Taran (Battering Ram)
The cost of military construction in the Soviet Union belonged to the category of classified information, the cost of construction of a missile defense - to the category of top secret. Traditionally, since the days of Stalin, reliable data had a small circle of top leaders, and only they, could they really be compared with figures of expenses for the development of other sectors of the economy.
The most complete data are possessed only the head of state. Khrushchev was no exception and was well aware of the scale of the forthcoming work on missile defense. His grand plans were not frightened, but on the contrary, gave the energy of its exuberant nature. But one question he could not even find it an answer: where to get money to create defense systems across the country, the need of which he had no doubt?
The main obstacle to the approval of the project of Kisunkon, with a gradual build-up of the A-35 system for the security capabilities of the USSR, was the contradiction between the huge cost of the complex to intercept a ballistic missile and the plans for the application of the United States of a massive nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, who were at the same time building up their strategic offensive arms.
Khrushchev could not accept the idea that the head of a huge power, not denying anything for strengthening the security and defense might of the country, can not protect it from missile attack by an aggressor. It is said that Khrushchev was annoyed by the material before him and wondered why scientists and engineers, which the country provides everything they need may not come up with something cheaper. He was not used to hiding his emotions, and soon the interest of the head of state became known in the Ministry of Radio Industry, the Ministry of Defense and in the Military Industrial Commission.
The experimental and combat systems of G.V.Kisunko were just as complex and, at times, dramatic, as the fate of their chief designer, yes, perhaps, as the fate of many inventions and their talented creators. At the end of 1960 funding for the system "A" was under threat of closure. Interception March 4, 1961, and saved the system "A" and the project A-35, and the most Kisunko.
Project A-35 assumed an unprecedented scale deployment of production and construction. The success of the first interception took place, and instead of it emerged the frightening amount of costs. Kisunko started asking questions about whether its system to cope with the selection of complex ballistic targets, the development of which in the Soviet Union, and was carried out in full swing in the United States. He was advised to give up the expensive and cumbersome method of three distances. Sometimes he replied irrelevantly: "In such a huge speed setting can not be interference." Sometimes it was absolutely right: "On the basis of the available components, we cannot create other means of determining the exact coordinates of a ballistic missile."
As it seemed the leadership of the USSR, Chelomei offered quite effective and relatively inexpensive defense system throughout the country. It was in April, Khrushchev approved Chelomey's proposal to establish a system of "Taran", and during the Summer began preliminary design study. The possibility of establishing a system to deflect the massive missile attack of the enemy stood on the agenda at the end of 1960, after the completion of the main phase of testing experimental system "A", designed to intercept a single target, and began to develop the A-35 system, intended to deflect a group strike.
In the winter 1960/1961 period were carried out so-called "Pokrovsky gatherings" or "meeting of the twelve apostles." At the Ministry of Radio Industry guesthouse, located in a picturesque forest of Pokrovsky, arrived twelve major and general constructors and twelve representatives of the customer in order to discuss the question of what should be the future missile defense system. Among the designers were A.A.Raspletin, P.D.Grushin, G.V.Kisunko, VN Chelomei, S.N.Hruschev, Yu.G.Burlakov and others. Customer group headed K.A.Trusov. After much debate, the participants came to a common conclusion: the creation of defenses against a massive missile attack was possible. The "Pokrovsky gatherings" inspired VN Chelomeya.
In 1961 Chelomei came out with a proposal to establish a medium-class rocket UR-100 (8K84) - one of his planned series of universal launchers. According to the plan, the UR-100 can be used as an intercontinental ballistic missile and missile interceptors like. Moreover, the general designer also proposed version of the missile UR-100M for placement on surface ships. This project was named "Scorpio" .
April 17, 1962, on his birthday, NS Khrushchev was shown the documentary "System A", with the announcer's voice-over, like a mantra, repeatedly and emphatically repeating the magic phrase that all the success to establish a system is inextricably linked to using the method of the three ranges. Someone has already taken care of and put into the mouth of Khrushchev another phrase: "it is necessary to go to the single station method and make the system easier and cheaper." Easier and cheaper project looked to be VN Chelomey's "Taran".
In 1962 Chelomei proposed project "Taran". "Taran" system was to protect the territory of the USSR in a massive missile attack of the enemy. Its structure was assumed to enter the station range detection SSC-P and station detection and tracking SSC-C A .L. Mintz, the UR-100 missile of V. Chelomey (direct development anticipated by DB-52 branches in Fili) close interception system C-225 A.A.Raspletina and other means.
According to the plan, the SSC-P radar located in the Arctic should detect a massive launch of an ICBM opponent and pass the information stations SSC-C rendered at a distance of about 500 kilometers from Moscow on the missile-direction toward Leningrad. Stations NOC-S made one goal interceptors UR-100. At long range and height above the northern borders of the Soviet Union, detonation of warheads with a capacity of 10 megatons would lead to disabling automatic detonation of nuclear warheads of ballistic missiles of the enemy.
The "Taran" looked more or less attractive, provided that the Americans will launch a massive strike that all their missiles will fly just over the North Pole and arrive at the same time in the interception zone. How to reflect the group, salvo or single strokes? How to ward off the attack of ballistic missile submarines, the flight path which is not ran over the North Pole? How to reflect the impact ICBM trajectories that did not run over the North Pole? These and many other questions were no answers.
In October 1962, a project to develop the A-35 system and proposals for the "Taran" was considered by the Commission, headed by Commander of Air Defense Forces, VA Sudets. Members of the committee supported G.V.Kisunko and made an uncertain opinion about V.N.Chelomey's offers. Then it was decided to convene a large commission Ministry of Radio Industry to determine the prospects for the development of missile defense systems.
The Ministry of Radio Industry committee headed by the director of NIIDAR Fedor Viktorovich Lukin meeting again went to Pokrovskoye. It was to determine the effectiveness of the systems in use by the enemy means to overcome missile defense and high-altitude nuclear explosions, as well as to consider the possibility of establishing a territorial missile defense.
Here is how this time he G.V.Kisunko in the book "The Secret Zone" : "The report of the commission F.V.Lukina System" Taran" A.A.Raspletin began with reports that academician VN Chelomei noticed that the trajectory US ICBM attack the Soviet Union, will pass through a small spatial region, that is, the focus in this area, which is thus the most convenient locus intercepting ballistic missile defense purposes means. this makes it possible to ensure the territorial compactness in placing missile defenses and defeat even more than one purpose by one superpower nuclear propellant th interceptors. Following this presentation, Rapporteur on the blackboard with chalk held two intersecting curved lines, depicting the trajectory of ballistic targets and UR-100 missiles to be used as interceptors."
Kisunko vigorously defended his project. Chelomey's performances were bright, but not convincing. From a technical point of view, the proposal was "lame" on both feet and not all members of the committee agreed with this project. However, proponents of Chelomey were confident that with the strong support of all problems will be solved in the future. For the development of radar systems and low intercept P-225 had decided to take a lot of weight and authority academics AL Mintz and A.A.Raspletin.
Saving the A-35, F.V.Lukin proposed to use the system as an intermediate between the systems S-225 and "Taran". This opinion he continued to defend and further than angered Minister radio V.D.Kalmykova and was soon forced to move from the Ministry of Radio Industry in Minelektronprom.
After completing work on November 26, the commission was unable to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of the system "Taran". However, May 4, 1963 was adopted a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers "On the development of anti-missile defense of the country." The unusual decision was the fact that the chief designer of "Ram" system was appointed VN Brow and head of the development of the preliminary design of the system, "Taran" - A.L. Mintz.
The developer proposed to present a preliminary design of the system in the fourth quarter of 1963 and the first quarter of 1964 to develop an integrated preliminary design of a territorial missile defense system of the country based on the application of the system "Taran", and other means of missile defense. In June 1964, the financing system of the A-35 has been nearly eliminated, the construction of frozen, military engineers began to move to other places. AL Mints "revived" the station SSC-C, A.A.Raspletin boosted creating S-225 with the radar targeting "Program", and YG Burlakov Kartsev prepared a set of upgraded computers M-4M.
Says veteran engineering NGOs V.G.Ivashin "Elaboration of pilot project carried out in our bureau at the end of 1962 - beginning of 1963 with the participation of specialists of KB-1 A.A.Raspletina, NII-885 M.S.Ryazanskogo, NII-944 VI Kuznetsov, RTI AL Mints , 2nd Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense and Minsredmash organizations."
Participants in the Work came to a conclusion about the possibility of creating a missile defense system capable of providing highly efficient protection of the main part of the territory of the USSR. The structure of "Taran" system were to enter: firepower, including as a universal missile ballistic missile UR-100 nuclear warheads with high power; radar means for detection, target tracking and target designation firing means; complete management tool, designed to provide continuous operational readiness and battle management systems.
The system "Taran" was to intercept warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range missiles, tactical missiles and satellites for military purposes Earth. The preliminary design performed later were considered: questions of construction and the principle of the creation of the country's territorial missile defense system; questions using the system "Taran" to deal with the satellites for military purposes; the results of the preliminary study of the possibility of using the UR-100 missiles in territorial missile defense system; initial data for the development of an integrated pilot project of territorial missile and anti-satellite defense of the country."
According to the plan, to ensure the radar "Taran" system was based on a system of multi-sectoral radar. As such radar station planned to use SSC-C (T) , which is a modification of the station SSC-C. Modification was associated with increased range and field of view, as well as with increased noise immunity. Station SSC-C (T) was based on the same type of modular structures (transmitting unit, receiving unit, the detection module, and other devices). The modular construction of the finished station functional units allowed to develop on the basis of these nodes simplified versions - Station SSC-C (Y).
Later, at the stage of preliminary design had considered ways to reduce the cost of stations while maintaining its tactical characteristics. Soon, however, VN Chelomei became clear that without any simplification and cost reduction can be no question that SD-100 can not be used as an interceptor missile, and that missile defense project involves the deployment of the country's work, unprecedented in scale.
In June 1964 G.V.Kisunko was invited to the Ministry of Defense and familiarized with the project of a new Resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, where he was appointed first deputy general designer of the system, "Taran" V. N. Chelomeya.
G.V.Kisunko from the book "The Secret Zone" recounted: "Mentally, recording all the absurdity of the proposed document to me, I decided to talk with the generals to take me to keep strictly within me personally concerning the item on the appointment of first deputy general designer of the system," Taran "My answer was brief.: as a general designer of the system A-35 , I was not physically able to combine this with their work even more ambitious work, offered me, "Taran" system.
"One of the generals said to me: Ministry of Defense Guidelines do not doubt that you will be able to unify the technical "Taran" system solutions based on the A-35 system principles. So instead of the two systems to establish a single system - "Big A-35", but under the name of "Ram". It is in your face we see the actual (though not de jure), chief designer of the system."
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