Covert Operations Against Iran
2006-
Secretary of State Rice noted in her 15 February 2006 Senate testimony that the US was working with friends and allies on a range of measures to reach out to the Iranian people and support their calls for freedom. These overt measures probably represented only a small fraction of the overall effort, and in some instances provided cover and plausible deniability for covert measures.
The Bush Administration was thought to spend at least $10 million in FY06 funds to support the cause of freedom in Iran in 2006. These funds would be used to support political dissidents, labor union leaders and human rights activists. This included work with NGOs to help build networks of support inside and outside Iran.
The Administration requested an additional $75 million in its FY06 supplemental request to support other efforts. With $50 million the US significantly increased television broadcasting ability, establishing a 24 hour/7 days a week broadcast in Farsi into Iran. This also worked to improve radio transmission capability and tap into satellite technology for both radio and TV transmission into Iran. The US supported internet and other efforts to reach the Iranian public with $5 million in funding for public diplomacy, and also supported the development of independent Farsi television and radio.
An additional $15 million fostered participation in the political process and support efforts to expand internet access as a tool for civic organization. Working with NGOs and through organizations such as the International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute and National Endowment for Democracy the US supported civic education and work to help organize Iranian labor unions and political organizations.
To enable US and other NGOs to undertake these activities for the Iranian people, inside and outside Iran, the Departments of State and Treasury worked together to secure Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) licenses to make grants to these organizations. New licensing procedures would allow moving quickly and effectively to support democracy efforts in Iran.
It is believed that beginning in 2007, the United States Special Operations Forces participated in cross-border raids against targets within Iran from southern Iraq. In late 2007, Congress at the behest of the Bush Administration approved a $400 million increase in funding for covert actions against Iran, this suggested by a Presidential Finding. The exact details of where the money was going were not known as of the July 2008. Suspected operations within the Finding have included capturing members of Iran's elite Al Quds force and questioning them in Iraq, general intelligence gathering, and neutralization of terror suspects in Iran.
To achieve these and other goals such as destabilizing the Iranian Clerical regime and attacking Iranian military targets, the United States government was thought to have started giving large amounts of money to individuals and groups within Iran. As of July 2008 it was speculated that the United States was helping and possibly funding groups including the MEK (despite their status as a terrorist organization according the Department of State), PJAK, the Jundallah, other groups within the Baluchi Tribe and the Ahwazi Arabs, along with individual Iranian dissidents.
As of June 2008 the MEK were still considered a terrorist groups by the EU, as well as the United States Department of State, while the UK had removed it from their list of terrorist organizations in 2008. US officials were understood to have worked with the MEK prior to 2008.
Jundallah, or the Iranian People's Resistance Movement was made up of Baluchi who practice a Salafi form of Islam. They claim that they are fighting to end persecution of Sunni muslims by the Iranian government. The United States has had a relationship with members of Jundallah since 2005 though America had not overtly funded them.
The Ahwazi Arabs are another group of primarily Sunni muslims, some of whom have been active in anti-Iranian groups such as the Popular Democratic Front of Ahwazi Arabs. This group was known to have taken part in attacks against Iranian officials. Some of these militant groups were fighting for for an Independent or semiautonomus Khuzestan.
The PJAK, a Kurdish organization, also known as the PEJAK or the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, based in the north of Iraq had been attacking Iranian targets since 2004. They intended to take advantage of the 4 million Kurds in Iran and create an independent Kurdistan along with promoting the cause of democracy in Iran. It was thought that US officials had worked with the PJAK before 2008.
There were critics of how the Presidential Finding was handled by the White House and Congress, with some suggesting that the Bush administration had been actively hiding things from Congress. A classified Presidential Finding must be brought before Congress or at the very least, the so-called "Gang of Eight," when a covert intelligence mission begins, though the document was not needed for actions taken by Special Forces. The Gang of Eight is made up of the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate and the House, as well as the ranking senators in the intelligence committees of both Houses. The finding is simply a notification that the President is planning to take covert actions, and not an request for congressional approval. It is the intelligence committee that is the group in charge of overseeing the President's plan for covert actions.
There were also been questions concerning about the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operations ordered by the Bush Administration and if Congress had been given a chance to review operations. The Administration cited the President's right to command the forces and legislation written after 11 September 2001 that allow the Executive additional freedom from congressional oversight. The Administration had also taken oversight away from commanders and consolidated it into civilian hands. This, members of the military argued, made it harder for commanders to understand what was happening on the battlefields that they controlled and could jeopardize missions. There were reports that disputes existed between Vice President Cheney and the individuals in the JSOC over the speed, and manner in which targets within Iran were attacked. According to sources dealing with the Pentagon, the Bush administration attempted to model Iranian covert actions after those being taken in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. The Military argued that the same model used to attack those targets could not be duplicated in Iran, because of Iranian targets did not move across Iraqi targets like the Taliban did in Pakistan. This had reportedly caused hesitation on the part of the military for continued cross-border strikes.
Incidents of violence increased towards the beginning of 2008, but it was not known if the United States or its proxies were responsible. The Iranian Government had named the CIA, the United States, and the United Kingdom for assisting in some of the attacks. It was also very difficult to assess any possible affects that these attacks had on any of objectives laid out in the Presidential Finding. Critics claimed that the attacks against the Iranian military might do more harm than good, by galvanizing the Iranian people in support of the existing regime. The Iranian media was covering the attacks and by blaming Western entities they had instilled a feeling of fear in the population, which decreased the likelihood that the majority of the populace becoming more open to Western influence and change. Others argued that the ethnic minority groups that the Americans may be funding were too small, unimportant or to well mixed into the rest of the society to create any major pressure on the Iranian government or change that majority of the population's opinion of the government.
Individuals with knowledge of the Presidential Finding and operations going on in Iran criticized the plan for not being focused, and being too uncoordinated to produce changes in the Iranian Government's actions. Others cited US inability to ensure that the money given to various organizations was not taken by the leaders for their own gain or funded to third groups not necessarily in line with US objectives, such as Al-Qaeda. Supposed contact with the MEK was especially suspect as the organization was already listed as a terrorist group by the US. In 2007 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently illegalized foreigners meeting with members of the MEK after meeting with Iranian authorities, likely harming any US-MEK relations. The Jundallah were thought to be involved with drug smuggling and therefore tied to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind behind the September 11th terrorist attacks and Ramzi Yousef, a participant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, were both Baluchis, educated in madrassas with members of the Jundallah and other organizations. Further complicating potential US relations was Pakistan's conflict with its Baluchi minority, and its agreement with Iran to extradite Jundallah members to Tehran. Lastly, US connections with Kurdish organizations such as the PJAK could also be in danger because of cool relations with Turkey and growing Iranian-Iraqi-Turkish cooperation in military and police actions against Kurdish groups.
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