Find a Security Clearance Job!

Intelligence

FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception

APPENDIX E

Deception Evaluation Checklist


G3 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. What integration of deception operations into tactical maneuvers occurred?

2. Did the OPSEC annex support the deception annex?

3. Was the deception annex to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?

    a. Were individuals at all echelons identified and aware of their responsibilities in relation to deception activities?

    b. What were the required unit tasks?

    c. How was the deception annex coordinated? Was it complementary? Did it address a common list of indicators that required either display or concealment?

    d. Did other supporting annexes contain option choices addressed in the deception annex without alluding to deceptive intent?

    e. Does the deception annex address main and alternate courses of action in the basic operational concept?

4. Were surveys conducted of both concealed sensitive indicators (OPSEC) and displayed deceptive indicators to access visibility?

5. What was the deception objective?

    a. Did the deception objective closely support the objective of the tactical operation?

    b. Did the deception objective support corresponding OPSEC objectives? c. Were phase-out actions planned to disguise that deception was used?

    d. Was an implementing schedule prepared?

    e. Did the implementing schedule identify the start and finish times of event, location, unit involved, and means to be used?

6. What was the deception story?

    a. Was it employed as planned.

    b. Did the deception story provide adequate information to deter the enemy from taking undesirable actions?

    c. Was the story flexible enough to allow changes during its execution to take advantage of unexpected enemy actions?

7. Did compromise of intent of deception or OPSEC activity occur?

    a. If yes, what was the compromise?

    b. If yes, did the compromise degrade the overall success of the operation?

8. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?

9. What deception technique was employed?

    a. Were C-E deception and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) or C3 protection measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?

    b. Were non-C-E deception and ECCM measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?

    c. If the following nonelectronic deception techniques were employed, what was the desired effect of the techniques?

      (1) Ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.

      (2) Aerial reconnaissance or activity.

      (3) Engineer activity.

      (4) Agent activity.

      (5) Vehicular movements.

      (6) Demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks.

      (7) Communications and coordination patterns.

      (8) Fire support and artillery activity.

      (9) Unit subordination.

      (10) Boundaries and phase lines.

      (11) Timing of operations.

      (12) Cover names and designations.

      (13) Camouflage.

      (14) Other.

10. What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with deceptive intent?

    a. Were sufficient resources available?

    b. What was the experience level of deception elements personnel?

    c. What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed, used, and how? Numbers?

    d. What other resources or services were required and were they available?

    e. What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for deception?

    f. Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources?

11. Were dedicated, secure communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan available? Were they adequate?

12. Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSEC plans?

13. What were the results of deception activities?

14. Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation?

G2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. Were deception and OPSEC annexes to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?

2. Does intelligence have an established enemy data base and an understanding of enemy doctrine?

    a. Were operations conducted mindful of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules?

    b. What were the PIR and IR for the deception and OPSEC plan?

    c. What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly forces?

    d. What intelligence activities were targeted at determining enemy reaction to friendly deceptions?

    e. What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why?

3. What was the deception story?

    a. At what level of the enemy organization was it focused?

    b. Did the deception story cause the enemy decision maker to make the desired decision?

    c. Was the story consistent with the friendly unit's tactical doctrine, established patterns, and normal operational sequences?

    d. Was the story consistent with the target's perception of the friendly unit's real capabilities?

    e. Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems?

4. What countersurveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions and evaluate indicator visibility?

5. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?

6. What deception steps were employed?

    a. If C-E deception and ECCM/C3 protection measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?

    b. If non-C-E deception and ECCM measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?

    c. If the following nonelectronic deception and OPSEC techniques were employed, what was the actual effect of the techniques?

      (1) Ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance.

      (2) Aerial reconnaissance or activity?

      (3) Engineer activity.

      (4) Agent activity.

      (5) Vehicular movements.

      (6) Demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks.

      (7) Communications and coordination patterns.

      (8) Fire support and artillery activity.

      (9) Unit subordination.

      (10) Boundaries and phase lines.

      (11) Timing of operations.

      (12) Cover names and designations.

      (13) Camouflage.

      (14) Other.

7. Did the enemy's intelligence estimate of friendly capabilities warrant the use of deception with the expected expenditure of personnel and equipment?

8. Was there adequate time for the enemy to observe the deception and react in a desired manner?

9. What were the results of deception activities?

10. Were intelligence means and indicators established to measure enemy reaction to the friendly unit's deception?



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list