of his reconnaissance elements.

Forward security is positioned based on IPB. Where necessary, security elements may be strengthened by allocating additional forces to them. For example, a tank platoon with its tank thermal sight (TTS) capability and additional firepower can be attached to the TF scout platoon at night.

Defensive Control Measures.

Fire control measures are used to help the task force commander to mass fires on the enemy while distributing them to avoid target overkill. Combined with a well-planned obstacle system, they allow the defender to fully exploit the effects of organic and supporting weapons. Techniques for controlling task force fires are --

Target reference point. A TRP is an easily recognizable point on the ground, either natural or man-made, used for identifying targets and controlling direct and indirect fires (figure 10). TRPs are designated to rapidly distribute or mass fires. A TRP is designated using a standard target symbol and target number issued by the FSO or IAW SOP. Once designated, TRPs also constitute indirect fire targets. TRPs should be placed on each major obstacle to ensure that it is covered by both direct and indirect fires. This results in the obstacle and the direct and indirect fire targets all having the same number. TRPs should be planned on likely enemy locations and obstacles. They may also be used to clearly define engagement areas or to mark engagement and disengagement ranges. Weapons will be engaging from different directions, so compass points (north, east), rather than right or left, are used when giving directions centered on a TRP.

Engagement priority. Fire can be rapidly and effectively distributed by assigning each weapon or section a type of vehicle to engage first; for example BFVs engage BMPs; tank or ITVs engage tanks. The most dangerous targets are shot first then targets in depth.

Trigger line. A fire control measure related to terrain (roads or streams) obstacles, or weapons capabilities that initiates fire when crossed by the enemy.

Sector of fire. A specific area can be assigned to a unit or a weapon. Each unit should be assigned one primary sector and an on-order or secondary sector of fire. If no targets appear in its primary sector, it engages targets in its secondary sector (figure 11).

Engagement area. Engagement areas may be designated by the task force or company team commanders along enemy avenues of approach. They are areas in which the commander intends to destroy an enemy force with massed fires. An engagement area can be identified by prominent terrain features around the area or by a TRP at the corners of the area. The area may be divided into sectors. The commander must provide guidance on the timing necessary to initiate fires. Distances can be marked by TRPs (figure 12).

Maneuver control measures normally used by the battalion task force are --

Coordinating points.

Phase lines.

Battle positions or sectors.

Contact points.

Passage points.

Passage lanes.

Routes.

MSR.

Checkpoints.

Assembly areas.

Limited Visibility.

Normally, the task force commander can expect an attacker to use limited visibility conditions to --

Reconnoiter to locate the defender's weapons, obstacles, and positions.

Move assault overwatch elements into position.

Infiltrate infantry.

Breach obstacles.

Move elements through gaps in the defender's coverage caused by reduced ranges of weapons.

Defending during limited visibility, especially at night, will be a normal condition. The defender must be able to rapidly modify the defense to negate the impact of limited visibility on the operation.

The task force must establish signals that initiate direct and indirect fire engagements, lift or shift fires, and initiate movement.

The following steps are planning considerations for limited visibility operations:

Use long-range detection equipment (radar, sensors, night observation devices) on well-defined avenues of approach.

Increase surveillance of obstacles, potential enemy overwatch and assault positions, and routes into them.

Redeploy some units and weapons along avenues of approach that the enemy will likely use during limited visibility.

Use more infantry, scouts, OPs, patrols, and armor-killer teams forward on secondary avenues of approach and between positions to detect and slow enemy infiltration.

Use point obstacles and early warning devices along likely night approaches to slow the enemy and to alert defenders to enemy presence.

Plan and rehearse the required movement of weapons and units and the massing of fires.

Plan illumination on or behind likely engagement areas to silhouette enemy forces while leaving defenders in shadows and darkness. While illumination is not needed with thermal sights, it may be needed for dismounted infantry.

Movement to night defensive positions should begin just before dark, and the return to daylight positions should be completed before dawn.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The success of the defense is determined by how effectively all supporting organizations are integrated into the maneuver plan. This section describes the general defensive roles, missions, and priorities of supporting organizations.

Maneuver. The task force commander arrays company or team-size forces against battalion-size avenues of approach. Against armored attacks, the defense is organized around weapon systems that can maneuver and destroy the enemy.

Scout platoon. During the defense, the scout platoon's initial mission is to coordinate the battle handover of covering force units and facilitate their orderly movement through the battalion defensive sector and battle positions. Concurrently with this mission, the scouts identify the main effort of the enemy moving into the battalion task force sector. Subsequent missions include screening missions of flank avenues of approach and maintaining contact with adjacent units.

Antitank. Antitank units are employed in mass during defensive operations. Antitank units add depth to the defensive fight by being positioned to the rear of the main defensive forces to cover and support by fire. The maneuver of forward company teams positioning should allow for engagement of the enemy from the flank and rear.

Attack helicopters. When brigade employs an attack helicopter battalion, it is usually used to cover gaps, to attack by fire against penetrations, to provide overwatch for counterattacking forces, or to attack enemy second echelon formations.

Fire Support

Field artillery. Field artillery is positioned by brigade to support both the battalion close fight and brigade deep fight. Task force priority targets are planned on the most dangerous enemy avenues of approach. They are then suballocated to units on those approaches and shifted as the battle develops. Priority of fires is initially to the forward security element during battle handover; on order, it shifts to the unit designated the main effort.

Mortars. The battalion mortars are initially deployed to support a secondary avenue of approach. Their alternate mission is to provide responsive smoke to support the maneuver of company teams between battle positions.

Air Force. CAS targets are preplanned to support the full depth of the battlefield and the transition to the offense.

Intelligence.

GSR. In the defense, GSRs are positioned well forward to participate in the early identification of enemy reconnaissance units and confirm enemy movement within NAIs and TAIs. GSRs are most effective in these roles during limited visibility. Subsequent missions include observation of flank avenues of approach and vectoring of the reserve company/team in support of a night operation mission.

Other. Aviation or ground units performing reconnaissance or security missions forward of the task force also provide valuable intelligence.

Air Defense Artillery. ADA assets are initially positioned well forward to provide area coverage in support of the defensive preparations, the battle handover operation, and the initial enemy attack. Subsequent employment is area coverage throughout the battlefield with priority to counterattacking forces, choke points, river crossing sites, and other potential high payoff enemy air targets.

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability.

Engineer. Priority of engineer support is normally to survivability, countermobility, then mobility. The engineer assists initially in planning and emplacing obstacles to support its countermobility mission.

NBC. NBC operations in the defense concentrate on survivability. Smoke is employed in mobility and countermobility roles.

Combat Service Support.

Combat trains. The combat trains are as far to the rear as possible but close enough to be responsive to maneuver units. Combat trains may be required to move frequently to support defensive operations. Combat trains operations are organized to provide continuous support but not interfere with maneuver elements.

Support platoon. Before defensive operations, the support platoon brings forward barrier material. During defensive operations, the support platoon's priority of support is to Class III and V.

SEQUENCE OF THE DEFENSE

A defense will often be conducted in the following sequence of events:

Occupation. During this phase, the scouts are usually the first to clear the proposed defensive position. They check for enemy OPs and NBC contamination. Leaders then reconnoiter and prepare their assigned areas. Security is established forward of the defense area to allow occupation of positions and preparation of obstacles without compromise. During occupations, movement is minimized to avoid enemy observation.

Passage of the Covering Force. The task force establishes contact with, and assists the disengagement and passage of the covering force or other security elements.

Defeat of Enemy Reconnaissance, Infiltration, and Preparatory Fires. Consistent with security requirements, task force elements remain in defilade, hide, and prepared positions to avoid the casualties and shock associated with indirect fires. The enemy will attempt to discover the defensive scheme by reconnaissance and probing attacks of the advance guard. The enemy may also attempt to infiltrate infantry to disrupt the defense or to breach obstacles. Task force security forces must defeat these efforts using maneuver and fires.

Approach of the Enemy Main Attack. Task force security elements observe and report enemy approach movement. The task force commander repositions or reorients his forces to mass against the enemy's main effort. Enemy formations are engaged at maximum range by supporting fires and close air support to cause casualties, to slow and disorganize him, to cause him to button up, and to impair his communications. Obstacles are closed. Direct fire weapons are repositioned as required, or maneuvered to attack the enemy from the flank. The task force commander may initially withhold fires to allow the enemy to close into an engagement area so that at the decisive time he can concentrate fires on the enemy formation.

Enemy Assault. As the enemy deploys, he becomes increasingly vulnerable to obstacles. The task force uses a combination of obstacles, blocking positions, and fires to break up the assaulting formation. Continued maneuver to enemy flanks and rear is used to destroy him and to increase the number of directions to which he must react. Some security elements may stay in forward positions to monitor enemy second-echelon movement and to direct supporting fires on these forces as well as on his artillery, air defense, supply, and command and control elements.

Counterattack. As the enemy assault is slowed or stopped, the task force commander will launch his counterattack (by fire or by maneuver) to complete the destruction of the enemy forces.

Reorganization and Consolidation. The task force must quickly reorganize to continue the defense. Attacks are made to destroy enemy remnants, casualties are evacuated, and units are shifted and reorganized to respond to losses. Ammunition and other critical items are cross-leveled and resupplied. Security and obstacles are reestablished and reports are submitted.

BATTLE HANDOVER

As the covering force moves to the rear, the task force commander prepares for the battle handover. The handover is the transition from the CFA battle to the MBA battle in which the MBA forces begin to engage the enemy.

The battle handover is an important function in a coordinated defense because it provides assistance to the CF units near the FEBA, allowing them to disengage without excessive losses so that they can reform and fight again.

The difficulty inherent in the battle handover arises from when, where, and how the CF gives up responsibility for the fight and the MBA task forces takes over. The battle handover line and contact points on the ground must be coordinated and clearly identifiable to both forces.

The headquarters that establishes the CF designates the battle handover line and establishes contact points to facilitate contact between MBA units and CFA units (figure 13). MBA and CFA commanders coordinate and recommend any changes in location of the handover line to the higher commander. The handover line is shown on the operation overlay as a phase line. It is the CFA rear boundary unless otherwise stated. The handover line delineates the location where control of the battle will be passed from the CFA to the MBA commander. It is typically 2 to 4 kilometers forward of the FEBA where MBA forces can use direct fires and observed indirect fire to assist the covering force in its final delay, disengagement, withdrawal, and rearward passage of lines. The battle handover takes place at the time or event coordinated between the commanders or as directed by the senior commander.

The task force commander defending in the MBA positions security forces between the FEBA and the handover line (figure 14). Security forces perform security operations for the MBA as part of the commander's overall surveillance, counterreconnaissance, and deception effort. Additionally, elements from the security force man the contact points forward of the handover line.

The security forces --

Assist the passage of the covering force at the handover line and assist in CF disengagement.

Gain and maintain contact with enemy forces as the battle handover occurs.

Locate and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements to preclude enemy observation of primary defensive positions.

Close gaps and lanes in forward obstacles as the CF withdraws.

During this learning event, you have learned how to conduct defensive operations. You have learned the steps that must be accomplished before a successful defensive operation can be planned and undertaken. You have also learned what is to be accomplished in each of the areas of the battlefield from deep operations behind enemy lines to the employment of reserve forces and security of the rear area. In the next learning event, you will learn about the various types of retrograde operations.

Learning Event 2:
IDENTIFY THE TYPES OF AND CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

A retrograde operation is a movement to the rear or away from the enemy. Such an operation may be forced or voluntary, but, in either case, the higher commander must approve it. Retrograde operations gain time, preserve forces, avoid combat under undesirable conditions, or draw the enemy into an unfavorable position. Commanders use them to harass, to exhaust, to resist, to delay, and to damage an enemy. Retrograde operations are also used in operational maneuver to reposition forces, to shorten lines of communications, or to permit the withdrawal of another force for use elsewhere.

TYPES OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The three types of retrograde operations are delays, withdrawals, and retirements. In delays, units give ground to gain time. Delaying units inflict the greatest possible damage on the enemy while preserving their freedom of action. In withdrawals, all or part of a committed force voluntarily disengages from the enemy. This preserves the force or frees it for a new mission. In retirements, a force not in active combat with the enemy conducts a movement to the rear. This is done, normally, as a tactical road march.

The underlying reasons for all retrograde operations are to improve an operational or tactical situation, or prevent a worse one from occurring. In doing this, division and corps commanders usually combine all three retrograde forms, either simultaneously or in sequence.

As in other operations, depth is important in retrograde operations. Commanders conducting such operations must concern themselves with impeding the enemy's movement in depth. They are also concerned with the security of their own rear areas. Therefore, intelligence on enemy movements in the area of interest will be vital in any form of retrograde operations. Skillful air support and long-range fires can add appreciably to the effectiveness of delay.

These fires may be critical to the security of a withdrawal. Firm control of friendly movement to the rear is essential to retaining control of any retrograde operation.

DELAY

A delay is an operation in which a force trades space for time while avoiding decisive engagement. The delay incorporates all of the dynamics of defense, but emphasizes preservation of the force and maintenance of a mobility advantage. The task force may attack, defend, or conduct other actions (such as ambushes and raids) during the delay to destroy the enemy or to slow his advance. The battalion task force may be given a delay mission as part of the covering force, as an economy-of-force operation to allow offensive operations in another sector, or to control a penetration to set up a counterattack by another force.

Considerations of METT-T

Commanders preparing to conduct delays should consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops, time (METT-T) as they make their initial estimate of the situation.

Mission. The higher commander's requirements for the delay are contained in the mission. The commander will also state his concept of the operation for the total force. He will specify the duration and terrain limitations that might apply to the operation. If the commander intends to employ the delaying force in a subsequent operation, he must specify the degree of damage or risk to the force he is willing to accept. The commander MUST MAKE CLEAR which parameter will govern--duration and terrain, or friendly loss.

Enemy. The enemy's strength, location, tactics, mobility, and capabilities impact on a commander's organization of the delay. The delaying commander first considers the enemy's overall pattern of operations. He examines the enemy's capability to conduct air attacks on the delaying force and to insert forces behind friendly units. He also examines the enemy's capability to employ nuclear and chemical weapons. Among the most important considerations for the delaying commander, in addition to patterns of enemy operations, are the enemy's vulnerability to:

Counterattack.

Interdiction.

Electronic warfare.

Air attack.

Canalization by obstacles.

Terrain. The terrain over which delays must be conducted limits the commander's options. Open, unobstructed terrain makes delays more difficult to achieve. Such terrain favors the use of a mobile delaying force and requires great engineer effort. Close or broken terrain generally slows the enemy's movement and makes contact with him difficult. Wooded, swampy, or rugged terrain is best suited for infantry delaying forces.

Weather either promotes or retards cross-country movement. It also impacts on aviation and air support, and obstacle construction. Limited visibility requires increased numbers of troops. It affects their operations and makes decisive engagement harder to avoid. Early detection of the enemy becomes more difficult, and long-range fires are less effective.

Troops Available. The troops available to the delaying commander determine his actions to a large extent. As a general rule, the mobility of the delaying force should be equal to or greater than the enemy's. The delaying commander usually attempts to avoid decisive combat. His forces should be able to deliver accurate, long-range fires and to construct significant obstacles. Armored, mechanized, and aviation units are generally best suited to delay. Cavalry units are specially organized and trained to conduct security missions. Thus, they should be used whenever available. Infantry is best used in close terrain. Delaying forces rely heavily on artillery and engineer support. Military intelligence units, when available, assist in maintaining contact with the enemy, and slowing his movement by interrupting his communications. Air defense is capable of defending critical points such as river crossings and passage points. If authorized, nuclear and chemical weapons can be used to create obstacles, destroy units, and slow the tempo of the attack.

Time. Time to prepare and the period of the delay are the final preliminary considerations for the commander. He must use available time effectively to prepare for his operation, as well as provide his subordinates with the most time possible to plan and prepare for their own operation. The length of time he is required to delay the enemy will determine the tactics he uses and the risks he will have to accept.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

All retrogrades are difficult and inherently risky. To succeed, they must be well organized and well executed. A retrograde operation requires the following elements.

Leadership and morale. Maintenance of the offensive spirit is essential among subordinate leaders and troops in a retrograde operation. Movement to the rear may be seen as a defeat or a threat of isolation unless soldiers have confidence in their leaders and know the purpose of the operation and their role in it.

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and security. Timely and accurate intelligence is especially vital during retrograde operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance must locate the enemy so that security elements can deny him information and counter his efforts to pursue, outflank, isolate, or bypass all or a portion of the task force. The commander must constitute a security force that is strong enough to --

Secure enemy avenues of approach.

Deceive the enemy and defeat his intelligence efforts.

Overwatch retrograding units.

Provide rear guard, flank security, and choke point security.

Mobility. To conduct a successful retrograde, the task force seeks to increase its mobility and significantly slow or halt the enemy.

The task force improves its mobility by --

Reconnoitering routes and battle positions.

Positioning air defense and security forces at critical points.

Improving roads, controlling traffic flow, and restricting refugee movement to routes not used by the task force.

Rehearsing movements.

Evacuating casualties, recoverable supplies, and excess materiel before the operation.

Displacing nonessential combat service support activities early in the operation.

Covering movements by fire.

The task force degrades the mobility of the enemy by --

Occupying and controlling choke points and terrain that dominate high-speed avenues of approach.

Destroying roads, bridges, and rafting on the avenues not required for friendly forces.

Improving existing obstacles and covering them with fire.

Employing indirect fire and smoke to degrade the enemy's vision and to slow his rate of advance. To ensure continuous coverage, task force mortars normally move in split sections.

Conducting spoiling attacks to keep the enemy off balance and force his deployment.

Deception. The objective of the deception is to hide the fact that a retrograde is taking place. This is essential for success. Deception is achieved by maintaining normal patterns of activity, such as radio traffic, artillery fires, patrolling, and vehicle movements. Additional considerations include using dummy minefields or decoy positions, and conducting feints and demonstrations under limited visibility conditions. Retrograde plans are never discussed on unsecure radio nets.

Conservation of combat power. The commander must conserve his combat power by --

Covertly disengaging and withdrawing less mobile units and nonessential elements before withdrawing the main body.

Using mobile forces to cover the withdrawal of less mobile forces.

Using minimum essential forces to provide security for withdrawal of the main body.

Delay Missions.

A delay mission may be one of two types: delay in sector while avoiding decisive engagement, or delay forward of a specified line or position for a specified time. Examples of delay missions are:

TF 1-92 DELAYS IN SECTOR 151800B SEP ______ FROM NA ______ TO MR ______ TO MA ______ TO MB ______ TO DELAY THE ENEMY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE WHILE AVOIDING DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT TO ALLOW TF 1-91 TIME TO COMPLETE DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS.

TF 1-10 DELAYS IN SECTOR 030400A AUG ______ FROM NB ______ TO NB ______ TO NB ______ TO AC ______ TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM CROSSING PL TIGER PRIOR TO 050400A AUG ______ TO ALLOW TF 1-12 TIME TO COMPLETE DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS.

Normally, a battalion task force delays in sector, and companies and platoons are assigned specific BPs to enhance command, control, and coordination across a wide area. In a delay, a determination must be made as to whether the preservation of the force or time is more important. This must be stated in the commander's intent.

Delay Fundamentals. The basic concept for delay is to retain freedom to maneuver while forcing the enemy to deploy repeatedly against successive battle positions. As the enemy uses artillery, deploys ground units, and begins maneuver, the delay force moves to subsequent battle positions to make the enemy initiate the same time-consuming process again. In doing this, the task force commander must seize the initiative whenever possible. The following considerations are applied when planning and executing a delay:

Centralize control and decentralize execution. A delay is normally conducted on a wide front with maximum forces in contact and minimum forces in reserve. This results in a series of independent actions, and more consideration is given to attaching CS to companies.

Maximize use of terrain. Delay positions should be on terrain features that control the likely enemy avenues of approach. They should block the enemy where his movement is most canalized and facilitate maximum delay with minimum forces.

Force the enemy to repeatedly deploy. If possible, enemy reconnaissance elements will be ambushed. The enemy main body will normally be engaged at maximum range of all weapons to cause the enemy to deploy and maneuver. Repeated use of this technique slows the enemy and allows the commander to exchange space for time.

Maximize use of obstacles. Reinforcing and existing obstacles are used on high-speed routes to slow the enemy's progress and to gain time for disengagement. To be effective, obstacles (including FASCAM) must be covered by fire.

Maintain contact with the enemy. Continuous reconnaissance must be conducted to maintain contact with the enemy. Enemy forces will attempt to bypass, to envelop the flanks, or to penetrate between units conducting the delay. To prevent penetration or envelopment, contact must be maintained with all enemy forces encountered.

Avoid decisive engagement. In a delay action, positions must be occupied long enough to force the enemy to deploy and maneuver. Disengagement criteria must be specified. The delay force moves from one delay position to another without becoming decisively engaged with the enemy unless required.

Delay Planning. The following are planning considerations for development of courses of action to accomplish the delay mission:

Delaying forces must maintain a mobility advantage over the attacker. Enemy closure rates for the terrain should be calculated during wargaming and compared to friendly displacement rates between positions. Time-distance factors dictate the amount of time the commander has to engage the enemy and move his unit before becoming decisively engaged; these factors should be calculated for each avenue of approach. Situational templates must tell the commander where the enemy will be at certain times and help him decide where to emplace obstacles, and if or where decisive engagement is likely. The commander must use clearly defined decision or trigger points for displacing. This includes trigger points for employment of indirect fires and mortar displacement.

Obstacles must slow the enemy long enough for the task force to engage and displace.

Sectors of responsibility or battle positions are assigned to each committed company.

When using sectors, the task force commander assigns each likely enemy battalion avenue of approach in its entirety to one company. Boundaries are assigned so that terrain features that control fire and observation into a sector belong to the unit having responsibility for the sector. Contact and coordinating points are designated.

If the terrain is suitable, battle positions are preferred in the delay.

The graphic control measures a commander chooses are key portrayals of his intent. Control measures used in the delay usually include --

Phase lines of all higher commands.

Supplemental phase lines.

Checkpoints.

Battle positions and sectors.

Engagement areas and target reference points.

Contact points.

Passage points.

Assembly areas, main supply routes, and logistics release points.

Coordinating points.

Routes and lanes.

Delay from Successive Positions

Delay from successive positions involves fighting rearward from one position to the next, holding each as long as possible or for a specified period. In this type of delay, all company teams are normally committed on each of the battalion task force delay positions or across the sector on the same phase line (figure 15).

Delay from successive positions is used when a sector is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single line of positions. The disadvantages of this delay are lack of depth, less time to prepare subsequent positions, and possible occurrence of gaps between units. When ordered to move, the task force disengages, moves, and occupies the next designated position.

When the order to delay back is received, a portion of the unit concerned displaces directly to the rear and occupies the next designated position. The remainder of the unit maintains contact with the enemy between the first position and the next delay position. As these elements pass through, the enemy is engaged at maximum effective range from the next delay position. When the battalion task force is no longer able to hold the position without becoming decisively engaged, it moves to the next successive position.

Delay from Alternate Positions.

Delay from alternate positions may be used when a task force has a narrow sector or has been reinforced to allow positioning in depth. Employing this method, one or more company teams occupies the initial delay position and engages the enemy while the other teams occupy and prepare a second delay position. These elements alternate movement in the delay. While one element is fighting, the other occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the fight.

Units occupying the initial delay position delay between it and the second delay position. When the delaying units arrive at the second delay position, they move through or around the units that are occupying the second position, and occupy the third delay position. Responsibility for delaying the enemy is assumed by the units on the second delay position. The delaying procedure is then repeated. Moving around the unit on the next delay position is preferred because this simplifies passage of lines (figure 16).

Delay Position Selection

A reconnaissance of delay positions is made as early as possible. Likely avenues of approach are determined, and plans are made to deny their use to the enemy. The commander selects positions that allow long-range fields of fire with routes suitable for rearward and lateral movement, and he establishes priorities of movement on these routes. Positions should incorporate as many of the following characteristics as possible:

Good observation and long-range fields of fire.

Covered or concealed routes of movement to the rear.

A road net or areas providing good cross-country trafficability.

Natural (or reinforcing) obstacles on the front and flanks.

The commander assigns company team sectors astride likely enemy avenues of approach. Where possible, a company team is assigned a BP covering one major avenue of approach and the terrain dominating that avenue.

The reserve is located initially in an area from which it can counterattack or move rapidly to reinforce.

The battalion task force main CP and combat trains are well to the rear and normally behind the next rearward phase line. The tactical CP remains well forward in positions best suited to control the operation.

The following provides a comparison of key considerations for use when determining the method of delay to be used.

COMPARISON METHODS OF DELAY

METHOD OF DELAY	USE IS FAVORED WHEN:	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Delay from successive positions	--Sector is wide. --Forces available do not allow split operations.	--Increased ability to mass fires.	--Limited depth to the delay positions. --Less time available to prepare each position. --Less flexible.
Delay from alternate positions	--Sector is narrow. --Forces are adequate for split positions.	--Allows positioning in depth. --Allows more time for equipment and soldier maintenance.	--Requires continuous coordination. --Requires passages of lines.

Conduct of the Delay. A commonly used sequence for the conduct of a delay is depicted as follows:

Initial delay positions are occupied, security and OPs are established, and priority of work is determined. Creating the illusion of a determined defense increases the amount of delay obtained.

As the enemy approaches, long-range fires are used to inflict casualties, to disorganize him, and to force him to stop. If possible, enemy reconnaissance elements and advanced guard are destroyed by counterreconnaissance or ambushed.

Each position occupied by a forward unit is defended until the enemy threatens an assault or envelopment of that position. Decisive engagement is avoided.

The task force commander recommends to the brigade commander the appropriate time to move from brigade-designated delay positions. He moves on the basis of prearranged times, trigger points, or other decision criteria; on order, or when appropriate based on his commander's intent. He coordinates movement with higher and adjacent units. The task force moves only after considering the following.

What is the strength, composition, and location of the enemy attacking force? Are elements of the task force threatened with decisive engagement or bypass?

What is the status of adjacent units? How does their status affect the task force's capability to continue to delay?

What is the condition of the delay force in terms of losses in men, equipment, and morale?

How strong is this particular position in relation to other positions that may be occupied?

Is unit survivability or time key to the mission?

When maximum delay has been achieved, movement to the next delay position begins. Coordination of fires and recognition signals between the moving element and adjacent, supporting, and overwatch elements is an important task.

If elements of the task force are threatened with decisive engagement or have become decisively engaged, the commander may take several actions to facilitate their disengagement. In order of priority, he may do any of the following.

Allocate priority of all indirect supporting fires to the threatened unit. This is the most rapid and responsive method of increasing combat power of the unit.

Direct adjacent units to engage enemy targets forward of the threatened unit. This may require positioning of units adjacent to or behind the threatened unit.

Reinforce the unit.

Conduct a counterattack to disengage.

To redesignate a reserve, the task force commander designates the least engaged force to perform reserve missions, especially when delaying on successive positions. The reserve may also consist of an element in depth. When assigned multiple missions, the reserve force must be given priority of missions for planning. Reserve missions are--

Reinforcing.

Assisting in disengagement.

Providing overwatch.

Assuming another unit's mission.

Counterattacking.

Blocking.

Each delay must end with a planned operation such as a defense, a withdrawal, or an attack.

WITHDRAWAL

A withdrawal is an operation in which all or part of the battalion frees itself for a new mission. A withdrawal is conducted to break contact with the enemy when the task force commander finds it necessary to reposition all or part of his force or when required to attain separation for employment of special purpose weapons. It may be executed at any time, during any type of operation. There are two types of withdrawals -- withdrawal not under enemy pressure and withdrawal under enemy pressure. Both types begin while the battalion is under the threat of enemy interference. Preferably, withdrawal is made while the battalion is not under heavy enemy pressure.

Withdrawals are either assisted or unassisted. An assisted withdrawal uses a security force provided by the next higher headquarters to assist the main body in breaking contact with the enemy and to provide overwatching fires. In an unassisted withdrawal, the task force provides its own security force.

Planning Considerations. Planning considerations for the withdrawal are the same as for the delay. Withdrawals are accomplished in three overlapping phases.

Preparatory phase. Reconnaissance and quartering elements are dispatched, warning orders are issued, and planning is initiated. Trains, main CP elements, and nonessential vehicles are relocated to the rear.

Disengagement phase. Designated elements begin their movement to the rear. When contact with the enemy is broken, they assemble and conduct a tactical movement to a designated assembly area or position.

Security phase. A detachment left in contact (DLIC) assists disengagement of other elements, assumes responsibility for the battalion sector, deceives the enemy, and protects the movement of disengaged elements with maneuver and fires. This phase ends when the DLIC completes its movement to the rear.

Withdrawal Not Under Pressure

A withdrawal not under enemy pressure depends on speed of execution and deception. If the task force is not under attack, then withdrawal is not under enemy pressure. Deception and operations security are essential to success. The enemy must not be aware that a withdrawal is taking place.

Deceptive measures used are --

Simulating or continuing normal activities, with a DLIC that deceives the enemy into believing that defending forces are still in position.

Continuing communications in a normal manner.

Continuing patrolling activity.

Using limited visibility to cover withdrawal.

Operations security complements the deception effort. Nothing is transmitted that might compromise the intention to withdraw. Noise and Light discipline is maintained. Movements may be masked by artillery fire, and counterreconnaissance activities are continued.

Before the withdrawal, a thorough reconnaissance is conducted, and control measures are established to ensure control. Each company's key leaders need to know the plan of withdrawal in detail and should participate in the leader's reconnaissance. The leaders reconnoiter the start points, routes, release points, and assembly areas (figure 17). Reconnaissance should be conducted during a condition of visibility that approximates the withdrawal conditions.

The task force commander states the following in the operation order:

When the withdrawal will start.

Where the task force assembly area is (if used) and what each company team is to do upon arrival there.

The location of each company team assembly area.

What routes to take from the company team assembly areas to the task force assembly area, or to the next position.

The DLIC's size, composition, mission, and commander.

Subsequent task force and company team missions.

In an assisted withdrawal, the brigade establishes a security force. The task force commander withdraws behind this force.

In an unassisted withdrawal not under pressure, a DLIC is organized from elements from each company in contact with the enemy. Command and control of the DLIC is exercised to closely simulate normal task force activities. The task force S3 is in charge of the battalion DLIC, with company XOs in charge of their respective DLICs. The task force commander may leave a company team intact as the DLIC. When that occurs, elements of the company team are repositioned to cover the entire task force sector. When the main danger is on a single company team's approach, the task force commander may leave that team in position and attach security elements from the other approaches to it.

The task force commander determines the size and composition of the DLIC based on METT-T. The DLIC is able to detect the enemy, deceive him, and engage him on all avenues of approach with both direct and indirect fires.

The main body of the task force is composed of the remaining maneuver, combat support, and control elements. Its mission is to displace using stealth, move along designated routes, assemble, and move to a new location in preparation for the next mission.

Reserves or units positioned in depth within the battalion sector may coordinate withdrawal before, during, or after the displacing elements of the forward companies. Generally, they will withdraw after these elements. This increases flexibility and security in the event the enemy detects the withdrawal and attacks.

The main body moves on designated routes to the next position according to priorities established by the task force commander. Main body elements may also be given on-order missions to defend, delay, or counterattack during the withdrawal (figure 18).

Withdrawal Under Pressure

A withdrawal under enemy pressure depends on maneuver and firepower to break contact as the enemy attacks the task force. A reconnaissance is conducted to the rear to identify routes that offer the best cover and concealment and to determine engineer assistance required to overcome obstacles. The planning closely resembles that of the delay in regard to the use of available organic and nonorganic assets.

The task force commander should prescribe specific control measures (figure 19) to maintain order during the withdrawal under enemy pressure. These measures may include --

Sectors.

Battle positions.

Phase lines.

Routes.

Passage lanes or passage points.

Contact points.

Checkpoints.

Battle handover line.

Success of the withdrawal under pressure depends on facilitating disengagement of the main body by massing its own fires and overwatching fires provided by a security force.

The brigade commander may place adjacent units or a reserve in overwatch, or may require them to conduct security operations or limited counterattacks to support the withdrawing task force.

To assist withdrawing elements, the security force must be strong enough to detect and engage the enemy on all avenues of approach. The task force may form its own security force from forward company team elements. Missions of the security force are --

Stop, disrupt, disorganize, or reduce the enemy's capability to pursue.

Reduce, through smoke and suppressive fires, the enemy's capability to observe movement of the task force.

Rapidly concentrate additional combat power in critical areas.

As the order to withdraw is given, the battalion must engage the enemy with concentrated direct and indirect fire to enable the withdrawing force to disengage, conduct a rearward passage through the security force, assemble, and move to their next position.

The security force assumes the fight from the forward elements. This includes delaying the enemy advance while the bulk of the task force conducts movement to the rear. On order or when other predetermined criteria are met, the security force disengages itself and moves to the rear as a rear guard. Depending on the task force's next mission, the security force may be required to maintain contact with the enemy throughout the operation.

RETIREMENTS

Retirements are rearward movements away from the enemy by a force not in contact. They are normally covered by the security forces of another unit to their rear and conducted as a tactical road movement. Retiring units must be organized to fight, but they do so only in self-defense. A retiring unit may be attacked by guerrillas, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires. Its commander must have plans for dealing with such contingencies.

Security and speed are the most important considerations in conducting a retirement. Retiring units move at night when possible. Daylight movement is done only if their mission requires it. Movement during daylight may also be accomplished if the enemy is incapable of interfering with such movement. Movement by infiltration may be necessary for a retiring force. This is done when the enemy controls the air or can otherwise interdict friendly movement in depth. Commanders conducting retirements emphasize the maximum use of operational security measures during their movement.

CSS IN RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Planning for combat service support (CSS) must reflect the nature of the operation. To ensure uninterrupted support in any retrograde operation, CSS installations should be located well to the rear. CSS units displace early and, when possible, at night. This is done to reduce congestion and interference with combat units moving to the rear.

Because retrograde operations move rapidly, commanders often attach supporting elements to the maneuver force. Because delaying actions consume large amounts of fuel and ammunition, CSS units may carry ammunition forward to fighting positions and establish forward fuel and ammunition stocks. In withdrawals and retirements, fuel and ammunition must be available for emergency issue and positioned in depth.

Maintenance and recovery problems associated with retrograde operations are complex. To overcome these problems, CSS unit commanders should furnish contact teams to committed units. They should also consider augmenting these teams with additional personnel.

Commanders must control the flow of supplies to forward areas. This will avoid destroying or evacuating supplies unnecessarily during retrograde actions. When commanders contemplate a delay, withdrawal or retirement, they should plan for early displacement of excess supplies and logistic facilities. By positioning supplies along routes of withdrawal, CSS commanders can simplify support. This reduces the enemy's ability to interfere with logistic operations.

During this learning event, you have learned why retrograde operations are necessary. You have also learned the types of retrograde operations and why each is conducted.

Learning Event 3:
PLAN AND CONDUCT RELIEF OPERATIONS

A relief is an operation in which a unit is replaced in combat by another unit. Responsibilities for the mission and assigned sector or zone of action are assumed by the incoming unit. Reliefs may be conducted during offensive or defensive operations and during any weather and light conditions. They are normally executed during limited visibility to reduce the possibility of detection.

The purpose for relief is to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed elements. A relief may be conducted to --

Reconstitute a unit that has sustained heavy losses.

Introduce a new unit into combat.

Rest units that have conducted prolonged operations.

Decontaminate a larger tactical plan or make mission changes.

A unit may conduct a relief operation using one of the following:

Relief to Continue the Defense

Area relief. The area relief is least common. It is conducted when units are dissimilar or when improved defensive terrain is away from the line of contact.

Relief in place. The relief in place is the most common and is used when units have similar organizations or when occupied terrain must be retained. This particular type of relief requires more time than the area relief. Additionally, the relief in place requires detailed planning and coordination, as the incoming unit will be assuming the same positions and missions of the outgoing unit.

Relief to Continue the Offense

Forward passage of lines. This is the most common form of relief in the offense. It takes the least amount of time and coordination. This form of relief also assists in maintaining the momentum of the attack.

Relief in place. This is the least common form of relief in the offense because of the detailed coordination and length of time it takes to conduct the operation.

CONDUCT OF THE RELIEF

Liaison. Upon receipt of the order to conduct the relief, the task force commander and staff develop their estimates. The relieving unit establishes continuous liaison with the relieved unit immediately upon receipt of the relief order.

The orders group moves to the main CP of the unit being relieved to coordinate the operation.

The relieving unit XO supervises unit movement to an assembly area to the rear of the relieved unit.

Liaison involves coordination of the task force maneuver and fire support plan, and an intelligence update that includes past, present, and probable enemy action.

Sequence of Relief. The sequence of relief is from rear to front. Three different methods may be used to conduct the relief. In determining which sequence will be used, particular attention is given to the combat effectiveness of the companies and their subsequent missions (figure 20).

Relieving units one at a time. This method is the most time-consuming. The combat trains of the two units may be collocated to facilitate coordination and transfer of equipment, excess ammunition, fuel, water, and medical supplies. Relieving units maintain radio-listening silence and monitor the relieved unit's command net. Relieving task force scouts may initially be used as guides. When relief along the FEBA is complete, they move forward to relieve the scouts of the relieved unit.

Relieving units simultaneously. This method is the fastest, but sacrifices secrecy and causes confusion because all units move at once. When the command groups and combat trains are collocated and plans and equipment have been exchanged, the units of the relieving battalion task force move at once along designated routes. Relief occurs simultaneously at each location. Relieved units withdraw immediately once they are relieved; they do not wait for the other units of the task force.

Relieving by occupying in-depth or adjacent position (area relief). A relief in place can be conducted by occupying in-depth or adjacent positions. To facilitate this method, the relieving unit should be able to place direct fires on the other unit's direct fire control measures (TRPs, EAs). This method is particularly useful if the unit being relieved has been chemically or radiologically contaminated. The relieving unit maintains radio-listening silence until the responsibility of the sector or zone is passed. The unit being relieved maintains normal traffic. Coordination between units is directed by higher headquarters and accomplished at brigade and/or division designated contact points. The relieved unit withdraws one unit at a time or simultaneously, depending on the situation.

Location and Types of Obstacles. Unit obstacle locations are identified; minefields are recorded and verified; and minefield records are transferred.

Fire Support. Detailed fire support coordination and liaison are conducted between the two units. Target lists are given to the incoming unit. If fire support assets are to be relieved, they are the first to collocate and the last to leave. Fire support assets of the relieved unit remain in position throughout the relief of maneuver units and are prepared to support both units throughout the relief. For example, mortar units and FISTs to be relieved remain in position until the relief of infantry units is completed. Range cards, target lists, and overlays should be given to the incoming unit to ensure the effective delivery of fire. Fire support assets of the relieving unit move into positions as quickly as possible so they can support both units during the relief.

Movement Control.

Movement control is maintained by designating and ranking routes in priority order. Guides are positioned at critical points along the routes. Assembly areas (AAs) are designated and activities to be performed in these areas are specified. Separate AAs are designated for the incoming and outgoing units to minimize confusion. Time spent within AAs is minimized to avoid possible compromise.

Passage of Command. The task force commanders mutually agree to the sequence of relief and for the passage of command. The passage of command normally takes place when one-half of the relieving unit is in position.

Enemy Contact during a Relief in Place. If either unit gains direct fire contact with an enemy force, it immediately notifies the other unit and the higher headquarters directing the relief. If responsibility has not passed, the relieving unit immediately becomes under OPCON of the relieved unit. The relieving unit's mortars will fire missions as directed by the commander of the unit being relieved. If responsibility has passed, the relieved battalion task force commander and staff may become under OPCON of the relieving unit. The presence of collocated CPs facilitates rapid coordination and action of enemy contact is encountered during the relief. Unity of command is imperative.

Exchange of Equipment. When a relief is conducted during limited visibility, grounded crew-served weapons should not be moved, since re-laying them is difficult. Equipment exchanged may include --

Machine gun tripods, and other supports for crew-served weapons or equipment.

Bulky or excess supplies.

Wire.

Emplaced sensors and radar sets.

M8 alarms.

Security and Deception.

Communication security measures include using wire as the primary means of communication. Radios are used as little as possible, and the outgoing unit's radios are manned until the relief is completed.

Deception plans should aid secrecy and surprise. The normal patterns of activity must be maintained by the relieved unit. The relieving unit must conform to this pattern until the relief is completed.

Exchange of Liaison Personnel. Well before the operation, plans and liaison personnel are exchanged between the relieved and relieving unit. Liaison personnel are exchanged down to company level. Those from the outgoing unit remain with the incoming unit until it is familiar with the situation.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Normal patrols and radar activity are continued. Surveillance teams and radar equipment of the outgoing unit remain on position until the relief is completed. If time is available and the situation permits, the company commanders, scout and mortar platoon leaders conduct a reconnaissance before the relief. Reconnaissance should be conducted during both daylight and darkness, as the incoming unit must know the location of individual and vehicle positions, weapons, communication centers, command posts, aid stations, and all other essential facilities. This reconnaissance should also include all routes for vehicle and foot traffic, the specific location of assembly areas, and locations for service support units. Reconnaissance parties in the forward areas should be small. Vehicles and aircraft used for the reconnaissance should be furnished by the unit being relieved.

Relief Order. When planning and coordination are complete, the TF commander then issues his order. To reduce confusion and maintain secrecy, the relief order should, as a minimum, include --

Time at which responsibility for the sector, BP, or zone is effective.

Fire support plan.

OPSEC considerations.

Deception plans.

Time, method, and sequence of relief.

Routes and critical control measures.

Concept of subsequent mission.

Plans for additional positions -- changes to present concept.

Contingency plans.

Location and transfer of responsibility for obstacles.

Transfer of ammunition, wire lines, POL, and materiel to incoming unit.

Learning Event 4:
IDENTIFY THE STANDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBINED AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

AirLand Battle doctrine provides guidance for operational and tactical level employment of U.S. Army units worldwide. National policies and strategies; alliance and bilateral international agreements; U.S. joint military policies and doctrine; and specific theater military policies, strategies, and doctrine provide the framework for application of AirLand Battle doctrine in NATO Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and other theaters to be established in case of war. AirLand Battle doctrine is predicated on the assumption of routine cooperation of Army units with other services in joint operations. In most cases, Army forces will cooperate with the military forces and civilian agencies of other nations as well. This learning event summarizes standing arrangements for joint operations and presents general considerations for combined operations.

JOINT OPERATIONS

National strategy and theater strategy will dictate the ends and means of major operations. This strategy also governs the purpose and conditions of tactical battles and engagements. Cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Marine forces will be vital to success. U.S. Army deployments in mid- to high-intensity theaters will also require some level of allied cooperation. In cases such as Europe and Korea, with allied command structures in place, close cooperation with allied forces will be routine.

Organization and Command and Control

Command and control of joint forces (figure 21) will conform to the provisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 2. Each service's doctrine and applicable joint doctrine will guide employment. Joint forces include unified and specified commands and joint task forces (JTFs). Each military service is responsible for providing its contingent (composed of various types of units) to unified and specified commands. These contingents are called service components. They may have other titles, such as theater army, navy, fleet, marine, or theater air force. JTF normally draw units from the components. For command and control, forces are normally assigned to unified and specified commands and are attached to a JTF.

Joint forces operate within two distinct chains of command. One is for operations, and the other is for administrative and logistical matters. Operations orders to commanders of unified and specified commands are issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. The JCS prepare plans and provide strategic direction for the armed forces, including operations by commanders of unified and specified commands. These commanders are, however, responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for accomplishing their assigned tasks.

The administrative and logistical chain of command encompasses those functions of the military services not included in strategic direction. The military departments are responsible for administrative and logistical support of their forces, wherever employed. Forces assigned to unified and specified commands deal directly with their respective departments and services on matters which are the responsibility of the departments or services.

Joint commanders are granted the authority necessary to accomplish their missions. Operational command and operational control are terms used to describe the authority exercised by joint commanders over subordinate components. These terms are synonymous. Operational command describes the authority granted commanders of unified and specified commands by the National Security Act of 1947. Operational control describes operational command when applied to other than unified and specified commanders. Both operational command and operational control empower joint commanders to:

Establish the composition of subordinate forces.

Assign tasks.

Designate objectives.

Direct actions necessary to accomplish the mission.

The critical factors that determine the structure of a joint organization are:

Responsibilities, missions, and tasks assigned to the commander.

Nature and scope of the operation.

Forces available.

Duration of the operation.

The organization should provide for centralized direction, decentralized execution, and common doctrine. The common doctrine is based on the characteristics and service identity of forces available to the command.

Unified Commands

A unified command is established by direction of the President to perform a broad, continuing mission. It is composed of forces assigned by two or more services. It operates under the operational command of a single unified Commander in Chief (CINC). The CINC is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing his mission. He operates under the strategic direction of the JCS. The CINC normally exercises operational command through component commanders and the Special Operations Command. When he deems it necessary, he may establish a subordinate unified command or JTF to conduct specific missions. Under emergency conditions, the CINC has the authority to use all facilities and supplies of assigned forces to accomplish his mission. The CINC of the unified command develops operation plans (OPLANs), operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs), and operational orders (OPORDs). He is responsible for a specific geographical area.

Specified Commands

Like the unified command, a specified command is established by direction of the President to accomplish a broad, continuing mission. Unlike a unified command, however, a specified command is primarily a single service command. It may have elements of other services assigned. Like a unified command, a specified command receives strategic direction from the JCS.

Joint Task Forces

A JTF may be constituted by the Secretary of Defense. Commanders of unified commands, specified commands, or an existing JTF may also constitute a JTF. It is composed of elements of two or more services operating under a single JTF commander. Normally, it performs missions having specific, limited objectives or missions of short duration. It dissolves when it has achieved its purpose. The JTF commander is responsible to the JTF establishing authority. He has operational control over the entire force. He will usually augment his own staff with representatives from the other services. He exercises logistical coordination or control only as necessary to meet his subordinate commanders' logistical needs.

Component Commands

Each component commander is responsible for the proper employment of his forces and for accomplishing operational tasks assigned by the joint commander. He is also responsible for:

Internal administration and discipline.

Training in his own service doctrine, techniques, and tactics.

Designation of specific units to meet joint requirements.

Logistical functions normal to the component.

Tactical employment of service component forces.

Service intelligence matters.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

In addition to operating as part of a joint force, the Army must be prepared for combined operations with land, sea, and air forces of allied governments. Army forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area will operate under one of NATO's Major Commands (Allied Command Europe, Allied Command Atlantic, or Allied Command Channel). Those in the Republic of Korea will fight as part of the United States- Republic of Korea (US-ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC). In these theaters, doctrine, procedures, and principles have been developed and practiced to minimize the problems of inter-allied coordination.

Elsewhere, agreements on doctrine, principles, and operating techniques are only partially developed or do not exist at all. In such theaters, U.S. and allied forces will have to work out procedures for combined operations under the pressure of imminent conflict or even while operations are under way.

Campaign planning in combined theaters of operations imposes special considerations not present in unilateral theaters. In combined theaters, the allies share a compelling need to maintain the political cohesion of the coalition as a prerequisite for maintaining the military effectiveness and cohesion of the allied military organization. Accommodation of differences in political-military objectives is therefore of the highest importance. Similarly, accommodation of differences in capabilities among the allies' military forces requires careful planning and tailored coordination and liaison between the forces. Logistical support, while normally a national responsibility, must be coordinated in a combined effort to permit proper synchronized employment of the various allies' combat formations. Campaign planning in all of its facets is inherently a combined activity in coalition warfare.

Considerations

AirLand Battle doctrine must be adapted to each conflict. This section describes the chief considerations for Army units in combined operations.

The U.S. Army has fought alongside allied forces in a wide variety of operational situations. In high- and mid- intensity conflicts, allied officers have commanded U.S. formations as large as field armies. Likewise, U.S. commanders have both employed and cooperated with armies, corps, and divisions of other nations. In low-intensity conflicts, cooperation between smaller forces has been just as common. Maneuver, fire support, air operations, combat support, combat service support (CSS), and naval support have all been effectively synchronized between allies in support of combined operations.

Special efforts have always been necessary to coordinate the operations of a multi-national force. Such efforts will continue to be required in future combined operations. The chief considerations in planning and conducting such operations are:

Command and control.

Intelligence.

Operational procedures.

Combat service support.

Interoperability between U.S. Army and allied forces is an essential condition for efficient combat operations in combined or coalition warfare. In established alliances, specialized agencies and procedures exist to facilitate common or compatible development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training methods, and exercises, professional education, organizational design, and materiel developments. The ultimate objective of these efforts is to ensure the synchronized employment of U.S. Army and allied combat capabilities to achieve the military objectives in a theater of operations.

Command and Control

Unity of command is essential in all operations. In combined operations, it proceeds from the political and strategic leadership of the alliance. It is exercised in the theater of war by a supreme allied commander or commander in chief appointed by the leaders of the alliance.

National contingents usually retain command of their own forces. They relinquish operational command or control of the forces they commit to combined operations. This will be the usual arrangement for Army forces participating in combined operations. Army commanders will fight at the direction of the allied commander, but some administrative functions of command will usually be retained by a U.S. Army officer. This officer may be a theater Army commander or the commander of a subordinate force. Special communication and liaison arrangements are required when command relationships are established between U.S. units and superior, subordinate, or adjacent allied headquarters. This is true of highest levels (field armies and corps) down to smaller units who must cooperate with local self-defense forces or civil authorities.

Commanders and staff officers in combined operations must take personal and national characteristics into account in all their actions. At times, such considerations will largely dictate the disposition of forces and the assignment of mission. Multi-level/multi-national staffing helps in understanding and coordination of operations of all forces. Civil affairs officers can also assist in the control of operations that require the cooperation of host nation civilian authorities.

Intelligence

Allies normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. In war, the products of national collection that affect operations must be shared. Early coordination should be made to ensure that the intelligence operations of allies are coordinated. Specific provisions for combined intelligence operations and the utilization of national systems must be arranged at the highest levels of the alliance.

For operational and tactical purposes, it is essential that arrangements be made for the rapid dissemination of military intelligence. The use of available intelligence assets must be shared by all partners of the operation. The use of technical collection devices, such as radars, direction finders, and drones, should be optimized. Doing this will ensure the command's full potential for intelligence collection is realized.

Coordinating Combined Operations

AirLand Battle doctrine is based on the flexible application of friendly strengths against enemy vulnerabilities. This is adaptable to combined operations at the operational and tactical levels in the offense and defense. The design of combined operations should make maximum use of the strengths of all participating forces. Their comparative vulnerabilities must also be considered. In many operational and tactical activities, standing operating procedures (SOPs) will have to be developed to assure effective cooperation between the forces of different nations.

At the operational level, combined forces pursue campaign objectives for the alliance. Plans should reflect the special capabilities of each national contingent in the assignment of missions. National contingent commanders, while employed together, are responsible for their own operations and support. Some functions may be assigned to a smaller group of allies. For example, rear area security might be given to the police forces of a host nation.

Tactical cooperation requires more precision since it deals with immediate actions in combat. Among the disparities that adjacent and supporting allied commanders must reconcile are dissimilar tactical control measures, differences in tactical methods and operating procedures, varying organizations and capabilities of units, and differences in equipment. Weapons, radios, maps, and intelligence collection systems usually differ among allied armies.

Liaison, equipment exchanges, and combined training can offset some of these problems. More basically, though, the commander of a combined force must plan and conduct his operations in ways that exploit complementary strengths and minimize problems of coordination. Habitual relationships between units should be established and maintained when one nation's forces will be assigned to another's for an extended period. Detailed planning with emphasis on rehearsals and careful war-gaming should precede operations in which allied units will cooperate for the first time.

Specifically, tactical plans should address:

Recognition of allied units, soldiers, and vehicles.

Fire control measures.

Air support arrangements.

Communications.

Liaison.

Movement control.

The commander's intent and the concept of the operation should also receive special attention because of differences between allies in doctrine and terminology.

Plans for close operations must reflect the capabilities of all available forces. Allied units in adjacent zones or sectors must understand their neighbors' concepts of operations. They must maintain contact as necessary, just as adjacent forces of the same nationality would. Tactical differences deriving from national doctrine must be clearly understood. Examples of tactical differences include how flank security is handled, how passages of lines are conducted, when and whether small enemy forces will be bypassed or permitted to penetrate a defense, and how much ground will be given up.

Deep operations plans of a U.S. force containing allied units must also provide for the intelligence and long-range fire support needs of such forces. In some situations, allied artillery, air, electronic warfare (EW), or special operating forces (SOF) can contribute to deep operations or improve the overall capability of the force. When this is true, their capabilities must be understood and their efforts coordinated with the overall tactical plan. U.S. units operating under allied command should use their own capabilities for deep operations to accomplish their missions in consonance with the allied commander's concept of operations.

Rear operations must also be coordinated between allied units. This should be done by assigning responsibility for all areas in the rear. When reserves or supporting forces must pass through or fly over a unit's rear area, careful coordination must be made in advance. Similarly, the movements of enemy forces in the rear area must be reported promptly when such forces pass from one ally's area to another's. Territorial forces or home defense units, police organizations, and civil authorities with rear operations responsibilities in the rear area of a U.S. force must be included in rear operations planning. They must be kept informed, and kept in communications with the headquarters they support.

Combat Service Support

The logistical support of military forces is normally a national responsibility. Nonetheless, allied commanders will have to coordinate the use of major facilities. This includes the use of highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields. They will also have to seek, and usually regulate within the force, the support available in the theater of operations or from the host nation. For these reasons, combined commanders should form a combined logistics staff section as early as possible.

Movement control, operation of ports and airfields, theater communications, some supply functions, and airspace command and control are significant matters that may have to be coordinated above the level of national contingents. To ensure coordination and to prevent duplication, commanders of combined forces must establish clear responsibilities for such functions. Lower level commanders and staff officers responsible for operating in the theater will have to resolve the problems of liaison, language, and compatibility of equipment inherent in multi-national military operations.

Transportation, construction services, medical support, and some classes of supply will often be available in the theater. Host nation support may be used to supplement or substitute for U.S. services, supplies, and facilities. Water, food, and construction materials may also be available. These may have to be obtained by a central allied agency and shared equitably between national contingents. The civil military operations (CMO) officers can identify and coordinate U.S. requirements for local resources, facilities, and support.

In many cases, the U.S. has supplied allied forces with material. In exchange, it has received combat support or CSS from the military or civilian authorities of other alliance partners. Such arrangements can lead to significant economies of force and effort. Support agreements between allies should be sought early in a combined operation.

When allies use the same equipment, provisions should be made for resupply, maintenance, or other support operations across national lines, routinely if that is feasible and in case of tactical emergency in any event. Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), medical supplies, barrier materials, mines, and some tools and vehicles can usually be used by all members of an alliance. In the interests of simplicity of operations and economy of effort, these may be obtained and distributed through a single combined supply agency in some cases.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The National Command Authorities (NCA) may direct contingency operations of U.S. forces overseas in support of national policy. Contingency operations are military actions requiring rapid deployments to perform military tasks in support of national policy. Such operations are normally undertaken when vital national interests are at stake. Usually, direct or indirect diplomacy and other forms of influence have been exhausted. Thus, a show of force or some direct military action is required. Contingency operations involving Army forces may provide a rapid show of force in support of a threatened ally to deter aggression by a hostile neighbor. Forces might also be used to protect U.S. property, U.S. nationals, to rescue hostages, or perform other tasks directed by the NCA. Contingency operations are always joint undertakings conducted within the framework of the Unified Command System. The size of a contingency force, its mission, and its area of operations will vary. Once deployed, Army units operate in accordance with the standard principles of tactical doctrine.

Considerations

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and unified and specified commands provide for the most effective use of forces committed to a contingency. These military planners seek to:

Provide best available intelligence information, including political, social, and economic considerations as well as information on terrain, climate, and friendly/enemy forces.

Provide multiple options to the NCA in support of national objectives, and explain the capabilities and limitations of the military forces in each option.

Use the most current and authoritative guidance available. They should know before hostilities occur what U.S. political authorities are prepared to do in response to threats to national interests.

Inform civilian authorities of the risks associated with proposed plans.

Judge what additional resources would effectively reduce those risks.

The overall national policy aims must always be clear when military contingencies are planned. Rules for limitations on use of force must be observed. At this level, military planners harmonize plans with diplomatic efforts to deter hostile actions and facilitate military actions. They also provide a framework of policies to govern military action.

JCS and unified and specified command planners consider nine factors involving total force readiness, availability, and appropriateness in their plans. The considerations include:

Mission. The mission analysis determines the tasks. A large force may have to deter or defeat enemy forces that attempt subversion or invasion. A small force may be deployed to perform any of a number of specialized missions.

Adequacy. A trained force adequate to the task should be available.

Deployability. The means should be available to deploy the necessary force in the required time.

Supportability. The means should be available to support and sustain the force long enough to accomplish the mission.

Affordability. The forces and other resources for one mission must be weighed against vital missions elsewhere.

Availability of Forces. Light forces can be deployed quickly and are easiest to support. When adequate to the threat, they are the preferred Army force. Before an impending crisis develops into open hostilities which may increase risks to U.S. interests, there may be an early deployment of light forces. This might deter the opponent and thus prevent a costly subsequent engagement. Light forces would not be appropriate to face tank-heavy forces. They are also inappropriate to operate over great distances. Heavy forces take longer to deploy and are more difficult to support. However, they may be the only way to defeat the enemy. Planners weigh the considerations in each case to arrive at a proper combination of forces.

Use of Indigenous Forces. Indigenous forces may be available to accomplish all or part of the mission. Such forces may also be available to assist in supporting U.S. units. The capabilities and limitations of indigenous forces enter into contingency planning. Combined with a small U.S. combat force or appropriate U.S. logistic and fire support, an indigenous force may be sufficient. Given these circumstances, U.S. forces can operate under either U.S. national command or a combined command.

Command and Control

The command and control needs in contingency operations might lead to forming a joint task force (JTF). Assets for the JTF might come from within the unified command responsible for the contingency area. A JTF could also be organized and deployed from forces of a supporting Commander in Chief (CINC). They could then be transferred to the control of the supported CINC just before employment. The gaining unified command could be responsible for employing the JTF or the NCA might retain control of the JTF through the JCS.

Strategic Deployment

The commander of the United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) is also Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces Readiness Command (CINCUSARRED). He supports USREDCOM. Readiness Command forces may fill Army requirements in deploying JTF. They may augment Army components of unified commands overseas. Army forces normally deploy on receipt of a JCS deployment order. They also receive some movement instructions from JCS warning or alert orders. Transportation by sea or air is under supervision of supporting or supported unified commanders and monitored by the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA).

During deployment planning, the gaining Army component commander ensures the arrival of Army units into the operational area according to the CINC concept of operation. The Army component commander develops an operational scheme for employment of Army forces. He determines the forces required to accomplish the missions assigned to the CINC. After coordinating with the other services, the Army component commander develops his deployment plan. The location, nature, and intensity of the conflict will determine the composition of units needed and how they will be phased during deployment.

Employment

The scope and nature of the contingency influence both force organization and operations. Economy of force, mobility, surprise, and bold aggressive actions should be emphasized to achieve decisive results. Operations should be in keeping with the AirLand Battle doctrine. They should be characterized by flexibility, imaginative leadership, thorough planning, and skillful, decentralized execution. Support from the other services is essential to the success of the Army mission in joint operations.

Commanders at appropriate levels maintain contingency plans for rapid force deployment. At the time of deployment and under guidance from the NCA, plans are modified to fit existing conditions. The Army component for a contingency operation may consist of any size Army force. It might be a small specialized unit or a multiple-corps force.

In planning to function as part of a joint force in a contingency operation, the Army component commander considers the operational environment and support requirements.

Operational considerations involve:

The joint force mission and the land component's tasks.

Assumptions under which the planning was conducted.

The joint commander's concept of the operation.

The probable or actual composition and size of land, air, and naval forces of the joint force and any allied force.

Command relationships within the joint force.

Specific operational aspects including fire support (all services), communications, nuclear and chemical warfare guidance, intelligence, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare.

Enemy capability for ground, air, naval, electronic, and nuclear, biological, and chemical operations.

Enemy capability for unconventional and psychological operations.

Geography, weather, and terrain.

The political situation and civil-military responsibilities.

Language requirements.

In-country facilities.

Support operations involve:

Maximizing use of local resources.

Limiting supplies to essentials.

Formulating a maintenance policy.

Formulating a medical evacuation policy.

Maintaining and securing necessary stockage levels.

Phasing in additional combat service support (CSS) capabilities with follow-up elements as required.

Force planners normally seek to maximize combat capability and to reduce support to the essentials. A contingency force relies heavily on strategic airlift for rapid deployment and resupply from Continental United States (CONUS). Early air superiority, continuous tactical air support, logistic resupply by air, and maintenance of air lines of communication are essential for operations to be successful. Sealift of outsized equipment, armored units, and bulk supplies may be necessary. Certain CSS commodities, services, and facilities may have to be furnished to or by other services in the area of operations.

A lack of adequate communications and intelligence may hamper the initial phase of contingency force operations. Limited knowledge of the enemy may dictate that initial combat actions consist of a movement to contact or a reconnaissance in force. Long-range communication should be established early to ensure an effective flow of information to facilitate decision making.

Contingency planning requires an all-source intelligence system be organized to meet the needs of the deploying force commander prior to deployment. The intelligence planning process should be continuous and aggressively managed. It should develop, maintain, and update a data base that is keyed on worldwide contingency requirements. This database incorporates intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). On alert notification, the intelligence officer focuses his effort on the specific objective area. He should rapidly provide the commander only that information that is critical to the operation.

Maintaining the intelligence data base permits commanders to identify intelligence gaps. These gaps become immediate collection requirements in a crisis. Updating the data base and satisfying intelligence gaps require active coordination between the contingency force and national intelligence systems. National intelligence systems support for early deployed units plays a key role in fulfilling the commander's intelligence needs. After deployment, these systems can supplement the contingency force's organic collection assets in the objective area.

Army forces in contingency operations should be more mobile than their potential enemy. To achieve superior mobility, they may need to include mechanized, armored, and aviation units. Although it is costly, mobility improves the commander's ability to fight.

CONCLUSION

In this learning event, you have studied Joint, Unified, and Combined command structures, contingency operations, and planning considerations for each. Earlier in the lesson, considerations for planning and conducting defensive operations were described. You are now ready to complete the practice exercise which follows.

Practice Exercise

Military

LESSON 2

CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Learning Event 1:IDENTITY THE CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Learning Event 2:IDENTIFY THE TYPES OF AND CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Learning Event 3:PLAN AND CONDUCT RELIEF OPERATIONS

Learning Event 4:IDENTIFY THE STANDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBINED AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Learning Event 1:
IDENTITY THE CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Learning Event 2:
IDENTIFY THE TYPES OF AND CONSIDERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES FOR PLANNING, PREPARING, AND CONDUCTING RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Learning Event 3:
PLAN AND CONDUCT RELIEF OPERATIONS

Learning Event 4:
IDENTIFY THE STANDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBINED AND CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS