New Iraqi Army (NIA)
A professional Iraqi army is being created to replace Saddam's army with a professional force for maintaining peace and stability. The New Iraqi Army's primary responsibilities would be for border protection, securing roads and installations, and clearing mines and unexploded bombs left over from the war. Only a small number of officers would be employed in the new army, as plans called for it to be much smaller than that of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's. The US administration in Iraq envisions the new army to be purely for defense and wholly separate from the civil police force unlike during the Hussein regime.
Units are to reflect Iraq's religious, regional, and ethnic mix, be non-political, under law-based civilian control, and a force for defense and security-not aggression and oppression.
CPA Order Number 22, Creation of a New Iraqi Army, August 7, 2003, established a military force for the national self-defense of a future free Iraq. CPA Order Number 23, Creation of a Code of Military Discipline for the New Iraqi Army, August 7, 2003, established a system of discipline to maintain order in the New Iraqi Army.
Excluded from New Iraqi Army include:
- Former persons from regime security organizations
- Intel organizations
- Special Republican Guards
- SSO
- Ba'ath Party security and militia organizations
- Top-level Ba'ath Party members
Former military officers of the rank of Lt Col and below were being accepted into the new organization with all other males between the age of 18-40 years and not listed on excluded list allowed to sign up at recruiting centers. Recruitment Centers have been set up in Baghdad, Al Basrah, Mosul with an additional one at Irbil planned.
As of 15 February 2004, more than 3,500 personnel had been recruited; nearly 2,000 were operational and over 1,700 were in training. A groundbreaking ceremony for a new training base for the Iraqi Army took place in Kirkuk on April 29, 2004. The facility will accommodate an entire brigade of soldiers.
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi of Iraq's interim government announced organizational changes for the country's security forces, along with a plan for taking on Iraq's enemies, at a 20 June 2004 Baghdad news conference. The interim government has parceled out responsibilities for specific branches of Iraq's armed forces, Allawi said. New units include:
- infantry brigades;
- the national guard (previously the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps;
- rapid intervention forces; and
- Iraqi special forces
He said the army would focus on border defense and homeland security. "The reserve forces of the army will also assist in dealing with the domestic threats to our national security," he noted. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) would be renamed as the Iraqi National Guard and would come under the command of the army, which would also include the Iraqi intervention forces and special forces. "The national guard would be increased, and their training level upgraded. Six new local divisions will be established, as well as 18 brigades and 50 regiments at least. "The Iraqi special forces, which are highly trained and equipped with advanced tools," he continued, "will stalk and arrest all the terrorists and those who tamper with the security of our homeland and citizens."
As of 30 Apr 2004. See CENTCOM Briefing
By early 2005 the Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments, with Coalition assistance, had fielded over 90 battalions in order to provide security within Iraq during a period of an intense counterinsurgency campaign that was designed to suppress the development of democracy. All but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities. These limitations, coupled with a more resilient insurgency than anticipated when the Iraqi Security Forces were initially designed, have led the Prime Minister of Iraq to request forces that can participate in the "hard end" of the counterinsurgency, and to do so quickly.
Iraq celebrated Army Day on Jan. 6, marking the 84th anniversary of the activation of the Iraqi Army on Jan. 6, 1921. Ceremonies across the country recalled the Army's past service and sacrifice and showcased current and future capabilities. Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Minister of Defense Hazam Sha'alan, Minister of State Cassim Daoud, and Gen. Babakir Al Zibari, the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, presided over ceremonies held at Taji Military Base, north of Baghdad, before returning to Baghdad to conduct ceremonies at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
Prime Minister Allawi addressed the Iraqi Armed Forces in particular and the people of Iraq more generally, in his speech at Taji. "Free brothers, Iraq is facing a difficult and complicated situation especially in this period, but together we are going to build a strong and independent Iraq, a country free of oppression and depression, a country based on the power of law, honesty and truth," Allawi said. "It's a difficult mission, but we will do it. You brothers, members of the army forces, will face crucial challenges, but I am confident of your ability to overcome them with your heads up. Your solid will is an advantage to defeat these challenges. Together we will win. Together we will defeat our enemies. Together we will build our beloved Iraq."
Army Day ceremonies around Iraq including reading of a proclamation issued by Gen. Babakir that recalled the proud history of the Iraqi Army, announced the activation of nine Iraqi Army divisions, and explained the incorporation of the National Guard into the Regular Army. This move will "ensure unity of command and effort to meet the security challenges we currently face," Babakir noted.
During the ceremony at Taji, Prime Minister Allawi and Minister Sha'alan named Iraqi Army Lt. Gen. Abdul Qader Mohammed Jassim, who was the Iraqi ground forces commander in Operation Al Fajr (Fallujah), the Land Forces Commander, with responsibility for the Iraqi Army. A pass in review then showcased some of the capabilities of the Army.
As of July 2005, MNF-I had implemented a structured training and assessment process for Iraqi Military Forces. Training for the individual soldier was divided into two areas: training for new recruits and training for former soldiers. Training for new recruits took a total of nine weeks and was usually conducted at the Iraqi Training Brigade (ITB) in Kirkush. Training for former soldiers lasted three to four weeks and was usually conducted in divisional locations with graduates generally being assigned to the division that trained them. All personnel received standard infantry-style training; selected soldiers received specialized training in Army Military Occupational Specialties, such as Signal, Administration, Supply, Armor, Transport, Maintenance and Military Police.
Membership in the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade required additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers underwent a three-week Assessment and Selection course. Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces (ICTF) soldiers received 12 weeks of training in Jordan on Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Planning, and Leadership before they conducted Direct Action missions. ISOF soldiers underwent rigorous training emphasizing small unit tactics, counterterrorism, and unit self-reliance. Improved qualification and vetting standards minimized absenteeism and the risk of insurgent infiltration. The Brigade’s chain of command and officer cadre were assessed as being very effective. ISOF elements had been conducting operations for the previous year. They have played crucial roles in major combat operations along side of, and sometimes independently of, Coalition forces.
A small number of Army personnel attended advanced training with NATO and U.S. Army schools.
MNF-I had also implemented, in partnership with the MOD, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provided Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments took into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army used to evaluate its units’ operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership.
Overall, operational units were assessed as:
It is useful to place these readiness assessments in perspective. The first Iraqi Army infantry battalions finished basic training in early 2004 and were immediately required in combat without complete equipment. They had inadequate time to develop unit cohesiveness, staff proficiency, and a leadership chain of command that is fundamental to a military unit. Ministry of Defense forces did not perform well in Fallujah—several battalions collapsed. Absent-without-leave (AWOL) rates among regular army units were in double digits and remained so for the rest of the year.
Although, as of 2005, such problems had not been entirely solved, they had been addressed in large measure because of the ability to put to good use the security sector funding from the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF) as provided for by Public Law 108-106. Furthermore, although there was variance in the rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion among the Iraqi Army, rates had diminished significantly and were around one percent for some divisions. Still, units that were conducting operations and units that relocated elsewhere in Iraq experienced a surge in absenteeism.
