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National Port Readiness Network

Strategic ports are U.S. ports designated to support major force deployments during the initial surge period under one or more national defense contingency plans. They are selected based on their proximity to deploying units, transportation links to those units, and port characteristics. Strategic ports also include primary military ammunition ports (Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point NC, Concord Naval Weapons Station CA, and Port Hadlock WA) whose operations would impact unit deployments due to their proximity to other strategic ports and the nature of their activities during deployment.

The National Port Readiness Network promotes the readiness of three continental U.S. military and 13 commercial strategic seaports to support deployment of military surge and sustainment cargo. These ports and waterways must continue to provide the critical infrastructure and services needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military mobilization. These strategic resources include deep-draft harbor channels, modern port facilities, and an extensive network of intermodal links.

MARAD is the permanent chair of the National Port Readiness Network. A Memorandum of Understanding on Port Readiness establishes the National Port Readiness Network Steering Group (NPRNSG) and a National Port Readiness Network Working Group (NPRNWG). The organizations provide coordination and cooperation to ensure readiness of commercial ports to support force deployment during contingencies and other defense emergencies.

Procedures for assigning priority of use and exclusive-use port terminals for military operations are in Title 46, CFR. A National Shipping Authority Service Priority Order (NSPO) directs that priority of use be given to the movement of DOD cargoes. A National Shipping Authority Allocation Order (NAO) gives DOD exclusive use of port facilities. Both of these documents refer to specified terminals and facilities within a port, and both are legally binding. These documents are issued by MARAD at the request of HQ MTMC and give port authorities 48 hours to prepare for military use.

For many years, various government organizations with significant roles in the mobilization of U.S. ports planned, exercised, and operated without a good understanding of the functions of other agencies in the port. Many had little appreciation for the responsibilities, capabilities, and limitations of their fellow agencies. In 1983, six agencies of the Federal Departments of Defense and Transportation formed a working group to clarify the roles of each of these agencies. The DOD agencies involved in the working group were the Military Transportation Management Command, Military Sealift Command, Naval Control of Shipping Organization, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The DOT agencies were the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration.

The working group developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Port Readiness, which was signed by the Departments of Defense and Transportation in 1985. In 1989 the Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) accepted membership along with Forces Command in 1992. In 1993, U.S. Transportation Command was added as a signatory agency. With the new membership, revisions to the National MOU have been made. In addition to formally establishing the National Steering and Working Groups and providing a synopsis of agency responsibilities, this Port Readiness MOU encouraged the formation of port-level committees to coordinate local planning and exercises.

The national MOU formalizes the establishment of local Port Readiness Committees (PRCs). PRCs are designed to ensure military and commercial port readiness to support deployment of military personnel and cargo in the event of mobilization or national defense contingency through enhanced coordination and cooperation among responsible agencies. Although many of the personnel deployed for a particular operation would be airlifted, the vast majority of equipment, ammunition, petroleum, food, and other necessary supplies could be transported only by sea. Most of these supplies would be transported through the commercial port system. The PRC accomplishes its objectives from the support and agreement of each member agency, which executes actions in accordance with their own plans and procedures.

In May of 1986, the Coast Guard, in accordance with a recommendation from the National Port Readiness Working Group, directed Coast Guard Captains of the Port to take the lead in establishing Port Readiness Committees (PRCs) throughout the United States. Captains of the Port were selected to serve as permanent chairpersons because of their broad port safety and security authority and responsibilities, and because of their presence in all U.S. Seaports of Embarkation.

Enhanced coordination and cooperation is the PRC charter. It is important to recognize that the PRC is not an operational command. The PRC accomplishes its objectives from the support and agreement of each member agency, which executes actions in accordance with their own plans and procedures. Each Port Readiness Committee falls under the guidance of the National Port Readiness Working Group (NPR-WG). The NPR-WG presently has two standing subcommittees, focusing on Port Security and Exercises. The NPR-WG is guided by the National Port Readiness Steering Group.

MARAD, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Coast Guard, and components of three major and unified DOD commands (Transportation Command, Joint Forces Command and the Army Forces Command) - have agreed upon joint responsibilities to ensure efficient movement of military forces and supplies through U.S. ports. The agreement also established a National Port Readiness Steering Group whose efforts establish joint policy direction and broad priorities. MARAD regional officials and other members of the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN) conduct semi-annual port readiness visits at each of the marine terminals. Mobilization exercises to test port readiness were also conducted at six ports. MARAD continued to participate with DOD personnel on two teams whose purpose is to improve port readiness.

Because normal port operations would be significantly impacted, prior preparation and coordination are essential to maximize port responsiveness and throughput of critical DOD cargo, while simultaneously mitigating adverse impact on normal port operations. Port Readiness Committees responsible for these ports are mandatory. Alternate ports that could be used for deployment of unit equipment under certain circumstances such as extreme national emergency and damage to primary ports. PRCs located in Non-Strategic ports are not mandatory, but provide an interagency action group to respond collectively to crises. This has proven invaluable for responding to natural disasters.

As the "Focused Logistics" component of the National Military Strategy evolves, military cargo requirements could increase. Using DOD's "Ports for National Defense" studies and Mobility Requirements Study, 2005, MARAD will assist MTMC in determining if any additional port facilities should be added to the 14 facilities already designated by DOD as strategic ports. MTMC will also determine the criteria for selecting any additional strategic ports. MARAD will then issue necessary planning orders to the affected ports for information purposes and provide guidance for arrangements necessary to meet DOD's needs.

MARAD is responsible for determining the priority and allocation of ports and related intermodal facilities during DOD mobilizations, when the smooth flow of military cargo through commercial ports is critical.

The port readiness measure consists of the total number of DOD-designated strategic ports for military use that are assessed as able to meet DOD-readiness requirements on 48-hour notice. The MARAD/DOD semi-annual port assessments provide data or other information on a variety of factors, including the following: the capabilities of channels, anchorages, berths, and pilots/tugboats to handle larger ships; rail access, rail restrictions, rail ramp offloading areas, and rail storage capacities; the availability of trained labor gangs and bosses; number and capabilities of available cranes; long-term leases and contracts for the port facility; distances from ports to key military installations; intermodal capabilities for handling containers; highway and rail access; number of port entry gates; available lighting for night operations; and number and capacity of covered storage areas and marshalling areas off the port.

Port and intermodal facilities provide the critical interface between the water and surface modes of transportation, handling both commercial and military cargoes. As DOD reduces its overseas presence, it must rely more on transportation resources located in the continental United States. During military mobilizations, DOD must be able to move equipment and supplies through designated commercial port facilities quickly to ensure optimal logistics flow to overseas commanders. DOT is responsible for establishing DOD's prioritized use of ports and related intermodal facilities during DOD mobilizations. When military cargo movement is time critical, DOT ensures that designated strategic ports are available.

In the event of a national defense emergency of a magnitude that would require deployment of U.S. forces overseas, U.S. commercial ports would have a key role in equipping, supplying, and sustaining actions by troops in the theater of operations. Although the majority of personnel deployed would be airlifted, along with limited amounts of initial equipment and supplies, the vast tonnage of equipment, ammunition, petroleum products, rations, etc., needed to successfully conduct and support combat operations could only be moved by sea. The majority of this material will go through the commercial port system.

Due to the continuing globalization of the U.S. economy, foreign trade is continuing to increase. Since 95 percent of U.S. foreign trade (by volume) moves by sea, this places growing demands on U.S. ports. This increased demand may reduce port facilities' ready availability for priority movement of military cargo during national security contingencies. U.S. port national security capability will also be affected by: 1) adequacy of land and waterside access to the strategic ports; 2) the availability of sufficient longshore labor to load military cargo during contingencies; and 3) the suitability of cargo handling technology and equipment.

With the increase in commercial shipping, port authorities desire to capitalize on the booming business by enticing commercial shippers to sign long term leases for the use of premier terminals at their ports. This produces constant business and constant revenue for the ports. The ports can ill afford to antagonize commercial shippers by disrupting service and rerouting ships to inferior terminals. Port authorities attempt to pacify the military by offering inferior facilities that are either unused or unattractive to commercial shippers. While the military attempts to comply with port authority requests, caution must be taken to ensure that inferior facilities do not seriously downgrade a military unit's throughput capability. Such downgrading cannot be tolerated when time is critical in a deployment. As a result, some port authorities would just as soon that the military did not use their port facilities.

Concurrent with the greater dependence on commercial ports is the use of larger, deeper draft commercial vessels that depend upon technically sophisticated, highly specialized shoreside facilities for loading and offloading. Ports selected to serve as DOD deployment points are designated as Strategic Ports. The coordination of deployment activities at these strategic ports relies upon the local Port Readiness Committees (PRCs) and National Port Readiness Network (NRPN).

In 1997, the U.S. port system handled more than 2 billion metric tons of foreign and domestic waterborne cargo. This cargo moved through 326 coastal, Great Lakes, and shallow-draft ports. Within the individual ports, cargo is transferred between water and landside transportation modes at publicly and privately owned marine terminals. Private ownership of inland waterway facilities is more pronounced than that of the coastal and Great Lakes facilities, with 87 percent privately owned, compared to 66 percent at the deep-water ports.