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	Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
FY97 Annual Report

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CONTROL SYSTEM (CSSCS)

	Army ACAT IC Program 1651 systems Total program cost (FY97) $309.3M Average unit cost (FY97) $78K Full-rate Production (V.3) 2QFY98 Prime Contractor TRW, Inc.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010

The CSSCS will become an integral part of Joint Vision 2010 and its concept of focused logistics support. Focused Logistics requires systems that are responsive, flexible, and precise. The CSSCS, the combat service support component of the Army Battle Command System, is a computer software system designed to assist commanders and their staffs in the planning and execution of logistics operations. Combat service support commanders and staffs currently participate in force-level planning and decision making using a time and manpower intensive manual process to gather, correlate, and analyze volumes of technical data from units and the Standard Army Management Information Systems. The CSSCS will enhance current capabilities by automatically extracting and managing the information needed by commanders to sustain and reconstitute the force. CSSCS software tools maintain combat information, generate reports and orders, and provide analytical tools to support commanders and their staffs from maneuver brigade through echelons above corps. Commanders at each echelon can tailor the amount of information tracked within their organization. The primary communication means are fiber-optic local-area networks interconnected by the Mobile Subscriber Equipment.

The CSSCS Program Office was chartered in 1988 and the program was designated an Acquisition Category IC program in 1989. The CSSCS is following an evolutionary development and the current software is the third of five planned versions. The CSSCS completed an Early User Test and Evaluation in 1992 and Limited User Tests in 1993 to support the evolutionary development efforts.

The first CSSCS IOT&E was conducted at Fort Hood in 1994. The CSSCS performance in the 1994 IOT&E was inadequate to proceed to an acquisition decision primarily because of shortfalls in data entry, information accuracy, and network management.

The CSSCS IOT&E II, October 30 through December 13, 1996, at Fort Hood, TX, was a division-level command post exercise using soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division. The IOT&E II had two phases. Phase I was a control phase focusing on CSSCS functionality and suitability using a scripted scenario and extensive data collection. Phase II was a free-play corps command-post exercise that provided operationally realistic conditions to assess system doctrine and system level operational effectiveness, particularly information accuracy.

The OT II focus was software performance deficiencies, command and staff training, and doctrinal employment. This test addressed all these issues except for interoperability with STAMIS and network management. DOT&E supported deferring these tests. The STAMIS interfaces were not available, however, CSSCS automation depends on successfully interfacing the CSS STAMIS, accepting input from other elements of the CSS community, and exchange information with other automated systems to evaluate logistics information with respect to the force-level commander's tactical courses of actions. The design of the network for the flow of information across the local area networks and the radio links as well as the procedure to introduce new units into the system is a critical element in the combat environment. This was not tested because of known deficiencies. Unfortunately, this is an Army wide problem with all Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) and impedes the progress toward a fully digitized force. These issues will be addressed in future testing.

CSSCS was not fully tested in the tactical environment. This requires information to be transmitted over the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) radio system, with the SINGARS radio system as a backup. The operational test did not test interoperability with the single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINGARS) because it was already known that there were significant problems with this communication mode. The control phase of the test did not use SINGARS, but rather a garrison local area network and MSE. In the field, the system will use generator power the stability of which can cause problems with computers. The 1994 computer system could reliably use generator power, however, the upgrade configuration (Sun 20) was not tested in the same environment.

After a detailed review of the data collected during the December 1996, OT, several areas of concerns were raised by DOT&E. On August 29, 1997, the Deputy, US Army (Operational Research) requested DOT&E to defer the beyond limited initial procurement (BLRIP) report until these concerns with CSSCS are addressed.

The CSSCS workstation demonstrated positive indicators of effectiveness in required functionality such as projecting requirements, course of action analysis, and modifying orders in a non-operational environment when operated exclusively over local area networks. Operators successfully entered, stored and displayed logistical information, but the operational part of the test did not evaluate manual data workloads. Since automated entry systems such as STAMIS may not be available across the board in the near term, manual entry still will be required. The workload thus induced may limit the number of critical items that can be tracked. Therefore the objective of total asset visibility has never been tested nor has positive effectiveness been demonstrated.

The system's flexibility to support the Commander and his CSS staff was tested in ways other than the proposed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training, techniques and procedures (TTP). The test was unable to determine the effectiveness of the system using these TTPs and emerging doctrine. To capitalize on, and to correctly evaluate full impact of the TRADOC vision, a test unit would have to adopt and utilize these new TTPs. The system however did exhibit a feature that represents a significant operational risk. A "short-cut" procedure was introduced in the test that, in fact, significantly corrupted the data bases. Such a procedure might be typical of one that units "discover" on there own when given the system. It was not until the test was 90 % complete before the unit and observers had enough information to acknowledge the problem. The system does not easily allow "reasonableness checks." In this case the system showed a significant risk to unintended data corruption or even corruption by an IW attack.

CSSCS functionality was demonstrated in a technical environment. However, to be effective requires maintaining an accurate logistics database. This is fundamental to all functionality for the system since the value of the other functions rely on the veracity of the database. Test data revealed that the CSSCS, considering all aspects (hardware, software, procedures, training package, etc.), did not maintain an accurate logistics database in all classes of supply. There appeared to be an inconsistency across the different classes of supply. Class V (ammunition) was 94% consistent, well above the standard of 85%, but class III (POL) was only 75%. Class V's consistency may have been due to its high visibility at all levels by its product manager the division ammunition officer (DAO). Our analysis also found that there is a decline of data accuracy over time. Due to the lack of instrumentation, the collected test data were not sufficient to isolate causality. Focused Logistics requires systems that are responsive, flexible, and precise. CSSCS tools have shown to be somewhat responsive and flexible in meeting the commander's needs; however, its apparent problem with database accuracy makes it imprecise.

The operational suitability of CSSCS was not confirmed. Training and interoperability remain the key issues. The inability of the training programs to adequately prepare commanders and staffs to integrate the CSSCS into an effective command and control system, and the integration of the system with its supporting interfaces and communications continues, to be the primary operational suitability concern.

Further testing will be required that will focus on the integrity of the data base over time, the impacts on the data base by the communications network, interoperability with other Army Tactical Command and Control Systems (ATCCS) and validate CSSCS tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and emerging combat service support doctrine.