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Director, Operational Test & Evaluation |
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FY97 Annual Report |
FY97 Annual Report
B-2 ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BOMBER
| Air Force ACAT IC Program 21 systems Total program cost (TY$) $44,411M Average unit cost (TY$) $1,175M Full-rate production N/A Prime Contractor Northrop Gruman Corporation | |
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & CONTRIBUTION TO JOINT VISION 2010
The B-2 builds on technological innovations and advancements in weapon delivery accuracy and low observable technologies to enhance the operational concept of precision engagement.
The B-2 Spirit bomber is an all-wing, two-crew aircraft, designed for worldwide conventional and nuclear weapon delivery missions. It is propelled by four F118-GE-110 turbofan engines. The aircraft has twin side-by-side weapon bays, capable of carrying a total of approximately 44,000 pounds of weapons. The B-2 incorporates technologies providing it with a very low observability (LO), i.e., low radar cross section, as well as low IR, visual, and acoustic signatures.
The aircraft was delivered in three different configurations with incremental increases in capabilities. The initial version (Block 10) was intended primarily for training. All Block 10 aircraft have been returned to the factory for upgrade to later configurations. An interim Block 20 configuration reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in April 1997. Block 20 aircraft have a nuclear weapon delivery capability as well as a near-precision guided bomb capability called Global Positioning System (GPS)-Aided Targeting System/GPS-Aided Munition (GATS/GAM). GAM consists of a 2,000-lb Mk-84 bomb equipped with a guidance package controlled by a GPS-aided inertial navigation system (INS). Block 30 final version aircraft are now being produced and delivered to Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Block 30 will be capable of carrying and delivering additional types of conventional weapons, and the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Operational testing of the B-2 has been conducted within a combined DT&E/IOT&E program carried out at Edwards AFB, California beginning in 1989. The primary IOT&E activity consisted of system assessments, made by dedicated IOT&E test team pilots during operationally realistic DT&E flights. In addition, a series of test flights was conducted against individual threat systems and an integrated air defense system to evaluate survivability. The only dedicated IOT&E missions were eleven Integrated Sorties carried out just prior to delivery of each block to the operational squadron. Two Integrated Sorties of a test aircraft configured to represent a Block 10 aircraft were flown in October 1993 and five Block 20 Integrated Sorties were conducted in April and May 1996.
The B-2 was added to the Annual T&E Oversight List for Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) in May 1995. DOT&E decided that the requirements of Title 10 Section 2366 of the United States Code apply only if the program is expected to proceed beyond low-rate production. The Air Force is conducting an LFT&E program which relies almost entirely on modeling and simulation.
TEST & EVALUATION ACTIVITY
IOT&E assessments during DT&E flights continued through June 1997 on test aircraft, which were modified to incorporate most Block 30 features. Survivability test flights were also continued and four Block 30 Integrated Sorties were flown in June 1997. The IOT&E test program ended in July 1997 even though several important subsystems had not completed development. Residual test requirements are being deferred until FOT&E by the Air Combat Command operational wing at Whiteman AFB. The test program schedule was delayed primarily by software problems and late software delivery. Availability of test ranges also affected the ability to complete comprehensive survivability testing.
Reliability, availability and maintainability assessments of the B-2 were based on flight test data collected at Edwards AFB, combined with maintenance data from the Block 20 aircraft operations at Whiteman AFB.
The TEMP approved February 1996 includes a Live Fire Section. OSD is to review the Air Force's vulnerability assessment and prepare the report to Congress. The Air Force has submitted B-2 vulnerability assessments which are currently in review.
TEST & EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
With the exception of the items noted below, assessment of the B-2 is complete. DOT&E's assessment is based on observation and analyses of Block 30 Integrated Sorties and discussions with test force and operating bomb wing personnel.
The B-2 Block 30 capabilities required by the user's Operational Requirements Document (ORD) were only partially demonstrated in IOT&E through actual tests. Some capabilities (e.g., Deployability) and measures of effectiveness (e.g., Sortie Generation Rate) were evaluated as not being met based on test team subjective judgments and/or use of models.
The Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) evaluated five Critical Operational Issues (COIs) for their final IOT&E report:
- Rapid Strike
- Sustained Operations
- Mission Survivability
- Weapons Effectiveness
- Reliability, Maintainability, and Deployability
Rapid Strike: This area was assessed as meeting user requirements for preplanned missions only. Limitations in rapid strike capability result from immaturity of the Mission Planning System (consisting of Air Force Mission Support System, AFMSS, combined with B-2 unique software) and the Defensive Management System (Radar Warning Receiver), and minor limitations of the Terrain Following System.
Sustained Operations: This area was assessed as not meeting user requirements. The B-2 was rated as incapable of achieving the required Sortie Generation Rate due to unreliability and difficulty in maintaining the aircraft's LO system. The ability to sustain combat operations in a deployed environment was also rated as a problem area due to the need for sheltering the aircraft and the need for extensive support equipment at a forward operating location.
Mission Survivability: AFOTEC assessed the B-2 as being survivable against the projected threat on the assumption that appropriate tactics are employed. DOT&E has not yet had an opportunity to review detailed results of survivability tests and is deferring an assessment of this area pending further analysis. In its current state the B-2's Defensive Management System is operationally unsatisfactory. Problems include inaccurate information, a cluttered display, and excessive workload being required to operate the system.
Weapons Effectiveness: Testing of the B-2 indicates that all requirements for carriage and release of nuclear and conventional weapons have been demonstrated. Accuracy requirements appear to have been met for all conditions; however, DOT&E has not yet completed a review of bomb scores. The B-2 has a unique capability to target near-precision GPS-guided munitions, although some workarounds are required to deliver weapons successfully. The JDAM BLU-109, penetrating warhead version, can also be successfully delivered with a reduced delivery envelope due to temporary weapon limitations. DOT&E notes that the total weapon delivery rate of the B-2 will depend on Mission Capable rates and Sortie Generation Rates that can be attained.
Reliability, Maintainability, and Deployability: AFOTEC rated this area as not meeting user requirements because the B-2 cannot be maintained effectively at deployed locations. The most significant limitation is LO maintainability. Reduced aircraft availability results from the large number of B-2 LO system unscheduled maintenance events, combined with lengthy times to repair LO discrepancies and excessive manpower required to effect LO repairs. The cure times of LO materials are major components of the time it takes to complete an LO maintenance action. These materials include sealants, used to fill gaps between panels, adhesives, and tapes to cover the joints. Deployment of the
B-2 will require more facilities and support equipment than originally envisioned. The aircraft will require shelters at all operating locations because it is subject to rain intrusion and water entrapment. Some LO maintenance actions will also require a controlled environment.
Live Fire Test and Evaluation: B-2 vulnerability testing and analysis remains ongoing. To date, the Air Force has identified hydraulic fluid, fuel tank ullage, JP-8 fuel, flight control systems, and dry bay fires as potential B-2 vulnerability issues. Because of the B-2's unique stealth characteristics, impacts to radar cross section must also be assessed.
DOT&E's assessment of the B-2 is incomplete. Immaturity of several subsystems precluded a final evaluation of effectiveness and suitability. In particular, the following will require additional OT&E:
- Mission Planning System
- Defensive Management System
- Terrain Following System
- Auxiliary Power System and Environmental Control System
Additionally, survivability testing for several threat types is incomplete. DOT&E also plans to assess progress in improving the cost and complexity of LO maintenance. Finally, the robustness of the B-2's LO features has also not been adequately quantified. More testing is required to determine the effects of long duration flights.
At this time, the B-2 is considered as potentially effective if development and operational testing for immature subsystems is completed satisfactorily. The B-2's suitability will require significant development and time to overcome deficiencies. The Air Force has initiated a strategy to improve LO maintainability. Initiatives include increased manpower, developing better materials, improving repair techniques, and providing equipment to verify LO repairs.
In an effort to provide the Air Force B-2 community with improved LO diagnostic tools, the Director, DOT&E, sponsored an initiative with the Office of Naval Research to conduct a demonstration of current LO diagnostic tools that the Navy has developed or is in the process of developing. A successful demonstration of the Navy's LO diagnostic equipment was conducted at Whiteman Air Force Base in August 1997. During the demonstration, a B-2 aircraft was imaged with two separate state of the art ground-mounted radar systems. The objective of the demonstration was to provide the Air Force with insight into how far LO diagnostic technology has come in the last several years and to determine if this technology could be effectively employed on the B-2. Based on the results of this successful demonstration, the Navy is now working closely with the Air Force to provide the B-2 with an interim diagnostic tool that will greatly improve their ability to manage LO discrepancies.
The B-2 is currently exceeding its cost of ownership per flight hour requirements. This is mainly driven by high levels of maintenance man-hours per flying hour required to meet operational commitments. LO maintenance is the main driver in determining cost of ownership. The Air Force must continue their effort to reduce both the cost and time required to complete LO repairs. They also need to continue to work with the other Services to develop better tools to be used for LO diagnostics.
In addition to operational testing, the B-2 was thoroughly evaluated for operational utility in Phase Two of the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS), conducted by DOD in 1996-1997. The objective of this portion of the study was to quantify B-2 contributions to the warfighter and to determine if acquiring more B-2s would be cost effective. The study compared B-2 capabilities with other platforms and/or weapons. DOT&E has reviewed the study and determined that the assumptions used for the B-2 were overly optimistic, representing capabilities the B-2 presently does not have, nor is not funded to acquire in the near future. Even so, the study determined that procuring additional B-2s at the expense of other assets would adversely impact the force structure, causing serious shortfalls in other areas. Based on these results, DOD determined in 1997 that acquiring additional B-2s was not an acceptable strategy.
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