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Polaris A-3P

United States assistance and support to the United Kingdom's (U.K.) strategic systems programs are covered by the POLARIS Sales Agreement, which was a direct result of the now-historic meeting at Nassau in December 1962 between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan. SSP has additional responsibilities related to the British Strategic Systems Programs. Under the terms of the Sales Agreement, the U.S. sold POLARIS missiles (less warheads) to the U.K. In addition to the missiles, the subsystems that make up the weapon system were also sold. The British built their own nuclearpowered submarines to house the weapon system and provided their own warheads.

In December 1962, the then Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Harold Macmillan, met with John F. Kennedy, then President of the United States, at Nassau in the Bahama Islands. They discussed the cancellation of the Skybolt project. Skybolt was a U.S. development project which the U.S. had agreed to share with the U.K. It had been planned as U.K.'s prime deterrent and its cancellation caused the U.K. some concern. At this Nassau meeting, it was agreed that the POLARIS A3P would be made available to Britain in order to maintain the U.K.'s deterrent potential during the years ahead. This agreement became known as the "Nassau Agreement." It eventually resulted in signing of the "U.S./U.K. POLARIS Sales Agreement" in April 1963. It was further agreed that Britain would build its own submarines of their own design, including the nuclear propulsion plant, but would be armed with the POLARIS A3P missile. Britain would also design and construct its own nuclear warheads for the POLARIS missiles.

A British Admiralty negotiating team came to the U.S. to negotiate a detailed U.S./U.K. agreement. The POLARIS Sales Agreement was signed on 6 April 1963. Upon approval of this agreement, work began in earnest and continued at an intense pace ever since. VADM R. N. MacKenzie was named the U.K. Chief POLARIS Executive (CPE) and he was authorized to use personnel from the MOD(N) for the production of submarines, ground support, and mechanical and electrical equipment. The Ministry of Public Buildings and Works has prime responsibility for providing facilities ashore for supporting and maintaining the entire system. The Ministry of Aviation has the responsibility, within the U.K., for procurement of the POLARIS missile, including the reentry system and all necessary associated support equipment. It also acts as the U.K. approving authority for the reentry system's warhead. Through the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, design responsibility for the U.K. warhead is in the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), under the direction of the Ministry of Aviation.

To ensure cooperation and coordination, a Joint U.S.-U.K. Steering Task Group and a Joint U.S.-U.K. Reentry System Working Group were formed. These were parallel structure groups to those in the U.S. FBM Program.

Contracts were released to British industry for various parts of their weapon system. Among them were:

• a. Vickers Ltd. (shipbuilder) for the launching system
• b. BAC for the POLARIS missile, test equipment, ULCER
• c. GECfor fire control and test instrumentation subsystem
• d. Elliott & Sperryfor the navigation system
• e. EMIfor the weapon control subsystem simulator
• f. Vickers, Barrow & Cammell Laird, Burkenhead shipbuilder for the submarines.

In the early 1970s, the U.K. embarked on an extensive program, known as Chevaline, to improve the effectiveness of the A3 missile system by modifying its front end. The Chevaline (aka "Super Antelope" and "KH793") program. It began in secret (as is true of all British nuclear programs) in the late sixties when the Soviet Union began deploying an ABM system around Moscow. Although this system eventually turned out to be very limited in scope, concern about the continuing potency of the British deterrent developed and proposals were made to develop a countermeasure system to improve the ability for Polaris to penetrate these defenses. The program was not an original British undertaking, but was based on a classified U.S. program called Antelope which had made available to the UK in 1967. In June 1967, the Labour Government announced in Parliament its decision not to upgrade the Polaris system by purchasing Poseidon missiles from the United States.

Instead of deploying Poseidon, it was decided to re-direct work at Aldermaston to investigate the possibilities of designing a new warhead capable of penetrating Soviet defences using decoys, hardening techniques and penetration aids. Studies of the concept were made in 1967 and the decision to proceed was made by the first Wilson government that same year. By 1969 the Chevaline concept was defined and by 1972 the system had been worked out in detail. It was approved for deployment by the Heath government (1970-74), a decision finally ratified by the second Wilson government in February 1974. At the time of the Wilson decision to proceed the cost was estimated at £250 million. By 1975 this cost had increased to £400 million, and a review was held to determine whether the program should be cancelled in September. This was an important moment in British nuclear policy making because the key issue on review was more than just Chevaline - it was whether the British could afford to maintain its deterrent and competitive in the arena of nuclear arms.

In 1977, the decision came up for review by a small group of Ministers, which has often been criticised since. The reason that the decision came up before a small group of Ministers was that it had already been taken. The cost escalation was considerable. At that time, the question was whether the programme should be cancelled. That was considered seriously, because the cost by then was £700 million and the cost eventually became £1 billion.

One of the major arguments used against cancellation was its effect on the capability of our nuclear deterrent. It was felt that if one came forward and announced that one was cancelling a programme on which one had spent £700 million and which had been started to improve the penetration of missiles, one would flag to everybody—and very visibly to the Soviet Union—that one's existing deterrent was not effective. Nobody argued more strongly against cancellation than the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence community. They argued powerfully that it was absurd to cancel the program, having spent so much money on it. The anti-ballistic missile treaty had been signed by then, the UK was dealing only with the rather inadequate Galosh system around Moscow, and some Ministers did not believe in the Moscow criteria.

There was nothing disreputable or discreditable about the Government deciding — the decision was made for them at almost technical level, as most classifications are — that this classification should be highly secret and that disclosure would be deeply damaging. There was a change of Government in 1979. On 24 January 1980 the Conservative Defence Secretary of State for Defence — later Lord Pym — came to the House and suddenly announced not only that the project was near to completion—which he was entitled to do—but that the project was called Chevaline. On what authorisation did Francis Pym suddenly announce the name of the project? It was one of the most highly classified secrets of the previous 10 or 11 years. Presumably he decided to declassify it himself, rather as Winston Churchill declassified documents at frequent intervals.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Francis Pym) stated : the Soviet Union has continued to upgrade its ABM capabilities, and we have needed to respond to that upgrading so that we can maintain the deterrent assurance of our force. The previous Conservative Government therefore pressed ahead with a programme of improvements to our Polaris missiles, which our immediate predecessors continued and sustained. The House will, I am sure, understand that I cannot go deep into detail, even to correct the widely mistaken assertions which have sometimes appeared in public, but I think the programme has now reached a stage where I can properly make public more information about it.v "The programme, which has the code-name Chevaline, is a very major and complex development of the missile front end, involving also changes to the fire control systems. The result will not be a MIRVed system, but it includes advanced penetration aids and the ability to manoeuvre the payload in space. The programme has been funded and managed entirely by the United Kingdom with the full co-operation of the United States 682 Government, including the use of some of their facilities for trials and tests. "Some American firms have been employed, but most of the work in industry has gone to British firms. We have had a very successful series of flight trials and development is close to completion. Deployment will begin soon afterwards, and that will maintain the full effectiveness of our strategic deterrent into the 1990s.

"It has been a vital improvement. I do not think the House will be surprised that it has also been costly. The programme's overall estimated cost totals about £1,000 million.

"It is a major improvement. For at least another decade we can be confident that our strategic force is equipped absolutely to fulfil its deterrent function. But, for a variety of technical and operational reasons, we cannot sensibly or responsibly plan on its continuance much into the 1990s. We intend to ensure that our strategic deterrent remains effective for a long time thereafter. Knowing how long it takes to design and procure new strategic forces of the complexity now needed or, indeed, any complicated weapon system, we must decide before long about Polaris's ultimate replacement.

Chevaline was a complex system based on the coordination of the 16 missiles on a single submarine, maneuver by the RVs to elude interceptors, along with multiple decoy re-entry vehicles, and hardening of the warhead against ABM weapon effects. Each missile would fly a different trajectory so that all missiles would arrive simultaneously over the target (Moscow) and release two real warheads (reduced from the three of the AT3) plus four decoy RVs, and a large number of decoy balloons. The defense would be presented with 96 simultaneous maneuvering targets to intercept (even after the balloon decoys burned up). The system proved far more difficult to develop and deploy than expected. The total cost of the project was given as £1,000 million making Chevaline the most expensive defence project not to be made public. The high cost resulted in a highly critical report by the Public Accounts Committee published in 1982.

In the 1980s, new A3 first- and second-stage motors were procured by the U.K. to replace aging A3 stocks; the new motors were designated A3R.

The U.K.'s POLARIS force was phased out in 1996 and has been replaced by a Trident force.