Theater / Operational Missiles
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| Russian Designations |
Bilateral
[START] |
Western Designations |
Missile
Designer |
SystemMinistry |
SystemOperator |
DIA |
NATO |
| Ballistic Missiles |
| R-1 |
8A11 |
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SS- 1 |
SCUNNER |
| R-2 |
8K38 |
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SS- 2 |
SIBLING |
| R-3 |
8A67 |
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none |
none |
| R-11 |
8K11 |
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SS-1B |
SCUD-A |
| R-300 |
9K72 |
Elbrus |
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SS-1C |
SCUD-B |
| R-5 |
8K51 |
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SS- 3 |
SHYSTER |
| R-12 |
8K63 |
Dvina |
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SS- 4 |
SANDAL |
| R-14 |
8K65 |
Usovaya |
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SS- 5 |
SKEAN |
| TR-1 |
9K71 |
Temp |
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[none] |
[none] |
| TR-1M |
8M76 |
Temp-S |
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SS-12 |
SCALEBOARD |
| TR-1M |
8M76B1 |
Temp-S |
OTR-22 |
SS-22 |
SCALEBOARD B |
| RT-1 |
8K95 |
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[none] |
[none] |
| RT-15 |
8K96 |
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SS-14 |
SCAMP |
| RT-25 |
8K97 |
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[none] |
[none] |
| RT-21M? |
15Zh45 |
Pioneer |
RSD-10 |
SS-20 |
SABER |
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15Zh53 |
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SS-28 |
SABER/2-RV |
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15Zh57 |
Pioneer-3 |
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SS-28 |
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Pioneer-3 Complex - SS-X-28
Message Practitioner » Fri 04 Mar 2011 12:36 am
In the early 1980s, the deployment of the Pioneer RSD complex was in full swing, initially the Pioneer RK (15P645 and 15P645K), and since 1981 - the Pioneer-UTTKh (15P653).
However, MIT continued work on improving the mobile RK with RSD missiles.
Further development of the Pioneer RSD was planned both in the direction of improving the missile complex as a whole, and in the line of creating warheads of several types.
To successfully overcome the ABM system, it was envisaged to implement a number of measures, including the use of more advanced, relatively small-sized and light warheads with lower radar visibility. At the same time, it was possible to increase the number of warheads to four. The corresponding Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers dated November 12, 1979 No. 1011-289 determined the development of such a complex, which received the name Pioneer-3.
Further development of this complex showed, on the one hand, that such a number of warheads was excessive for a medium-range missile, and, on the other hand, the Customer set the task of further increasing the warhead deployment zone and allocating mass and energy reserves for the implementation of measures to counter the missile defense system. Therefore, on April 6, 1983, Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 300-120 established a three-block equipment of the Pioneer-3.
Like the previous modernized versions of the Pioneer missile system, the new modification was created by improving the warhead stage of the 15Zh53 missile, without modifying the cruise engines. The warhead stage of the 15Zh57 missile used a propulsion system of a fundamentally new design, with a large fuel reserve, ensuring the implementation of the warhead deployment zone requested by the Customer. The new control system equipment ensured high accuracy of hits.
But the main "highlight" of the new Pioneer-3 complex was completely different. By the mid-80s, the ideology of combat use of mobile ground missile systems had changed; autonomous launch capabilities were needed, and all previous modifications of the Pioneer missile system could only carry a combat missile system as part of a division.
During the same period, MIT was completing work on the creation of the Topol missile system, where the idea of ??autonomy of the self-propelled launcher had already been implemented. Therefore, the creation of a medium-range missile system with an autonomous mobile launcher was no longer a difficult task. Many units and equipment of the Topol missile system were used to create the RSD launcher. The MAZ-7916 chassis was developed for the 15P157 launcher of the RK. In terms of weight and size characteristics, the 15U167 APU of the Pioneer-3 was practically identical to the 15U136 SPU of the Pioneer-UTTH (15P653) RK. The remaining units of the Pioneer-3 RK - MBU, MS and MOBD were "borrowed" from the Topol RK (with minor changes).
Apparently due to such new features of the Pioneer-3 missile system, the 15Zh57 missile, although it was essentially just a modernization of the 15Zh53 missile (
SS-20 Mod 2 Saber according to Western classification) was given the designation SS-X-28.
Another significant difference of the Pioneer-3 missile system was that the missile complex (regiment) already had 4 missile divisions (12 launchers) and, as before, one PKP rp.
It was planned to re-equip the missile divisions armed with the first generation Pioneers (15P645K missile system) and divisions with R-12 systems with the Pioneer-3 missile system.
In 1986-87
In 1985-86, survey and design work was carried out in the 49th Infantry Division (Lida), 4th Infantry Division (Drovyanaya), and 40th Infantry Division (Ostrov). Flight tests of the Pioneer 3 were quite successful.
However, all activities to deploy the Pioneer 3 missile system were interrupted in early 1988 in connection with the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the USSR and the USA.
Main performance characteristics of the 15Zh57 missile
Developer MIT
Chief Designer A.D. Nadiradze Missile
manufacturer Votkinsk MZ
NATO code SS-X-28
INF Treaty name RSD-10
System type mobile missile system with medium-range ballistic missiles, fourth generation
Test status since 1985
Modified 15Zh53 missile
Firing range, km;
- with split. head. 5500 part
- with a single-block warhead. 7500
Mach missile speed, km/s 3-5.5
Warhead type thermonuclear, single-block or
with three individual guidance units
INS control system with a gyrostabilized platform based on float gyroinstruments and with an onboard digital computer
- developer NPO AP
- chief designer V.A. Lapygin
Steering drives:
- type hydraulic
- developer TsNIIAG
Control and stabilization bodies:
- I stage gas and aerodynamic lattice rudders, lattice stabilizers;
- II stage for pitch and yaw - injection of hot gases into the supercritical part of the nozzle;
by roll - gas nozzles with gas generator
Launch type "mortar" from TPK
Number of stages 2
Rocket dimensions, m:
- full length 17.0
- length without warhead 14.9
- TPK pinnacle 19.32
- max body diameter 1.79
Launch weight, t 37.0
Rocket weight in TPK, t 43
First stage:
Dimensions, m:
- full length 8,58
- max case diameter 1.79
Stage weight, t 26.7
Propellant type mixed solid
Engine single-chamber solid-propellant rocket motor
Operating time, s 63
Second stage:
Dimensions, m:
- full length 4.4-4.6
- max case diameter 1.47
Stage weight, t: 8.63
Engine single-chamber solid-
propellant rocket motor Propellant type mixed solid
Transport and launch container:
Type with thermostatting
Dimensions, m:
- full length 19.32
- max case diameter 2.14
Weight, t 5.7
Launcher:
Type ground mobile 15U167
Developer TsKB "Titan"
Manufacturer PO "Barrikady"
Base MAZ-7916
Number of axles 6
Dimensions, m:
- full length 19.6
- height 3.13
- width 3.38
Full weight of the launcher, t 40.25
Weight of the launcher with a missile, t 82.0
Engine type diesel
Max speed, km/h 40
Number of missiles on the launcher 1
Missile lift drives in the TPK:
- type hydraulic
- developer TsNIIAG
Obstacles to overcome:
- climb, deg 15
- ford, m 1.0
Turning radius, m 21
Crew, persons 3 Based on materials from "In the strategic direction" (To the 60th anniversary of MIT), Intervestnik, Moscow, 2006 A.V. Karpenko, A.F. Utkin, A.D. Popov "Domestic strategic missile systems"
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15Zh66 |
Skorosti |
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[none] |
[none] |
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9K714 |
Oka |
OTR-23 |
SS-23 |
SPIDER |
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9K716 |
Volga |
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[none] |
[none] |
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9K720 |
Iskander |
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SS-26 |
STONE |
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Zmeevik |
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[none] |
[none] |
| Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles |
| R-27K |
4K18 |
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SS-N-13 |
[none] KY-9 |
| Air-Launched Ballistic Missiles |
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9M730 |
Knizhal |
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SS-N-13 |
[none] KY-9 |
| Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles |
| EKR |
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none |
none |
| Tu-121 |
[none] |
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[none] |
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[none] |
| OS-24 |
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Komet |
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SSC-1 |
SEPAL |
| S-2 |
4K-87 |
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SSC-2 |
SALISH / SAMLET |
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P-20 |
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SSC-3 |
STYX |
| RK-55 |
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Granat |
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SSC-4 |
SLINGSHOT |
| P-750 |
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Grom |
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SSC-5 |
SCORPION |
| Kh-35 |
3M24 |
Uran |
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SSC-6 |
Sennight |
| R-500 |
9M728 |
Iskander-K |
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SSC-7 |
STONE |
| .... | 9M729 | .... | .... | SSC-X-8 | SCREWDRIVER |
| Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles |
| 10X |
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J-1 |
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| P-1 |
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Shchuka |
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SS-N-1 |
SCRUBBER |
| P-35 |
3M-44 |
Pityorka |
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SS-N-3 |
SHADDOCK |
| P-70 |
4K-66 |
Ametiste |
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SS-N-7 |
STARBRIGHT |
| P-120 |
4K-85 |
Malakhit |
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SS-N-9 |
SIREN |
| P-350 |
4K-77 |
Bazalt |
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SS-N-12 |
SANDBOX |
| P-500 |
4K-80 |
Bazalt |
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SS-N-12 |
SANDBOX |
| P-700 |
3M-45 |
Granat |
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SS-N-19 |
SHIPWRECK |
| P-750 |
3M-24 |
Grom |
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SS-N-24 |
SCORPION |
| S-10 |
3M-10 |
Granat |
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SS-N-21 |
SAMPSON |
| S-10 |
3M-10 |
Kalibr |
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SS-N-30 |
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| T3K22 |
3M22 |
Zircon |
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SS-N-?? |
TBD |
PLARK
Podvodnaya Lodka Atomnaya Raketnaya Krylataya
Nuclear-Propelled Cruise-Missile Submarines
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Russian
Designation |
Characteristics |
NATO
Designation |
| Class | Name |
Missile |
Entered
Service |
| 651 |
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Juliett |
| 659 |
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6 - P-35 / SS-N-3 |
1960 |
Echo I |
| 675 |
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8 - P-35 / SS-N-3 | 1962 |
Echo II |
| 670 |
Skat |
8 - P-70 / SS-N-7 |
1968 |
Charlie I |
| 670M |
Skat-M |
8 - P-120 / SS-N-9 |
1974 |
Charlie II |
| 661 |
Anchar |
10 - P-120 / SS-N-9 |
1969 |
Papa |
| 949 |
Granit |
24 - P-700 / SS-N-19 |
1982 |
Oscar I |
| 949A |
Antey |
24 - P-700 / SS-N-19 |
1986 |
Oscar II |
After the US withdrawal from the INF treaty to eliminate missiles with a range of 500-5,000 km, Russia intends to move its ship- and plane-based missiles to land. On 02 February 2019, President Vladimir Putin announced a mirror response to the US withdrawal from the INF arms control treaty. As a result, the coming decade will see the appearance in Russia of ground installations able to hit enemy bases at distances from 500 to 5,500 km.
First of all, the presidential order involves moving Kalibr-type missiles from sea to land. Not only are they to be integrated into ground-based weapons systems, but upgraded with hypersonic technologies capable of circumventing all existing enemy missile defense systems. The Russian military was considering the Iskander-M missile system as the carrier of the land-based Kalibr. The former was currently deployed in Kaliningrad on the border of Eastern Europe to counter the US missile shield in Poland. These systems’ arsenal was now set to be expanded with new precision weapons capable of hitting targets as far away as the Mediterranean.
Another item in the new “ground upgrade” list was the latest hypersonic Kinzhal (Dagger) missile for MiG-31 interceptor aircraft. Military sources state that this was currently the only air missile able to fly at Mach 8. In the words of Colonel-General Sergei Surovikin, commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the air-launched version of the Kinzhal can strike targets at a distance of more than 2,000 km without entering the enemy’s air defense zone.
The shortcomings of the Russian architecture of non-nuclear deterrence include, perhaps, the lack of modern marine systems. The construction and modernization of nuclear submarines and large ships capable of carrying the Caliber was rather slow. Therefore, the main carriers of such missiles in the fleet are small missile ships (RTOs) and diesel submarines. While the Medium and Shorter-Range Missile Treaty was in force, RTOs were considered as a relatively inexpensive platform capable of moving along inland waterways - the ersatz of land launchers. After the collapse of the INF Treaty, the shortcomings of this option of deploying long-range cruise missiles become more noticeable: those that have no means of combating submarines and are very limited in terms of air defense missile systems cannot be considered sufficiently effective and stable.
Part of this question, it was hoped, will be closed by the continuation of the construction of nuclear submarines of Project 885 Ash and the modernization of Soviet-built submarines of Projects 971 and 949A with the inclusion of the Caliber in the armament of these boats. At the same time, the question of the construction of large warships - carriers of the "Caliber" remains open, the volume and pace of which today do not allow even counting on replacing the existing Soviet-built destroyers and cruisers.
The lack of such carriers does not allow counting on ensuring, if necessary, a constant presence (and deterrence) where the characteristics of RTOs are technically lacking, and the covert presence of submarines and the periodic overflights of long-range aviation will be politically insufficient. However, it was believed that the new state the weapons program should partially correct this situation by increasing the volume of construction of modern surface ships - carriers of cruise missiles.
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