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Director, Operational Test & Evaluation |
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FY97 Annual Report |
FY97 Annual Report
SUITE OF INTEGRATED INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES AND
COMMON MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM (CMWS, AN/AAR-57) (SIIRCM/CMWS)
INCLUDES: ADVANCED THREAT INFRARED COUNTERMEASURES
(ATIRCM, AN/ALQ-212)
| Army ACAT 1C Program 2607 systems Total program cost (TY$) $2430.6M Average unit cost (TY$) ATIRCM B-KIT AUPC $699M CMWS B-KIT AUPC $216M Full-rate production 3QFY01 Prime Contractor SANDERS, A Lockheed Martin Company Major Subcontractor (CMWS - sensors) Lockheed Martin Infrared Imaging Systems (LMIRIS) Group A Contractors Boeing Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems Northrop Grumman | |
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010
The SIIRCM/CMWS contributes to full-dimensional protection by improving individual aircraft (or ground vehicle) probability of survival against an increasing worldwide proliferation of advanced infrared (IR) guided missiles. CMWS is a software reprogrammable system intended to provide automatic passive missile detection, threat declaration, positive warning of a post launch missile which is homing on the host platform, countermeasures effectiveness assessment, false alarm suppression, and cues to other onboard systems such as expendable countermeasures dispensers. For the Army only, the ATIRCM adds active directional countermeasures via an arc lamp and laser.
The ATIRCM/CMWS design is modular to allow multiple configurations on a wide range of aircraft and other vehicles. The lead U.S. military services' host platforms are: the MH-60K (Army), the AV-8BN (Navy), and the F-16 Block 40 - Close Air Support (Air Force) aircraft.
The ATIRCM is part of the U.S. Army's SIIRCM concept of IR protection. SIIRCM also includes: a new development set of IR flare decoys the Advanced Infrared Countermeasures Munitions (AIRCMM), and passive IR features. These features include host platform modifications such as engine exhaust/heat suppression, and special coatings, intended to reduce the platform IR signature.
The ATIRCM/CMWS is comprised of six types of line replaceable units (LRUs). The installed LRU configuration may vary by platform from the baseline:
- CMWS: The Electronic Control Unit (ECU, baseline of one for both ATIRCM and CMWS) controls other LRUs, provides countermeasures selection and initiation, controls built-in-test (BIT), and provides the platform interface. The Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMS, baseline four for ATIRCM and six for CMWS) passively detect the presence of energy within a specific band of interest, and transmit information to the ECU.
- ATIRCM: In addition to the above LRUs, the ATIRCM adds a Jam Head Control Unit (JHCU, baseline of one), which performs the laser and lamp jamming control functions for the Infrared Jam Heads (IRJHs, baseline two), once provided a missile hand-off from the CMWS. Also added are: an Infrared Jam Laser (IRJL, baseline one), which provides laser energy to the IRJHs; and an Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD, baseline one government furnished equipment AN/ALE-47 sequencer and two "smart" dispensers).
ATIRCM is required to demonstrate integration with the Army Suite of Integrated Radio Frequency Countermeasures (SIRFC). The Navy Integrated Defensive Electronic Counter Measures (IDECM) program is required to demonstrate integration of CMWS in the IDECM suite.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The SIIRCM/CMWS is a joint service, Army lead, program. In January 1995 USD (A&T) approved the merger of the Army ATIRCM program with the Navy/Air Force Advanced Missile Warning System (AMWS) program. An integrated product team (IPT) was formed in June 1995 to produce a tri-service approved ORD and an IPT coordinated TEMP in support of a 4QFY95 Milestone II decision. The program entered EMD in September 1995. The IPT formed in June 95, produced a "fully coordinated" TEMP in late December 1995 which was immediately approved by both DTSE&E and DOT&E upon submission to OSD in April 96. After expanding the EMD Critical Design Review process, delays in initial EMD hardware/software production, and adjusting detailed T&E planning, the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) schedule was approved in June 97, moving the MS-III objective/threshold from FEB00/AUG00 to MAR01/SEP01. The ORD was changed in FY97 to include a more realistic threshold to objective range for ATIRCM effectiveness. The Joint Program Office (JPO) was relocated from St. Louis, MO to Huntsville, AL during 4QFY97 as part of a BRAC move of the Army Aviation Electronic Combat Project Office (PM-AEC). The JPO move resulted in vacancy, gaps, or rapid turnover in several key project management positions.
TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY
The aggressive continuum of modeling and simulation (M&S) intended to support the system development, hardware (and software) in the loop (HITL) testing, open air range testing, installed equipment testing, operational evaluation of the system, and ultimately the life cycle maintenance of the system, has been dependent on the Test and Measurement (T&M) program which has been ongoing since June 1996. While supporting system development, some aspects of the M&S effort are also dependent on the prime contractor's system design process and hardware deliveries. The T&M, conducted in and around Sander's Nashua NH facilities, at Eglin Air Force Base, and at White Sands Missile Range, has continued to gather both instrumented ground truth and prototype sensor views of environmental, threat, and false alarm data. T&M collection events planned in late FY97 were canceled due to CMWS sensor availability and cost of the T&M effort. Some multi-spectral test and evaluation limitations can only be overcome through iterative (i.e., model, test, model) modeling and simulation in conjunction with DT/OT events in order to construct and validate an end to end operational evaluation environment. The approved TEMP T&E concept for the CMWS included a sensor in the loop HITL capability. $2.5M of program funds were budgeted for that purpose. Beginning in late FY96, the program conducted a $250,000 effort to survey existing HITL capabilities. Proposals to upgrade an existing facility to this capability were reviewed. After consultation with OUSD(A&T)/S&TS-EW, the PM concluded that the sensor HITL schedule, cost, and technical risk to the ATIRCM/CMWS program was unacceptable. DOT&E has insisted that the approved T&E concept for the CMWS is dependent on a sensor HITL, and that this HITL could not be eliminated unless some adequate alternative is articulated in a TEMP update with DOT&E approval. Continuing dialogue in 1QFY98 resulted in a renewed commitment from the PM to develop the CMWS sensor HITL. This was further facilitated by a commitment from the Air Force Test and Evaluation Executive to fund the $600K of HITL cost which is in excess of the original budget set aside by the PM for this resource.
TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
A TEMP update was begun in early FY97 to reflect the APB schedule changes and the proposed addition of a CMWS LRIP to the approved acquisition strategy. This TEMP update effort has now been re-scoped to include high priority changes to the program as of 1QFY98. Specifically:
- Plans for developing the CMWS sensor HITL.
- Addition of both CMWS, and ATIRCM, LRIPs to the acquisition strategy.
- Resolution of the programs funding and schedule with adequately resourced T&E.
Responding to DOT&E and AFOTEC concerns, the PM has agreed to proceed with CMWS sensor HITL development. Since this is a unique capability, with moderate technical and schedule risk, which is being developed for the first time, the current plan follows a risk mitigating incremental approach.
T&E planning is in progress for completion of a combined DT/OT phase, and a resulting Operational Assessment, to support the acquisition decision maker prior to the proposed LRIP decisions.
As of October 98, the JPO identified a substantial FY98 funding shortfall and has moved to delay several key program events into subsequent years for funding, and also to reduce the T&E resource requirements which were approved in the MS-II TEMP. In addition, contractor delays to date to complete the system design and initial EMD hardware deliveries, resulted in the early FY97 program re-baseline which extended the MS-III by thirteen months. Continued delivery delays after the re-baseline have contributed to delays in completing early T&E related events. Most notably to date this has contributed to delays in development of the necessary and challenging modeling and simulation. Aircraft integration schedules are also major T&E drivers potentially at risk due to EMD delivery performance.
The DUSA(OR) and Army OPTEC have assumed an increased leadership role with the Joint T&E community, and along with the newly formed JPO are driving the production of the needed TEMP update for approval by DOT&E.
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