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Further Reading

Saudi Arabian F-15 Peace Sun

On 29 December 2011 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced that it had reached an agreement to purchase from the US government 84 new Boeing F-15 fighter aircraft and to upgrade 70 of its existing F-15s. As of 2011 Saudi Arabia had 66 F-15C single seat and 18 F-15D two-seat fighrer aircraft and 70 F-15S air-to-ground aircraft. For many years the customers authorized to have the F-15 aircraft were limited to Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Israel. More recently, South Korea and Singapore were added to this exclusive list. With this latest purchase, Saudi Arabia will operate a fleet of 238 F-15s of all types.

For the past twenty years the F-15 has been a cornerstone of the relationship between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the RSAF. The procurement of the F-15SA, the conversion of the F-15S fleet to a common configuration, and the CONUS training contingent will provide interoperability, sustained professional contacts, and common ground for training and support well into the 21st century. The F-15SA will help deter potential aggressors by increasing Saudi’s tactical air force capability to defend KSA against regional threats. The CONUS-based contingent would improve interoperability between the USAF and the RSAF. This approach will meet Saudi’s self-defense requirements and continue to foster the long-term military-to-military relationship between the United States and the KSA.

In 1977, the Carter Administration committed to an F-15 sale for Saudi Arabia. After a difficult time on the proposed Iranian AWACS sale the year before, policy makers anticipated an equally rough time for this sale. US Defense Secretary Harold Secretary Brown sought to alleviate fears of some Senators that the F-15 that would be sold to Saudi Arabia would be used against Israel. He explained the capabilities of this aircraft and also specified the assurances received from the government of Saudi Arabia.

As a result, Carter, faced with the unappealing prospect of a legislative veto, chose not to face down the Congress over just the Saudi sale. He attempted to package the Saudi F-15s together with other aircraft purchases by Egypt and Israel in a take it or leave it effort to force through all the sales. The threat of a Congressional veto in response to both these tactics, and the unpopularity of the Saudis vis-a-vis the Israelis in general, forced the administration to back down. Although the Saudis eventually received F-15s, strict limitations were placed on the offensive capabilities of the aircraft.

The Saudi request for F—15s in 1978 had a high political content centering on the growing role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab—Israeli problem, particularly since 1973. The request itself, however, represented a step in the development of a modern Saudi air defense system largely conducted under U.S. tutelage and begun in 1962 with no reference whatever to Israel.

During the 1970s arms trade became a domestic political and foreign policy issue. Congress imposed legislative controls, most notably through theInternational Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; the Carter Administration sought to "reform" U.S. arms sales through a set of specific guidelines, and it undertook discussions with the Soviet Union regarding international restraints. The Carter Administration's handling of arms sales was easy to criticize. Certainly the reality did not match the overblown and moralistic rhetoric, and arms sales were never relegated to the status of being an "exceptional" instrument of foreign policy as promised in the Administation's early days. The policy guidelines - e.g., that the United States would not bethe first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, advanced weapons systems that would create a new or significantly higher combat capability; that it would not permit development or modification of advanced weapons systems solely for export; that it would not permit co-production agreements with other countries, etc. - were frequently not observed.

The Reagan Administation in its ?rst nine months sought to accentuate the difference in its approach toward arms sales. Addressing the Aerospace Industries Association, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley observed that the Carter Administration had adopted policies on the sale of arms that "substituted theology for a healthy sense of self-preservation."

A cornucopia of arms sales marked the first months of the Reagan Administration. In the largest arms deal in history, the United States sold to Saudi Arabia not only the five AWACS aircraft but also 1,177 advanced Sidewinder air—to—air missiles, six KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft, and conformal fuel tanks to enhance the range of the 60 F-15 fighters sold in 1978 - for a total value of $8.5 billion. lsrael was promised additional F-15 fighters and was told that past restrictions on the export of its Kfir fighter, containing an American engine, would be dropped.

The heated debate over the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and F-15 fighter components to Saudi Arabia was only one of a number of controversies involving U.S. arms sales. A particular sale may be destabilizing or it may restore a balance. Itmay promote an arms race in a region, or it may help deter a potential conflict. Moreover, what is true in the short run may not be valid for the longer term.

In 1983 when the Reagan administration, under pressure from the Israeli lobby and a legislative veto, refused to sell an additional 48 F-15s to Saudi Arabia. AIPAC proved influential enough to persuade Congress to block the sale of additional F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Instead of procuring the primarily defensive F-15, the Saudis bought the offensive strike version of the Tornado from the UK. One could argue that the net effect of the U.S. refusal to sell the F-15s was a lessening of Israeli security if for no other reason than other countries were willing and able to ?ll Saudi needs with offensively oriented aircraft.

Saudi Arabia ranked first among all Third World recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 1993, concluding $9.6 billion in such agreements. The principal Saudi purchase contributing to this 1993 total was a $9 billion agreement with the United States for 72 F-15 ?ghter aircraft. At that time, industry lobbyists such as a coalition of arms manufactures and labor unions claimed that 40,000 jobs would be lost if a pending sale of72 F-15s to Saudi Arabia were not approved. What was not advertised was that Saudi Arabia required a 30 percent offset on all buys, which for this purchase channeled $2.7 billion to Saudi workers and the Saudi economy. Although there is considerable political pressure to curb the use of offsets, Congress has been reluctant to take issue with offsets and with arms sales generally. Exports through defense sales provide jobs and generally support the economy.

F-15 production was extended into 1999 by the orders for 72 F-15S aircraft for Saudi Arabia. Peace Sun IX is an F-15 Foreign Military Sales production program, with development, to deliver 72 F-15S aircraft including support equipment, spares, and training to the Royal Saudi government. Saudi Arabia has purchased a total of 62 F-15C and D aircraft and later procured the F-15S, which is a two-seater aircraft based on the F-15E airframe, with downgraded avionics, downgraded LANTIRN pods, and a simplified Hughes APG-70 radar without computerised radar mapping. Four F-15S Eagles were delivered in 1995. On 10 November 1999 the last of 72 F-15S aircraft was delivered to Saudi Arabia. In November 1995 Saudi Arabia purchased 556 GBU-15 Guided Bomb Units (including six training units), 48 data link pods, personnel training and training equipment and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $371 million. Saudi Arabia would use the GBU-15s to enhance the stand off attack capability of the F-15S aircraft.

On October 20, 2010 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress today of a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Saudi Arabia of 84 F-15SA Aircraft and 170 APG-63(v)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA) radar sets. Also included are the upgrade of the existing Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) fleet of seventy (70) F-15S multi-role fighters to the F-15SA configuration, the provision for CONUS-based fighter training operations for a twelve (12) F-15SA contingent, construction, refurbishments, and infrastructure improvements of several support facilities for the F-15SA in-Kingdom and/or CONUS operations.