China - Taiwan Military Balance
With the end of the Cold War both China and Taiwan embarked upon far-reaching upgrades to their naval and air forces. China returned to Mosow for assistance denied since the Sino-Soviet rift of the Khruschev era, while Taiwan turned to France and America. Although this fact seems largely un-noticed, Taiwan's military buildup has succeeded and is now largely complete, while China's significant modernization effort, despite early setbacks, is ongoing though years away from completion. The present military balance across the Taiwan Strait is somewhat more favorable for Taiwan, though Taiwan's relative strength will inexorably decline over the next decade as China's modernization effort continues.
Both China and Taiwan have rid themselves of elderly aircraft, and acquired more modern units. The total number of Chinese fighter aircraft has decreased by half over the past four years, from about 2,500 to about 1,300, as the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has sought to supplement its numerical superiority with more modern aircraft. Force improvements have been limited almost exclusively to the addition of first-rate Su-27s purchased from Russia, with the remaining inventory consisting of obsolete designs which dated from the 1960s. Similarly, Taiwan's fighter force has decreased somewhat since 2000 (following a significant increase in aircraft since 1995), with the bulk of the force consisting of over 300 modern first-class aircraft. While Taiwan enjoys a qualitative superiority with the deliveries of F-16s, Mirage 2000-5, and the Ching-Kuo, the ROC Air Force advantage will erode over the next decade as Chinese modernization plans are eventually fullfilled.
Both China and Taiwan have rid themselves of elderly ships and acquired more modern major surface combatants. Ambitious Chinese plans to acquire at least a pair of Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers and to construct a number of other modern ships, have been realized. These ships, added to the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) Luhai, Luhu, and Jiangwei classes, approach world standards for modern major surface combatants, and significantly improve the PLAN's operational capabilities. In contrast, the Taiwan's Navy has recently completed the acquisition of a total of 22 Perry, Knox and La Fayette class frigates equiped with modern shipboard combat systems. Taiwan's acquisition of 4 Kidd class destroyers will not be completed until around 2006 and its efforts to build a modern AEGIS capable destroyer will not be realized until the end of the decade.
According to estimates, the forces available to the PLA for the invasion of Taiwan include about 50,000 troops of the 31st Group Army deployed in Nanjing Military Region. The PLA could reshuffle in a short period some of the "Rapid Reaction Forces" of other military regions, which along with strategic reserves would bring perhaps another 250,000 troops to the area, according to estimates of the Taiwan Ministry of Defense. Naval forces, including submarines and motorized fishing vessels, could establish a sea blockade. Naval units could lay mines over the peripheral waters of Taiwan proper and the offshore islands, while concentrating amphibious landing craft transporting one reinforced division to conduct a regular landing operation. Or motorized fishing vessels could carry up to 350,000 light infantry to undertake an irregular landing operation. At the 13 military-civilian airports within 250 NM from the Taiwan proper, the PRC's Air Force could station up to 1,200 combat aircraft and maneuver five dozen air transports to carry one airborne division for an operational mission. The DF-15 (M-9) and DF-21 could directly attack key political, economical, and military targets.
The military balance is of course more complex than can be depicted by considering only a few indicators. There are certainly areas, such as anti-shipping cruise missiles, in which China fields a formidable force. Taiwan has not been entirely successful in bringing its new hardware up to combat full readiness, and such defficiencies surely compromise other evident advantages in command and control.
