China's Options in the Taiwan Confrontation
Wang Zaixi, former deputy director of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits of the State Council and vice president of the National Society of Taiwan Studies, told the Global Times annual forum 2020 held in Beijing on 05 December 2020 that the possibility of peaceful reunification of Taiwan is diminishing. The secessionist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the current ruling party of the island, would crack down on any party that may propose reunification with the mainland, Wang said.
Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University, said at the forum, "We have seen enough political farce within the island and we attach no hope to the political forces within the island to change the status quo and make joint efforts with the mainland to realize reunification.... The key is how the power balance of the geopolitics and strategic situation would change in the West Pacific region. As long as China has enough strength and influence and dominates the situation," reunification will only be a matter of time, Zhu said. "We will never lose the opportunity to solve the Taiwan question peacefully, because this variable is not set by the DPP or Taiwan's 'playhouse politics.' It is determined by the future geopolitical strategy of the whole East Asia and the belief in peace, stability and prosperity carried by all Asians," Zhu said.
Chiu Yi, a Taiwan-based expert on cross-Straits relations and a TV commentator, said at the forum that whether the possibility of peaceful reunification exists or not, it depends on how to define peaceful reunification. "If it means reunification without pressure from the mainland, then peaceful reunification won't happen. If it means peaceful reunification under military pressure, then it would be possible." Chiu further elaborated that there are eight obstacles in the way of achieving this goal which are legislature, education, elections, rising populism, US-led anti-China sentiment, conflict of interests business, culture conflicts and passive attitude of political parties. Chiu said KMT-led anti-CPC education and "secessionist education" and rising populism are the biggest obstacles to peaceful reunification. The US-led anti-China sentiment has been followed by the island, Chiu noted. Many young people, who make up a large part of population of Taiwan, think they are protected by the international community that will help them confront with the mainland, the expert said.
With a belief that the US will come to Taiwan's aid should China initiate action to curb any independence-like moves, Chen continued a campaign toward independence, betting on sympathetic voters to side with his positions. By 2005, however, the independence card had been trumped by the mainland's policy of reconciliation, and overshadowed by other domestic issues. While China has long avowed to prevent Taiwan's declaration of independence by force, if required, their response to current trends in Taiwan thus far has been significantly tempered.
China does not want to repeat the results of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait missile crisis in which PRC military actions adversely influenced (in Beijing eyes) Taiwanese opinions and resulted in President Lee Teng-hui's re-election. Beijing recognizes that the economic and diplomatic costs of even measured military responses to the situation in Taiwan would be enormously high, and as such they will reserve such activity as an absolute last resort.
Should Chen begin openly promoting an independence platform, Beijing could undertake an escalating series of actions to bring Taiwan back into line. China's leaders will choose their courses of action (COA) based on the COA's perceived impact on internal stability and government authority. They can neither afford to risk growing unemployment during a period of fantastic economic growth nor risk appearing weak in dealing with one of their three primary separatist movements (Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet).
It is generally assumed that China would likely attack Taiwan under certain previously defined circumstances [China's "Five Noes"]:
- a formal declaration of independence by Taipei
- a military alliance by Taiwan with a foreign power, or foreign intervention in Taiwan's internal affairs
- indefinite delays in resumption of cross-Strait dialogue, and an unwillingness to negotiate on the basis of 'one China'
- Taiwan's acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
- internal unrest or turmoil on Taiwan
As of mid-2004 President Hu Jintao's government was emphasizing formal independence, US-ROC cooperation on technology to defeat a PRC attack, and the lack of progress in negotiations.
Conversely, China's precise definition of "reunification" is somewhat opaque. In November 2004 Tang Jiaxuan, who was foreign minister until 2003, and serves as a vice minister in the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, said that after reunification, Taiwan would enjoy broader autonomy than Hong Kong and Macao. He suggested that Taiwan could preserve its social system; freely choose its leaders; keep the first right of legal jurisdiction; not pay taxes to the central government; preserve its own armed forces and police; have external foreign commercial, economic, trade and cultural relations; and purchase some offensive weapons. Furthermore, the central government in Beijing would not send officials to Taiwan but island officials could be part of the central government.
A walk down the escalation ladder may illustrate the range of possible actions that may be expected. Those rungs on the escalation ladder of greatest interest are those that may not provoke direct American response, but that would demonstrate the dispositive influence of Beijing over the status of the territory presently controlled by the Taipei regime, and Beijing's ultimate control over the relationship between that territory and the rest of the world.
Diplomatic Initiatives
Although a climb at least mid-way up the escalation ladder has some surface appeal and plausibility, there is surely a case to be made that the costs to Beijing will outweigh the benefits, and that in any event such a provocative course of action would merely play into Taiwan's gameplan for reducing the ambiguity of American commitments in its favor. Taiwan's declaratory shift has not been followed by overt acts, such as President Lee's 1996 visit to the United States, and indeed its declaratory initiative has been rebuffed by the US Government and by others. The counsel of patience would suggest that time is on Beijing's side, and that at some point the post-Lee leadership in Taipei will recognize the futility of his "state to state" formulation and return to some more constructive approach.
Military Exercises
China's military probing has been going on for years — an unending stress test for the democratic island it claims as its territory. But in 2020, the threat took on a new intensity. Over and over again, Taiwan scrambled fighters to intercept Chinese warplanes flying towards or even into Taiwan's airspace. With China cracking down on freedoms in Hong Kong, accused of sweeping repression against the Uighurs in Xinjiang, expanding in the South China Sea, and clashing with India in the Himalayas, Taiwan was next.
At a minimum, the PLA may repeat the military posturing of March 1996, and indeed it is difficult to imagine how a response of at least this intensity can be avoided under some circumstances. It is predictable, however, that the United States will respond by the deployment of military forces to some carefully calibrated locale, and that these manuevers alone will do little to resolve the present political crisis. To the extent that Taiwan's political challenge is viewed as being more substantial than that of 1995-96, a simple repetition of the firepower displays of that crisis could demonstrate a lack of credibility and resolve on the part of Beijing, and could be readily characterized as inadequate.
President Xi Jinping framed the matter in a high-profile speech in 2019: "We do not promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option to use all necessary measures." The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) held joint maritime and aerial exercises and combat-readiness patrols in the Taiwan Straits starting 18 September 2020. The mainland military spokespersons used three different expressions in describing the operations, namely real combat-oriented exercises, combat-readiness patrols and joint aerial and maritime drills, which showed the exercises this time are multidimensional. The real combat-oriented, joint aerial and maritime drills mean that the PLA is practicing in key areas of a real battle, while the combat-readiness patrols are operations aimed at preparing for combat anytime if anomalies occur on the island.
Some military observers said that by normalizing large-scale exercises, the PLA can assemble troops near Taiwan and launch a sudden attack during the exercises. But others said that while the PLA had that capability, it will likely not use this method, but rather give an ultimatum to the Taiwan secessionists before doing it. If the secessionists insist on their obduracy, then the PLA could turn the exercises into real actions and reunify the island. Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned 19 September 2020 that China was ramping up its military pressure and that the threat of a military intervention against Taiwan had "intensified". Wu said that after China's crackdown in Hong Kong, "Taiwan might be next". Wu pointed to recent military drills by China as evidence that Beijing was eager to fulfill the commitment of President Xi Jinping to "reunify" China by taking control of Taiwan. He said Taiwan was beefing up its military in order to respond to the threat and welcomed US moves to warn China against using military force. He also said that the potential for an accidental war with China was escalating. Wu hailed the recent visit by United States Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar to Taiwan – the highest-level visit on the island by a US official since 1979 – as a watershed moment.
Foreign Minister Wu hoped that the world will pay attention to the profound threat emanating from China. "The threat is very real and therefore Taiwan's preparation is also very serious... We are trying to deal with the military threat, day in and day out" he said 19 September 2020 "They are trying to export the authoritarian international order while democracies are following the rule-based international order," he said. "If China succeeds in taking Taiwan over — I think the rest of the world, especially for democracies, is going to feel the heat. China is expanding outward. Taiwan happens to be on the front line."
Chiu Kuo-cheng, Taiwan's Minister of Defense, said on 21 September 2023 that the recent movements by the PLA are "highly unusual," media reported. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly conducted a ground exercise on the mainland side of the Taiwan Straits on 24 September 2023, as the defense authority on the island of Taiwan became aware of the participation of long-range rockets, conventional missiles and amphibious troops in the PLA drills around the island in addition to previously detected aircraft and vessels. The intense PLA exercises over the past two weeks, which featured a record-breaking numbers of vessels and aircraft as well as new training methods that featured an aircraft carrier group, sends a stern warning to "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces and external interference forces, Chinese experts said.
Armed forces on the island of Taiwan detected PLA military drills at Dacheng Bay located in Dongshan Island in East China's Fujian Province featuring undisclosed numbers of aircraft, vessels and ground troops, the defense authority on the island said. Taiwan had been reporting daily PLA aircraft and vessel activities over the past few years, but only started reporting PLA ground activities on 21 September 2023, when it said for the first time that it had spotted the PLA Army's long-range rocket artilleries, Rocket Force missiles and ground activities around Dacheng Bay. Located in Dongshan Island in East China's Fujian Province, Dacheng Bay is a PLA amphibious landing training site that faces the island of Taiwan from the mainland side.
September 2023 saw the PLA break the record for the number of daily aircraft sorties and vessel activities around the island of Taiwan, as the island spotted 103 PLA warplanes on September 17 and 20 PLA warships on September 11. Also in mid-September, the Shandong aircraft carrier group held a five-day exercise in West Pacific waters to the east of the island, joined by another group of eight PLA warships. The latest drill likely featured new tactics or a new form of training, Chinese observers noted.
In December 2024, China executed its largest naval deployment around Taiwan in nearly 30 years, signaling a significant escalation in regional tensions. According to a Taiwanese national security memo reported by Nikkei Asia, more than 90 navy and coast guard vessels have been deployed by Beijing across the region. This area encompasses Taiwan, Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, and the Philippines, collectively referred to as the “first island chain.” The memo describes the operation as Beijing’s largest fleet mobilization in decades, noting that preparations took approximately 70 days. Analysts believe China is also testing the winter maneuverability of its maritime forces.
Earlier in 2024, China conducted two major military exercises near Taiwan and was expected to hold a third in response to Taiwanese Vice President Lai Cheng-te’s recent tour of Pacific allies, including the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and Palau, as well as Hawaii and Guam in the United States. Lai’s trip, which drew strong opposition from Beijing, followed a U.S. approval of arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese authorities labeled Lai a “separatist” and vowed “strong countermeasures” against perceived provocations.
China’s actions drew criticism from Taiwanese officials and lawmakers, who warn of the broader implications for regional security. Wang Ting-yu, a senior lawmaker and co-chairman of Taiwan’s defense committee, stated that Beijing is attempting to assert control over the first island chain, likening it to an “inland sea.” Wang highlighted that this moves targets not only Taiwan but also democratic nations such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, alongside U.S. allies including Australia and Canada. Wang emphasized the need for military cooperation and regional security alliances to counter China’s growing ambitions. “Taiwan must strengthen its capabilities and foster deeper collaboration with democratic nations to deter China’s aggression,” Wang said.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry echoed these concerns, stating: “The large-scale military build-up has introduced insecurity and risk to the region, undermining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. China is increasingly viewed as a destabilizing force.”
China maintained that its actions are a direct response to “separatist activities” and foreign interference. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning reiterated the country’s commitment to the one-China principle during a press briefing. Mao warned against crossing the “red line” of the Taiwan issue in Sino-U.S. relations, affirming that China will “resolutely defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Shows of Force
The Central Military Commission (CMC) has released an outline on improving joint combat capabilities of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), which is aimed at war preparedness given the intensifying situation and increasing risk of military conflicts in some regions - such as the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea and the China-Indian border, and more joint exercise between different forces will follow in accordance with the outline. The outline, which took effect on 07 November 2020, established basic concepts and rules, clarifies basic responsibilities, addresses fundamental questions such as how to fight future wars, and strengthen war preparedness. The outline was released to enhance the PLA's capacity to attack large islands and to fight a quick battle on the Taiwan island. The Taiwan Straits is a major region, for which PLA have to enhance joint combat capacity and get war preparedness. Air, navy, land, and rocket forces as well as strategic and logistic support forces will all be involved if military conflicts break out in the region.
Unconventional Warfare
Chinese attacks on critical infrastructure could unsettle Taiwan's economy without provoking American military involvement, and perhaps without even being directly attributable to the Chinese government. Although apparently coincidental, the island-wide blackout of late July 1999 is illustrative of such possibilities, and subsequently reported attacks on government computer systems may forshadow more ambitious attacks.
On 04 October 2004 Richard Lawless, Deputy Undersecretary of Defence, warned the US-Taiwan Business Council China is developing the means to electronically blockade Taiwan with attacks to the island's vital utilities, the Internet and other communications networks. He warned that China might first target things that keep Taiwan's high-tech society running if a war broke out between China and Taiwan. "China is actively developing options to create chaos on the island, to compromise components of Taiwan's critical infrastructure - telecommunications, utilities, broadcast media, cellular, Internet and computer networks," he saidl. Such a strategy could be called an "acupuncture" attack aimed at "the destruction of a national will" with "the insertion of a hundred needles."
It is rather difficult to envision effective modalities for American enhancements to Taiwan's physical or technical security to counter such infrastructure attacks beyond modest technical assistance efforts. Although the potentially unattributable character of infrastructure attacks would deny Beijing the pleasure of explicit mastery over Taiwan, the absence of attribution would not diminish the impact on Taiwan's economy nor would it diminish from the depiction of Taipei as lacking effective control over its nominal territory.
Peripheral Assaults
Taiwan occupies one island in the disputed Spratly chain, and the handful of small islands occupied by Taiwan near the mainland coast are far less heavily fortified than Quemoy and Matsu. Chinese seizure of these otherwise insiginificant specks of real estate could be accomplished with relative ease, and as with a partial naval blockade would concrete demonstrate Beijing's dispositive influence over territory claimed by Taipei. The United States is extremely unlikely to assist Taiwan in the recovery of the legally disputed Spratly, and would be only somewhat less unlikely to directly participate in the recovery by Taiwan of minor specks of territory in the Taiwan Strait.
Naval Blockade
The PLA Navy would face serious difficulties in coordinating an effective naval blockade enforced through the combined efforts of air, surface, and submarine forces. But the reaction by Taiwan and the international community to the PLA's March 1996 exercises and missile tests suggests that less comprehensive measures could substantially disrupt Taiwan's economic life, potentially creating pressure over time for a political settlement. Depending on the modalities of such an embargo, the United States might have difficulty in identifying politically appropriate or militarily effective means of countering Beijing's interdiction of international commerce with Taiwan. Mine-sweeping operations might not be sufficiently effective to restore the confidence of commercial shippers, and the US Navy might be loath to proactively sink Chinese submarines that were not immediately attacking friendly shipping. Consequently, a partially effective Chinese blockade of Taiwan would appear to be an attactive option for concretely demonstrating China's ultimate authority over Taiwan without prokoking an American military challenge to this assertion.
Food composes a very important part of Taiwanese culture. The variety is overwhelmingly abundant. Owing to the lack of natural resources and limited space, Taiwan is heavily reliant on importing a wide range of food and beverage products from different countries. Although the local food production industry is well-established, Taiwan is still heavily reliant on imports, with a self-sufficiency ratio of around 33 percent. Taiwan’s dependence on food and feed imports is expected to continue to grow due to its limited arable land and small agricultural sector. Taiwan imported US$4 billion of food and agricultural products (including edible fishery products) from the United States in 2018, representing 24% of Taiwan’s total agriculture import market. The United States also exports many high-valued consumer oriented agricultural products, including beef, poultry, fresh fruit and vegetables, dairy, tree nuts, processed foods, and beverages. Taiwan relies on imports of essential agricultural commodities for food and feed purposes.
A joint combat exercise might be conducted like this: when a hostile aircraft carrier wants to enter the South China Sea or the Taiwan Straits, to deny the ship from entering, the PLA Navy force sends submarines; the PLA Air Force sends surveillance and early warning aircraft and fighters to collect intelligence, fight for the control of the air and conduct long-range strikes, while the Rocket Force launches anti-aircraft carrier rockets such as DF-26 and DF-21D.
An estimated 4,500 tons of food and other supplies was needed daily to maintain the West Berlin industry and population of 2 million. Between 26 June 1948 and 30 September 1949, the Berlin Airlift delivered more than 2,300,000 tons of cargo. On 17 April 1949, this system delivered 13,000 tons of cargo. The Berlin Airlift relied on C-47s, each with a cargo capacity of 3 tons, and larger C-54s that could carry 10 tons apiece. Taiwan has a population of 23 million, and by Berlin Airlift standards might require 50,000 tons per day of cargo. The modern American C-5 transport has a capacity of about 100 tons [in round numbers, depending on range], so 500 daily sorties would be required of the current fleet of some 50 aircraft [which is missing a zero, buy this calculation]. The distance from Agana Airport, Guam to Taipei Airport is about 2,800 km, roughly an 8 hour flight. Staging from Guam, relief aircraft could probably plan on a single sortie per day. So in round numbers, some 500 heavy transport aircraft could be required. During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, the apex was marked at an in-active inventory of just under 17,000 widebodies, narrowbodies and regional jets, or about 64% of the global fleet, including an almost total collapse in scheduled passenger flight activity for the Airbus A380 and Boeing 747.
Air Operations
China's mildest option could be to send warplanes to fly over the Taiwan island. They could decide whether to fly at ultra-low altitudes across Taipei, based on the severity of the situation, to declare China's sovereignty. Hu Xijin, Editor in Chief at Global Times, wrote 06 December 2020 : " The so-called Taiwan military doesn't have the guts to open fire at the PLA. They are fully aware that if they open fire, it will mark the start of war. Our military will immediately inflict devastating blows on the Taiwan military airfield and other important military facilities.... Morale in Taiwan will quickly collapse."
The PLA began frequently conducting exercises and patrols near the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan media reported that PLA warplanes approached the island in 25 out of 31 days in October, and 26 out of 30 days in November. This continued in December, as PLA aircraft edged near the island in six days as of the seventh day of the month. PLA's exercises and patrols are no longer mere warnings to the Taiwan authorities, as warnings no longer seem to be enough. "The PLA should continue to conduct exercises and prepare to perfection for a possible future battle in the Taiwan Straits. If the day comes that military action is needed against the island, the PLA would be able to immediately turn the exercises into real operations and resolve the Taiwan question," Zhongping, a Chinese mainland military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times said.
Air operations could be conducted in concert with a naval blockade, amphibious operations, missile strikes against Taiwan-held islands, or missile strikes against Taiwan. Taipei's qualitative advantages would help offset the PLA's numerical superiority. But air operations could cause great damage that might eventually enable China to achieve air superiority, and could force Taipei into a political settlement on China's terms unless Taiwan were to receive external assistance. The United States would almost certainly be prepared to provide aircraft and ordnance to replace combat losses, though it is rather difficult to imagine modern counterparts to the "Flying Tigers." It is unclear how or whether American carrier-based aviation would be used to enforce a no-fly zone in the Taiwan Strait. Such enforcement would probably come towards the end of a military crisis to either administer a cease fire or revser the declining fortunes of Taiwan. American carrier aviation combat operations at the outset of a Chinese air campaign against Taiwan would appear unlikely under current US declaratory policy, although there could be substantial Congressional pressure for such a committment.
Full-scale Invasion
Three possible scenarios include: gradually chipping away at Taiwan's stability via military and hybrid means; a sudden, Crimea-style annexation of outlying islands; and finally a full-scale invasion. An invasion would involve enormous risks not just to Taiwan, but to the whole world. The US would face the dilemma of whether to intervene — potentially sparking a war between two superpowers.
A main force attack to "Liberate Taiwan" would be an extremely high risk undertaking with uncertain prospects for success. Invasion seemed to some to be unlikely, since the PLA cannot yet transport a credible invasion force to Taiwan. Amphibious forces are capable of transporting no more than a single division [15,000 troops], and military air transports could add possibly an additional divisions worth of troops. Taipei would have significant warning time if Beijing were to prepare for an invasion, and could mobilize significant reserves that would outnumber the invading force by a wide margin. Taiwan retains significant qualitative advantages against the numerically superior PLA in fighter aircraft, surface warships, air defenses, and many ground force capabilities.
According to computer simulations run and published by the Chinese mainland's Naval and Merchant Ships magazine in May 2020, as well as many other military analysts, the PLA could launch intensive waves of missile and rocket attacks that would neutralize most of Taiwan's air defense capabilities and airfields within five minutes after the operation starts, and PLA warplanes would then seize air superiority and sweep enemies, with PLA warships, including two aircraft carriers, also engaging in naval battles. General air and sea superiorities are expected to be gained in about two hours, with most stationary ground military facilities destroyed. Two PLA aircraft carriers would then group up to the east of the island and prepare to counter foreign intervention, and after 24 hours of continuous suppressive attacks, amphibious landing forces would start the landing operation that would eventually see the entire island under control, according to the simulations.
Main battle forces of the PLA are always ready to join combat, and Chinese observers noted that the September 2020 drills showed the US forces will not have time to come to Taiwan's aid, and the military on the island would not be able to stand up to the PLA's lightning quick, thundering powerful attacks, if a reunification-by-force operation is to occur.
Although it is unlikely that China would initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction in the context of a conventional invasion of Taiwan, it is possible that Taiwan would initiate the use of chemical weapons in respose to such an invasion in the event that a purely conventional military response appeared inadequate. In any event, if Beijing's amphibious assault did not spontaneously collapse, such an invasion would almost certainly provoke an American intervention sufficient to terminate hostilities on terms unfavorable to Beijing, unless Taiwan collapses before America can intervene.
Michael Morell, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and retired Admiral James Winnefeld warned in August 2020 that Chinese leader Xi Jinping will "bring Taiwan back into China" in mid-January 2021. In the article published by the private, non-profit U.S. Naval Institute Morell and Winnefeld paint a worst-case scenario for an operation that would unfold quickly, "beginning on the evening of 18 January," prior to the U.S. presidential inauguration. China would carry out cyberattacks to cripple the country by disabling the national power grid and other important utilities. This will be followed by a swift sea and air blockade, with several People's Liberation Army (PLA) submarines joining in the action. The the blockade will pave the way for the landing of PLA amphibious forces.
Meanwhile, China would send stern warnings not to intervene to the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other Taiwanese allies. On the second day, global stock markets will crash due to the turmoil. World leaders wouldd make statements condemning the attack, but bogged down by multiple issues, Washington will be unable to react. On the third day after the attack, Morell and Winnefeld believe it will be too late for Washington to reverse the damage. Xi would then whitewash the invasion by telling the world that the "Chinese Dream" has been fulfilled and "welcome the people of Taiwan home."
Former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou on 10 August 2020 said the U.S. will not come to Taiwan's aid in the case of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Ma stated that China’s strategy of striking Taiwan is to "let the first battle be the last," suggesting that the communist nation aims to launch a quick war so that Taiwan does not have time to wait for American military support. The president should prevent war from happening, Ma remarked, referring to President Tsai Ing-wen’s comment to foreign media that if Taiwan is attacked by China, Beijing will "pay a great price." She also said that after the nation endures the first wave of attacks, she hopes countries around the world will come to assist it. Ma said he was worried because the nation’s military is aware of China’s strategy. Once war has begun, it will be over in a very short period of time, he predicted, giving Taiwan no chance to wait for the U.S. military. The former two-term president added that in fact, there is no way the U.S. would even come to the rescue in such a situation. Ma stated: "Whoever is president should not tell our compatriots how many days [the nation] can last in a war but rather tell our compatriots that he or she can prevent war from happening."
Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the Global Times, wrote on 26 October 2021 "The Tsai Ing-wen authority has said that the island will defend itself "to the very last day" if the Chinese mainland attacks. Most people know they are bluffing.... Taiwan only has 180,000 troops of active forces. Most of these are "strawberry soldiers", which is a term used to describe delicate or spoiled youths who cannot withstand the pressures of being in the military.... If the Taiwan question escalates so that it can only be solved through military means, the sudden surrender of Taiwan authorities who dare not fight is within everyone's expectation. "
Nuclear Attack on Taiwan
China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.
Publicly available PRC writings describe different operational concepts for amphibious invasion. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would be to break through or circumvent shore defenses, establish and build a beachhead, transport personnel and materiel to designated landing sites.
Amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. To achieve the final objective of the Joint Island Landing Campaign, a series of sub-campaigns, such as electronic warfare, naval, and air campaigns – including the underlying logistics and mobilization – must be executed.
An amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the Joint Island Landing Campaign could tax the capabilities of China’s armed forces and almost certainly invite international intervention. Add to these strains the combat attrition of China’s forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency – assuming a successful landing and breakout – and an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk for China’s leaders.
Conclusion
The absence of overt actions on the part of either China or Taiwan does not indicate a resolution of the problem. The crisis in 1995-96 unfolded from July of 1995 through March of 1996, and a similar timeframe may be expected for a future crisis. Both capitals, however, face strong incentives to modulate events and American attitudes in their favor, and both capitals could probably withstand a considerable escalation of the confrontation before natural risk aversion came to dominate decision-making.
China's military posturing during 1995 and 1996 indicates that any use of force by China, whether demonstrative or in combat, will provoke domestic and regional demands for an appropriate American response. The United States "One-China" policy is based on dialogue between the two sides and a peaceful resolution of any differences between China and Taiwan. The long-standing position of the United States is that any effort to resolve the issue of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would be considered "of grave concern" to the United States. The American deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait area in March 1996 set a precedent that is impossible to ignore. The United States faces extremely difficult choices in becoming more directly involved in a Taiwan-China conflict, and must carefully select the appropriate mix of military and political means. Although a direct force-on-force confrontation is unlikely, a reinforced American military presence directly adjacent to an escalating conflict in the Taiwan Strait would provide uncomfortable opportunities for accident or miscalculation to widen the confrontation.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
