Signals Intelligence Programs and Activities
Russia continues to maintain one of the most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. The GRU's Sixth Directorate uses over 20 different types of aircraft, a fleet of 60 SIGINT collection vessels, satellites, and ground stations to collect signals intelligence. Together with FAPSI, the GRU operates SIG1NT collection facilities in over 60 diplomatically protected facilities throughout the world. These agencies also operate large ground collection facilities within the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States, at Cam Rank Bay, Vietnam, and at Lourdes, Cuba. These activities provide the Russians with worldwide SIGINT collection capabilities.
The sphere of activity of Soviet radio reconnaissance began to expand considerably since the early 1950s. In particular, active research work was carried out to find ways of access to sources using VHF and microwave bands. At the same time, radio engineering intelligence has been further developed, extracting data on radio electronic means of foreign states. This was done by the relevant units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the 8th Main Directorate of the State Security Committee of the USSR.
Later, already in the 1960s, the KGB had the 16th Directorate, from which they demanded the following tasks: intercept messages from communication lines of foreign missions and illegal immigrants on the territory of the USSR; to locate radio equipment and decrypt intercepted messages; to carry out technical penetration into foreign embassies and missions both in the USSR and abroad; receive information abroad in government and military lines of communication of foreign states, as well as with the use of listening equipment and other technical means.
The number of employees of the 16th Directorate in the late 1970s reached two thousand people. It then included: The number of employees of the 16th Directorate in the late 1970s reached two thousand people. It then included:
- 1st department - was engaged in opening ciphers, for which the PC "Bulat" - one of the most powerful in the USSR.
- 3rd department - was responsible for translating the correspondence into Russian, which were then sent to the 4th department.
- 4th department - edited and supplied with explanatory comments the materials received from the 3rd department and selected from them those that were intended for sending to consumers. The material was made out in two brochures. One of them was received only by some members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (in the 1970s they were Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov and Ustinov), and from the second met the chiefs of the First (Intelligence) and the Second (Counterespionage) of the main KGB offices . In addition, without indicating sources, the information in the second brochure was sent to other interested agencies.
- The 5th department - was engaged in the analysis of cipher systems and carried out communications with the relevant special services of the Warsaw Pact member countries and the Union states.
- The 1st department of the Service was responsible for the analysis of foreign cryptographic equipment for the detection of bookmarks in it, and developed methods for capturing signals emitted by this equipment.
- 2-nd department was engaged in interception of these signals and their processing.
- The 3rd department maintained contacts with customs authorities and other institutions through which operations were conducted to bookmark and remove "bugs".
- The 5th department "cleared" the intercepted signals from interference.
Since the 1960s radio interception posts had been established in the residences in foreign countries. The very first such post was organized in 1963 in Mexico City and received the code name "Radar". Three years later, a similar post named "Reach" earned in the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and in 1967. the "Sample" post in New York began to function. By 1970, the posts Pochin-1 (in the embassy), Pochin-2 (in the residential complex of the embassy), Proba-1 (in the building of the Soviet representation in the UN) and Proba-2 (at the Soviet Embassy on Long Island) could already intercept the messages of diplomats from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Portugal, Spain and a number of other countries, as well as some messages transmitted over US military lines of communication. The Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Yuri Andropov, approved the plan for the deployment of radio interception posts in 15 residences of the CCGT on May 15, 1970, and by the end of this decade more than 30 such "points" had already operated abroad.
| Spring | San Francisco |
| Venus | Montreal |
| Radar | Mexico City |
| Termite-C | Havana |
| Maple | Brasilia |
| The Island | Reykjavik |
| Mercury | London |
| North | Oslo |
| Jupiter | Paris |
| Tirol-2 | Vienna |
| Elbrus | Bern |
| Caucasus | Geneva |
| Home | Rome |
| Altai | Lisbon |
| Rainbow | Athens |
| Tulip | The Hague |
| Vega | Brussels |
| Sail | Belgrade |
| Rainbow-T | Ankara |
| Sirius | Istanbul |
| Mars | Tehran |
| Orion | Cairo |
| Sigma | Damascus |
| Dawn | Tokyo |
| Crab | Beijing |
| Cupid | Hanoi |
| Dolphin | Jakarta |
| Crimea | Nairobi |
However, the extraction of posts "Pochin-1" and "Pochin-2" became information not only political, but also military. It concerned, in particular, Trident ballistic missiles, MX, Pershing-2, cruise and anti-aircraft missiles, F-15, F-16, F-18, B-52 and B-1 aircraft. Since 1973 New York posts "Proba-1" and "Proba-2" were able to receive very valuable scientific and technical information. They, for example, intercepted a number of facsimile messages from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Boeing, Fairchild, General Dynamics, Grumman, Hughes, Lockheed, IBM, and some other leading firms of the US military-industrial complex. So it was possible to find out very important data on the design and development of A-10, B-1, F-14, other aircraft, anti-missile and anti-submarine defense programs. And earned in 1976 in San Francisco post "Spring" controlled facsimile and telephone communications of Pentagon contractors, as well as the largest companies located on the west coast of the United States.
The SIGINT facility at Lourdes was among the most significant intelligence collection capabilities targeting the United States. This facility, less than 100 miles from Key West, was one of the largest and most sophisticated SIGINT collection facilities in the world. It is jointly operated by the GRU, FAPSI, and Cuba's intelligence services. The complex was manned by over 1,000 Russian personnel and is capable of monitoring a wide array of commercial and government communications throughout the southeastern United States, and between the United States and Europe. Lourdes intercepts transmissions from microwave towers in the United States, communication satellite downlinks, and a wide range of shortwave and high-frequency radio transmissions. It also serves as a mission ground station and analytical facility supporting Russian SIGINT satellites. The facility at Lourdes, together with a sister facility in Russia, allowed the Russians to monitor all U. S. military and civilian geosynchronous communications satellites. It was alleged that the Lourdes facility monitors all White House communications activities, launch control communications and telemetry from NASA and Air Force facilities at Cape Canaveral, financial and commodity wire services, and military communications links. According to one source, Lourdes has a special collection and analysis facility that is responsible for targeting financial and political information. This activity is manned by specially selected personnel and appears to be highly successful in providing Russian leaders with political and economic intelligence.
The former Soviet Union also used a variety of other means to collect signals intelligence. The Soviets operated SIGINT collection sites in over 60 countries from diplomatically protected embassies, consulates, trade legations, and residences. It is possible that these activities are continuing in the United States. The location of a number of Russian diplomatic facilities in the United States would provide Russian SIGINT collectors with access to sensitive information. Russian collection activities could derive sensitive information on Government policies from monitoring Government activities in the Washington, DC area, and sensitive financial and trade information using Russian facilities located in New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. The location of microwave towers and cellular communication repeaters in the vicinity of Russian diplomatic facilities in these cities increases the potential damage from collection activities. In the past, vans from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations were observed in the vicinity of the GE Americom satellite ground station in Vernon Valley, NJ, and vans from the San Francisco consulate were observed in the vicinity of AT&T microwave towers in Northern California. In both cases, the vans appeared to be conducting SIG1NT monitoring at these facilities.
The Russians also continued the Soviet practice of using covert mobile collection platforms. During the Cold War, the Russians frequently used tractor-trailers, and other vehicles with concealed SIGINT collection equipment to gather intelligence in Western Europe. Western intelligence officials estimate that the Soviets conducted over 7,000 covert vehicular SIGINT operations in NATO countries annually. During these operations, the Soviets gathered electronic order of battle (EOB) data, monitored exercise communications, conducted direction finding operations, and calibrated Soviet SIGINT satellites to determine geolocation accuracies. The Soviets also allegedly used clandestine collection vans located in Mexico to monitor activities at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Vans operating from Tijuana, Mexico reportedly were able to monitor all of Southern California and Western Arizona. There have also been reports that Aeroflot aircraft and clandestine collection vehicles have been used to collect SIGINT data inside the continental United States.
The Russians also use satellites for collecting SIGINT. The first Soviet SIGINT satellite was the Cosmos 189 ELINT satellite, which was launched in 1967. Over the next 24 years, the Soviets placed over 200 SIGINT satellites into orbit. The Russians continue to maintain a robust presence in space. During 1994, the Russians conducted 48 spacecraft launches, 50 percent of which were military missions including advanced imagery systems, ocean reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence collection. In 1995, the Russians have programmed 45 space launches; again approximately 50 percent will be military missions.
The GRU is tasked with operating Russian ELINT satellites. ELINT satellites use active and passive techniques to detect specific targets. They complement the data provided by imaging satellites and assist in developing a more complete picture of an adversary's forces or intentions. These satellites are designed to track and geolocate radio and radar emanations of ships at sea, mobile air defense radars, fixed strategic early warning radars, and other military emitters for the purpose of identification, location, and signals analysis. The data can then be used for targeting, offensive and defensive engagement planning, and countermeasure development.
Collection activities are managed by the Cosmic Intelligence Directorate, and data analysis is performed by the Decrypting Service of the Sixth Directorate. Currently, there is no evidence of the existence of a Russian COMINT satellite, however, it is likely that the Russians could develop such a system if they wished.
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