Aerial Common Sensor [ACS] System Development and Demonstration
The ACS program received approval to proceed into System Development and Demonstration (Milestone B) on 29 July 2004. On 3 August 2004 the US Army awarded the Lockheed Martin team an $879 million defense contract to develop the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). Under the SDD phase of the contract the team would deliver five certified, mission ready airborne ISR systems, with initial testing planned for 2006. The balance of the effort would be performed under a follow-on low rate initial production contract anticipated in 2007, followed by a full rate production contract in 2009.
Lockheed Martin's ACS design featured an unprecedented sensor-computer integration that was designed to pinpoint threats in real-time. ACS would provide instantaneous access to decision-quality intelligence from manned, unmanned and space-based ISR systems. It was intended to provide US Army and US Navy commanders with persistent surveillance, allowing them to "see" a complete representation of the battlespace.
The team's ACS solution incorporated a software-centric, open architecture to ensure easy technology insertion, growth and compatibility with future systems including the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) and the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). ACS would bring real-time multi-intelligence sensor and fusion capability to DCGS and would use the new DCGS architecture framework to enable extended joint operations with ISR systems such as JSTARS, U-2, and Global Hawk.
The Navy became a fully integrated ACS partner in February 2005. The Navy's FY06 Budget requested $133.6M of RDT&E for joint ACS aircraft development. ACS was intended to replace the Army's Guardrail and Airborne Reconnaissance Low (AR-L) systems as well as the Navy's EP-3E aircraft. It would provide a transformational multi-intelligence platform capable of providing strike support to the war fighter.
In June 2005 Lockheed informed the Army that the ERJ-145 would be too small for the planned sensor package. Lockheed suggested replacing it with the larger Embraer 190 airplane. The Army had estimated the weight of electronics, cables and cooling would exceed Lockheed's initial estimate by 28 percent, by the summer of 2005 Lockheed and the Army agreed that the weight increase was over 40 percent.
In September 2005, the Army issued a stop-work order with respect to the ACS program. A joint review by the Army and Lockheed Martin of the Lockheed Martin design had determined the weight of the ACS payload and required airframe modifications exceeded the structural limits of Lockheed Martin's selected aircraft, the Embraer ERJ-145, and that more than a two-year slippage in the program was projected with a significant cost growth. To meet Army and Navy requirements, an alternate aircraft to the Embraer 145 would be necessary to achieve mission capability.
Lockheed Martin was required to submit a plan to address schedule and cost issues with respect to the ACS program to the Army by 14 November 2005, and the Army was expected to make a decision regarding the ACS program within 30 days of Lockheed Martin's submission. On 14 November 2005 Lockheed Martin recommended the Army switch the Aerial Common Sensor from the Embraer ERJ-145 to Bombardier's Global Express business jet. The original proposal to use the Embraer ERJ-145 was rejected after it became apparent that the aircraft was too small. Lockheed Martin contended that the work previously done on militarising the Global Express for the British ASTOR program would save the ACS program money, despite the fact that the larger Global Express was more expensive than the Embraer ERJ-145.
Cancellation of the ACS would divide the mission requirements and contractor work between Boeing's Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft contract with the Navy, and Northrop Grumman's E-10A contract with the Air Force. The Navy indicated it might end participation in ACS if it does not meet naval reconnaissance needs, scrapping plans to buy 19 planes for $2 billion.
The ACS was featured in a broad Government Accountability Office report published in March 2007. In it was noted that only one of ACS's six critical technologies was mature when the program initially started development in July 2004 and two more were nearing maturity. When the Army terminated the development contract, one additional technology was nearing maturity. The maturity of one of the remaining technologies was tied to the development of the airborne version of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which would not have been available until after ACS was fielded. The Army expected that all of the critical technologies except the one tied to the radios would be fully mature by December 2006. It was not clear at the time which requirements might be eliminated or the resulting impact to the technology maturity. However, the Army planned to seek approval for development start only after all its critical technologies have reached maturity.
The ACS program office estimated that 50 percent of the design drawings, a measure of design stability, expected for ACS would have been releasable by the original design review, which was scheduled for December 2006. As a result of the change in host aicraft, the new date for design review had not been determined by the time of the GAO report, but it was suggested that it would be unlikely that any of the original drawings would be relevant at the time of program restart due to technology obsolescence and program redefinition.
Other issues noted in the report included that in December 2005, just prior to contract termination, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Army and Navy, in coordination with the Air Force, Joint Staff, and others to conduct a study of joint multiintelligence airborne ISR needs. The report's findings, which were due to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by the end of July 2006, were still pending as of March 2007. Four options were being considered. One option would be to restart system development with most or all of the previous requirements intact. The second option would be to field a system that is more capable than those currently operating while deferring somerequirements for future spirals. This option would probably still require a business jet or larger platform to permit growth. The third option would be to field two systems with some requirements on a manned platform and some on an unmanned platform. The fourth option would be to field an unmanned system. The Army expected to make a decision in time for it to be reflected in the FY08 President's budget.
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