![]() |
||
Director, Operational Test & Evaluation |
||
FY97 Annual Report |
FY97 Annual Report
NAVY AREA DEFENSE (NAD)
| Navy ACAT ID Program 1500 missiles Total program cost (TY$) $6253.9M Average unit cost (TY$) $2.787M First Unit Equip 4QFY01 Full-rate production 4QFY01 Prime Contractor Standard Missile Company (missile) Lockheed Martin Government Electronic Systems (Aegis Ship) | |
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010
The Navy Area Defense (NAD) system is a response to the vulnerability of U.S. forces and protected populations to the ballistic missile threat. The mission of NAD is to protect amphibious assault forces and coastal cities from short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, while maintaining current standard missile capabilities against manned aircraft and cruise missiles. The NAD system contributes to three of the four Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts: precision engagement, full-dimensional protection and dominant maneuver forces. The NAD incorporates state-of-the-art technologies in its sensors, weapons, and battle management, command, control and communications systems. Information superiority enables NAD to be fully capable of operating autonomously or in a network receiving and exchanging data with other theater air and missile defense systems and external sensors. The NAD system will help ensure that Joint Forces enjoy full-spectrum dominance in the theater by being a primary contributor to full-dimensional protection of the dominant maneuver forces through precision engagement of threat short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft.
The NAD consists of the following:
Prior to full fleet introduction, the Navy will release a User Operational Evaluation System (UOES), which will comprise 35 missiles installed on two cruisers. The Navy will use the UOES for training and operational testing, and it is potentially deployable in contingency operations. UOES will be a TBM-only system, while the final system will be able to defend against TBMs and anti-air warfare (AAW) threats simultaneously.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The NAD system passed Milestone II (MS II) in February 1997. Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) activities consisted of the following:
- Extended Tracking and Control (ET&C) experiment. The Navy conducted the ET&C experiment in June 1995 off Kauai, Hawaii, demonstrating the ability of the Aegis system to track two separate ballistic missile targets from launch through impact. ET&C also demonstrated the ability of the Aegis to receive and process cueing data from National Sensors in a timely fashion.
- Environmental Test Round-1A (ETR-1A). The Navy fired a Standard Missile round with an instrumented Inconel dome at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) on August 2, 1996. The flight profile (no target) explored various regimens that included changing angle of attack, various yaw angles, and various turns. ETR-1A collected data to validate wind tunnel testing, demonstrated IR dome cover removal and dome cooling system performance, and collected seeker IR flight environmental vibration data.
- Developmental Test Round-1A (DTR-1A). The Navy fired a Standard Missile round with prototype IR seeker at a Lance target at WSMR on January 27, 1997. DTR-1A demonstrated end-to-end missile performance and placed fragments on the target. The missile successfully intercepted the Lance.
TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY
The NAD TEMP was approved in February 1997. The TEMP includes the complete test matrix for UOES, DT, and OT. Navy testing will examine performance against ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles, multiple targets, and countermeasures and debris environments. There are four major test phases. The DT/OA will consist of eight missile firings at WSMR (without the Aegis system) during FY99-FY00. The Navy will launch three missiles at HERA targets during the UOES at-sea exercise in FY00. The Navy will fire 25 missiles during at-sea DT and OT phases in FY01. All at-sea phases will be at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai. Additionally, the Navy will have a UOES tracking exercise in FY98 and participate in the FY00 system integrated test sponsored by BMDO.
The NAD LFT&E strategy was approved in advance of the TEMP in August 1996. Risk-reduction lethality testing executed in FY93-FY96 served as the baseline for the strategy. In July 1997, the Navy conducted high altitude blast effects arena tests at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, to study the effects of warhead blast at high altitude. The information obtained from those tests will be incorporated into lethality simulations. Execution of the LFT&E program is expected to begin in late 1997.
TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
PD&RR phase demonstrated that the Aegis SPY-1 radar can track a TBM target. In a separate test, the Standard Missile demonstrated it can engage and intercept a Lance by using guidance data from WSMR instrumentation. The contractors and the Navy have a long history of evolutionary development of the Aegis and Standard Missile system. However, the Navy has not attempted previously to develop a system to acquire, track, and intercept TBMs.
There are several specific areas of technical risk in the program. The Navy had not completed and did not test the design for the forward looking fuze prior to MS II; it is unclear how that fuze may interfere with the current RF seeker, which is colocated with it. Discrimination of the target in conditions of multiple objects (countermeasures) and debris is a concern that has not been addressed to date by testing. Also, the Aegis system may have difficulties maintaining both TBM and AAW missions given the high radar loading requirements for high-speed, low cross section TBM targets.
LESSONS LEARNED
The Integrated Product Team (IPT) process for the T&E related areas has not worked well for the Navy TBM programs. The Navy tends to work all problems and issues in house and present their conclusions to the IPTs-usually without data essential to support their rationale and conclusions. The Navy representatives attending the TBM IPTs are usually not empowered to make decisions that are necessary for efficient program planning and execution. Initially, infrequently scheduled IPT meetings precluded issue identification and resolution on an orderly and timely basis. Thus, issues were not always raised to the higher level IPTs for timely resolution. Several T&E issues on the NAD program were not resolved until immediately prior to the MS II DAB. Recently, there has been some improvement with the Navy IPT process for the TBM programs, except that representatives who participate in the working level IPTs are still not empowered to make decisions.
NEWSLETTER
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|