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IRGC Quds Force - Organization

Ahmad Vahidi was the first commander of the Qods Force. He is also a former Iranian Minister of Defense and is linked to various international military and paramilitary activities. After his time with the Qods Force, he continued to serve in different high-ranking positions within Iran’s defense establishment. Qassem Soleimani was the most prominent commander of the Qods Force and led it for over two decades. He was considered a key figure in Iranian military operations abroad, including in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. He was killed in a U.S. drone strike near Baghdad International Airport on January 3, 2020. Esmail Qaani succeeded Soleimani after his death. He had previously served as Soleimani’s deputy and played a key role in Qods Force operations. His focus included maintaining influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

The Quds Force is a completely independent structure within the IRGC, most of its units are secretive, and its commander reports directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei, bypassing the official chain of command. The IRGC had between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel. The IRGC-QF had between 5,000 and 15,000 personnel as of 2022 according to US intelligence, handpicked from the broader IRGC for their competency and allegiance to the regime.

The Quds Force was officially established in 1988 after the IRGC was reorganized following the Iran-Iraq War (it operated several years before and during the war in various forms – Division 900 and Special External Operations). It was the foreign special operations branch of the IRGC, responsible for implementing Iran’s regional policies. In effect, it specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations that are essential to launching terrorist attacks.

The Quds Force operates against Western targets and opposition activists around the world, with an emphasis on the Middle East. The force was divided into a headquarters with special units and several regional stations spread across all continents, and it cooperates with terrorist organizations and proxy entities such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, and Shiite cells in Africa.

The Quds Force provides proxies with funding, training, weapons, technological equipment, intelligence, and leadership and mentoring programs tailored to each agent. The Quds Force was also responsible for operational communications with Iran-friendly states such as Syria, Venezuela, and North Korea. The Quds Force maintains close relations with mafia gangs in various countries around the world, especially in Türkiye, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Balkans.

Unit 190 was a special unit of the Quds Force for logistics operations, and was responsible for transporting and smuggling Iranian weapons and elements around the world, and was also responsible for transporting tens of thousands of tons of weapons in recent years to international armed organizations and groups working as proxies for Iran, most notably: Hezbollah, the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis, Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Hamas, Shiite militias in Iraq, and more. The unit's modus operandi involves using cargo and civilian aircraft and ships as camouflage, transporting weapons through third countries, sending them with forged papers under the guise of humanitarian aid, or hiding them inside containers containing legitimate products. A large part of the unit's personnel are pilots who operate under the cover of Iranian airlines with the aim of deceiving the West.

As Head of Unit 190 of the Quds Force, Behnam Shahariyari was the one who advanced the unit’s capabilities. He built and directed the infrastructure that enabled the Quds Force to transfer sensitive weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. To this end, Shahariyari established an extensive network of connections to smuggle goods in Syria and Lebanon. This smuggling network was supported by various front companies, enabling large sums of money to be transferred between Iran and its proxies.

Unit 340 was the Quds Force’s Technology Research and Development Unit. Most of the unit’s personnel are mechanical engineering experts, assisted by a series of engine and missile production facilities in the Tehran-Semnan area for production, research, training, and testing of systems. In addition to developing missiles, the unit provides training and technical support to the armed organizations it supports, primarily Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis in Yemen. The technical support aims to enable these organizations to produce missiles themselves. Briefings and training are conducted in Iran at the Shahid Shabani Training Center and at the firing ranges of the Space Research Center in Semnan. Among the projects on the technical unit's planning agenda were the heavy missiles seen in Iraq, Syria and more recently in Gaza. These missiles carry a particularly large warhead to cause greater destruction and severe damage in urban areas.

Chief of Unit 340 Hamid Fadli (Mohsen Kafi) holds a Ph.D. in mechanics from Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Prior to his current position, he was the head of the Iranian Space Agency. In recent years, he had also served as the head of the Iranian Space Research Institute.

Unit 400, also known as the “Special Operations Unit,” was the most elite unit of the Quds Force. It operates outside Iran’s borders. Its mission was to carry out terrorist operations against Western targets. This unit was intended to carry out special missions that the Quds Force wants to carry out itself without “risking” less professional local cells, and was staffed by highly trained personnel for various operational situations. The unit was responsible for assassinations, kidnappings, and sabotage. It works closely with Hezbollah’s External Operations Unit 910, which pursues the same goals.

Prior to his appointment as commander of Unit 400, Hamed Abdullahi served in various positions in the IRGC and the Quds Force, including: commander of the IRGC’s Zahedan and Zabol regions, deputy to Qassem Soleimani when the latter was commander of the 41st Division, and head of the Quds Force’s intelligence branch. Abdollahi had been personally involved in carrying out terrorist attacks throughout his career. As head of Unit 400, Abdollahi was involved in all of its activities, approving attacks from inception to execution, including intelligence gathering, operational planning, final approval, and post-attack operational considerations.

Unit 840 was an elite and classified unit of the Quds Force. This unit branched off in recent years from Unit 400 (a highly trained special operations unit), and was responsible for establishing operational cells in foreign countries and using them primarily to carry out terrorist operations (kidnapping or assassination) against Western targets and Iranian opposition activists. These cells are usually part of/or connected to the local organized crime community in the country of operation. The main divisions of the unit are: the General Command, the Intelligence Division, the Middle East and Africa Division, the Caucasus and Asia Division, the Europe and the United States Division, and an operational division specializing in activity against opponents of the regime. Unit 840 carried out terrorist operations in various countries around the world targeting opposition figures, including assassinations of opposition activists in the Netherlands and Turkey, and failed assassination attempts in the United States and Azerbaijan. The unit had used elements from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iranians living in European countries to carry out its terrorist operations.

The IRGC-QF targets US, Israeli, Saudi, and UAE interests, as well as Iranian dissident groups. As part of Iran’s state security apparatus, the IRGC-QF uses its intelligence and military capabilities to support its own terrorist operations and those of its partners and proxies. It provided advanced military equipment to Lebanese Hizballah, including air defense systems, coastal defense cruise missiles, long-range rockets, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). It also supplies Iraqi Shia militant groups with antiaircraft weapons, armor-piercing explosively formed projectiles, improvised explosive devices, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and UAS.