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Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program

Program History

The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force initially requested 1,169 MRAP vehicles. There were different variants such as, multi-mission combat vehicles, ambulance variant vehicles, troop transport vehicles and so on. The MRAP vehicle's final design and manufacturer had not yet been determined. As of 10 June 2005 MRAP was one of a dozen USMC Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS) awaiting DWG review or require solution resolution. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle UUNS requested an MRAP vehicle capability to increase survivability and mobility of Marines operating in a hazardous fire area against known threats. EFDC was developing a course of action for development of a future vehicle that provides the requested capability.

The official establishment of the Joint Service MRAP program was in November 2006. The Marine Corps Systems Command issued a request for industry bids in November 2006 for 4,060 vehicles, 2,500 for the Army, 538 for the Navy and 1,022 for the Marine Corps.

By contrast the Buffalo MRAP, in use since 2003 was originally intended to be fielded only to engineer units, with the Army planning to stand up three Route Clearance Companies per year starting in FY07, for a total of 12 companies. This vehicle, was subsequently classified as relevant to the MRAP's Category III, not initially specified in the January 2007 contracts.

On 27 January 2007 the Navy awarded a firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity multiple award contract for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Under the contract the Government could order up to 4,100 MRAP vehicles composed of 1,500 Category I and 2,600 Category II. Each awardee would receive an initial delivery order for two test vehicles per Category to include associated vehicle support. The total value of the initial delivery orders for 36 test vehicles was $34,574,582. The Government could place additional delivery orders for production vehicles. Vehicles procured under these contracts would be deployed to and supported in Iraq and Afghanistan. Initial test vehicles would be delivered no later than 60 days after contract award. Logistics support would continue up to two years after fielding for test and any production vehicles.

Work was to be performed respectively in York, Pennsylvania, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, North Charleston, South Carolina, York, Pennsylvania, Ladson, South Carolina, Sealy, Texas, New Orleans, Louisiana, New Haven, Michigan, and Westpoint, Mississippi. Work was expected to be completed January 2008 (2012 with options). Contract funds would not expire at the end of the fiscal year. These contracts were awarded based on full and open competition from solicitation M67854-07-R-5000. The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia was the contracting activity. (Contract Numbers: BAE Systems- M67854-07-D-5025; Oshkosh Truck Corporation- M67854-07-D-5026; Protected Vehicles, Inc.- M67854-07-D-5027; General Dynamics Land Systems- M67854-07-D-5028; Force Protection Industries- M67854-07-D-5031; Armor Holdings- M67854-07-D-5030; Textron Marine & Land- M67854-07-D-5033; General Purpose Vehicles LLC- M67854-07-D-5029; International Military and Government LLC- M67854-07-D-5032).

Marine Corps leadership reportedly decided in February 2007 to replace all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with MRAPs, whereas Army leadership would continue to rely on its uparmored HMMWVs. In March 2007, the MRAP requirement for all services reportedly grew by 15% as the Navy, Air Force, and the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) added requirements for MRAPs that stood at 7,774 DoD-wide as of March 26, 2007. In May 2007, reportedly because of the requests from Army commanders in Iraq, Army leadership reportedly began considering the possibility of replacing all uparmored HMMWVs in Iraq with MRAPs, thereby increasing the Army's total requirement to approximately 17,700 MRAP vehicles.

As of May 2007 estimates valued the total military MRAP procurement at more than $8 billion and in excess of 7,700 units. US Central Command indicated it might need as many as 17,700 vehicles, enough to ensure that every soldier who leaves a base in Iraq would be riding in one. Nine companies had been selected to build test vehicles, and the Marine had planned to choose multiple winners from the various vehicles submitted. The Army would like one primary design.

On 17 May 2007 it was reported that the Army had asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates to approve spending almost $20 billion for new armored vehicles. This move came a week after Gates called deploying the vehicles the military's top hardware priority. According to a memo dated 15 May 2007 and obtained by USA Today, acting Army Secretary Pete Geren asked Gates for as many as 17,770 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs).

On 28 June 2007, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reportedly endorsed a requirement to replace every HMMWV in theater with an MRAP, potentially pushing the MRAP requirement to more than 23,000 vehicles. The JROC capped overall MRAP procurement at 15,374 vehicles in September 2007, but suggested that these numbers could change, based on the assessment of commanders. By June 2007 Acting Army Secretary Pete Geren had asked Defense Secretary Robert Gates for as many as 17,770 MRAPs, at a cost of $20 billion. The vehicles would be shipped to Iraq after production by July 2009.

The total requirement as of 10 August 2007 stood at 7,774 MRAPs in total, including Category III vehicles. At the time the procurement had amounted to a total of 6,415 MRAPs in all categories.

On 18 December 2007, DoD reported that it had awarded four manufacturers a contract just under $2.66 billion for an additional 3,126 MRAPs to be delivered by the end of July 2008. This award, combined with previous contract awards, totaled 11,941 MRAPs out of the existing 15,374 requirement. The 18 December 2007 contracts were to Stewart and Stevenson Tactical Vehicle, BAE Land Systems and Armaments, Force Protection Industries, Inc, and International Military and Government LLC. Stewart and Stevenson Tactical Vehicle (Sealy, Texas), was a Division of Armor Holdings that had recently been acquired by BAE Land Systems, and was awarded a contract to produce 668 Category II MRAPs. BAE Land Systems and Armaments (Santa Clara, California) was awarded a contract for 600 additional Category II MRAPs, bringing its total to more than 1,730 vehicles. Force Protection Industries, Inc. (Ladson, South Carolina), was awarded a contract for 178 Category I and 180 Category II MRAPS. International Military and Government LLC (Warrenville, Illinois) received the largest single deliver order for 1,5000 Category I MRAPs.

As of 2008 the MRAP program was referred to as the DoD's highest-priority acquisition program. To meet an urgent, joint service operational need, DOD was buying MRAP as nondevelopmental items. A March 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office suggested tha the greatest challenge for vendors would be obtaining sufficient quantities of ballistic-grade steel. Another significant challenge would be producing enough tires to equip the fleet and provide for replacements. Finally, integration of government-furnished equipment was taking three times longer than desired at the time of the report's publication. DOD was pursuing a very aggressive schedule while at the same time grappling with a significant number of unknowns that could delay fielding or increase costs. The program was trying to concurrently produce the baseline MRAP, develop and produce various upgrades, and develop an MRAP II vehicle.

A DoD assessment found there was sufficient steel available to produce the 11,891 contracted vehicles. However, the total number of vehicles procured was projected to increase and subseqeuntly the amount of armor per vehicle would grow to meet the threat, there were concerns that there might not be enough steel. Similarly, tire production was expected to reach 9,500 per month by February 2008, but 20,000 per month could be needed to support production and replacement in the field. Replacement rates were not known.

The GAO reported that DoD had taken steps to ensure availability of key materials. For example, DoD gave MRAP contracts a higher priority (DX rating) that required these contracts to be accepted and performed before all other non-priority government and commercial contracts. DoD also allocated funds to procure an advance reserve of steel and to increase tire production capacity. In addition, some of the vendors and suppliers made corporate investments to maximize capacity.

As of March 2008 all vehicles had come from the vendor without mission equipment, something that was not expected to change, and which required that the equipment be integrated onto vehicles before fielding. The equipment was 20 percent of the total program cost and included items such as a tracking system that identified friendly forces and a system to jam improvised explosive devices. A large challenge was integrating the entire suite of mission equipment onto the vehicles in a timely manner. The GAO reported that as of 2008 the installation took an average of 21 days, but the goal was to reduce that to 7 days. The plan was to process 50 vehicles per day for a total of 1,000 vehicles per month.

The GAO also reported that in order to rapidly field the vehicles, DoD substantially reduced the normal scope of test and evaluation. For example, there was no minimum requirement for vehicle reliability, and durability testing covered only 300 hard surface miles and 200 off-road miles in the first test phase. By the time the first phase of developmental testing had been completed, over 3,700 vehicles were already on order, a commitment of nearly $2 billion. The procurement plan as of March 2008 placed 11,891 vehicles on contract before operational effectiveness and operational suitability were determined. As a result, test results could lead to costly retrofits or replacements.