HMMWV Recapitalization
As of 2005 the Marine Corps had an inventory of about 20,000 Humvees, while the Army had more than 120,000. The projected life cyle of a Humvee is 13 years, but they last no more than two in Iraq.
Over half the current HMMWV fleet was built in the first six years of the program. The HMMWV was originally built with an expected service life of 15 years. In FY00 the first three trucks produced went over age and this was only the beginning. These first trucks, along with those built in FY85, are the bow wave of a significant aging trend across the HMMWV fleet. The fleet average age is also increasing. At the end of FY01 the fleet average age was approximately 10.8 years old. Continuing current funding levels to only procure new vehicles, the HMMWV fleet average age could grow to almost 17 years old by FY10.
PM-LTV recognized the need to address the rapidly rising operation and support (O&S) costs associated with these over age vehicles and began to develop an OPA-funded program to rebuild and upgrade the fleet of over 100,000 vehicles. The program's initial objective was to return HMMWVs to a near zero hours/miles condition to extend their life for an additional 21 years while enhancing performance and minimizing O&S costs. As initially conceived, the program would have included a new engine and drive train, new corrosion-resistant frame rails and 50 other mandatory modernization parts. The cost of this modernization program was projected to approach $40K per vehicle.
The scope of this program expanded in 2000 with the advent of the Army Recapitalization Policy. The goal of this initiative was to enhance readiness and slow the growth of O&S costs by maintaining the average fleet age at or below half the system's expected service life. In support of this effort PM-LTV developed a mathematical model to predict the average fleet age and numbers of vehicles within service life or over age based on projected annual new production and recapitalization quantities. Using this model it was determined that over 8,000 vehicles had to be recapitalized annually for the first several years in order meet the half-life standard by the target date of 2010. The high cost of this and other recapitalization programs caused the Army to further refine the recapitalization standard.
In September 2001, the Army leadership determined that it was not cost effective to fully recapitalize the HMMWV fleet to a zero hour/zero mile standard. The program was redirected towards an OMA-funded, focused recapitalization effort of only the older vehicles in the counter attack corps. The reduced scope of work consisted of an engine and drive train rebuild and a focused component inspect, repair and replace process. This program was approved by the VCSA on 19 October, 2001 and funding was programmed for the recapitalization of 4,372 total vehicles starting in FY04. The result of this focused recapitalization effort will be a vehicle with a ten year extended service life that is like new in appearance and performance.
HMMWV Rrecapitalization rebuilds older HMMWV variants (M998/1037A0) into armor-capable M1097A0s. It reduces overall operations and support costs and increases the service life of the overall HMMWV ?eet. It provides a platform for the spiralling of new technology into the HMMWV ?eet. A centerpiece of the recapitalization effort is the Repower Initiative, which will spiral a new power train into both recapitalized and new production lines for more power, better reliability and sustainability, better range and fuel economy, and better environmental controls. FY04 Continued recapitalization of HMMWVs with the ?rst recapitalized vehicles delivered by Red River Army Depot.
The HMMWV Repower Kit will be incorporated into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles. The recapitalization program converts A0/A1 HMMWVs into a M1097R1 configuration in order to support increased payload, allowing for the addition of add-on armor. With inclusion of armor and increased operational demands on the vehicle, it has become necessary to replace the existing powertrain package to regain vehicle performance and significantly improve reliability and maintainability (Repower Kit). This effort repowers the M1097R1 vehicle with a new engine/drivetrain kit that includes provisions for rapid removal and replacement of major components. The new powertrain package will be procured and delivered as a kit to U.S. Army depots (Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, PA and Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, TX) for installation during the ongoing recapitalization process.
FY 2005 funds HMMWV Repower Testing and development to support logistics improvements to the HMMWV Family of Vehicles through the use of more recent engine technol ogies and maintainability improvements, which will result in decreased operational support costs and product improvements. The Acquisition Strategy for HMMWV Repower was to award three contracts for Testing and Logistical Improvements, development and testing of vehicle prototypes.
Led by the Engines Team, testing began in October 2005 to provide information for engine and chassis selection. TARDEC tested the selected engines on dynamometers in test cells and the vehicles for full load cooling either at Aberdeen or Yuma Proving Grounds.
To fulfill the need for the integration of HMMWV Repower Kits into HMMWV Recapitalized vehicles, TACOM developed a streamlined acquisition strategy consisting of two phases. The acquisition strategy is to award a single production contract to support Phase II of the HMMWV Repower Program. The Phase II proposed Repower Kit, as installed in Recap Vehicles, must meet all Phase II threshold contract requirements. In responding to Phase I test failures in the Phase II proposal, proposing a change in the contract requirements is not acceptable. The degree to which the Phase II proposed credible corrective actions result in major redesigns or major modifications will significantly increase risk. A major modification to the Repower kit is a change to a component which potentially results from a major or catastrophic TIR and/or is determined by the Test Community to be so significant, that if changed it will result in the need to accumulate additional RAM test miles in order to validate the proposed kit fix. Additionally, a modification will be classified major if it results in a 10% cost increase to the Repower Kit. If corrective plans are not credibly supported or if the proposed fix is simply technically unacceptable, this may result in the failed condition being determined a deficiency which may prevent award of a contract.
Under Phase I, TACOM awarded three (3) contracts for the integration of the respective contractors HMMWV Repower Kit into a HMMWV Recapitalized vehicle, purchased eight (8) each HMMWV Repower Kits per contract (one (1) kit integrated into a HMMWV Recapped vehicle and seven (7) kits installed at Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD), acquired Field Service Representative (FSR) support during installation of the kits at LEAD, and acquired field service test support at up to three (3) Government test sites (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Yuma Proving Ground, and TACOM).
Four (4) of the vehicles (with the furnished Repower Kits installed) were sent to Aberdeen Proving Grounds (APG), Aberdeen, Maryland, and three (3) of the vehicles, with the kit installed, were sent to Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG), Yuma, Arizona, for testing. Purpose of testing was twofold: to run tests to support a Materiel Release/Type Classification (MR/TC) Decision following award of this production contract (Phase II) and to provide data from testing for the Phase II source selection decision. Vehicles provided for this test were to be as close to production vehicles as possible. Contractors whose Phase I product differs significantly from what they propose for production under the Phase II Evaluation will be downgraded in their assessment to the extent any untested Phase II configuration changes pose a heightened risk to the Government.
