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Nuclear Facilities

In February 2003, before the top officials of the Ministry of Science, Iranian President Mohammad Khatanmi reportedly announced a program for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which was to consist of these components:

1. Mining Uranium in Saghand (200 kilometers, 125 miles from Yazd) from 350 meters (1160 feet) deep.
2. Preparing Yellow Cake in Ardekan near Yazd (at a site known as Ardekan Nuclear Fuel Unit)
3. UCF Facility in Isfahan site. At the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in Isfahan, using the yellow cake prepared in the Ardekan, a number of by-products including uranium hexofloride (UF6), metallic uranium, and uranium oxide (Uo2) are produced. These are later used for uranium enrichment.
4. Natanz Uranium Enrichment Facility. Using the yellow cake and the products of the Isaheur UCF unit, uranium is enriched using the centrifuge equipments, and nuclear fuel pellets are to be eventually produced in Natanz. These pellets could then be used to form the fuel rods.

Some US officials suspect Iran of operating secret enrichment facilities elsewhere in the country.

In the report Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General International Atomic Energy Agency [06 Jun 2003], the Director General identified a number of corrective actions by Iran which were necessary to enable the Agency to verify the previously unreported nuclear material declared to have been imported by Iran in 1991. These actions included the provision of design information on the waste storage facility at Esfahan, and the granting of access to that facility as well as to Anarak and Qom, where waste resulting from the processing of the imported material is stored or has been disposed of.

There remain significant such open question related to Iran's enrichment program. The 26 August 2003 IAEA report provides information making clear Iran has consistently misled the Agency about its enrichment program. First, as paragraph 30 reveals, Iran's centrifuge enrichment program did not begin in 1997, as Iran initially told the Agency, but in 1985, i.e., almost 20 year ago. Second, Iran's centrifuge program is not entirely indigenous, as Iran initially told the Agency and as AEOI President Agazadeh assured an informal meeting of the IAEA Board on 06 May 2003. Iran later said it received centrifuge drawings in 1987 from a still unnamed foreign intermediary and, in addition, Iran said it imported components for centrifuges and a cascade design. Third, the Kalaye Electric Company -- which Iran originally told the IAEA only produced centrifuge components -- now is said to have been a central part of its centrifuge testing program for five years (1997-2002); but Iran still claims, implausibly, that it never introduced nuclear material into centrifuges.

There were also open questions in June about laser enrichment. The August 26 report suggested that those questions are still open. Iran has not allowed IAEA inspectors to take environmental samples at a key laser research site - whose existence it had previously not acknowledged - and did not let them visit the site until after some equipment, including a large imported vacuum vessel that could have applications for laser uranium enrichment, had been moved to another location.

There were also "open questions" in June 2003 about the Kalaye Electric Company site. After months of repeated requests, the Agency was finally allowed to take environmental samples there in August 2003, but the 26 August 2003 report noted that Iran had used the intervening months to make "considerable modifications" to the site that "may impact on the accuracy of the environmental sampling and the Agency's ability to verify Iran's declarations about the types of activities previously carried out here."

The IAEA discussed with Iranian officials during the meetings that took place on 9–12 August 2003. In that discussion, in contrast to earlier information provided about the launch dates of the program and its indigenous nature, AEOI officials stated that the decision to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme had actually been taken in 1985, and that Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary around 1987. The officials described the program as having consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the AEOI premises in Tehran; during the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities had been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran; during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the R&D and assembly activities were moved toNatanz.

The Iranian authorities also explained that during the first phase, components had been obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or directly by Iranian entities, but that no help had been received from abroad to assemble centrifuges or provide training. Efforts were concentrated on achieving an operating centrifuge, but many difficulties had been encountered as a result of machine crashes attributed to poor quality components. According to the AEOI officials, no experiments with inert or UF6 gas were conducted. Iran indicated its willingness to make available for interview key scientists responsible for that phase of the enrichment programme. According to Iranian officials, from 1997 through 2002, the activities were concentrated at Kalaye Electric Company, and in volved the assembly and testing of centrifuges, but again without inert or UF6 gas.

* Facilities declared in 2003