• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
FY97 Annual Report

SSN 21 ATTACK SUBMARINE AND AN/BSY-2 COMBAT SYSTEM

	Navy ACAT IC Program 3 systems Total program cost (TY$) $13185M Average unit cost (TY$) $2828M Full-rate production N/A Prime Contractor General Dynamics Electric Boat Division - SSN-21 Lockheed Martin - AN/BSY-2

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The SEAWOLF (SSN 21) Nuclear Attack Submarine was developed to maintain the U.S. technological lead in undersea warfare well into the 21st century. It is designed to rapidly deploy to militarily important hostile ocean areas and deny their use to the enemy, clear the way for strikes by other friendly forces, and engage and destroy enemy submarines, surface forces, and land targets, supporting dominant maneuver as well as full-dimensional protection for afloat forces. Secondary missions are mine and special warfare. SSN 21 is designed to be a quiet, fast, heavily armed, shock resistant, survivable submarine, outfitted with the AN/BSY-2 Submarine Combat System.

The AN/BSY-2 Submarine Combat System is designed to support SSN 21 in all mission areas. It is required to track targets, platforms, and weapons. These characteristics will provide intelligence and strike capabilities to support the Joint Force Commander in precision engagement as well as providing full-dimensional protection. The combat control subsystem provides setting and control of weapons and mines, over-the-horizon targeting, combat systems management, and piloting and navigation functions. It includes the weapon launch equipment to support eight horizontal tubes, a vertical large screen display, and own ship data displays. More specific information is included in the classified version of this report.

The SSN 21 program began in 1982 and was approved for conceptual design in 1983. In December 1983 the preliminary design was authorized; it was completed in 1985. Approval for lead ship production was granted in 1988.

The DAB ADM for the SSN 21 Program Review decision of January 11, 1991, approved continuation of LRIP through completion of operational testing in FY98 (now scheduled for FY00). DOT&E's input to that decision was based upon an independent evaluation and assessment of projected performance of SSN 21. DOT&E identified several important aspects of performance without which SSN 21 may not achieve and retain the advantage over the projected threat. A detailed discussion of these aspects was published in the FY90 Annual Report. Performance changes due to programmatic changes to supporting systems are discussed in the FY95 Annual Report.

SSN 21's initial sea trials were delayed by concerns about the robustness of the titanium used in some of SEAWOLF's watertight integrity applications. This was partially resolved and SEAWOLF began initial sea trials in July 1996. On her second trial, a casualty to a sonar fairing occurred. The corrective action delayed delivery until mid-1997. Following delivery, USS SEAWOLF began acoustic trials, which were completed in November 1997. USS SEAWOLF is scheduled to conduct Navy acceptance trials and some DT in FY98, entering Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) in August 1998. During PSA numerous improvements and corrections of known material deficiencies will be accomplished.

In 1997, DOT&E and COMOPTEVFOR developed a plan to take advantage of USS SEAWOLF's underway time before OPEVAL to assess her performance in as many different environments and scenarios as possible. This was undertaken with the desired end of reducing the length, cost and scope of IOT&E, while gaining a more thorough understanding of USS SEAWOLF's capabilities. Throughout the post-delivery period, it is intended that USS SEAWOLF be observed conducting exercises with and against surface ships and submarines, and some COIs may be resolved.

The planned OA of the AN/BSY-2 combat system in the land-based test facility was cancelled, since SEAWOLF is using the system. Instead, DOT&E and COMOPTEVFOR have observed AN/BSY-2 performance at sea. INSURV was completed on SEAWOLF in mid-1997. DOT&E representatives observed SEAWOLF operations at sea, and part of acoustic trials. Collection of suitability data for SEAWOLF and AN/BSY-2 began in July 1997, and will continue through OPEVAL, interrupted only by maintenance periods. The TEMP is being revised to reflect schedule changes, and to be consistent with DoD 5000.2-R requirements.

T&E has not been conducted in accordance with the TEMP, mostly because of unavoidable schedule slips. DOT&E is working with the program office to revise the TEMP.

DOT&E made two contributions to the SEAWOLF program in the past year. DOT&E developed the operational test approach above to assess SEAWOLF performance in a number of areas before OPEVAL. DOT&E also drove the development of a coordinated suitability data collection program, so that suitability information discovered in the pre-OPEVAL time frame will be recorded for all users.

USS SEAWOLF's high speed capability contributed to some material problems on initial sea trials that were resolved. Some other material problems have been identified by the Navy, as might be expected early in the post-delivery period. These include anomalies in weapons launch at high speed, and slower than expected torpedo tube reload. Corrective action for these deficiencies is being assessed.

Analysis of the acoustic trials has not been completed; however, some known acoustic problems have been resolved; others are still being addressed by the program office. It is DOT&E's assessment that some material problems may not be completely corrected, due to technical limitations in some cases and the high cost of correction in others. The effectiveness of corrective action will not be definitive until after PSA, in FY00. The Navy recognizes that it is important that deficiencies be corrected; DOT&E will monitor these efforts.

Although there has been no formal operational testing, AN/BSY-2 has in general performed as expected. The TB-29 towed array recently completed OPEVAL, but the data has not been analyzed. TB-29 is crucial to USS SEAWOLF's undersea warfare missions, and will be closely examined. AN/BSY-2 passed JMCIS certification on a land-based test site, and must be certified at sea.

USS SEAWOLF tactics should be developed that capitalize on the ship's unique characteristics. The Navy plans some tactics development work before PSA. DOT&E will monitor this.

In the area of suitability, SEAWOLF faces difficulties, as funding is not available for some critical spares, and In-Service Engineering Assistance (continued engineering support for correction of major material deficiencies) is not funded. Some systems in SEAWOLF are extremely complex, and include some potentially high failure rate items. These factors, combined with the fact that many original SEAWOLF parts are out of production, means that it will be expensive to maintain SEAWOLF as an operationally effective ship, even if availability and reliability meet their goals.

The SEAWOLF program still has more than two years to correct deficiencies before USS SEAWOLF's OPEVAL. This period includes a year long PSA in the shipyard, which allows major repairs, if necessary.

DOT&E considers the ship shock test schedule to be undesirably late in development, as two of the three SSN-21 class submarines will have been completely built by the time it is evaluated in 2001, and construction of the first NSSN (which could benefit from ship shock test lessons learned) will be well under way. However, DOT&E agreed to the delay as the Navy could not fund ship shock test on schedule. Component shock tests continue to demonstrate that component shock hardening requirements have been met, and provide confidence that the tested components will not adversely affect SEAWOLF's performance in an underwater shock environment.

The cost cap, which served its purpose to rein in cost growth, is now adversely impacting future operational effectiveness of the ship, since planned enhancements have had to be delayed or scrapped, and some material deficiencies may not be completely corrected before OPEVAL. Cost caps should be tailored to allow improvements following delivery of each LRIP article of a capped program.

It is important to begin gathering suitability data as early as possible in program development. For a ship, delivery represents a good starting point, providing as many as several years of acceptance testing and shakedown to gather information. Delaying this effort until OPEVAL would mean the data might not be a representative sample. Even with all parties agreeing to this concept, it was difficult to get the data gathering effort started.

It is also important to identify what suitability data is significant early, so that information collection efforts will not be redundant or burdensome to the crew, and information won't be missed. This is not a trivial effort; fortunately, all stakeholders participated willingly.

Emerging problems in the SEAWOLF RDT&E program delayed delivery, necessitating a delay in ship shock test. RDT&E money that had been allocated to ship shock test in that year was used for re-engineering to address the problems, and was used for a claim settlement, rather than expose the unspent shock test funds to re-programming. The RDT&E money was not replaced, leading to an undesirable three year total delay in ship shock test. When material problems arise, testers must assess the impact of schedule changes on the T&E plan. Testers must also be alert for re-programming of RDT&E funds, and must insist that those funds, if used, be replenished without significant impact to the T&E schedule.