B-52 Stratofortress Upgrades
The B-52 is a typical representation of the misnomer of "legacy" system. While the B-52 exceeds 30 years of age, new modifications and mission capabilities are constantly updating the system. The following is a list of current B-52 modification programs:
- Global Positioning System (GPS)
- TACAN Replacement System (TRS)
- Integrated Conventional Stores Management System (ICSMS)
- ARC-210/DAMA Secure Voice
- AGM-142 HAVENAP Missile Integration
- High Reliability Maintenance-Free Battery
- Electronic Counter-Measures Improvement (ECMI)
- Off-Aircraft Pylon Tester (OAPT)
- Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS)
- Electro Viewing System - EVS 3-in-1 (EVS, STV, FLIR)
- Advanced Weapons Integration Program (JDAM, WCMD, JSOW, JASSM)
- Night Vision Imaging System Cockpit Compatible Lighting
- Night Vision Imaging System Compatible Ejection Seat Mod
- Standard Flight Loads Data Recorder (SFLDR)
- Avionics Midlife Improvement (AMI) (ACU, DTUC, and INS Replacement)
- ALR-20 System Replacement
- Fuel Temperature Monitoring System
- Panoramic Night Vision Goggles
- Advanced Infrared Expendables
- Advanced real Time Engine Health Monitoring System
- Closed Loop Sensor-To Shoot Data Collection/Trans
- Precision Targeting Radar
- TF-33 Engine Replacement
- Lethal Self Protection
- B-52 Cockpit Modernization
- KY-58 VINSON Secure Voice
- AVTR
- Additional Cabin Pressure Altimeter
- Enhanced Bomber Mission Management System
- Chaff and Flare Dispenser Upgrade
- Non 1760 Pylon Upgrade
The B-52 is undergoing a Conventional Enhancement Modification which allows it to carry MIL-STD 1760 weapons. The Advanced Weapons Integration (AWI) program supports the conventional enhancement of the B-52 through the addition of the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW), and the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM). Limited Initial Operational Capability for the WCMD was achieved on the B-52 in December 1998, and LIOC for JDAM was achieved on the B-52 in December 1998.
The Air Force Mission Support System supports the Air Force movement of all mission planning to a common system. GPS TACAN Emulation provides support to the Congressionally-directed GPS-2000. Electronic Countermeasures Improvement supports a DESERT STORM identified deficiency. The B-61 Mod 11 program was added at the direction of the Nuclear Posture Review and Presidential Decision Directive-30.
The AGM-142 (or Have Nap as it is commonly called) and Harpoon missile systems were first installed and made operational on the B-52Gs in the mid-1980s. When the “G” models were retired, these capabilities were moved to the B-52H model. While Air Combat Command (ACC) was happy to retain these operational capabilities, they were limited in their ability to employ either Have Nap or Harpoon by the fact that only a limited number of B-52Hs could employ the missiles. In the early 1990s the B-52 Conventional Enhancement Modification (CEM) Integrated Product Team (IPT) began programs to make it possible for any B-52H to carry and launch either missile. At about the same time, the AGM-142 SPO began a second phase of their producibility enhancement program, PEPII for short, to upgrade the AGM-142 missiles to both enhance supportability and lower the missiles cost. As of 31 December 97 these programs provided ACC with the expanded and more flexible mission capability they desired.
Upgrades
Since Operation Desert Storm, the B-52 community has deployed as an integrated force rather than individual units. The 5th Bomb Wing, along with the 2nd Bomb Wing and the 917th Wing (Air Force Reserve) at Barksdale AFB, La., are leading the way in developing a new joint training initiative called Buff Strike 2000. Buff Strike 2000 integrates training opportunities between the three B-52 wings and several off-board sensor platforms such as the E-8, E-3, and RC-135. Off-board sensor aircraft identify, classify, detect, and locate targets and then share that information with strike aircraft such as the B-52. The primary goals are to validate B-52 formation standards, standardize joint mission planning cell procedures and products, enhance interactions with off-board sensor platforms and develop tactics to hit emerging targets. The other aspect of the program involves the airborne alert interdiction mission. The interaction and standardization of the mission planning cell is vital during deployment situations because they are the hearts of combat operationsd. This effort will ensure combat isn't the first time everyone works together. Buff Strike 2000 was developed in response to recent B-52 real-world operations, as well as new mission requirements. Operation Allied Force validated the training and agility of the force and quality of its precision equipment and aircraft. Buff Strike 2000 improves past training and builds upon lessons learned from Operations Allied Force and Desert Fox. This allows units to deploy to a forward location and immediately begin combat operations. In the past it's taken time to fully integrate the two wings; this should cut that time dramatically. The future of the program includes integrating sensor aircraft to practice dynamic battle control to ensure target identification, classification and the ability to put direct air power to those targets.
The B-61 Mod 11 program involves development and testing of a modified nuclear weapon on B-52 operational aircraft. Replacement of a strategic weapon was recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review and directed by Presidential Decision Review-30. Congress was notified during the second quarter of FY 1995, of the Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy intent to modify an existing weapon to provide a replacement option. Modifications (made by the Department of Energy) to the B-61 Mod 7 strategic bomb accomplish the mission requirements of the replaced weapon. Modification of an existing weapon is less expensive than the cost to develop a new weapon from "scratch." Flight testing by the 419th FLTS, Edwards AFB, CA is required to certify the modified weapon mass and physic properties are the same as the Mod 7 device. The Air Force asked and received permission from Congress to reprogram the $4.5M FY 96 Congressional plus-up for AGM-130 integration on the B-52, into the B-61 Mod 11 Flight Test program. This program was completed in FY 97.
A key element to preserving the combat capability of the BUFF is the continued effort to improve the reliability, maintainability, and supportability (RM&S) for the B-52s in the near future. The three major defensive ECM systems on the aircraft, the AN/ALQ-172, AN/ALQ-155, and AN/ALR-20, all needed upgrades or replacement due to performance, reliability, and/or supportability problems. In addition, a myriad of other defensive systems on the BUFFs required enhancements to keep the B-52 ECM suite viable throughout the lifetime of the aircraft. In FY97, the B-52 fleet received only six percent of the overall bomber budget which further complicated efforts to maintain these aging ECM systems.
Between October 1996 and March 1997, the B-52 ECM suite became the leading cause of the Air Combat Command's B-52 bomber wings not meeting mission capable (MC) rate standards for the B-52H fleet. The aircraft's three major defensive systems all needed upgrades or replacement due to performance, reliability, and supportability issues. During these six months, these three systems combined to produce a six month mission incapable (MICAP) driver rate for the B-52 fleet of more than 43,000 hours. In addition, B-52 ECM employees discovered that because of this, readiness spares packages (RSPs) kits were depleted of several key system line replaceable units (LRUs). This resulted in a significant impact to the operational readiness of the entire B-52H fleet.
In March 1997, HQ ACC B-52 logistics officials (HQ ACC/LGF52), Oklahoma City ALC B-52 leadership (OC-ALC/LHL), and managers from the Center's LNR division implemented an ECM Support Improvement Plan (SIP) to improve the B-52H ECM MICAP rate and RSP fill rates to acceptable levels. As a result, they eliminated MICAPs by April 1997 and filled RSP kits to the Independent Kit Level by May 1997.
The ALQ-172 ECM electronic countermeasures suite is being improved to cover a requirement identified during DESERT STORM. The improvement provides for an increased memory capability to handle advanced threats as well as correcting a coverage capability problem. The project adds a third ALQ-172 to the ECM suite and develops the new display required by the addition of the third system. The B-52's electronic countermeasures suite is capable of protecting itself against a full range of air defense threat systems by using a combination of electronic detection, jamming and infrared countermeasures. The B-52 can also detect and counter missiles engaging the aircraft from the rear. These systems are undergoing continuous improvement in order to enable them to continue to counter emerging threat systems.
Situational Awareness is the highest priority modification needed for the B-52. The Electronic Countermeasure Improvement is a Reliability and Maintainability initiative that upgrades two low Mean Time Between Failure components, and replaces two Control and Display Units (CDU) with one CDU. The ECM system uses 1960s-era technology and will likely be unsupportable by FY02.
Link-16 - A line-of-sight datalink that uses structured message formats to provide the capability for an organized network of users to transfer in real-time/near real-time, digitized tactical information between tactical data systems used to increase survivability and develop a real-time picture of the battlespace.
Re-engining
An unsolicited proposal for reengining 94 aircraft in the B-52 fleet was submitted to the Air Force by Boeing North American, Inc. in June 1996. Boeing proposed modernizing the B-52 fleet by replacing the current TF-33 engines with a commercial engine through a long-term leasing agreement, and providing fixed-cost, privatized maintenance based on the number of hours flown each year. Boeing's proposal included modernizing the B-52 fleet by replacing the TF-33 engines with the Allison/Rolls commercial RB-211 engine through a long-term leasing agreement and providing a fixed-cost, privatized maintenance concept through a "power-by-the-hour" arrangement. Boeing initially projected reengining cost savings of about $6 billion, but later revised the projected savings to $4.7 billion to reengine 71 B-52s. An Air Force team formed to study Boeing's proposal analyzed the lease and purchase alternatives and concluded that both options are cost prohibitive compared to maintaining the existing TF-33 engines. The General Accounting Office estimated that Boeing's unsolicited proposal to reengine the B-52 fleet would cost the Air Force approximately $1.3 billion rather than save approximately $4.7 billion as Boeing projected.
This proposal would allow the Air Force to lease engines, providing a low cost means of modernizing the Air Combat Command (ACC) B-52H weapon system. Installation of the proposed engines and APU would result in significant maintenance reductions for the engines while providing on-board ground power for general aircraft maintenance. The reduced fuel consumption of the modern engine would extend the un-refueled operational range of the aircraft. This proposal would also result in reduced "foot print" requirements when ACC deploys the weapon system by reducing the requirements for Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) electrical power carts and start cart equipment. The proposed support structure provides for all "below the wing support" of the engine through Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), around the clock & around the world. The proposal also provided for contractor owned and maintained pre-positioned spares at ACC B-52H operating locations as well as on site Contractor Field Service Representatives (CFSRs). The depot engine maintenance would be performed by the FAA compliant American Airlines service facility that currently maintains that airline’s fleet.
The Boeing Company proposed using a private sector financing model that avoids the need for large, up- front appropriations. The Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC) concept uses private capital to execute the program, and links a payment schedule to operations and maintenance savings over the remaining life of the B-52H. This is not a new concept. ESPCs have been used successfully to fund facility upgrades for some years. In the case of re-engining, the funds would be paid back from reduced fuel and maintenance costs and reduced requirements for tanker aircraft.
In June 2002, USD(AT&L) commissioned a Defense Science Board [DSB] task force to advise on the key issues associated with re-engining the B-52H Stratofortress. This was the fourth B-52H re-engining study conducted since 1996. In the three years since completion of the previous study, cost, operational and business factors relevant to a re-engining decision have changed substantially. In order to compare the projected maintenance of the TF33-103 with proposed replacements, the task force received briefings from 3 COTS engine manufacturers with engines that appear suitable for use on the B-52H; the Rolls-Royce RB-211, the Pratt & Whitney PW 2040, and 3 options from General Electric.
Engine removal rates for today’s commercial engines are very low. This is primarily a function of the technical advances made in engines over the past 30 years. Today’s new commercial engines can last 10,000 to 15,000 hours between initial installation and first off-wing repair. For the B-52H re-engining, the time interval between installation and first off-wing repair is projected to be greater than the remaining hours left on the airframe, making re-engining essentially a “hang and forget” program.
The first three Air Force studies concluded re-engining was not economically justifiable. Several factors drove this conclusion: use of a constant fuel price at the Defense Energy Support Center’s (DESC) rate; Air Force Material Command’s estimate that engine depot cost would be stable through 2037; and the organizational judgment that required funding would not compete successfully against higher priorities. In addition, premature B-52H retirement and force reductions were considered program risks. This task force concluded that the economic and operational benefits far outweigh the program cost; and unanimously recommends the Air Force proceed with B-52H re-engining without delay.
