Parchin
According to reports published in Russia, apparently based on information developed by the Russian Federal Security Service, Parchin, 30 kilometers south-west of Tehran, is the site for the implementation of a variety of defense projects. Parchin is the center of the Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is chemical industry (production of explosives, fuel, etc.), and, possibly, the home of the main producers of the OGHAB and NAZEAT missiles.
Parchin Chemical Factories (PCF)
A small arms and ammunition plant at Parchin was established in 1939, and has been in operation since before the Second World War. Very little solid information is available about the post-Revolutionary Iranian arms industry. On 25 August 1999 Iran’s Defense Ministry opened a new chemical factory capable of producing previously imported explosives. The new factory, with a production capacity of two tons per day, opened in the presence of Defense Minister Vice-Admiral Ali Shamkhani in the Parchin Chemical Complex.
Sazemane Sanaye Defa called "SASAD" is one of the largest and the most important Industrial organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is capable in production and export of multi-purpose defense and civil products & services.
Parchin Chemical Factories (PCF), the Chemical Industries Groupd of SASAD, is equiped to modern technology with more than half century experience in producing various commercial explosives such as: Gelationous Dynamite, Powder Explosive, Emulsion Explosive, Detonating Cord, Safety Fuse, Hunting Powder. It also produces chemical material such as: Industrial Nitrocellulose, Alfa Cellulose, Medical-Industrial Alcohol, Pure- Industrial Sulfuric Acid, acetic acid, acetic anhydride, nitric acid, lab. Sulfuric Acid, Di. Nitro Toluene (DNT), Di. Ethyl ether, Antifreeze, and Ethyl Acetate Carboxy Methyl Cellulose (CMC).
Parchin Chemical Factories makes Slurry explosive, which is classified in emulsion material group. Slurry contains ammoniun nitrate, sodium nitrate and TNT with gum base. Four different types of slurries are produced to be used in the mines which contain water and have big hole bore. Slurry is a very good water resistant explosive. It is gelatinous and its viscosity is high, therefore it can be pumped very easily. Slurry is available both packed and bulk. Its power against different stones is appropiate and changable. As slurry does not contain nitroglycerine, there are no headache or other problems for its consumer. Slurry is quite safe and resistant against normal fires and mechanical stimulates such as stroke, friction, etc. Also mechanical stimulations do not change its power and physical form. As a result, its consumption is economical. Slurry can be stored in warehouses for about six months.
Parchin is said to be one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities, along with the facilities located at Damghan [the primary production facility], Esfahan and Qazvin. Reports that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and Parchin that began operation as early as March 1988 are of uncertain reliability. Iran continues to upgrade and expand its chemical warfare production infrastructure and munitions arsenal, which includes blister, blood, choking agents, and nerve agents.
Parchin Missile Industries
Defense Industry Organization Department 140
A number of unguided rockets have been developed and placed in production by Iran's Parchin Missile Industries Division of the Iranian Defence Industries Organization (A.k.a.: DIO Missile Industries Group, Parchin Missile Industries Division or DIO Rocket Products or Moavenate Sanaye Moushaki Parchin). Parchin has built the Russian AT-3b 'Sagger' anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) for some years under the local name of Raad. In 1998 it was reported that Iran had begun production an improved version of the Russian AT-3b . Called the Improved Raad (I-Raad), the wire-guided missile has a new front airframe fitted with a tandem high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead that to defeat main battle tanks fitted with explosive reactive armor.
Defense Industry Organization Department 140/31 at Parchin is associated with production of solid propellant for missiles. The production of a few types of unguided missiles, including Okhab and Nazeat-10, air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles, anti-tank TOW missiles, as well as the assembly of the SCUD missiles or SCUD-based missiles. New production facilities are being built for the IFA.
Iran has invested heavily in an assembly line for production of the Fajr-3 missiles in Parchin using North Korean missile manufacturing technology. Iran's missile program reportedly includes production plants in Esfahan and Semnan, as well as at design centers in Sultanatabad, Lavizan and Kuh-e Bagh-e-Melli on the outskirts of Teheran. Other reports claim that the Iranian missile infrastructure includes a Chinese-built missile plant near Semnan, larger North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan which can produce liquid fuels and some structural components, and missile test facilities at Shahroud.
Nuclear Weapons Work at Parchin
In a public session of the Iranian Parliament on 24 November 2003, Ahmad Shirzad, a deputy from the city of Isfahan, stated that there was a large nuclear-related underground facility near the city of Parchin. [SOURCE]
In Iran's nuclear menace Washington Times March 07, 2004, Mansoor Ijaz claimed that Iran's nuclear weapons program included use of "Belarus-Russian filtering and high-temperature melting technologies for uranium enrichment. These facts were revealed by Ahmad Shirzad, a member of Iran's Parliament representing Isfahan, in late 2003 as he passionately argued Iran's children were starving while the mullahs processed uranium at secret underground facilities near Parchin (southeast of Tehran) and in the mountains between Qazvin and Karaj (northwest of Tehran)." The precise technique allegedly involved here is unclear, but would appear to be thermal diffusion. The thermal-diffusion process is characterized by its simplicity, low capital cost, and high heat consumption. The thermal-diffusion plant in Oak Ridge was dismantled when the much more energy-efficient (by a factor of 140) gaseous-diffusion plant began operation in the 1940’s. The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. The specific energy consumption is 2300-3000 kWh/SWU for Gaseous Diffusion, versus 100-300 kWh/SWU for gas centrifuge. So the gas centrifuge is probably a thousand times less energy intensive than thermal diffusion, rendering this allegation implausible.
On 11 September 2004 it was reported that the IAEA had requested a visit to Parchin, but the Iranians had not yet agreed to the inspection. The IAEA questioned whether Iran might be doing nuclear weapons work there. The agency had requested to send inspectors to Parchin, but this was not mentioned in the IAEA report on Iran published 01 September 2004.
One area at Parchin may be assessed as a "probable" nuclear weapons development facility. The extensive weapons development activity at the rest of the complex makes it an entirely logical location for weaponization work for Iran's atomic bomb program. The overall Parchin complex represents is the leading center of Iran's munitions industry, so a nuclear weapons program would already have all the expertise needed within commuting distance. The suspect site is physically isolated from the rest of the complex, suggesting that it is not part of the conventional ammo, poison gas or missile programs. The recent construction activity is also consistent with the recent construction activity at other parts of Iran's bomb program, and the recent completion is consistent with estimates of when Iran would get the bomb.
However, AFP reported on September 16, 2004, that Hossein Mousavian (Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA) denied any nuclear-related testing at Parchin. Interestingly, on September 21, 2004, Iran announced that it had began a new round of nuclear experiments. While these experiments are supposedly aimed at developing a civilian nuclear energy program, its plans to convert 40 tons of raw uranium into enriched uranium concerns the IAEA since their energy program is roughly ten years away from needing converted uranium to operate.
In early November 2005 it was reported that Iran had granted access to the Parchin site to IAEA inspectors. This was confirmed by a statement by Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi on November 6 during a weekly press conference and reported in an IRNA story, saying that this inspection would not be the first time IAEA inspectors had come to the site. Ollie Heinonen, the agency's deputy director-general for safeguards, and two other IAEA inspectors went to the Parchin military site on 1 November 2005.
