Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO)
(Sazeman hefazat va ettela’at-e sepah-e pasdaran-e enghelab-e eslami, SHE)
The IRGC Intelligence Organisation (IRGC-IO) was created by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 1997 after the election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami. The presidency had no control over this institution. Amid the protests against the contested presidential election in 2009, Khamenei expanded the organization’s powers.
The IRGC Intelligence Organization was part of Iran’s intelligence community, operating independently of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and had a permanent seat on the Intelligence Coordination Council. The organization (in its current form) was established on Khamenei’s initiative in 2009, and reports directly to him. It was formed in this way to prevent bureaucratic and politically motivated conflicts between the political elite and the MOIS, which was also subordinate to Khamenei.
The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization deals with special operations, countering political subversion activities, directly participating in suppressing protests and riots, and combating “Western cultural penetration.” In recent years, the organization had been tasked with tasks that were previously classified as operational. For example: arresting opponents of the regime abroad, arresting tourists and dual nationals for the purpose of prisoner exchange deals with Western countries or to promote various economic interests, and other operations that amount to terrorism. The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization competes with the Quds Force for various missions abroad. Both have operational capabilities for intelligence gathering and special operations. However, some testimonies show that cooperation between the two sides already exists in foreign operations, although how it was divided and managed was not yet clear.
Hussein Taib (b. 1963) was head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (October 2009 – June 2022), later special advisor to IRGC Commander Hossein Salami. Taeb had served in the IRGC since its early years. Before becoming head of intelligence, he was commander of the Basij. He was a religious figure and close to Khamenei. He was replaced after several operational failures in operations he masterminded.
Mohammad Kazemi, nicknamed Hajj Kazem (b. 1957) was Head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (since June 2022, replaced Hossein Taeb). Kazemi had served in the IRGC since 1983. Previously, he was the head of the IRGC’s Information Protection Unit (2009-2022), the counterintelligence branch responsible for uncovering spies and combating infiltration into the regime’s security apparatus. Over the years, Kazemi had led numerous operations against regime opponents, earning him the nickname “spy hunter” among the IRGC’s top ranks. Kazemi was the most influential IRGC official and was involved in every executive decision the regime was about to make. The Information Protection Unit operates independently, was a top security institution, and answers directly to Khamenei, with whom Kazemi had close ties. In 2020, Kazemi established a new unit to oversee the affairs of IRGC commanders and officials.
Hassan Muhaqqiq, Deputy Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (since 2019), served in the Habib Battalion in his early days and was injured, and uses crutches to this day. Before assuming the position of deputy of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Mohaqeq was the chief of staff of the IRGC’s 27th Division, and later became the head of the IRGC’s Strategic Intelligence Division. In May 2019, the IRGC Intelligence Organization received another boost in its stature when it merged with the Strategic Intelligence Division, with Mohaqeq becoming Taeb’s deputy.
The IRGC's Intelligence Organization units carry out terrorist attacks around the world, just like Units 400 and 840 of the Quds Force, or at least try to do so (many of their most qualified personnel have been transferred to the Quds Force, leaving the unit with untrained personnel who fail in their missions). The organization had various departments and uses multiple means to track terrorist attacks, including a network of military attachés around the world.
Section 800: Foreign Intelligence: collecting, analyzing, producing, and categorizing internal and external intelligence.
Section 1500: Counterintelligence / Information Protection Unit. It was rponsible for uncovering conspiracy, subversion, espionage, sabotage, and sedition against the independence, security, and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It also worked on protecting intelligence, news, documents, records, facilities, and personnel of the ministry; and • training and assisting organizations and institutions to protect their significant records, documents, and objects. Ruhollah Bazghandi, Head of Counterintelligence Operations of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (Department 1500), served as Javad Ghaffari’s deputy. The two have known each other since serving together in Syria, with Bazghandi serving as Ghaffari’s chief of staff. In Taeb’s final years as head of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, Unit 1500 shifted its primary focus to terrorist operations. Bazghandi was also behind failed attempts to assassinate and kidnap Israelis in Turkey.
Section 2000: Cyber Department. The IRGC had a special cyberspace division. Agencies intercept electronic messages and scrub social media for criticism of the government. They also use traditional collection methods, including interrogations, wiretapping and trailing people.
Section 4000: Special Operations Division was responsible for special activity against Western targets with a particular focus on Israelis and Iranian opposition activists. The unit had suffered operational failures in operations aimed at kidnapping and assassinating a number of Western targets, particularly Israelis, especially in Türkiye. Jawad Ghafari, nicknamed “The Butcher of Aleppo”, was Head of Special Operations Division (Department 4000) of the IRGC Intelligence Organization (replaced Reza Seraj). Ghaffari was one of the figures behind the failed assassination and kidnapping attempts of Israelis abroad over the past few months. Prior to his current position, he was the commander of Iranian forces in Syria. He was “expelled” from Syria for a “major violation of Syrian sovereignty.” In fact, the reason was that Assad had asked Ghaffari’s superiors to remove him after he ordered attacks on American forces and the deployment of Iranian weapons in unauthorized locations in the country. Ghaffari was also accused of violating norms and smuggling goods in order to create a “black market” that competed with and harmed the Syrian market. Ghaffari was a problematic figure, known for repeatedly failing to carry out the foreign missions he was assigned.
IRGC intelligence had historically focused on Iran and the surrounding region, where most armed opposition groups operate. IRGC intelligence deploys alongside the Qods Force, the elite branch responsible for IRGC operations abroad. IRGC intelligence had focused particularly on preventing armed attacks in Iran, such as bombings or the storming of government buildings. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rarely acknowledges mistakes or internal problems. IRGC intelligence mistakes are often blamed on other agencies.
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