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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
FY97 Annual Report

THEATER HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)

	Army ACAT ID Program 1233 missiles Total program cost (TY$) $14.84B Average unit cost (TY$) $5.8M Full-rate production FY07 Prime Contractor Lockheed Martin (Lead System Integrator) Raytheon (Radar Developer)

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The THAAD system is a response to the vulnerability of U.S. forces and protected populations to the ballistic missile threat. THAAD, the first weapon system designed specifically to defeat Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), is a ground-based missile defense system that constitutes the upper tier of a two-tiered defense against TBMs; PATRIOT and Navy Area serves as the lower. THAAD can conduct both endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric intercepts using state-of-the-art hit-to-kill technology. The system comprises four segments: missile; launcher; radar; and battle management/command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (BM/C4I). The missile is a single-stage, solid booster that propels a separating, maneuvering kill vehicle that uses infrared (IR) tracking to complete the intercept. The launcher is a modified Palletized Load System (PLS) truck. The PLS contains electronics, missile round pallet, generator, and battery pack. The radar is a solid-state, phased-array antenna supported by an electronics unit, a cooling unit, and a prime power unit. The THAAD BM/4I contains a Tactical Operational Center, a Sensor System Interface, and a Communication Relay, which are all transported on High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. The support equipment for THAAD includes a missile round shipping set, missile round sling, and other ancillary equipment.

The THAAD system contributes to three of the four Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts: precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and dominant maneuver forces. THAAD incorporates state-of-the-art technologies in its sensors, weapons, and BM/4I systems. Information superiority enables THAAD to operate autonomously or in a network receiving and exchanging data with PATRIOT, Aegis, and other theater air and missile defense systems and external sensors. The THAAD system will help ensure that Joint Forces enjoy full-spectrum dominance in the theater by being a primary contributor to full-dimensional protection of the dominant maneuver forces through precision engagement of longer range threat ballistic missiles.

The Gulf War demonstrated an immediate need for a system capable of defending large areas by intercepting and destroying TBMs. Recognizing that deficiency, the National Missile Defense Act of 1991 and the Defense Appropriations Act of 1991 established a requirement for a "deployable demonstration system" to provide highly effective TMD for forward-deployed U.S. and Allied Forces by the mid 1990s. A mature system with full capabilities is to be developed by the year 2000. To implement this requirement, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to aggressively pursue advanced TMD options, with the objective of down-selecting and deploying such systems by the mid 1990s.

The near-term response to this requirement is the THAAD User Operational Evaluation System (UOES); the longer-term response is the THAAD objective system. The concept of UOES involves military personnel using prototype equipment to perform early operational assessments (EOAs), influence system design, and be available to deploy in a national emergency contingency operation. Currently, THAAD is in the Program Demonstration and Risk Reduction (PD&RR) phase and is approaching a Milestone II decision in FY99. The UOES will achieve its full initial contingency capability when the Army exercises the 40-missile procurement option in the PD&RR contract.

THAAD has an approved TEMP from Milestone I. The draft Milestone II TEMP is in staffing. The ORD is being updated and is in staffing to support the Milestone II decision.

The PD&RR phase of the THAAD program contains no operational tests. However, the Army and OSD T&E communities are participating early in the planning and execution of the PD&RR testing. OAs using the PD&RR data are planned to support key program decisions.

The THAAD PD&RR program consists mostly of technical tests and simulations conducted by the contractor according to government-approved test plans. The program's centerpiece is a series of flight tests that are being conducted at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM. The flight-test program progressively stresses the system as hardware and software mature through PD&RR phase testing. Data from the PD&RR testing are being used to validate models and simulations. These models and simulations are supporting the DT and OT system evaluations.

The program has attempted seven of the PD&RR flight tests:

• Flight Test #1 (Propulsion Test). This flight demonstrated successful launch and booster performance, booster and kill-vehicle separation, and flight-termination system operation.
• Flight Test #2 (Controls Test). This flight demonstrated successful launch, THAAD energy-management system maneuver, booster and kill-vehicle separation, and response to in-flight target updates. The flare on the booster failed to deploy on this mission, causing the flight to be terminated early when the velocity surpassed WSMR's preset threshold for range safety. Even with the shortened mission, THAAD achieved the majority of the test objectives.
• Flight Test #3 (Seeker Characterization Test). This flight demonstrated successful BM/C4I and launcher integration, launch and booster performance, fire control solution, and kill-vehicle closed-loop navigation and guidance. Data gathered on this mission supports analyzing seeker performance in acquisition, track, and line-of-sight stabilization.
• Flight Test #4. This was the first flight where a THAAD program objective was to intercept a ballistic missile target. The flight met all test objectives, except for the interceptor missing the target. The contractor found a problem in the software that processes the in-flight update data from the ground radar. This problem caused the interceptor to over-correct during the first in-flight target update. The system recognized the error on the second in-flight update and attempted to null out the error in all subsequent in-flight updates. The kill vehicle divert system used all of its fuel before it could complete the last maneuver to fully correct the flight error. The contractor incorporated a "fix" into the system software that was operational for the next flight.
• Flight Test #5. This flight, conducted in March 1996, incorporated the PLS launcher, but also failed to intercept the target missile. After successful launch, maneuvering, receipt of in-flight updates, and separation, the THAAD kill vehicle ceased to track properly, missed the target, and was destroyed. Postflight analysis indicates that the problem was a catastrophic failure of a data umbilical cable during kill vehicle/booster separation.
• Flight Test #6. This flight, flown in July 1996, also failed to achieve an intercept. The problem again occurred in the final endgame phase of the engagement. Telemetry indicated that data was lost from one of the two halves of the IR focal-plane array seeker. Test personnel initially suspected a manufacturing defect in the seeker. However, the seeker was eventually recovered at WSMR and was found to be fully operable. After extensive analysis, current thinking suggests that the dewar holding the seeker coolant may have had contamination.
• Flight Test #7. This flight, flown in March 1997, also failed to achieve an intercept. The problem is attributed to inadvertent epoxy contamination on a shorting pin that prevented operation of the battery supporting the Divert Attitude and Control System (DACS). Thus the DACS did not provide thrust to the kill vehicle, although seeker performance and commands to the DACS were nominal. The contractor has taken corrective action to eliminate the chance of epoxy contamination and is modifying the connector and cables to add redundant power lines. This was also the first test in which the THAAD radar fully controlled the engagement. In previous tests the radar participated in the tests only in a "shadow" mode, tracking, but not controlling, the engagement. All of the flight tests prior to FT-07 have used WSMR range radars to track the targets and interceptors and provide in-flight updates.

During FY95, the program also conducted 15 static sled tests at Holloman AFB, NM, to study system lethality. A series of 10 quarter-scale, light gas-gun tests conducted at the University of Alabama-Huntsville to obtain more lethality information was completed in October 1996. These lethality tests provide the baseline for planning the formal LFT&E in the EMD phase. In 1996, DOT&E approved the THAAD live fire strategy.

The remaining PD&RR tests include six additional intercept attempts. The Milestone II criterion include three body-to-body intercepts. The Army plans to attempt the next intercept at WSMR in early 1998.