Military

In this Chapter:

• Summary of Events
• Army Attack Aviation
• The Battle of An Najaf: 25-28 March 2003
• Securing the Lines of Communication
• 173rd Airborne Operations
• Footnotes

The chapter title is borrowed from Xenophon's account of the ill-fated campaign of Cyrus I of Persia. Following Cyrus' defeat and death in 401 BCE, Xenophon successfully led a Greek contingent of the Persian army as it fought its way out of Mesopotamia marching up- country home to Greece. Xenophon's narrative is a classic on the difficulty of campaigning in Mesopotamia, or what we now know as Iraq.

Although hampered by severe sandstorms, coalition aircraft continued to attack air defense, command and control, and intelligence facilities in the Baghdad area. Coalition aircraft continued to achieve high sortie rates despite the weather. The focus of strike missions began to shift to the Republican Guard divisions in the vicinity of Baghdad. Control of the air allowed the employment of slow-moving intelligence-gathering aircraft such as the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the RC-135 Rivet Joint, which gathers signals intelligence and UAVs. In the days just prior to the sandstorms, the air component flew an average of 800 strike sorties daily. The majority of the effort was against discrete targets designed to achieve specific effects against the regime, to interdict enemy movement, or in close support of ground forces.² Even during the sandstorms, surveillance aircraft continued to provide data that enabled the coalition to target Iraqi units over an area of several hundred square miles during weather the Iraqis thought would shield them from air attack. On 28 March, the weather cleared, allowing coalition forces to increase the number of strikes on Baghdad and Republican Guard units. Coalition air forces operated against strategic, operational, and tactical targets, demonstrating both the efficacy and flexibility of air power.

Coalition maritime forces continued their efforts to expand the width of the cleared channel in Khor Abdullah. The channel was opened with about a 60-yard-wide pathway up to Umm Qasr. During operations to widen the cleared pathway to 200 yards, coalition forces identified "bottom-influence" mines. The Iraqis clearly had thought through denying the use of Umm Qasr to the coalition.³

Lieutenant General McKiernan and the CFLCC staff had reason to breathe a bit more easily in the days after V Corps and I MEF breached the berm. Both the corps and the MEF had moved out rapidly. SOF operations to seize the Gulf oil platforms and to generate threats against the regime from 360 degrees were under way and apparently with good effect. CFLCC's theater reception system seemed able to keep pace. In some ways, CFLCC now had to await events as its major formations undertook operations in Basra and in oil fields and began the march up-country. At An Nasiriyah, I MEF encountered and defeated an enemy attack in the sharpest engagement of the war thus far. The 3rd Commando Brigade of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division launched an offensive near Basra that secured Abu al Khasib. British forces continued aggressive patrols and engaged in sharp firefights with paramilitaries in the Al Faw and Basra areas. The Brits prevented any reinforcement of Basra while maintaining the security of the southern oil fields and the port of Umm Qasr.

V Corps had breached the border and secured its initial objectives. Now Lieutenant General Wallace directed several parallel actions to bring the corps forward to where it could threaten Baghdad proper. So far, the attack was "on plan," with the possible exception of the congestion along the restrictive LOCs as the corps uncoiled into Iraq. Casualties were minimal and the first fight, against the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division, had gone very well.

With the initial objectives secure, shifting the combat power north was necessary to prepare for the attack on Baghdad. It involved three distinct actions: moving the actual fighting forces--the 3rd Infantry Division, elements of the 101st Airborne Division, and the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment (AHR)--north; moving the logistics base north; and securing the vital LOCs. These related actions needed to be completed before the corps could engage in heavy fighting anticipated in and around Baghdad. March up-country sequence of events

Click here for higher resolution image (105 KB)
Figure 74. March up-country sequence of events

Lieutenant General Wallace and the corps planners knew that, after the 400-km assault north, it would be necessary to refuel, rearm, and refit the 3rd ID before it continued north.⁴ Accordingly, the corps planned to seize Objective RAMS, west-southwest of An Najaf and roughly two-thirds of the way between the border and the Karbala Gap. At RAMS 3rd ID and other corps units could refit to continue the attack while continuing to shape the enemy with deep fires. Establishing the logistics foundation became the proverbial "long pole in the tent" and drove the operations to seize RAMS, secure the LOCS, and neutralize the threats in As Samawah, An Najaf, and the surrounding areas.

The corps originally planned to move north along improved roads, bypassing the dangerous urban areas along the way. The 3rd ID would punctuate this maneuver with several feints across the Euphrates River to present the picture of a main effort east of the river. Following the combat troops, the corps logistics units would move forward to establish an LSA near Objective RAMS to sustain the upcoming phases of the operation. Moving north also enabled Wallace to bring his hard-hitting attack aviation forces, the 11th AHR and 101st Division's Aviation Brigade, into the fight, taking the first swipes at the Medina Division. These attacks would degrade the Medina and preclude any moves south to interrupt the corps' advance. Finally, they would thin the defense of Karbala Gap, supporting the 3rd ID's eventual attack.

Positioning 101st Airborne Division attack helicopters within striking distance of the Medina required the establishment of a series of intermediate fueling stops, or "lily pads." The division plan called for the ground emplacement of rapid refuel point (RRP) EXXON, approximately 150 km north of Camp UDARI, Kuwait, into a remote area of the Iraqi desert where the terrain offered reasonable access for 5,000-gallon fuel tankers. The second stop would be the bed-down location at a forward arming and refuel point (FARP) SHELL, just south of RAMS. V Corps and I MEF maneuver to Baghdad

Click here for higher resolution image (349 KB)
Figure 75. V Corps and I MEF maneuver to Baghdad

The 101st had to integrate its FARP personnel and equipment into 3rd ID's early convoys if they were to reach EXXON and SHELL in time to set up. 101st CSS units to support rearm- refuel points crossed the berm on 22 March. The mission of building and securing the refuel points fell to the 101st's 3rd BCT. Fresh from a nearly eight-month deployment to Afghanistan, followed by a training rotation at the JRTC, 3rd BCT built the aviation support facilities with FARP assets detached from the two aviation brigades. These lily pads supported not only the 101st's movement north, but eventually supported almost all aviation traffic transiting Iraq on the left bank of the Euphrates.

However, as in any battle, the enemy had a vote, and their tactics and their will to fight proved different than expected. For example, 3-7 CAV, which led the way for the 3rd ID, anticipated a relatively simple move north along the Euphrates River. Instead it became involved in a 100-km running fight against persistent, if generally ineffective ambushes. The 2nd BCT's attack to seize Objective RAMS also proved more difficult than expected. After seizing RAMS, the soldiers spent the next several days fending off waves of counterattacking Iraqi paramilitary forces coming out of An Najaf. Just as the enemy had to be prevented from exiting towns farther south, so too would An Najaf have to be isolated to ensure the troops working in the LSA and units moving on the LOC could do so unmolested. Isolating An Najaf developed into one of the hardest-fought actions in the campaign, eventually absorbing two BCTs and the division cavalry. In the end the 3rd ID handed An Najaf off to the 101st Airborne Division. Elsewhere, the ambush of the 507th Maintenance Company demonstrated the danger on the ever-lengthening LOCs.

While fighting continued along the corps' axis of advance, the CFLCC continued to build the logistics and sustainment base necessary to support extended combat operations in and around Baghdad. While perhaps not as exciting as the combat operations, these actions were among the most complex and critical to ensuring the campaign's overall success. The fighting in An Nasiriyah and As Samawah demonstrated the risk paramilitary forces posed to the LOCs. With 1st Armored Division unavailable to secure the LOCs as planned, McKiernan and Wallace had to find a way to secure the LOCs. Ultimately, McKiernan released the 82nd Airborne to V Corps and Wallace committed it, along with the 101st, to clean up the enemy forces that threatened to interdict the LOCs.

The march up-country included a series of combat and support operations to set the tactical and logistic conditions necessary to secure the corps' rear area and isolate Baghdad. Adding to the complexity and risk, the region suffered through a sandstorm of biblical proportions. The four major events described in detail are: ⁵

• The use of Army attack aviation in deep attacks
• The battle to isolate An Najaf
• The operations to secure the LOCs
• The airborne insertion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq

These were, by no means, all of the operations that occurred during the march up-country. The coalition executed a series of parallel, sequential, and simultaneous operations across the theater designed to increase the pressure on the Iraqis while moving the sustainment base forward.

Following Turkey's refusal to allow US combat forces to stage an invasion from its territory, CENTCOM and CFLCC determined to use the 4th Infantry Division in the south. Once on the ground, the "Ivy Division" assumed a "follow-and-support" mission, coming up from Kuwait behind the 3rd ID and 101st Airborne Division, ultimately securing part of northern Iraq. While the original plan was not executed, the extended threat of 4th ID attacking through Turkey may have fixed Iraqi conventional forces in the north, preventing them from repositioning south against V Corps and the MEF.

Without the 4th ID operating from Turkey, the coalition instead employed a powerful combination of SOF, Kurdish forces, and conventional US forces in northern Iraq. This included the first US airborne operations mounted from the European theater since World War II and 173rd Airborne Brigade's first combat operation since the Vietnam War. These forces continued to fix the Iraqi forces well north. SOF units worked aggressively in the west and north to interdict any theater ballistic missile capabilities, isolate Iraq from neighboring Syria, and destroy strategic targets throughout Iraq.

In addition to ground attacks from the south, CFLCC kept pressure on Baghdad and Saddam's regime directly by keeping the 2nd BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division, the theater reserve, available to employ deep in Iraq--specifically Baghdad. The 82nd could jump or fly into Baghdad to restore order and demonstrate a coalition presence if Saddam's government fled or imploded. In the meantime its presence in the theater gave Saddam another problem to contemplate.

Finally, as 3rd ID marched north, operations continued in the areas it passed through. The coalition's strategic goal was to establish a free, democratic, and prosperous Iraq, and this work started in earnest as soon as combat was over in the towns to the south. In what Lieutenant General McKiernan described as a "rolling phase IV transition," Army forces began stability operations and support operations in towns and cities from the Kuwaiti border all the way up to the frontline forces. Spearheaded by SOF, the coalition began linking up with local leaders and started the hard work of reestablishing basic public services and some degree of local governance.

Logistics -- Setting the Conditions to Win

At this point in the advance to Baghdad, V Corps and I MEF had nearly reached the end of their organic logistics tether. To continue beyond the range of onboard stores, V Corps and I MEF would require the entire theater's focused logistics efforts. The cliché that amateurs study tactics, while professionals study logistics proved to be quite true. Here is where the true "graduate-level" work of the campaign's design and execution paid off--after the initial push into Iraq.

There are certain hard facts that apply to even the most modern and best-equipped armies. Soldiers must eat, drink, and sleep. Tanks, Bradleys, and other vehicles require fuel and at least some maintenance or they will grind to a halt. For modern armies, fuel is perhaps the greatest single supply burden. For example, OIF planners estimated a daily fuel requirement approaching 2 million gallons through about day 14, when they expected the total requirement to exceed that amount. An armored move of this scale and scope placed an almost overwhelming logistics burden on theater and corps logistics units supporting V Corps and the MEF.

Wallace had believed in the months leading to OIF that the corps would need to slow or even pause somewhere "just to the west side of An Najaf" to "build our logistics power to continue to project our combat power."⁶ No stranger to the desert or to fighting a resourceful enemy in difficult terrain, Wallace did not just happen upon this conclusion. As a Vietnam veteran and an experienced cavalryman, including regimental command and six years at the NTC in California's Mojave Desert as a trainer and ultimately the commanding general, his planners' estimates made sense to him. Moreover, he knew the capabilities of his units, having commanded the 4th ID and having trained every kind of unit the Army fields during his tour at the NTC. Based on this experience, he knew the corps could win the tactical fights; his concern was adequate fuel, ammunition, and maintenance for future operations. An established LSA at Objective RAMS would be critical to future operations toward Baghdad.

Fuel, water, and food are the greatest burdens for logisticians to bear. To meet the 2 million gallons of fuel per day required--from tanks to aircraft--the Third Army had worked for two years to develop the infrastructure that a potential war with Iraq would require. Among other things, the Kuwaiti national oil company had, at the request of Third Army, laid pipeline nearly to the border. Third Army augmented this largesse by supplying the pumps. But in execution, Colonel Melvin Frazier, who commanded the 49th Quartermaster Group (fuel and water), was the man who brought it all together. Frazier and his troops, working with the 377th Theater Support Command (TSC) and Third Army, started planning in earnest in the fall of 2001. By March of 2003, he had assembled engineers and petroleum units that laid pipeline and built bag farms to store fuel. Between January and March 2003, seven line-haul truck companies arrived and reported to the group. Ultimately, Frazier's units--with support from Army and Marine units--had a system in place that could store 7.3 million gallons of fuel. Moreover, Frazier assigned one truck company to support V Corps and one to support the I MEF. Together with trucks organic to the corps, this meant that V Corps could refuel every 100 km, or five times between crossing the line of departure and arriving at Baghdad.⁷

Click here for higher resolution image (333 KB)
Figure 76. The V Corps logistics challenge

The plan to sustain the force further envisaged staging storage forward to reduce the length of the line haul. This would, in turn, reduce the time on the road for truckers and ensure that the demands of I MEF, V Corps, and nearby air bases could be met. To understand the scale of this effort, CFLCC expected to consume 40 million gallons of fuel by D+20, or about 10 April. By comparison, the Allies in WW I consumed 40 million gallons of gasoline during the four years of the war, a war that Winston Churchill described as having been won "on a sea of oil." By contrast, during World War II, the Allied fuel reserves in Normandy reached 7.5 million gallons only on D+21.⁸

Figure 77. 101st Airborne Division fuel consumption summary as of 30 April 2003

Clearly, Colonel Frazier and the V Corps and I MEF logisticians were no pikers in setting the conditions to feed the aircraft and fighting vehicles of an entirely mechanized force. Moreover, they planned to travel and fight across a theater to seize a hostile capital almost as far as Remagen on the Rhine River was from the Normandy beaches. To provide historical context, in summer and fall 1944, to keep up with a consumption rate of 800,000 gallons per day for First and Third Armies, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's logisticians created the Red Ball Express. The Red Ball Express required 132 truck companies to move the fuel over its 400-mile route. Frazier and the soldiers and marines of CFLCC, by means of trucks, pipelines, and fuel storage bags, aimed to more than double that accomplishment on a route that exceeded the length of that used by the fabled Red Ball Express.⁹

Three general officers shared the responsibility of assuring that trucks got forward to the right place and that logistics bounded forward. Major General Claude V. Christianson, the CLFCC C4, Major General David Kratzer, commanding the 377th TSC, and Brigadier General Jack Stultz, commanding the 143rd Transportation Command, responsible for transportation, focused considerable energy on the issue. Stultz attacked the problem vigorously. In the end everyone involved in logistics in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM found that personal leadership and hands-on management proved essential to coping with the scale of the problem.¹⁰ To this team, Brigadier General Charles A. Fletcher, commanding the 3rd Corps Support Command (COSCOM), and his counterpart in I MEF added their efforts to assure that bulk fuel and other supplies made it to the tactical units. The marines also extended their hose and reel pipeline system to Jalibah air base south of Tallil, where they built an LSA.

Figure 78. 101st Airborne Division water summary

Regardless of these generals' hard work, they all laid the credit for the fuel movement success at the feet of the soldiers and marines who drove the trucks and laid the pipeline, including 240 km of the Marine Corps' hose reel system. Truckers and logistics soldiers drove themselves to the point of exhaustion. They kept on driving and fighting to get supplies forward. Christianson, not given to hyperbole, claims that these ". . . guys were incredible."¹¹

CFLCC and the corps logisticians managed water, food, and ammunition as intensively as the fuel, with the result that units ran low but never out of any of these vital commodities. The theater did not do as well with repair parts. Generals Christianson, Kratzer, and Stultz all agree that the parts distribution system never worked, despite heroic efforts.¹² More than enough parts reached the theater and were duly processed, but almost none reached the intended customers during the fighting. Forward, the troops made do by cannibalizing broken-down equipment and towing what they could not repair. So, as the force moved north toward Baghdad with adequate fuel, water, and food, its ability to sustain an adequate maintenance readiness rate began to suffer. Fortunately, major combat operations ended before the failure of the parts distribution system affected operations in a meaningful way.

Fundamentally, the problem with parts is emblematic of a larger problem in the matter of distribution generally. A requisition for parts has to make its way through a fairly complex system and must be handled several times before it reaches the division where it is needed, let alone the platoon in which the part is required. In General Christianson's view, the real problem is that there is no single agent for managing "cargo distribution," whether it is water or a bolt needed on a tank.¹³ OIF highlights a problem identified during DESERT STORM that remains to be solved.

Deserts and Rivers--the Terrain

V Corps conducted operations in both desert and river valley terrain on the way to the Karbala Gap. In the western section of the area of operations, the terrain is typical desert--dry and broken with waddies and gullies that disrupt and canalize movement when traveling cross- country. Within the river valley, the terrain is similar to that around As Samawah--plowed fields dissected with irrigation ditches and interspersed with palm groves. Wheeled movement is possible along the canal dikes and roads, but they are generally not wide or strong enough to support armored vehicles. The desert area is generally not populated, while the farmlands between the towns on the Euphrates River are dotted with small villages and farming communities. The terrain was a known factor that the corps could plan for; the weather, on the other hand, was not.

The Mother of All Sandstorms

On 25-27 March 2003, a strong weather system in the Middle East triggered a series of dust/sandstorms that became nearly continuous and slowed operations throughout the theater. On the first day, several moderate to strong thunderstorms swept west to east through Iraq and Kuwait. In front of and behind these storms, strong winds caused blowing sand, reducing visibility to near zero at times. Sand, dust and raindrops mingled to form what troops described as a mud storm. On the second day, the storm center passed across northern Iraq and moved into Iran by midnight.

Strong west and southwesterly winds from this low-pressure system blew across central and southern areas of Iraq, keeping the sandstorms going throughout the theater. On 27 March, most of Iraq's skies cleared as the dust settled under an approaching high-pressure area. But Kuwait and the Persian Gulf were still experiencing blowing dust, hindering ground and air operations around Kuwait and naval operations in the gulf.¹⁴

Figure 79. Satellite photograph of sandstorm, 26 March 2003

Figure 80. 3rd ID soldier during the sandstorm

Figure 81. 101st Airborne Division OH-58D Kiowa Warrior after the sandstorm

While the weather threw its wind-borne surprises at the coalition forces, the Iraqis did the same on the ground. The enemy disposition, tactics, and threat were, at times, as murky as the dust-filled air.

Enemy Disposition

CFLCC and V Corps had no evidence of a significant conventional Iraqi force between An Nasiriyah and Karbala. Intelligence officers believed the next conventional forces would be encountered farther north, defending the immediate approaches to Baghdad itself. Here the Iraqis apparently had arrayed three Republican Guard divisions, the Hammurabi, Medina, and Al Nida Divisions from west to east. The Special Republican Guard Division remained in Baghdad, with the bulk of its troops west of the Tigris River and in position to protect essential regime personnel and facilities. During the opening three days of operations, the CFLCC and corps had not detected any significant movement. However, it remained unclear how the Iraqis would respond to the ongoing air and information operations campaigns. Intelligence proved even less precise on tracking or estimating what the various paramilitary troops might do.

As the fight in As Samawah indicated, approximately 3,000-5,000 paramilitary fighters of all sorts defended from the towns and cities along the Euphrates River valley. Generically described in intelligence and operational estimates as Republican Death Squads, these fighters included Ba'athist Party militia, Saddam Fedayeen, foreign fighters, and some elements of the Republican Guard forces. Moreover, as discovered during the fighting, they included Iraqi civilians coerced into fighting against coalition forces by Fedayeen or militia who threatened their families at gunpoint. Although the estimates accounted for these forces, they did not anticipate their intent. As Major General Marks, the CFLCC C2 put it, "We did not predict that they were going to come out of the cities and expose themselves to up-armored vehicles and armored formations without similar protection."¹⁵

Click here for higher resolution image (413 KB)
Figure 82. Iraqi force disposition

All of the estimates accurately assumed the Fedayeen were the most dangerous of the paramilitary forces, but they were thought to be in Baghdad in large numbers to bolster the capital city defense. As events unfolded, it appears that Saddam sent them south along the approach routes from Kuwait to stiffen the conventional defense, maintain political control over the southern cities, delay coalition momentum, and induce significant casualties. More surprising, these irregular forces chose to come out of the relatively safe urban areas to engage coalition armored forces out in the open. In doing so, they forfeited the tactical and propaganda advantages offered by fighting from the complex urban terrain--where fighting could result in significant civilian casualties and damage to buildings and infrastructure that could be used to sway international opinion. Even more surprising, the paramilitaries chose to attack the lead armored forces in waves rather than waiting for the soft-skinned, logistics convoys that would follow. Because the paramilitary forces were essentially untrained, if dedicated, their tactics were suicidal in that they literally ran, and drove, to their deaths.

In northern Iraq, two-fifths of the Iraqi conventional forces defended the "Green Line," across from the Kurdish Autonomous Zone, along the border with Turkey, and along the border with Iran (see Figure 83). Stiffened with two Republican Guard divisions, Saddam Fedayeen, and Ba'ath Party militia, these forces secured northern Iraq and posed a significant obstacle to the Kurdish forces. Moreover, if they moved south to reinforce the defense of Baghdad, they would greatly increase the challenge to the coalition forces moving up from Kuwait. V Corps and I MEF advanced north against this enemy disposition.

Click here for higher resolution image (475 KB)
Figure 83. Iraqi forces disposition, northern Iraq

The 507th Maintenance Company

When OIF began, many Americans viewed warfare with almost clinical detachment, assuming that the war could be concluded rapidly, with precision and with few casualties. They also believed that American troops armed with the latest technology and precision munitions could not possibly become lost or surprised in combat. They continued to believe this despite the evidence of Black Hawk Down and the inconclusive results of the air war in Kosovo, possibly because, with the exception of Black Hawk Down, all they saw were gun camera tapes accompanied by cocksure appraisals of the incredible precision of American weapons.¹⁶ Americans believed in the apparent precision of our armed forces without considering adaptation by the enemy or the frequent fallibility of the best technology or, for that matter, the human condition.

Humans tire and make mistakes, even if their weapons do not. When theorists and experts describe the modern battlefield as nonlinear, fast-moving, and noncontiguous, they fail to account for the implications of that assessment. If modern warfare is nonlinear--it means just that--there are no lines and no visible demarcation between the "front" and "rear." If there is no front and no rear, then nowhere on the modern battlefield is truly safe. An adaptable enemy may not wear uniforms and may not behave in a manner consistent with conventions developed in the West. If there are no rules--then there are no rules. In March 2003, the condition of the battlefield at An Nasiriyah, the town controlling the major southern crossing on the Euphrates River, was truly "noncontiguous," "nonlinear," and very much occupied by an adaptable enemy prepared to fight "asymmetrically."

Moving Out

The 507th Maintenance Company arrived at An Nasiriyah just over 60 hours after it had started out to join the 3rd Forward Support Battalion (FSB), 3rd ID convoy to Objective RAMS. RAMS lay some 350 km northwest of the 507th's base camp at Camp VIRGINIA, which was near the Kuwait-Iraq border. The 507th departed Camp VIRGINIA at 1400 on the 20th with 64 soldiers and 33 vehicles. Driving cross-country almost due west, it arrived in Assault Position DAWSON at 2100. There, the unit refueled and rested until departing the next morning at 0700. The second leg of the convoy took the 507th from DAWSON to Assault Position BULL, where it would link up with the 3rd FSB. The company drove some 35 km, crossed the Iraqi border, and arrived at BULL at noon on the 21st. ¹⁷

At BULL, Captain Troy King, commanding the 507th, met with the operations officer of the 3rd FSB, who provided him a CD-ROM disk containing orders and route information. Although 3rd FSB intended to travel cross-country for a part of the way, ultimately it would travel up Highway 8--called Route BLUE--to a point just south of An Nasiriyah where Highway 8 met Route JACKSON, or Highway 1. There, soldiers at a traffic control point would direct the 600-vehicle convoy from Route BLUE to Route JACKSON. Somehow, King only understood that he would travel Route BLUE.¹⁸

In any case, the 507th departed as part of the 3rd FSB column at 1800 on 21 March, moving cross-country to Assault Position LIZARD, which lay to the northwest, across 80 km of difficult terrain. During the night, vehicles in the convoy had trouble due to breakdowns, getting stuck in the sand, or becoming separated from their unit in the dark. Falling behind, Captain King decided to break his convoy into two serials. He led the first serial, consisting of vehicles that could keep up. First Sergeant Robert Dowdy recovered mired or broken-down vehicles and assembled them into the second, slower serial to continue the movement north.¹⁹

Captain King and the lead serial arrived in LIZARD at 0530 on 22 March. First Sergeant Dowdy and the second group finally reached LIZARD at 1600. Meanwhile, King reported his situation to his Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Fischetti, and to the 3rd FSB, which confirmed there would be no changes to the route. The 3rd FSB also advised King that the convoy would depart as scheduled at 1400. Rather than leave at the scheduled time, King opted to wait for Dowdy and the trailing vehicles, sending his executive officer on with the remainder of the company.²⁰

At 1930 on the 22nd, King and Dowdy departed LIZARD with 33 soldiers, including two (Sergeant George Buggs and Private First Class Edward Anguiano) who were assigned to 3rd FSB. King had 18 vehicles, including two that were being towed. The serial contained three HMMWVs, two of which were towing trailers, and eight 5-ton tractor-trailers, one of which was being towed. There were also five 5-ton trucks, including a wrecker towing a water trailer, two cargo trucks towing trailers, a fuel truck, and a disabled 5-ton cargo truck. Finally, there were two 10-ton wreckers, one towing the broken-down 5-ton shop van and the other towing the broken-down 5-ton tractor-trailer.²¹

Click here for higher resolution image (167 KB)
Figure 84. The 507th Maintenance Company sequence of events

Click here for higher resolution image (254 KB)
Figure 85. Captain King's serial, 507th Maintenance convoy

Missing the Turn

Captain King decided to take the most direct route to intersect Route BLUE, some 15 km cross-country from LIZARD. Unfortunately, the terrain proved nearly impassable. It took some 5 hours to reach Route BLUE. Sometime after 0100, the 507th drove through the traffic control point at the intersection of Route BLUE and Route JACKSON. Although there were troops in the area, no one manned the traffic control point. King, believing he was supposed to stay on Route BLUE, continued on rather than turning onto Route JACKSON. Because his next GPS waypoint was generally to the west, there was no cause yet for alarm. Just after 0530, King missed a left turn on Route BLUE. As yet unaware he had missed the turn, he headed north along the eastern side of An Nasiriyah.²²

Entering An Nasiriyah

Click here for higher resolution image (549 KB)
Figure 86. The 507th route of movement toward An Nasiriyah

Captain King, First Sergeant Dowdy, and the 31 other soldiers drove north through the eastern edge of An Nasiriyah, passing armed "civilians" and traveling through two Iraqi military checkpoints without incident. When the convoy reached Highway 16 on the northern outskirts of An Nasiriyah, it turned left, thinking it was turning onto Highway 8 south of the city. King turned north at the T-intersection where Highway 16 ends, realized his error and, after consulting with Dowdy, turned the convoy around. By now, after more than 60 hours on the move, King, Dowdy, and the soldiers were exhausted. Nevertheless, they got their vehicles turned around and made their way back and turned left, or east, onto Highway 16, and started looking for the right turn which would take them back south to safety and Route BLUE.

Almost from the moment they turned back onto Highway 16, they came under fire. First Sergeant Dowdy recommended that the serial pick up the pace to escape the fire. With only five radios, passing the word must have consisted, in part at least, of setting the example and exhortation by hand and arm waving. Dowdy's efforts to get the word out apparently included driving up alongside trucks and yelling instructions at the vehicle commander and driver.²³

Moving fast, Captain King now missed the turn south. First Sergeant Dowdy saw the error and called King to have him turn around a second time. By now, the entire serial had passed the turn. Sergeant First Class Pierce sped up and caught Captain King to advise him that he could find the turn. King told Pierce to take the lead. At this point, still under fire, the 5-ton tractor- trailer, driven by Private Brandon Sloan and commanded by Sergeant Donald Walters, broke down. Sergeant James Riley and Private First Class Patrick Miller, in the following vehicle, the 5-ton wrecker towing the water trailer, slowed down so that Sloan could leap aboard. It is unclear what became of Walters. He may have fought his way south of Highway 16 for some distance, but at some point he was killed in the action.²⁴

The serial, now disintegrating, had to travel some 3 km past the missed turn to find enough room to turn the large tractor-trailers around. As they made the U-turn, Sergeant Buggs and Private First Class Anguiano mired their wrecker and its tow in soft sand. Stuck and taking fire, the two needed help. First Sergeant Dowdy, who for more than two days had been policing up the trail of the 507th, slowed his HMMWV and picked them up. Dowdy reported to Captain King that the trail element had turned around and that he had Buggs and Anguiano and that they needed to get out of the city as soon as possible. Dowdy's HMMWV now had five people aboard, including Private First Class Lori Piestewa, Private First Class Jessica Lynch, whose supply truck had broken down, the two soldiers from 3rd FSB and Dowdy himself.²⁵

Driving fast, taking fire, doing a U-turn, and making a hard left off Highway 16 all contributed to breaking the serial into three groups. The first group, led by Captain King, included his HMMWV, a 5-ton tractor-trailer, and a 5-ton truck towing a trailer. The second group of three 5-ton tractor-trailers, one HMMWV, and one 5-ton truck followed some distance behind King. The last group, by now fairly far behind and badly strung out due to problems turning around and making the turn to the south, included First Sergeant Dowdy's HMMWV, two 5-ton tractor-trailers, one 5-ton truck with trailer, one 5-ton wrecker with a water trailer, and one 10-ton wrecker towing a 5-ton tractor-trailer. The company had abandoned three vehicles back on Highway 16.²⁶

Running the Gauntlet

Shortly after 0700 as the 507th sped south, separated into three dispersed groups, it now had to run a gauntlet of small-arms fire, RPGs, possible indirect fire, and at least one Iraqi tank. To add to the convoy's troubles, the Iraqis were placing obstacles--including vehicles--in the road. The beleaguered Americans had to maneuver the lumbering cargo trucks, made less agile by towing other vehicles or trailers, around obstacles. Captain King and his group of three vehicles cleared the city, raced south and made contact with marines of the 8th Tank Battalion assigned to Task Force Tarawa. The marines immediately moved out to rescue the rest of the company, heading back north the way King had come.²⁷

Meanwhile, the Iraqis continued to pound the two trailing groups of vehicles. The second group made it 5 km south of An Nasiriyah before their luck, such as it was, ran out. Taking multiple hits from RPGs and small-arms fire, the tractor-trailer crewed by Specialist Jun Zhang and Sergeant Curtis Campbell came to a stop. Zhang leapt aboard the trailing tractor-trailer crewed by Private First Class Marcus Dubois and Corporal Damien Luten, who had just been shot in the leg. Campbell, also wounded, caught a ride on the HMMWV crewed by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Mark Nash and Staff Sergeant Tarik Jackson. Like Campbell, Jackson was already wounded. Nash, carrying his two wounded passengers, managed to get a bit farther south before Iraqi fire stopped his HMMWV.

Private First Class Dubois, Corporal Luten, and Specialist Zhang turned their slow, awkward tractor-trailer around and returned to help CW3 Nash and his two wounded NCOs. Shortly after this, Private First Class Elliot arrived in his 5-ton fuel truck, carrying Specialist Grubb, who was already wounded in both arms. Sergeant Matthew Rose, driving the last tractor-trailer, and his co-driver, Corporal Francis Carista, also joined at this point. Together, the soldiers formed a defensive perimeter while Rose, a combat lifesaver (trained in combat first aid), supervised three other combat lifesavers in treating the wounded. The marines arrived in time to rescue this group of soldiers.²⁹

The Final Moments

First Sergeant Dowdy's group never cleared An Nasiriyah. They reached their end about 3 km north of where the marines rescued their colleagues. The end, when it came, was quick. First, the 5-ton tractor-trailer crewed by Specialist Edgar Hernandez and Specialist Shoshana Johnson veered off the road, swerving to avoid an obstacle. Dowdy, coming from the rear, passed Miller's 5-ton wrecker and ordered him to pick up speed and keep moving. Soon afterward, an Iraqi round, possibly an RPG, struck Dowdy's HMMWV. Private First Class Piestewa lost control and crashed into the rear end of Specialist Hernandez's 5-ton tractor- trailer. The redoubtable First Sergeant Dowdy died on impact. Piestewa, seriously injured, died after capture. Anguiano and Buggs died as well, like Piestewa, under circumstances that remain unclear. Alive but unconscious, Lynch remained in the wreck.³⁰

Click here for higher resolution image (161 KB)
Figure 87. The 507th Maintenance Company ambush summary²⁸
(The highlighted numbers depict actual locations where vehicles were left)

Iraqi fire stopped Private First Class Miller's wrecker some 400 meters north of where First Sergeant Dowdy died. Private Sloan, whom Miller had picked up minutes earlier, was killed at this time. Miller and Sergeant Riley moved south to assist Dowdy and the soldiers with him. Riley, now the senior man, took charge and attempted to organize a defense but had little to work with. Private First Class Johnson and Specialist Hernandez were wounded, so he had them take cover. No one in Dowdy's HMMWV could help, and Riley couldn't get a weapon to fire consistently. With no good options, Riley elected to surrender. Miller apparently made his way away from the scene and continued to fight until he too was surrounded and compelled to surrender.³¹

Farther south, Specialist Joseph Hudson and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Johnny Mata maneuvered their 10-ton wrecker past several obstacles and a tank. They reached as far south as the edge of the city before Iraqi fire brought them to a stop. Mata died soon after, killed by multiple rounds after the vehicle stopped. The Iraqis pulled the wounded Hudson from his vehicle and took him captive. The remaining two vehicles of the 507th did not make it quite as far south. Private First Class Howard Johnson and Private Ruben Estrella-Soto were driving a 5-ton tractor-trailer. They, along with Specialist Jamaal Addison and Specialist James Kiehl traveling in a 5-ton truck, were killed just north of where the Iraqis killed Mata.³²

The Rescue of Private First Class Lynch

On the evening of 1 April 2003, SOF, supported by marines, assaulted the hospital in which Private Jessica Lynch was being treated. Although there have been news stories subsequently suggesting that the assault was unnecessary since Iraqi troops had left the day before, one fact is clear--the SOF troops brought Lynch out. Her capture, her captivity, even her return home stimulated speculation and enormous media attention.

Less than two weeks later, marines, apparently notified by locals of the presence of American captives nearby, rescued the remaining survivors of the 507th Maintenance Company, as well as two Apache pilots being held with them. The small-unit tragedy of the 507th that began on 23 March had finally ended. The ripples of what happened to the 507th and, for that matter, the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment, will affect how the Army trains and equips units for years to come.

Moving North

With 3rd BCT, 3rd ID securing the logistics and staging facilities at Tallil, the scheme of maneuver required the 1st and 2nd BCTs to move north to secure Objective RAMS as the LSA in the vicinity of An Najaf. The 2nd BCT would secure the actual Objective RAMS, while 1st BCT would move through and north to isolate An Najaf from Baghdad. The 3-7 CAV would close the ring around the town from the south and east, ensuring the Iraqi defenders could not molest the logistics and aviation operations within Objective RAMS.

The 2nd BCT at Objective RAMS

The 2nd BCT, the division's lead element, arrived at RAMS late in the afternoon on 22 March, after moving north and passing 3-7 CAV as it fought in As Samawah. TF 1-64 AR, leading the brigade, traveled 141 km along Highway 28, with the task force's scout platoon and brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), leading. The task force prosecuted several contacts, including one when the BRT encountered a roadblock about 50 kilometers south of Objective RAMS. Four to six paramilitary troops fired small arms on the troop at a range of about 800 meters. The reconnaissance troop dispatched the defenders and four more who attempted to flank the troop in a pickup truck. The reconnaissance troops then continued toward RAMS and at about 1800, just south of RAMS, handed off the fight to TF 1-64 AR.³³

Click here for higher resolution image (460 KB)
Figure 88. Objectives in the vicinity of An Najaf

TF 1-64 AR, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip DeCamp, seized RAMS against light resistance and then spent several hours clearing the area. Ultimately the task force fought off counterattacking Iraqi forces throughout the night, using direct fire, indirect fire, and CAS to retain the critical terrain on RAMS. The Iraqis used tactics similar to those 3-7 CAV experienced at As Samawah--suicidal attacks using RPGs and civilian vehicles against armored vehicles. Paramilitary forces swarmed all over RAMS in civilian trucks. They also fought from spider holes along Highway 28 in the restrictive terrain.³⁴

Long-Range Surveillance Teams

The 2nd BCT did not attack into RAMS blindly. In addition to estimates developed prior to crossing the line of departure, V Corps attempted to insert reconnaissance deep on RAMS itself. V Corps has a unique, specialized capability to conduct sustained surveillance of an area to support decisions and targeting. Running counter to the trend for high-technology systems and remote sensors, the corps' long-range surveillance (LRS) company consists of the corps' most elite infantrymen, whose mission is to go deep into enemy territory and maintain constant "eyes on" a key piece of terrain. LRS teams are trained in infiltration, hide-site construction, enemy equipment and tactics, advanced communications, and a staggering host of survival and evasion skills. The selection process is brutally competitive to ensure only the very best, most capable, and experienced soldiers make the team. The small LRS teams are the corps' only all- weather, 24-hour-a-day capability to watch a critical piece of terrain.

Because of the rapid pace of the corps' advance, site selection proved to be difficult. The corps started the fight with 27 potential LRS sites, of which 17 were specifically to support the 3rd ID; however, the corps only inserted three teams. Indeed, the LRS teams' relative inability to contribute was due to the speed of the maneuver units' advance. After the initial three insertions, the pace was too fast to make an educated guess on where the corps would be--and what it would need to know--three to four days out.³⁷ More- over, the 11th AHR's experiences on 23 March in going deep, along with the sandstorm, cast a pall on aviation's perceived ability to support and made planning and execution more difficult.

Click here for higher resolution image (453 KB)
Figure 89. LRS team positions around Objective RAMS

Despite the inability to employ LRS after crossing the border, two of the three teams inserted provided some basic intelligence. Since the corps planned to use RAMS as a major LSA, it had to know what was there before the first combat troops approached. LRS Team 1-6, led by Staff Sergeant Travis Prohaska, inserted on G-day. The corps expected 3rd ID's 2nd BCT to take two days to reach RAMS; Team 1-6's insertion was planned for two days prior. However, the team was on the ground for only one day before 2nd Brigade "Spartans" rolled into RAMS. While on site, the team reported 10 technical vehicles on the objective and about 60 paramilitary fighters, believed to be a mixture of Ba'ath Party militia and Fedayeen, some of whom came close to Prohaska's position.³⁸ In fact, the team remained hunkered down while 2nd Brigade engaged and destroyed the paramilitaries, only coming out of their hide site after fighting ended.³⁹ Team 2-5, led by Staff Sergeant Timothy Barnwald, inserted to observe the airfield in the vicinity of An Najaf. After an 8-10 km ground infiltration from where the helicopters dropped them off, the team sat in place and maintained continuous coverage until extracted after linking up with the advancing 3rd ID soldiers.⁴⁰ In OIF, LRS teams achieved little in return for the risks that they took and the effort expended to insert them. SOF units produced far more information but even they could not be inserted everywhere. LRS units assigned to conventional maneuver units also produced very little in DESERT STORM, suggesting that their role and viability should be reassessed.

1st BCT to Objective RAIDERS

At 1120 on 23 March, 1st BCT passed through 2nd BCT on RAMS and proceeded north to seize Objective RAIDERS. 3rd ID wanted RAIDERS as the site from which they would mount the attack on Baghdad. Practically adjacent to An Najaf, RAIDERS also afforded protection for the LSA at RAMS. From RAIDERS, 3rd ID could position forces to preclude attacks against either RAMS or the LOC. To reach RAIDERS the division had to attack through the An Najaf escarpment. The escarpment, a natural shelf nearly 250 feet high running roughly west to east, could only be negotiated via a lone road. On the approach to the escarpment, the road formed a single-lane causeway between a marsh on one side and an inland lake on the other. The climb up the hill was at an 11.6-percent grade in some areas. The Iraqis appreciated the tactical value of terrain and dug in artillery and infantry to take advantage of the narrow approach and steep grade, emplacing fighting positions along the crest and at points along the face of the cliffs.

Colonel Will Grimsley's 1st BCT had the mission to seize RAIDERS. Commissioned as an infantryman in 1980, Grimsley brought a wealth of theoretical and practical experience to commanding a brigade. A graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies and an Advanced Strategic Arts Fellow at the Army War College, he had tours in Germany, Korea, Fort Hood, and Fort Stewart and served as a planner on the joint staff. He was a veteran of many bloodless battles at the National Training Center, the Combat Maneuver Training Center, and the Joint Readiness Training Center. Grimsley also served as an observer/controller for some 30 rotations

at the NTC. Because the terrain confined the brigade to the causeway that skirted the lake through soft ground, Grimsley expected a sharp fight at the escarpment. Intelligence placed an Iraqi regular army air defense battalion defending the escarpment and guarding an ammunition dump on the plateau. Grimsley also expected Fedayeen and Ba'ath militia in the area because An Najaf was a Shia city, so the Fedayeen would be there to assure the Shiites stayed in line. In the end his brigade confronted what amounted to two battalions. The regular army air defense battalion defended the An Najaf Ammunition Storage Facility on the top of the escarpment. A second battalion size force composed of about 250 Fedayeen and special republican guard troops with supporting mortars, dug in at the top and into the face of the escarpment.⁴¹

Colonel Grimsley assigned the task of assaulting the escarpment to Lieutenant Colonel "Rock" Marcone commanding TF 3-69 AR. Grimsley and Marcone had "rehearsed" this operation at the National Training Center in the fall of 2002 in anticipation of this very mission. On the basis of that experience and others, Marcone had decided opinions on how to do things. A veteran of DESERT STORM and Kosovo, Marcone had 17 blue force rotations at the NTC. He had participated in several rotations in support of an Army study on the wisdom of tracked versus wheeled scout platoons. Although the Army cited the study as the reason to mount scouts on HMMWVs, Marcone reached a different conclusion. Accordingly, he took the M113s assigned to company maintenance teams and gave them to his scout platoon in return for three HMMWVs for the maintenance teams to use. A firm believer in combined arms, he organized his tanks and Bradleys in what he called "combat patrols" of two tanks and two Bradleys accompanied by an engineer squad, thereby creating his own combined arms platoons and training them that way. Like Grimsley, Marcone believed in combined arms including using fires to support maneuver. Finally, Marcone liked to fight "two companies in relationship to each other. That is the key to success. It is to fight two company teams in relationship to each other because it is an unstoppable force."⁴²

Figure 90. The 1st BCT moving along Highway 28 to Objective RAIDERS after clearing the An Najaf escarpment

Marcone and Grimsley justifiably expected trouble attacking through the defile that led to the top of the escarpment. So did the division and corps. Accordingly, Grimsley had his own direct support battalion, 1-41 FA, and a second artillery battalion, 1-10 FA, reinforcing the direct support battalion positioned forward to support the assault up the escarpment. Further, Grimsley placed B/1-10 FA in Marcone's task force so Marcone had immediate support. To cover his advance Marcone ordered B/1-10 FA to lay in a 1,000-meter smoke screen. Grimsley also cued up air support and asked Colonel Dave Perkins and his 2nd BCT to help where they could. Perkins moved part of his brigade up to where they could support by fire.⁴³

Despite the screen, the Iraqis still shelled Marcone's task force, which was stacked up on the road since the terrain prevented dispersal. Iraqi mortar and later artillery fell within 50 meters of vehicles. Nonetheless, TF 3-69 AR's assault force quickly gained the heights. The lead unit, a tank company team, went deep while Captain Dave Benton's team B/3-7 IN, the Bandits, turned east and swept the escarpment, destroying the dug-in mortars that harassed the brigade. The remainder of the task force dealt with the air defense troops, who served as the guard force at the ammunition storage site. As 1-41 FA moved over the escarpment, each battery shot fire missions, mostly counterbattery, to protect the brigade's movement. Despite a brisk fight, neither the artillery nor the brigade sustained casualties.⁴⁴

Close air support assured TF 3-69 AR's success. As Marcone's troops advanced under fire, Grimsley's tactical air control party opened kill boxes on the escarpment. Grimsley used A-10s to "fly the road and get as close to the escarpment (as possible) ... [then] react to contact left and right all the way down the ridgeline . . . It was almost like opening a breach laterally for us."45 The fighters also began reporting what they believed was armor moving to reinforce the fighting, but it eventually proved to be truck-mounted paramilitary troops. Marcone's troops and aircraft from all four air forces (USMC, USN, USAF and RAF) supporting the brigade that day quickly dispatched the reinforcements. The airmen also assisted in destroying enemy artillery. For a time the brigade could not locate enemy artillery firing on them because one of their counterbattery radars broke down. Brigade fire support officers estimated enemy artillery locations from crater analysis. CAS aircrew flew over the estimated locations and detected D 30 howitzers from their muzzle flashes and destroyed them. Reflecting on that fight and those to come, Will Grimsley noted that there are a "host of Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Royal Air Force pilots I would love to meet some day."46

Figure 91. The 1st BCT climbing the An Najaf escarpment en route to Objective RAIDERS

While 2nd BCT secured Objective RAMS and 1st BCT advanced to Objective RAIDERS, 3-7 CAV departed As Samawah and moved north along the river to isolate An Najaf. Major General Blount wanted to prevent the Iraqis from moving additional reinforcements into the city and to prevent the Iraqis from interdicting operations at Objective RAMS. It was clear that the town could not be bypassed and left unattended. Although the BCTs advanced along the relatively clear highways west of the Euphrates River, the squadron hugged the valley and moved through some of the more densely populated and heavily defended areas south of Baghdad.

3-7 CAV--Ambush Alley

After returning to division control on 24 March, 3-7 CAV marched north on Route Appaloosa (See Fig. 92) paralleling the Euphrates en route to a bridge designated Objective FLOYD. FLOYD was east and south of An Najaf; securing it would prevent Iraqi forces from entering or leaving the town from those directions. The squadron took Route Appaloosa to avoid congestion with 2nd BCT, still moving north to secure Objective RAMS.⁴⁷ During the movement, the squadron ended up stretched out over an extended distance, beyond radio range. The satellite-based BFT email system provided the only reliable means of communications throughout the squadron. Communications proved essential as the enemy compelled the cavalry to fight through a series of well-prepared ambushes. Paramilitary forces fought from the side of the road and from ramps using small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG teams. They also attacked from armed vehicles that the troops called technicals, and a mix of ordinary cars and trucks. After the fact, soldiers dubbed the route "Ambush Alley." Ultimately, the squadron fought through a series of ambushes throughout the night. Complicating matters, visibility dropped precipitously with the start of the now infamous three-day sandstorm.⁴⁸

Click here for higher resolution image (606 KB)
Figure 92. Ambush Alley--officially known as Route Appaloosa from As Samawah to An Najaf

At 2100, as the squadron continued north out of As Samawah, it hit the first ambush. As the A/3-7 CAV scout platoon leader, First Lieutenant Matt Garrett, moved past a mosque on the western side of the road, he radioed, "Hey look, we're in Florida, it's Middle Eastern Times,"⁴⁹ referring to the popular restaurant in Orlando, Florida. The mosque caught his attention because of its design and complementary lighting that accentuated the architecture. Just as he commented on the radio net, Iraqis emerged from the mosque and engaged the platoon. Alpha Troop's fire support officer, First Lieutenant Wade, said it looked like "Star Wars, with the tracer bounce off of the vehicles." ⁵⁰ The ambush lasted approximately 2 hours as Alpha Troop fought through the extended engagement area. Artillery proved useful only in the early stages of the fight as the enemy closed to within 15 meters of the vehicles; so close the troop could not use artillery. Nonetheless, the heavily armed and armored cavalry cleared the engagement area with no casualties or losses.

Because the terrain did not permit maneuver, the following cavalry troops had to fight through the same ambush area as they moved north. The squadron confronted other difficulties during the running ambushes. After a canal bridge collapsed, dropping an M1 tank about 15 feet into a canal (with no injuries), A/3-7 CAV had to turn around on the narrow road and retrace its steps to the original route. Narrow roads and soft ground compounded the misery and resulted in an overturned truck and three mired vehicles. The collapsed bridge stranded a five-vehicle hunter-killer team of tanks and Bradleys on the far side. They had to wait until daylight before maneuvering back to the squadron.⁵¹

Countering Iraqi WMD And Ballistic Missile Strikes

While the coalition forces moved north, the Iraqis continued to exercise their only deep- strike capability--surface-to-surface missiles--with virtually no effect. After firing five missiles on the first day, the Iraqis launched an additional 12 missiles between 21 March and 3 April. The missiles included Ababil-100s, Al Samouds, and antiquated Soviet FROG-7 rockets. Of these 17, the Kuwaiti Patriots destroyed one, US Patriots destroyed seven, one was engaged simultaneously by US and Kuwaiti Patriots, and eight were not intercepted because they were not aimed at anything of value, fell well short of their targets, or blew up on launch. Aside from the four ineffective missiles, the Iraqis fired the remainder at Army and Marine staging camps within Kuwait and Camp DOHA, site of the CFLCC headquarters. Regardless of the Patriots' effectiveness, ground forces within a certain distance of the projected impact point continued to respond to the threat of a chemical weapons strike.⁵⁴

The threat of chemical weapons attack was not limited to surface-to-surface missiles. The coalition believed that the Iraqis had an artillery-delivered chemical attack capability that presented a significant threat to coalition forces. US combat actions also could lead to a chemical threat. For example, south of Objective RAIDERS on 28 March, JSTARS identified 10 Iraqi tankers heading south from Baghdad. The Latifiyah Phosgene and solid propellant production facility was their suspected point of origin. The contents of the tankers were unconfirmed, but intelligence believed that they might be filled with Phosgene, a dual-purpose industrial product and confirmed chemical weapon (choking agent). The Air Force attacked and destroyed the tankers approximately 10 km north of Objective RAIDERS, where 1st BCT, 3rd ID was located. The brigade assumed full chemical protective posture due to the potential downwind hazard. Since the unit's organic chemical defense equipment could not detect Phosgene, the brigade had to wait for the chemical reconnaissance platoon of the 3rd ID's chemical company to arrive and complete its specialized tests before receiving the "all clear."⁵⁵

Regardless of whether a missile or artillery attack triggered the chemical warning system, soldiers and marines donned their chemical protective equipment. Clearly, gaining control of the Iraqi'sWMDcapabilitywascriticaltoensuringcoalitioneffectiveness,aswellasmeetinganational objective. These operations were generally termed "sensitive-site exploitation" (SSE) operations.

Sensitive-Site Exploitation

As coalition forces moved north into the heart of Iraq, they continuously conducted SSEs to support the elimination of Iraqi WMD, regime change, and the destruction of terrorist networks. More specifically, SSE consisted of selectively seizing and searching facilities associated with Iraqi WMD programs and other points of interest. The purpose was to collect intelligence or WMD samples for analysis and, if necessary, secure sites until final disposition could be determined. Sensitive sites varied in size, scope, and composition. They included, but were not limited to, research and development (R&D) facilities, laboratories, weapons production facilities, and storage sites. Not all sites were strictly military. Some were dual-use facilities, such as fertilizer and pharmaceutical plants that were suspected of producing WMD. Other locations were associated with individuals or organizations involved in WMD programs.

Figure 93. The 101st Airborne Division chemical staff surveys a mobile laboratory

While most sensitive sites were associated with WMD, a significant number included known terrorist camps, universities, and government-sponsored commercial ventures, locations associated with individuals involved in terrorist activities, infrastructure that supported terrorist activities, presidential palaces, command centers, and headquarters. Other sites of interest, such as prisons and confinement sites suspected of holding personnel characterized as missing in action (MIA), hospitals believed to have treated MIAs, organizations associated with MIAs, and intelligence centers that could have held information regarding the existence, treatment, and location of MIAs, were searched. Intelligence identified more than 900 sites, not including a large number of sites that troops reported as suspicious.

To execute this task, the CFLCC used every available resource in the theater from the tactical to the national level. CFLCC employed maneuver units from the 3rd ID, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division and personnel from other government agencies as well. On a daily basis, the CFLCC approved or identified sensitive sites for exploitation based on current intelligence estimates and staff recommendations. The CFLCC C3 then tasked one of the major subordinate commands to seize and secure the approved sites. Once a maneuver unit secured a site, specialized teams of Army and other government agency personnel moved in to assess and exploit the sites.

Not only did seizing and securing sites divert combat power, most of these missions required combat support and combat service support from the divisions as well. Divisions provided NBC reconnaissance, decontamination teams, medical response, engineers, and military police. Furthermore, divisions provided force protection, life support, and transportation for the theater-level specialized teams.

Two specialized organizations exploited the sites: the site survey teams (SSTs) and the mobile exploitation teams (METs). SSTs focused primarily on conducting initial assessments of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) production locations, R&D facilities, storage sites, equipment, and other WMD infrastructure. Each SST, approximately 26 personnel, consisted of subject matter experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians; nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance specialists; and a support element. Based on its initial assessments, an SST would recommend sites for further exploitation by the MET. The MET elements were much larger and could conduct sample collection, perform computer and document exploitation, interrogate captured personnel, render safe munitions, and evacuate samples and materials to a laboratory or collection center for further evaluation and exploitation.

Figure 94. NBC reconnaissance specialists assigned to SST 4

Despite the number of specialized teams in the theater, the number of sites, coupled with the velocity of the march north--exceeded the capacity of CFLCC to conduct SSE exclusively with specialized teams. To span the gap, divisions organized, trained, and conducted limited sensitive sight exploitation with assigned personnel and equipment. The majority of these newly formed teams came directly from each division's organic chemical company. Much like the SSTs, the divisional teams made initial assessments of suspected WMD sites, reported their findings to higher headquarters, and made recommendations on further exploitation.

Although finding and destroying Iraqi WMD capabilities was a major strategic objective, coalition forces had not found any by the conclusion of Phase III combat operations. Of course, during the combat operations, V Corps could not divert significant combat power to secure and exploit the overwhelming number of suspected sites. Troops continued to support SSE after the conclusion of major combat operations.

Communicating or Not

As the corps stretched out toward Baghdad, the corps and theater communications started to falter. The modernization undertaken in the 12 years since DESERT STORM had closed part of the gap, enabling the Army to build a force (Force XXI) that could fight digitally connected. The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) enabled commanders to pass orders, intelligence, real-time awareness of everything flying, logistics information, and many other bits of useful or vital information. However, even modernized communication systems proved inadequate to support the speed of advance attained over long distances.

Most of the ABCS information is passed over an aging component of the communication system called Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE). The key to understanding MSE is that the name is literal. The subscriber may be able to communicate on the move, but the equipment on which the system is based cannot. The MSE "backbone" is based on stationary nodes dependent on line-of-sight antennas. Although satellite linkage is available, subscribers reach it via ground-based nodes. Consequently, it is easier to sustain the backbone while defending than attacking. If an MSE-equipped unit is attacking, the nodes must bound forward to assure continued service. Signal units have no organic security forces, so the same soldiers who install, service, and man the signal nodes must also defend those nodes.

Figure 95. Chemical soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division investigate a research and development facility

The problem of keeping up with the fight and keeping MSE users happy fell to Colonel Jeff Smith, commander of the 22nd Signal Brigade. Smith's challenge was not unlike that which confronts his civilian counterparts who provide "wireless" service, except that Smith had no "roaming" capability. When a subscriber passed outside of Smith's coverage, there were no adjacent nodes to carry the signal. In OIF, that meant turning to FM radio or a combination of commercial and military satellite radios and phones.

Undismayed, Smith and his troops set to work to solve the problem. In addition to Smith's organic battalions, the theater assigned two more and placed a third under the 22nd's operational control. Armed with six battalions and the ability to analyze the terrain and the operational plan, Smith and his staff developed a system that would bound node centers forward and congregate enough resources at preplanned sites to support what they called "wide band belts." The 22nd developed a set of positions along the anticipated axis of advance, from which their nodes could link to satellites and thus back to Kuwait (or to anywhere else) and provide adequate bandwidth to support the operation.⁵⁶

In the end, despite feverish efforts and signal units attempting to operate under fire, the 22nd proved unable to provide MSE support to the lowest levels. The 3rd ID, operating in the vanguard, fought the war "push to talk," using radios, satellite phones, and BFT delivered by satellite. V Corps `separate brigades and other units that relied on MSE and had fewer backup capabilities found themselves on the wrong side of the digital divide. Major General Marks, the C2, described one outcome of the digital divide when he noted that, although he could acquire "oven-fresh imagery," he could not necessarily get it to the units advancing on Baghdad.⁵⁷

National Guard and US Army Reserve Troops

As V Corps advanced north, it was far more than an active duty-only force. A true "Army of One," the corps included Army Reservists and National Guard soldiers who served throughout the combat zone. These soldiers were vital, indispensable members of the team and, unless asked, were wholly indistinguishable from active-duty solders. This marks a revolutionary change for the better toward achieving a fully integrated Army.

Operation DESERT STORM and the subsequent demobilization of the Cold War Army produced a divide between the Active and Reserve Components that seemed to many too wide to bridge. Acrimonious debates over the size of the reduction of each of the components eventually forced Congress to get involved. At first, congressional mandates and internal Army agreements pleased none of the components, but the Army--all of it--weathered the storm. Thanks to the energy of the leadership, all three components--Active, US Army Reserve (USAR), and US Army National Guard (ARNG)--reached a point during recent years when the Army could honestly describe itself as "the" Army--meaning everyone who wore the uniform or served as a civilian in any of the three components.

The tempo of operations driven by commitments in the Balkans, the Sinai, and elsewhere forced unprecedented deployments of reserve troops. Guard and reserve military police, civil affairs, and PSYOP units deployed at previously unheard-of rates.ARNG infantry units deployed routinely to secure Patriot units rotating in and out of the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Post-9/11 deployments increased astronomically to support everything from combat operations to providing security at housing areas near Army installations in Germany. On 9 June 2003, 143,000 reservists were on active duty. In short, by the time of OIF, saying the Army could not go to war without the Guard and Reserve was demonstrably not merely a slogan.⁵⁸

For the first time since the Korean War, ARNG infantry units went to war as units. Seven ARNG infantry units deployed in support of OIF. All were intended to secure sensitive sites, including Patriot units, theater support units, and air and seaports. Generally, because CFLCC expected to use them in local security roles, these battalions deployed in pieces and parts. Only one of them, 1-293 IN, Indiana Army National Guard, deployed as a whole battalion. Most deployed one or two companies, and others deployed with their headquarters but without their heavy weapons, a fact most came to regret. One unit, the 92nd Separate Infantry Brigade of the Puerto Rico Army National Guard, provided some 1,400 troops as on-board security to both commercial and Military Sea Lift Command vessels.⁵⁹

In fact, all of the ARNG infantry battalions that deployed were light infantry. Light infantry's distinguishing characteristic that makes them "light" is that they have almost no vehicles--in short, they are foot-mobile. Moreover, none of these battalions deployed with their parent brigades so they came without their organic support and, some might argue, without an advocate. The experience of the 1st Battalion, 293rd Infantry Regiment, is emblematic of all of them. From a broader perspective, it is emblematic, in many ways, of the experiences of the "orphan" active Army battalions, including the 2 -70 AR, 1-41 IN, and the 2-14 IN. In overcoming the difficulties of being "orphaned," these units demonstrated the flexibility and initiative of American soldiers.

The 1-293 IN, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Denton, mobilized at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. During their mobilization process, the soldiers worked through every holiday in the winter of 2002-2003. Mobilized on Veterans Day, they were "federalized" or brought on active federal service at Fort Knox, Kentucky, during Thanksgiving week, and the advance party deployed to Kuwait on New Year's Day. The battalion closed on the theater over the next couple of weeks, with the last unit (D Company) arriving on 20 January 2003. B Company arrived on 2 January and began conducting rear area security missions the next day. Supporting the 377th TSC, the battalion found itself spread all over Kuwait securing port facilities, Camp UDAIRI on the Iraqi frontier, the military side of the Kuwait International Airport, and convoys across the entire country.⁶⁰

But the battalion's real challenge came on 25 March 2003. CLFCC planned to establish a LSA south of Tallil Air Base (Objective FIREBIRD). Brigadier General Jack Stultz, commanding the theater transportation command, arrived at the air base on the heels of 3rd ID and immediately began setting up logistics support and working to return the airfield to service in support of coalition operations. On the 25th, Stultz learned that the Active Army infantry battalion task force, TF 1-41 IN, which had been defending the air base and assuring that any bad actors in Tallil remained in Tallil, would be moving north. TF 1-41 IN deployed from Fort Riley, Kansas, as part of the solution to the dilemma posed when V Corps learned 1st AD would not be flowed in time to secure the LOCs as planned. Now they had to move on to perform the same role farther up the LOC. Stultz needed infantry to relieve the TF 1-41 IN, and he needed them fast. Major General Kratzer, commanding the 377th TSC, had only one complete infantry battalion, the "Hoosiers" of the 1-293 IN.⁶¹

That evening, Kratzer ordered Lieutenant Colonel Denton to move his battalion to Tallil as soon as possible. Because all three infantry companies were out on missions, Denton ordered his support platoon to issue tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missiles to his antitank company, Delta Company, 1-293 IN. He then ordered Delta Company to depart Camp UDAIRI for Tallil Air Base as soon as it completed loading its TOW missiles.⁶²

Lieutenant Colonel Denton, with a small command post, his mortar platoon, one scout team, and two rifle platoons, departed Camp ARIFJAN at 0600 on the 26th. Delta Company trailed Denton by 2 hours, departing Camp UDAIRI at 0800. Denton linked up at Convoy Support Center (CSC) CEDAR, located south of the air base near Highway 8. There, the CSC commander claimed that the battalion's mission was to secure CEDAR and not Tallil Air Base. Denton did not believe that to be the case, but he left his operations officer and most of the troops at CEDAR and went on to Tallil Air Base with an antitank section and scout team where he reported to Brigadier General Stultz. Stultz confirmed the mission to relieve TF 1-41 IN in-place. After talking with Stultz, Denton concluded that he could relieve TF 1-41 IN and secure the CSC with the resources on hand. Out of radio range, Denton could not talk to his operations officer down at CEDAR. Accordingly, he sent a written order, delivered by his scout team, which directed his operations officer to move out smartly and to leave the two rifle platoons to secure CEDAR.⁶³

The following morning, Delta Company, the scout team, and mortars did the necessary reconnaissance and handoff with TF 1-41 IN. Lieutenant Colonel Denton did his own reconnaissance and conferred with the commander of TF 1-41 IN as well. The remainder of his battalion arrived on the 28th. At 1600 that day, 1-293 IN assumed the mission, thus becoming the first ARNG infantry battalion since Korea to enter combat as a unit. It was not the last. Ultimately all but one of the seven ARNG infantry battalions deployed into Iraq.⁶⁴ Conclusion

At the end of the march up-country, the corps had reached positions from which to launch north through the Karbala Gap and begin the isolation of Baghdad. The LSA at Objective RAMS was well on the way to achieving full operational capability, and the CFLCC had freed up the 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd ACR (L) to start cleaning up the threat along the lengthening LOCs.

Although many perceived the war as "in a pause," V Corps and I MEF did not cease operations. V Corps continued to fight in several directions, from As Samawah to An Najaf and elsewhere to defeat the mix of paramilitaries and conventional forces to set the conditions required to attack to Baghdad. I MEF was doing much of the same within its zone, and both corps were busily transitioning their support structures forward to support future operations to the north. The fighting to protect the LOC revealed the real nature of the Iraqi defense. Corps units adapted their fighting techniques to match. Immediately behind the fighting, soldiers quickly transitioned to stability and humanitarian relief operations while they tried to stabilize the liberated areas. The 11th AHR, which conducted the first Army aviation deep strike of the war, learned that its tactics were inappropriate and helped lead the effort to adapt appropriately. And finally, a sandstorm of biblical proportions swept through the theater, shutting down most aviation and inhibiting ground maneuver.

Elsewhere in the theater, JSOTF-North supported Kurdish attacks toward Kirkuk, Irbil, and the vital oil facilities in the region. In the west, the JSOTF-West searched for surface-to- surface missiles and WMD while denying the Iraqis the use of the entire western desert. SOF troops in JSOTF-West or in TF 20 seized a key dam and several airfields. Taking the dam protected V Corps and I MEF from a deliberate inundation, while seizing the airfields extended JSOTF-West's reach across the barren desert regions. Finally, the CFACC transitioned from its initial strategic air focus to concentrate on destroying the Iraqi ground forces. With a level of air-ground integration not seen before, the CAS and air interdiction operations destroyed threatening Iraqis and enabled ground maneuver.

During the march up-country, the implications of the scope and scale of the campaign became apparent. Reaching operational ranges greater than anything the US Army had executed since World War II, the speed and distance started to tell on the Army's logistics and combat support systems. While never out of fuel, ammunition, or food and water, the systems designed to deliver repair parts, tactical communications, and tactical intelligence support faltered under the strain. Moreover, after the initial coalition surge up-country, the enemy actions influenced events and to some extent forced the CFLCC to adjust. Soldiers, of course, immediately adapted and continued toward their objectives. Behind and beside them, the logistics troops demonstrated that they too could get the job done under difficult conditions. While never perfect, the Army and entire coalition force carried on despite the enemy and miserable conditions.

Back to Top

The 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment's deep strike of 23 March remains one of the key components of the "darkest day." On the night of 23-24 March, the Army sent its most powerful deep-attack system, the AH-64D Apache attack helicopter, to destroy Medina Division armor and artillery before they could affect the maneuvering ground forces. However, the regiment returned with 31 of 32 aircraft damaged, one downed in enemy territory, and two pilots captured, without decisively engaging the Medina. While marines eventually rescued the pilots, and the aviators repaired many of the damaged aircraft rapidly, it took 30 days to restore the regiment to full capability. The mission cast a shadow over deep-attack operations throughout the duration of major combat operations. In fact the Army only attempted one other deep attack. Moreover, the incident placed in question the efficacy and utility of attack helicopters in Army doctrine. Soon after the sandstorm cleared, the 101st Airborne Division successfully executed a deep attack. On that mission, two aircraft crashed in brownout conditions on takeoff, marring even this achievement.

But the mission is significant and important for other reasons, chief among which is that 11th AHR quickly assessed what went wrong and shared their assessment with the 101st and others. More important, all of the attack aviation units in theater learned lessons from the unsuccessful mission and applied them to great effect. A close review of the attack suggests the failed mission suffered from a classic "first-battle" dynamic. Specifically, Apaches ravaged Iraq formations during DESERT STORM. As a consequence, the Iraqis adjusted and prepared a defense specifically against attack helicopters going deep. No one detected their dispositions, with the result they achieved surprise and defeated one of the best-trained attack aviation units in the world. The aviators flew against these defenses using tactics, techniques, and procedures inappropriate to the combat environment. It took the hard lessons of the night of 23 March to change these tactics.

To be sure, the 11th AHR did not fail solely because of inappropriate tactics. As with most failures, there was a chain of events--a "failure chain"--that led to the ultimate outcome. In this case, the failure chain links the inevitable fog and friction of combat with a series of individual and collective decisions and the human ego in war. From delayed convoys to confusing terrain management to an indomitable warrior spirit to get into the fight, a variety of dynamics contributed to the unsuccessful mission. Yet even with the loss and damage of equipment, the capture of two aviators, and an unmolested enemy, the mission triggered an amazing revision of tactics and procedures that is a testimony to the integrity, flexibility, and perhaps most important, persistence of Army aviators.

The 11th AHR Attack

The 11th AHR, commanded by Colonel Bill Wolf and composed of two attack helicopter squadrons--2-6 CAV and 6-6 CAV--began planning for OIF in October 2002. At that time, 2-6 CAV was already in Kuwait supporting Operation DESERT SPRING, and the aircrews and planners were comfortable with conducting operations in the desert environment. By the time the rest of the regiment arrived in Kuwait, 2-6 CAV had flown some 4,000 hours training in the Kuwaiti desert. In January 2003, the rest of the regiment alerted to deploy to Kuwait and learned that it would receive attachment of the 1-227 Attack Helicopter Battalion (AHB). The 1-227 AHB, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Ball, an AH-64D Longbow-equipped attack helicopter squadron joined from Fort Hood, Texas.⁶⁵ Thus, the regiment would consist of three attack squadrons fitted with the most advanced attack helicopters in the world.

The AHR aborted its first planned deep-attack mission against the Iraqi 11th ID in the vicinity of Tallil Air Base due to haze, dust, and poor visibility. The mission would have been a "JV [junior varsity] fight," preparing the 11th AHR for the "varsity fight" with the Medina Division.⁶⁶ Frustration over aborting their first mission was palpable within the staff and aircrews. In particular, the 2-6 CAV aviators felt tremendous frustration. Not assigned to fly that night, they harbored the idea, with their longer experience in the desert that they might have been able to execute the mission had they flown. Second, the running start option reduced the number of ground combat units available to V Corps so the regiment, as Major John Lindsay, the operations offer put it, "felt significant obligation to alleviate as much pressure as we could on the 3rd ID."⁶⁷ But, when the regiment received the mission to destroy the Republican Guard Medina Division's artillery and armored maneuver units, it was determined to succeed.⁶⁸

The Plan

The 11th AHR planned to move forward to Objective RAMS immediately after 2nd BCT had cleared it. The initial quartering party and command post would fly into the assembly area, followed by the regiment's support units bringing fuel and ammunition forward. The attack helicopters would arrive last. Moving would position the corps' deep-attack capability well forward, extending their reach ahead of the rapidly advancing ground forces. Moreover, it would enable the corps to continue combat operations unabated while the ground forces refitted from their 200-km dash north from the border.

Intelligence on how the Medina's three maneuver brigades and its artillery were arrayed for battle was incomplete and led to debate between corps and the regimental staff officers. Intelligence estimates reported the Medina brigades in the vicinity of their home garrisons but their actual disposition for battle was unclear.⁶⁹ Although corps intelligence painted a fairly clear picture for the 10th AR Brigade of the Medina, the corps directed the regiment to attack the Medina's 2nd AR Brigade because it appeared to be astride the avenue of approach north of Karbala that 3rd ID planned to use.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, the corps could not accurately locate the units assigned to the 2nd AR Brigade

The original mission, purpose, and endstate were:

On order, 11th AHR attacks to destroy the artillery and armor of the Medina Division to facilitate 3rd ID freedom of maneuver through the Karbala Gap and seizure of Objective SAINTS.

The purpose is to shape the Corps' battlespace and thereby provide the 3rd ID freedom to maneuver in the Karbala area by destroying the artillery and armor forces of the 14th, 2nd, and 10th Brigades of the Medina Division.

The endstate is the destruction of the Artillery and Armor of the 14th, 2nd, and 10th Brigades, 3rd ID freedom of maneuver maintained, and 11th AHR postured to conduct shaping attacks against the Republican Guard's Hammurabi Division in support of V Corps establishment of the inner cordon [around Baghdad].⁷¹

Click here for higher resolution image (473 KB)
Figure 96. 11th AHR attack scheme for 23 March 2003

The 11th AHR estimated that the destruction of the Medina would take two nights of deep attacks, employing three battalions each night.⁷² Planning, already contentious because of inexact intelligence, became more contentious on the matter of routes. Regimental planners repeatedly requested to attack into their objectives from the west, avoiding the urban areas to the north and east of RAMS.

The western avenue of approach crossed Milh Lake north of Karbala, followed by a sparsely populated Iraqi army maneuver training area. Because the 101st's division boundary was to the west, the 11th AHR had to request these routes through the corps. V Corps denied the western avenues because to use them would have required establishing a FARP near Milh Lake to refuel the attack helicopters. This FARP would have been well forward of the advancing 3rd ID's forward line of troops and thus vulnerable. The corps had already received multiple reports of Iraqi forces maneuvering in the area where the FARP would have to go and did not believe the risk was acceptable. Even if the corps had approved the western approach and the forward FARP, it is clear that 11th AHR could not have executed such a plan. As it turned out, the regiment only got enough fuel to RAMS to refuel part of two battalions. On 23 March they had no means to establish a FARP north of RAMS, let alone as far north as they imagined prior to departing Kuwait. As it was, attacking the Iraqi 2nd Armored Brigade required a south-to- north approach, directly over the Iraqi equivalent of urban sprawl.⁷³

Click here for higher resolution image (621 KB)
Figure 97. Overview of 11th AHR planned routes

In any case, a route near the lake may not have solved the problem. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Troy Templeton recalled that "we templated all this ADA expecting us to come up the lakes."⁷⁴ Templeton believed that the 1-227 AHB routes reflected concern about possible ADA that could engage units attempting to use the lake to reach targets. In short, the enemy may well have anticipated that attack helicopter units would use the lake as a means to avoid ADA and so placed ADA where they thought the aviators would have to come to use the lake on their approach to the Medina. Templeton liked the idea of avoiding the ADA at the lake. As he put it, "They (the routes) were fine with me. We didn't start getting shot until we were right over the city--and what is a good way to enter a city?"⁷⁵

Still, the regiment planned routes that avoided the towns and villages along the way to the target. To do this they used FalconView, which enables route planning and rehearsal using high- resolution imagery. FalconView is first-class software that essentially supports a "magic carpet ride" over the terrain. Of course the utility of the tools is entirely dependent on the imagery. The relatively open areas the regiment planned to fly were not devoid of habitation. As Wolf put it, "We avoided any idea of a village at all. I will tell you once you cross the Euphrates everything is lit up. Every farm has a light and every farmhouse has a brick wall around it. Everything became a hiding place for whoever wanted to be there."⁷⁶

Captain Karen Hobart, the regimental intelligence officer, understood the threat urban terrain posed to the aircraft. In her intelligence estimate for OPLAN 1003, she explicitly described the threat to rotary-wing aircraft operating over the Iraqi urban terrain. Her intelligence summary described how Iraq's air defense systems enjoyed advantage in urban areas. Iraqi guns had the advantages of high rates of fire and high gun elevations, and they were light and easy to deploy and move on civilian vehicles.

In general terms, the regimental intelligence summary also addressed how smaller-caliber weapon systems, such as antiaircraft artillery, could be placed on rooftops and on mobile trucks for hit-and-run operations. Moreover, the summary assessed that the air defense assets could be placed around schools, mosques, and hospitals, indicating Iraq's awareness of coalition attempts to avoid collateral damage. Finally, Hobart described Iraq's air defense ambush techniques along friendly routes, to include massing small-arms fires on low-flying and hovering aircraft. At the final rehearsal for the mission, Wolf highlighted the small-arms threat, noting that he told his aviators that small arms "would ruin their day." But after the fact he recalled, "nobody in their right mind would have envisioned what we ended up facing."⁷⁷ In fact the Iraqis had perhaps as many as a dozen air defense teams deployed along possible routes. The teams included light air defense artillery cannon and shoulder-launched surface-to- air missiles.⁷⁸

The coalition intent to avoid destroying the Iraqi power grids also concerned Hobart. City lights could silhouette aircraft against the night sky and hinder the pilots' use of their night vision goggles. Thus placing their air defense artillery in the well-lit population centers reduced one of the Iraqi's major weaknesses--the lack of night-capable air defense artillery. What Captain Hobart and others did not know was that the Iraqis planned to use city lights as an early-warning system, turning an entire town's lights off and on to signal the approach of helicopters.⁷⁹

All aviators and intelligence personnel "knew" of the theoretical risk of small arms in an air defense role. But with the exception of Somalia in 1993, the Army had no contemporary experiences to weigh the actual risk, and very few of the aviators who flew that night had flown in Vietnam, where ground fire took an awful toll on helicopters. So the 11th AHR--and its supporting intelligence soldiers--seriously underestimated the small-arms and light ADA cannon threat to attack aviation operations. The commanders, pilots, and planners generally tried to avoid flying over urban terrain where possible, but after years of training on benign live- fire ranges and in computer simulations that do not adequately represent the small-arms threat, no one really understood that small-arms and light ADA cannon could be showstoppers.

Coordinating deep artillery fire for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) along the routes is a critical element of any deep strike. SEAD missions are historically among the most complex and challenging to execute, as ideally the artillery hits suspected air defense sites along the planned route only minutes before the aircraft traverse the area. Timing and accuracy are critical, made all the more difficult by typically imperfect knowledge of exactly where the air defense systems are. For this mission, the corps planned to fire 32 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles.⁸⁰ The corps also panned joint SEAD, primarily coming from electronic warfare aircraft and air strikes on suspected air defenses.⁸¹

The Preparation

Based on the pace of 3rd ID's advance, the corps ordered the regiment to attack the Medina a day earlier than originally planned. Adding to the sense of urgency, a severe sandstorm was bearing down on the region, expected to hit on the 24th. Many in the regiment felt that if the attack didn't occur on the 23rd, the 11th AHR might not get into the war in a meaningful way.⁸²

Figure 98. ATACMS missile fires in support of combat operations

The regiment failed to meet several of the doctrinal conditions for the attack. First, it operated from an unsecured assembly area on Objective RAMS. Some Iraqis appear to have driven around the flight line during mission preparation.⁸³ Second, the MSE Small Extension Node (SEN) that would have provided high-bandwidth digital communications for the TAC could not be sling-loaded forward due to weight and atmospheric conditions. Finally, less