CL-400 SUNTAN

The mystique of the Lockheed "Skunk Works" is based on a public perception of an unbroken string of successes, notably the U-2 and SR-71. What is much less well known is that these successes were punctuated by a singularly unsuccessful (and expensive) effort in the late 1950s. Following the completion of the U-2, Lockheed proposed to build a plane that would surpass the U-2 in high-altitude, long-range performance, while adding high speed to reduce vulnerability to enemy defenses. The focus of this effort was an aircraft known as the CL-400 Suntan.

The largest and most extraordinary project for using hydrogen as a fuel was carried out by the Air Force in 1956-1958 in super-secrecy. Very few people are aware of it, even now, yet over a hundred million dollars were spent-perhaps as much as a quarter of a billion dollars. Although the project was cancelled before completion, it led directly to the first rocket engine that flew using hydrogen. The project was code-named Suntan, and even this was kept secret. It had all the air of cloak and dagger melodrama and indeed, its principal precursor was just that. Suntan was an effort by the Air Force to develop a hydrogen-fueled airplane with performance superior to the secret spy plane, the U-2.

Suntan had its roots in Air Force interest in very high-altitude flight during the first half of the 1950s. One approach, along conventional lines, was pushed by Maj. John D. Seaberg of the Wright Air Development Center, beginning in late 1952. This involved a modification of the Martin RB-57 and the start of the Bell X-16, although the latter was cancelled in mid-1955. A different approach, sparked by a proposal by Randolph Rae in 1954 to build a glider-like airplane powered by the Rex engine, focused on the potential advantages of using liquid hydrogen. The Air Force interest in hydrogen was supported by Abe Silverstein, associate director of the Lewis laboratory of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.

By the end of 1955, the Air Force had in progress a number of research and development activities on the feasibility of using liquid hydrogen in flight. The Garrett Corporation, which bought Rae's patents and formed a Rex division with Rae as chief engineer, was three months into a contract for design studies of Rex engines and had concentrated on the largest and latest, the air-breathing Rex III. Kelly Johnson's Skunk Works at Lockheed Aircraft, past their peak effort in designing and building prototype U-2s for the CIA, was two months into a three-month design study of hydrogen-fueled aircraft for Garrett. United Aircraft (now United Technologies) was in the second quarter of a study of using hydrogen in a conventional turbojet engine, and a competitor, General Electric, was also showing interest in hydrogen. Beech Aircraft and Garrett were investigating liquid hydrogen tanks, insulation, and behavior of hydrogen in storage. The Air Force and NACA agreed that the Lewis laboratory would determine the feasibility of flying an airplane fueled with liquid hydrogen. The Air Force would provide the estimated $1 million needed, as well as lend equipment.

What was learned with the Suntan project? The technology of liquid hydrogen was advanced in several ways. There is concurrently a revival of interest in hydrogen-fueled aircraft. As before, however, their potential value is controversial. NASA held a special conference on hydrogen-fueled aircraft in 1973 and has sponsored industry design studies of both subsonic and supersonic configurations. Although no specific development has started, NASA continued to sponsor research applicable to hydrogen-fueled aircraft.

On the other hand, Kelly Johnson, who turned back to petroleum fuels and designed the highly successful SR-71, remains disenchanted with liquid hydrogen. In 1974, he summed up his view: "Today, there is regenerated interest in liquid hydrogen for aircraft propulsion, but considering all phases of the problem, I do not think we will have such aircraft in the foreseeable future." Seaberg, who managed design study contracts with Boeing, Convair, and North American Aviation as part of the Suntan effort in 1957, agreed with Johnson's 1974 assessment. The essence of technological progress, however, was the conversion of the impossible to the possible, so the case for hydrogen-fueled aircraft remained open.

Although Suntan technology and equipment have yet to find application in aircraft, they soon found application in rocket propulsion. In 1958, the Suntan management team began searching for ways to use the technology their project had generated, as well as equipment like the boost pump and the hydrogen liquefaction plants. One result was a proposal to use liquid hydrogen in a rocket engine for the rapidly developing space program. Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, the technology and equipment of Suntan would indeed play a major role in the space program of the 1960s. To learn how this occurred, we must next consider several other developments that were running concurrently with Suntan-activities at Pratt & Whitney, General Dynamics, North American Aviation, NACA, and the Department of Defense.