Operation Joint Guardian
Kosovo Force (KFOR)
The UN Security Council 10 June 1999 adopted a detailed resolution outlining the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paving the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation will enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees.
The force has a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA, something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deploy, the rationale for the Kosovar Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international community and could serve police functions.
NATO did not contemplating partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible fix was a de facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol the south.
Before Allied Force began NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people would have been Americans. As of mid-May 1999 NATO reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR [Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia training for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arriving as of mid-May.
The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic functions going not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the humanitarian relief organisations that in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up to establish themselves so once the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo.
The military force had several primary tasks. The first one was to make sure that the routes of entry were safe. That meant demining, taking out booby traps, taking explosive charges away from bridges. This was done by NATO troops, with some help from Serbs, who had maps of where the mines are. As the troops came in, they first established their own outposts, their headquarters, and decided where they were going to set up their camps. They then set up their protective arrangements and began to build their own infrastructure.
Early on there was, through non-government organizations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, some accounting done of the internally displaced people, their health, how hungry they are, their general status. In addition, NATO began working with NGOs and other groups to begin to rebuild crucial infrastructure -- first the bridges and the roads and the transportation facilities needed to get people back. Then shelters where they can stay when they get back.
NATO worked with people in the refugee camps to stress that a certain amount of security has to be established before it's safe for them to go back, and there had to be a certain amount of work done on demining to make sure they could go back safely. So there was some reasonable, but relatively short, delay before people start returning in order to make sure that the area is secure and stable for them to go back to. This corresponded with many of the desires being expressed by refugees themselves, that they wanted to make sure that Kosovo is stable and secure before they returned home.
Operation Joint Guardian will include forces from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.
- UK: 12,000 troops, including the commander of the international force, who set up a headquarters in Pristina, and the major part of the British contingent is based in this area.
- GERMANY: 8,500 troops deployed in the southwest part of Kosovo with the HQ in Prizren. This was the first time after WW II that so many German troops are being deployed somewhere.
- FRANCE: 7,000 troops were stationed in the western sector with the HQ in Kosovska Mitrovica. The French troops were reinforced with a contingent of 1,200 troops from the United Arab Emirates.
- ITALY: 2,000 troops in the west part of Kosovo with the HQ in Pec.
- RUSSIA: Russia announced that it was preparing up to 10,000 troops to be deployed in the northern part of Kosovo, alongside the French troops, though in fact a much smaller number actually deployed.
- USA - The United States agreed to provide a force of approximately 7,000 U.S. personnel as part of the NATO KFOR to help maintain a capable military force in Kosovo and to ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees. The US supports KFOR by providing the headquarters and troops for one of the four NATO sectors. The US also provides personnel, units and equipment to other components of the KFOR organization. The majority of US forces are in southeast Kosovo. The sector headquarters is at Gnjilane. Approximately 4,000 US troops were part of the initial force. This included the 1,900 Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 1,700 Army troops from Task Force Hawk and 200 soldiers from Germany to set up a headquarters for US forces. Ultimately, there were approximately 7,000 US troops from Germany as a more permanent force.
By late 1999 KFOR had reached its full strength of 50,000 men and women. Nearly 42,500 troops from 28 countries are deployed in Kosovo and another 7,500 provide rear support through contingents based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Albania, and in Greece. KFOR contingents are grouped into five multinational brigades. Although brigades are responsible for a specific area of operations, they all fall under a single chain of command under the authority of Commander KFOR. This means that all national contingents pursue the same objective, which is to maintain a secure environment in Kosovo. Approximately one-half of KFOR's total available personnel is directly committed to protection tasks, including protection of the ethnic minorities.
In Kosovo, the US forces are assigned to a sector principally centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo. The forces within MNB(E) are referred to as Task Force Falcon, and were built around the First Infantry Division's Assault Command Post and 2nd Brigade. The 13th Tactical Group (Russian), 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Greek), 18th Air Assault Battalion (Polish), the 14th Squadron Helicopter Detachment and the 37th Support Company (Ukrainian), a composite platoon from Lithuania, and a composite battalion from the United Arab Emirates complete the Brigade's operational forces. There are 5,500 U.S. service members throughout MNB East, as well as 830 Russian, 559 Polish, 429 Greek, 240 Ukrainian, 30 Lithuanian, and 115 soldiers from the United Arab Emirates.
Keeping the peace in Multinational Brigade East (MNB(E)) is a complex endeavor that encompasses a wide variety of missions, often as diverse as the region's geographic and demographic features. The brigade's soldiers patrol through both cities and hamlets scattered across approximately 2000 square kilometers. The geography within MNB(E) is quite dramatic, encompassing both mountains and open plain. The variations in ethnicity can be equally dramatic. While a few towns are comprised exclusively of one ethnic group, some communities can include up to five different groups. One of the best examples of this would be Gnjilane, a town of nearly 70,000 people that is represented by Albanians, Serbs, Romas, and Turks. This wide variation in both the people and the land provides new challenges for soldiers every day.
As of mid-2000 the US contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 7,500 US military personnel. This number once again will decrease to approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel when ongoing troop rotations are completed. In addition, other US military personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and logistics support roles for the U.S. forces in KFOR. Specifically, approximately 1,000 US military personnel are operating in support of KFOR in Macedonia, Greece, and Albania.
KFOR Contributions |
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As of 11 June 1999:
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Task Force Falcon was formed Feb. 5, 1999, when the 1st Infantry Division(ID) was notified of a possible deployment to conduct peace support operations in Kosovo. The task force, after conducting a command post exercise and a mission rehearsal exercise during February and March, was declared mission-ready and deployed a command and control element forward to Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. Following the signing of the Military Technical Agreement(MTA) on June 9, 1999, Task Force Falcon deployed forces from Central Region in the largest combined air-rail-sea-road movement since Operation Desert Storm. Task Force Falcon advance elements entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999, as part of Operation Joint Guardian, a NATO-led peacekeeping force. The Task Force Falcon headquarters was operational at the future Camp Bondsteel on June 16, 1999.
Forces from the U.S. and Greece composed the Initial Entry Force(IEF), with the headquarters built around the assault command post from the 1st ID and the Big Red One's Schweinfurt-based 2nd ("Dagger") Brigade Combat Team(2nd BCT). Operating under the command and control of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil and the Operational Control of KFOR, the IEF consisted of forces from the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Bragg, N.C; the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejune, N.C.; the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment from Schweinfurt Germany, Echo Troop, 4th Cavalry Regiment, also from Schweinfurt, Germany; and the 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion from Greece. Task Force 12, built around the 12thAviation Group from Wiesbaden, Germany, and the 16th Corps Support Group from Hanau, Germany supported operations from Camp Able Sentry.
As the VJ/MUP forces redeployed out of Kosovo in accordance with the MTA, Task Force Falcon soldiers, airmen and marines monitored their withdrawal and ensured compliance with the agreement. Withdrawal was complete on June 20, and the focus of operations shifted to enforce the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of the UCK, which was signed on June, 21. Additional forces arrived from Central Region, principal elements of the BRO's 2nd BCT from Schweinfurt, Germany, including the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, the 9th Engineer Battalion, and the 299th Forward Support Battalion. Other major units were the 94th Engineer Battalion from Vilseck, Germany and the 18th Air Assault Battalion from Poland. On July 10, the 1st Bn, 26th Inf. Regt. conducted a relief in place to allow the 26th MEU to re-deploy. Throughout the next week, both the 1st Bn., 77th Armor and the 18th Air Assault Battalion relieved the 2nd Bn., 505th Parachute Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector. The 13th Russian Tactical Group relieved the 1 Bn., 26th Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector on July 28 and the 2nd Bn., 1st Avn. from Katterbach, Germany, relieved Task Force 12 on Aug. 2.
In September 1999, 2nd Bn. 505th Parachute Inf. Regt., re-deployed to the U.S. and was replaced by a sister battalion, the 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. Recognizing a need in October to increase the available combat power in the vicinity of Gnjilane, the leadership of Task Force Falcon reorganized the battalion task force sectors in the MNB(E) area of responsibility. The 501st Mechanized Greek Battalion assumed a larger portion of the Urosevac Opstina, which enabled 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. to enlarge their sector to include the Vitina Opstina. Task Force 1st Bn.-77th Armor then conducted a relief in place with Task Force 1st Bn. 26th Infantry and assumed responsibility for the Opstina of Novo Brdo and the northern half of the Gnjilane Opstina. This enabled Task Force 1st Bn. 26th Inf. to concentrate their force in the southern half of the Opstina.
Following months of deliberate planning and detailed rehearsals, KFOR 1B built around the 3rd BCT from the 1st Inf. Div., conducted relief in place operations and assumed responsibility for the MNB(E) area of responsibility on December 12. The transition saw Task Force 1 Bn., 63rd, Armor replace Task Force 1st Bn., 77th, Armor and Task Force 2nd Bn., 2nd Infantry fell in on what was Task Force 1st Bn., 26th Infantry's sector in southern Gnjilane. During this same period, Task Force 1st Bn., 1st Aviation relieved Task Force 2nd Bn., 1st Aviation, 1st Bn. 6th , Field Artillery Battalion replaced 1 Bn. 7th FA, and the 201st FSB replaced the 299th FSB. Also on Dec. 12, as part of the transfer of authority ceremony, Brig. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of MNB(E) from Brig. Gen. Craig Peterson. Today, Task Force Falcon continues to conduct Peace Operations in Kosovo in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 under the Operational Control of the NATO-led KFOR, to ensure a safe and secure environment is maintained to enable the establishment of a stable society. The Falcon, a well-trained and equipped multinational force of allies, remains ever vigilant and ready to act with all means available to successfully carry out its peacekeeping mission.
In July 2000, command of MNB(E) was transferred to Brig. Gen. Dennis Hardy who finished his rotation on Dec. 15, 2000. Task Force Falcon is currently the responsibility of the 1st Armored Division under the command of Brig. Gen. Kenneth Quinlan.
Task Force Falcon is in Kosovo to enforce all aspects of the Military Technical Agreement, with a primary function of providing a safe and secure environment to the residents.
No timeline for Operation Joint Guardian has been established. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed.
The U.S. is committed to supporting peace in Kosovo by implementing the Military Technical Agreement and participating in the NATO-led military force. NATO's aim is to achieve a secure environment to ensure peace and stability in Kosovo without the presence of a NATO-led military force.
On July 28, 2003 elements of the 1st Infantry Division handed over KFOR duties to the 28th Infantry Division.
Multi-National Brigade (East) [MNB (East)] is part of the NATO led KFOR and is comprised of soldiers from the United States, Greece, Armenia, Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania. The mission of KFOR and MNB (East) is to provide a safe and secure environment in the region.
In a ceremony held 26 February 2004, Brig. Gen. Jerry Beck and the 28th Infantry Division officially handed over authority of Multi-national Brigade (East) to Brig. Gen. Rick Erlandson and the 34th Infantry Division. After serving in a six-month rotation that began in July, Beck and the 28th ID left Kosovo for the state of Pennsylvania where it is headquartered.
The UN-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR) continued to carry out its mandate to maintain a safe and secure environment and defend against external threats. UNMIK Civilian Police continued to transfer basic police authority and functions to the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), comprised largely of demilitarized former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, continued to develop its capacity as a civilian civil emergency response agency. UNMIK international civilian authorities and KFOR leadership generally maintained effective control over security forces; however, there were reports that elements of the security forces acted independently of their respective authority.
The reported phenomenon of "strategic sales" of property persisted in 2004. There was evidence that Kosovo Albanians in several ethnically mixed areas used violence, intimidation, and offers to purchase property at inflated prices in order to break up and erode Kosovo Serb neighborhoods. Some cases of violence against Serbs may have been attempts to force persons to sell their property. An UNMIK regulation prevents the wholesale buy out of Kosovo Serb communities and seeks to prevent the intimidation of minority property owners in certain geographic areas; however, it was rarely enforced.
The 16 March 2004 drowning of three Kosovo Albanian children from Cabra village in Zubin Potok Municipality ignited the March riots; the surviving child claimed Kosovo Serbs had chased them into the Ibar River with a dog. The media, prior to police and judicial investigations, reported this story. In addition, the drive-by shooting on March 15 of a 19 year old Kosovo Serb male in the Serb village of Caglavica in the Pristina region caused local Serbs to block the main Pristina Skopje highway.
On 16 March 2004, approximately 18,000 Albanians attended prescheduled demonstrations against the arrests of ex KLA members by UNMIK Police. On March 17, demonstrations by Albanians started in Mitrovica to protest the drownings and in Pristina against the Serb roadblocks in Caglavica and Gracanica. Unrest soon spread to other parts of Kosovo and became increasingly violent.
Violence errupted on 17 March 2004 in an attack on an observation post at the Serbian Church of Saint Uros in Ferizaj/Urosevac by a crowd of approximately 500 rioters. One US Soldier and 17 Greek soldiers received minor injuries from items the crowd was throwing. The crowd began attacking the observation post with rocks and bricks. Then the crowd began attacking the Greek soldiers with grenades and improvised incendiary devices. The crowd began setting fire to the first of three unoccupied military vehicles while the soldiers waited for the Greek Army’s Quick Reaction Force that had been called to assist the soldiers. Then the rioters attempted to enter the church and stopped when they were confronted by the soldiers inside, but continued to attack the church with grenades and incendiary devices. The soldiers fired their weapons in the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd, which had grown to approximately 1,000 to 3,000 people, and was still underway when the QRF arrived in armored vehicles to evacuate the soldiers at approximately 10 p.m. The rioters began throwing incendiary devices at the QRF vehicles and were not dispelled until U.S. helicopters began dropping tear gas on the crowd, dispersing them enough for the evacuation to take place. During the evacuation, rioters fired at the soldiers and their vehicles. Once the evacuation was complete U.S. military police and members of the Kosovo Police Service arrived to secure the church site. The crowd, reduced to about 150 people, did not continue the attack. By the end of the night an estimated 200 incendiary devices, 15 grenades, and numerous rocks were thrown at the soldiers and the church during the attack, resulting in the destruction of three military vehicles and damage to two others.
It appeared that there was a pattern to destroy Serb property and to expel the Serb population from enclaves in southern Kosovo. As a result of the riots, 20 persons were killed, including 8 Kosovo Serbs and 12 Kosovo Albanians, more than 900 were injured, more than 900 Serb, Romani, and Ashkali houses and 30 orthodox churches or monasteries were burned or severely damaged, and over 4,000 Serbs, Ashkalis, and Roma were made homeless.
The March 2004 riots involved an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 demonstrators over 2 days in every major city in Kosovo. Numerous serious attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries occurred during the March riots, resulting in extensive property damage, including the destruction or damage of 30 Orthodox religious sites and over 900 houses and businesses of ethnic minorities. The March riots resulted in the 20 deaths including of 8 ethnic Serbs and 12 ethnic Albanians.
The March riots, which targeted Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, were the most serious outburst of violence and destruction since the 1999 conflict. During the March riots, the Ashkali neighborhood in Vushtrri/Vucitrn was burned and looted, and its inhabitants took shelter at a KFOR base. Many refused to return by year's end. Many of those displaced in March, including Ashkali residents and Serbs, were displaced and had their homes burned for the second time. Increased violence, particularly during the March riots, may have been politically motivated and to some extent coordinated by ethnic Albanian extremists. Some Kosovo government leaders were slow to condemn the violence, exacerbating the problem and helping to legitimize the severe social abuse of minorities.
KFOR and UNMIK police were responsible for killing several protesters during riots in March 2004 after the protestors failed to heed prior warnings and threatened the international security officials or those they were protecting.
During the March riots, measures taken by KFOR and UNMIK police to protect themselves and others as well as to control the crowds resulted in several deaths of Albanian protesters and some allegations of police abuse. For example, an UNMIK police officer shot and killed a protester in Peja/Pec municipality while defending Serbian residents from Kosovar Albanian rioters. No legal charges were brought against KFOR soldiers or UNMIK police related to their actions during the March riots.
Kosovo Serbs, and to a lesser extent other minority communities, had considerable difficulty moving about safely without an international security escort. Following the March riots, KFOR and UNMIK police restricted movement in most of the affected areas and selectively imposed temporary curfews. Kosovo Serbs were frequently subjected to stonings and other low-level violence by Kosovo Albanians.
After public order was restored, police and KFOR commenced large-scale operations to apprehend those responsible for the riots. By June, over 270 persons had been arrested on a wide range of charges related to the riots, including murder, attempted murder, arson, and looting.
NATO’s Kosovo Force continues to provide critical security to this region in support of the United Nations’ Interim Administration in Kosovo. As of early 2005 Task Force Falcon had approximately 1900 soldiers from both the active and reserve components deployed as part of Multi-National Brigade - East to enforce the “Military Technical Agreement” and to conduct operations to further deter hostilities and promote a stable environment. NATO’s troop strength was reduced to 17,730 in 2004 with US forces contributing nearly 12 percent (2,010) of the personnel. Commanders don't expect NATO troops to leave the province by the original departure date of 2006.
Life in the Multi-National Brigade (East) sector of Kosovo reflects how much progress has been made in maintaining a safe and secure environment. While the mission always comes first, there are opportunities for off-duty soldiers to study, work out or just relax on the base camps. The only time soldiers are outside of the base camps, though, is when they are on missions. The variety of missions that KFOR performs is amazing. From patrolling city streets to assessing the needs of remote villages and everything in between, KFOR soldiers can be found throughout the sector.
Peacekeeping is a 24x7 mission, but there are opportunities for time off. The current pass policy states that after 30 days in theater soldiers are eligible, with their commander’s permission, for a 4-day pass to Sofia, Bulgaria. While in Sofia, soldiers are allowed to consume alcohol (in moderation) and engage in sight-seeing.
Kosovo is administered by the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK promulgates regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals, and ratifies laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government in Kosovo (the Constitutional Framework), which defined the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Kosovo has a multiparty political system with four dominant ethnic Albanian parties and several minority parties and coalitions. In October 2004, Kosovo Assembly elections were held that were determined to be generally free and fair.
In 2005 the United States presented three principles on which a solution for Kosovo would be based - no divisions, no unifications with neighboring countries, and no return to the status quo. Talks on Kosovo's final status will be launched in September 2005 and will last less than a year. Kosovo will become independent in July 2006, according to Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi.
