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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
FY97 Annual Report

ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE (RAM) SYSTEM

	Navy ACAT II Program 1,310 Block 0 missiles 620 Block I missiles 154 Launchers Total program cost (TY$) $1,709.4M Average unit cost Block 0 $0.273M Average unit cost Block 1 $0.444M Full-rate production (Block 0) FY94 Full-rate production (Block I) FY99 Prime Contractor Hughes Missile Systems Co. Tucson, AZ

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The RAM program is designed to provide surface ships with an effective, low-cost, lightweight, self-defense system which will provide an improved capability to engage and defeat incoming antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The RAM Block 0 has a five-inch diameter airframe that rolls in flight and dual mode, passive radio frequency/infrared (RF/IR) guidance. Initial homing for RAM Block 0 is in RF, using an ASCM's RF seeker emissions. If the ASCM's IR radiation is acquired, RAM transitions to IR guidance. RAM Block I uses an improved, electro-optical proximity fuze and a new IR seeker and can be launched in an IR all-the-way mode, as well as the dual mode (passive RF, followed by passive IR) used by Block 0. The launching system and missiles comprise the weapon system.

RAM weapon systems are integrated with the AN/SWY-2 combat system on certain ships and as part of the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) on other ships (LSD-41 class ships at this time). The AN/SWY-2 is comprised of the weapon system and the combat direction system. The combat direction system employs the existing Mk 23 target acquisition system (TAS) radar and the AN/SLQ-32(V) electronic warfare support sensor together with threat evaluation and weapons assignment software resident in the Mk 23 TAS to accomplish threat detection, correlation, evaluation, and engagement. With SSDS, RAM is part of the engagement suite. For example, on LSD 41-class ships, a typical SSDS engagement suite includes RAM, the PHALANX Close-In Weapon System Block 1A, and the decoy launch system. SSDS further integrates the AN/SPS-49(V)1 radar with the medium PRF upgrade, the AN/SPS-67 surface search radar, the AN/SLQ-32(V) sensor, and the CIWS search radar.

RAM Block 0 contributes to the JV 2010 concept of full dimensional protection in that it enhances ship self protection against several RF-radiating anti-ship cruise missiles that have "leaked" past outer air defenses; RAM Block I extends that protection against several non-RF radiating missiles. Given that some of the ships using RAM are also platforms from which strike operations are executed, RAM indirectly contributes to the concept of precision engagement.

An OR for the RAM weapon system was established by the Navy in 1975. The Federal Republic of Germany independently developed a requirement similar to that of the United States and the two nations signed a memorandum of understanding for joint participation in the advanced development phase of the program. Early IOT&E was conducted in FY87. IOT&E was completed in FY90 and the DOT&E assessment was reported in DOT&E's FY90 Annual Report. As noted in that report, a BLRIP Report was prepared for RAM, but a decision to proceed beyond LRIP had not been made. Because that decision was deferred, the BLRIP report was not forwarded to the congressional defense committees until April 1994 prior to Block 0 missile and launcher full rate production. The RAM Block I program is currently in engineering and manufacturing development and addresses the deficiencies and weaknesses reported in our BLRIP report.

Activity during FY97 consisted of three Block I missile firings conducted as RAM Block I DT at the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM. Additional DT during FY97 included captive-carry flight testing, with a Block I IR seeker mounted on aircraft, to develop software algorithms for seeker search, detection, track, and processing. This testing was conducted in Europe, using aircraft to represent anti-ship cruise missiles. The missile firings at WSMR, along with M&S results, served as the basis for an OA by COMOPTEVFOR. The OA was conducted in accordance with a TEMP and OA plan approved by DOT&E. A fourth firing was conducted in early October 1997. Modeling and simulation working group meetings were held to address the extent to which M&S could contribute to OT&E and to discuss validation of the M&S with DT and OT results. Other activity during the year included planning and definition of aerial target requirements for the combined DT/OT phase of testing onboard the Self Defense Test Ship during FY98. DOT&E representatives observed the missile firings at WSMR, participated in the M&S working group meetings, and participated in the test planning.

Missile firings included two successful intercepts against a BQM-34S drone target, configured with a threat seeker simulator (RF emitter) and IR augmentation. The first firing demonstrated the dual mode guidance capability of Block 0. The second demonstrated IR all-the-way guidance against the same target configuration. Achievement of the third intercept, against a BQM-34S target with neither RF nor IR augmentation, required two separate attempts. During the first, missile acquisition of the target was precluded by a missile roll gyro failure, attributed to corrosion on a pin that keeps the gyro stowed.

Limitations associated with this DT included the following: (1) Flight tests were conducted in a decidedly non-maritime environment, the high desert, thereby limiting assessment of operational effectiveness against sea-skimming threats; (2) Missile hardware was not production representative and software development has not completed; (3) Targets were not completely representative of the simulated threat in terms of size, speed, altitude, RF emissions, IR signature, and other parameters; and (4) WSMR tracking radars were used to determine target location and time to fire RAM; the RAM launcher was pointed at a fixed region of space through which the target was flown.

Notwithstanding the limitations associated with testing a missile -- intended to operate in a maritime environment -- in the high desert, based on results of the DT and M&S, RAM Block I is projected to be potentially operationally effective. Limitations preclude projection of potential operational suitability.

Based on the FY90 OT&E, the following observations are relevant with regard to more realistic operational testing of Block I:

• Credible assessment of operational effectiveness of ship-launched IR-guided missiles against sea-skimming threat ASCMs, based on testing at WSMR, is constrained by the disparity between the intended operational environment (maritime) and the test environment (high desert). (Unlike the RAM Block 0 OPEVAL which included supersonic, low altitude target engagement at WSMR and subsonic, low altitude target engagement at sea, all firings for RAM Block I OPEVAL will be conducted at sea.)

• Due to personnel and ship safety concerns when engaging threat-representative targets with a fleet ship, only subsonic targets could be presented and these were not on realistic profiles in the minimum range region because targets had to be turned away from the fleet ship. (This resulted in preparation of the Self Defense Test Ship (SDTS), for assessment of RAM Block I operational effectiveness against threat-representative targets.)

• Credible assessment of operational effectiveness against sea-skimming threat ASCMs precludes use of point-source augmentation devices to increase the intensity of the target IR signature. (Block I firings for operational effectiveness determination during OPEVAL will be against targets without IR augmentation devices.)