Ministry of Defense
The Iraqi Ministry of Defence is the national military establishment that under take the responsibility of defending the boarders and protecting the people and it is interests against the external and internal threats by coordination and cooperation with other governmental ministry and establishment.
The MoD remains under the MoF imposed hiring freeze of 253,000 personnel. According to May 31, 2010 data, there were approximately 332,000 approved MTOE positions in the MoD against which approximately 250,000 personnel were allocated pay. As the ground force neared completion, lack of a sustainment-funding plan and the presence of an overly centralized decision-making process inhibit MoD force improvements. The Minister of Defense still controlled almost all procurement and maintenance funding decisions and approves most equipment purchases.
The Joint Headquarters (JHQ) developed greater capability to provide operational-level advice to the MoD and is developing its capacity to plan and logistically resource operations. Despite the JHQ’s progress, the Iraqi national security C2 architecture continues to be poorly defined and overly centralized, which inhibits planning, decision making, and the ability to execute coordinated operations at all levels, and may encourage decisions made outside the established chain of command.
The MoD General Directorate for Policy and Requirements has limited capability to generate relevant and applicable defense policies and plans, and continues to await a Defense Minister decision on a potential restructure of the department. Although capability exists within some of the key staff members to produce their respective policies and plans, there is no institutional process for feedback, approval, and implementation of such guiding documents. Senior Iraqi leadership has resisted publishing formal policy documents, which contributes to the existing sluggish decisionmaking practices at all levels. The MoD leadership often disregards the requirements generated by its subordinate staffs and is resistant to tying capability requirements to national security documents. The linkage between capability requirements, strength levels, equipment purchasing, and budgeting is almost nonexistent.
Under Saddam the Ministry of Defense was combined with the Ministry of Military Industrialization to be called the Ministry of Defense and Military Industrialization, later changed to Ministry of National Security and Defense. It had both a civilian and military component. The civilian component is responsible for buying equipment and overall military funding. The military is responsible for manpower and liaisons. The Iraqi people run and lead their military with the purpose of defending Iraq.
After the "big historical alteration" on April 9th 2003 and through co-coordinating and co-operating global efforts to change the dictator regime a serious effort started to build a new national army on vocational and civilized bases far from politics, partialism, sectarianism and racism so that its aim would be to accomplish stability and security on every spot of the Iraqi territory without any distinction or differentiation.
The physical elements of the Ministry of National Security and Defense were stood up at Uday's Palace. The interim minister, Amb. Solcombe, arrived on May 15, 2003. Four key initial goals were:
- Standing up the physical components at Udays Palace. While the structure was badly damaged, the generator and pipes remained intact.
- Rebuilding the Ministry from the ground up by bringing thirty thousand Iraqi soldiers back to active duty.
- Paying these soldiers who havent been paid in over three months
- Start planning for the Iraqi Military International Conference in Tampa suggested for mid-June.
On 15 May 2003, the The Coalition Provisional Authority announced that the Ministry of Defense would be combined with the Ministry of Military Industrialization to be called the Ministry of Defense and Military Industrialization. It had both a civilian and military component. The civilian component was responsible for buying equipment and overall military funding. The military was responsible for manpower and liaisons.
On 23 May 2003, the US civilian administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, abolished several ministries and institutions of Saddam Hussein's regime, and disbanded the Iraqi army, declaring them illegal. The ministries of defense and information were among institutions being dissolved as well as the military and security courts, the Iraqi Olympic Committee, and the Republican Guard units. Bremer's office said that plans are afoot to create a new Iraq Corps as the first step toward forming "a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq." The statement said the corps would be "professional, nonpolitical, military effective and representative of all Iraqis." The move is aimed to get rid of Ba'athist influences in the military and security institutions. It followed the decision to abolish Hussein's Ba'ath party and order the dismissal of party officials from the civil service.
CPA Order Number 67, Ministry of Defence, promulgated on March 21, 2004, redesignated the New Iraqi Army as the Iraqi Armed Forces, established a new national ministry to provide civilian control of the Iraqi Armed Forces and supporting organizations, and provided for the eventual transfer of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps to the Ministry of Defence as a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
The new Ministry of Defence (MoD) was thereby established. The new MoD was a wholly distinct and separate entity from the organization with the same name that previously existed in Iraq and was dissolved by CPA Order Number 2. The MoD operated under the authority, direction, and control of the Administrator of the CPA pending transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government established in accordance with the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. The Administrator, after consultation with the Governing Council, appointed an interim Minister of Defence. The interim Minister reported directly to the Administrator. The MoD consisted of the Ministry proper (including organizations for policy oversight, financial management and administration and logistics of the Iraqi Armed Forces), the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), and those members of the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) employed by the MoD for the defense of its installations.
On April 4, 2004, Coalition Administrator Paul Bremer announced that Dr. Abdul Ameer Ali Allawi would be the interim minister of defense in addition to his other mission as a Minister of Commerce. Iraq took an important step, establishing three national security agencies: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministerial Committee for National Security, and a new intelligence service. These agencies will be headed by civilians, with oversight by the National Assembly, and will cooperate closely to combat terrorists and insurgents.Meantime there were three battalions for the army and a battalion of the National Guards were added , so there were three divisions.
During the time of the transitional government, Mr. Hazim Al Sha'alan occupied the position of the Ministry of Defense on June 28th – 2004. After electing the transitional government, Dr. Sadun Al Dulaimi took the power of the Ministry of Defense May 9th – 2005. The next Minister of Defense was Mr. Abdul Qader Mohammed Jassim, an independent and patriotic military personality who previously occupied the position of Ground Forces Commander in the new army before he was selected as the Minister of Defense by the Iraqi Parliament after the formation of the united national government chaired by Dr. Noori Al Maliki.
The Joint Headquarters [JHQ] is improving operational C2 capabilities. The Iraqi Forces Joint Operations Center (JOC) is increasingly self-sufficient in the development of situational awareness and intelligence reporting. The C2 of the ISF is generally exercised through a system of regional commands that function through the linkage of the Office of the Commander in Chief and seven Operations Commands. Stove-piping of information, as well as a lack of integration of intelligence analysis and operations to generate actionable objectives, remains a challenge. When accomplished, planning is performed at the most senior level rather than through a staff planning process. By 2010 the JHQ was becoming more focused on combined operations, and recent plans and operations have included representation by other Iraqi security stakeholders, including the MoI, the Director of Intelligence, the IGFC HQ, and others. There is also an evolving emphasis by the JHQ leadership to focus the armed forces on traditional external threats with recognition that internal security is not the primary function of the IA, IqAF, or IqN.
The Iraqi Logistics Operations Center (ILOC) serves as the central hub for tracking, coordination, and reporting of logistical operations and sustainment within the MoD. The ILOC has received increasing support from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCoS Log). As such, it continues to grow its reach, visibility, and influence. The ILOC concept, however, remains foreign to many, resulting in barriers to cooperation with DCoS Log Directorates. The slow pace of expansion of the IDN continues to affect logistics in general, and specifically the ILOC’s ability to communicate with logistics elements throughout the country. Cell phones, couriers, and commercial internet still account for a significant portion of logistics related communications. Functionally, the ILOC has become a capable organization whose officers operate under standard processes and procedures. Reporting is fair and improving. However, a lack of consistent, relevant, and accurate reporting from the services and other directorates makes it difficult for the ILOC to provide relevant and useful data to the JHQ.
The Joint Base Workshop is comprised of three major facility complexes known as the Wheel Depot, Track Depot, and Taji Vocational Institute. The Wheel Depot is comprised of 13 major facilities spanning 347,060 square feet. The Wheel Depot is responsible for depot-level overhaul of the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the M923 truck, and associated trailers. It will also establish direct support/general support maintenance capability for commercial trucks and forklifts. The Track Depot also has 13 major facilities spanning 496,118 square feet. The Track Depot is responsible for depot-level overhaul of the T72 main battle tank, BMP1 armored personnel carrier, M203 Grenade Launcher, AK 47 rifle, M2/16 rifle, M2 PKM machine gun, M9 and Glock pistols, and 60/81mm Mortars. The facility will also provide direct support/general support maintenance capability for generators. Lastly, the Taji Vocational Institute provides classroom instruction for 63 skill sets.
The General Transportation Regiment (GTR) remains the only strategic transportation unit in the IA. The GTR is responsible for transporting all external equipment and supplies from Iraq’s borders – including seaports, airports, and railheads – to the division areas and/or the main warehouses. By 2010 the GTR had completed over 350 logistical convoy missions, using 5,045 transportation vehicles to move 21,100 tons of supplies and 1,958 vehicles.
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