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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


SLBM Overview

By the mid-1950s, efforts to establish modern superpower thermonuclear weapons had been crowned with success in the US and the USSR, and force development in both countries the nuclear industry to continuously increase the rate of accumulation of nuclear munitions. However, such accumulation (the very existence of nuclear munitions) had no meaning without their means of delivery. And from this point of view, the position of the United States was incomparably more profitable than the Soviet Union.

The main factor since the beginning of the 1950s was the strategic advantage of the USA to conduct massive aircraft nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, building on its network "area of American military bases. The response of vengeance on United States could not fear a similar system forward airfield in the USSR, and the ultimate combat range only at the time of the Soviet nuclear medium bombers TU-4A (copies of American b-29)-does not exceed 5000 km.

The often quite exotic solutions (refuelling and ocean surface, creating a network of ice airfield at circumpolar Arctic) did not lead to practical development. Only once in the late 1950s the Soviet air force bombers became available, Myasischev and A.N.Tupolev Tu-95ms M, airlift of nuclear weapons to the objects inside the territory of the USA and returns the bomber was feasible. However, the USA, in 1954 by making strategic bombers B-52 (which are still the foundation of American strategic air), departed on an arms race. In 1960 the US can counter the forty-eight Soviet TU-95ms, each of which can carry two hydrogen bomb, with 1500 strategic bombers with over 3000 nuclear bombs on board. However, efforts to achieve a nuclear parity with "aviation" direction might have been clear to the Soviet leadership even earlier.

The initial demand for an intercontinental range of technologically meant a major leap in a few stages of technological development, and this path is never fast and smooth. Only 20 January 1960 in the USSR was formally adopted by the world's first terrestrial-based missiles, the R-7, and the number of its military launch sites on both sites (Plesetsk Cosmodrome) even later never exceeded six. It will take more than a decade, while hundreds of IDB M.C.Yangel and V.N.V.Chelomy formed the basis of strategic nuclear forces of the USSR.

And then, in the 1950s for Soviet political and military leadership has become increasingly clear that in order to ensure at least in principle the possibility of any sensitive nuclear strike on U.S. territory cannot be done without military technical development of ocean space. However, building a strong surface fleet was inherently a deadlock - both because of the huge financial cost and the need to divert the enormous energy and resources, it is unacceptable to just dilemma referred from military ruins, and because the huge advantages of American navy for nearly all qualitative and quantitative indicators. This outbreak of large-scale hostilities would undoubtedly lead to immediate destruction of Soviet strike fleet long before it goes into combat.

The uncompromising political and ideological confrontation between the USSR and the USA, continuously increasing the pace of the arms race, the low threshold of the outbreak of hostilities in numerous local conflicts, and in almost all cases affecting rivalry with was very rushed. By the way, understanding that the military and political imperative of cold war logic retrospective analysis of the historical events of the past at all, tends to be biased. Example, present the cries of "environment" and "democratic" journalists about the "excessive development of Soviet nuclear submarine fleet without regard to the negative ecological consequences."

The creation of nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines with unlimited cruising range and capable of firing from a submerged position posed a real threat to the "potential enemy". But with all the great importance of the 1st generation missile carriers as the founders of the strategic submarine fleet, their combat effectiveness was limited due to the short range of missiles and their small number. The harsh conditions of the arms race required an early build-up of naval nuclear potential. To implement this task, the creation of the 2nd generation missile carriers (project 667A) began. By that time, the United States already had a network of air bases for strategic bombers located near the borders of the USSR, and launched the construction of submarines, armed with Polaris ballistic missiles. The danger of an unpunished nuclear strike from the United States was very high. Land-based ballistic missiles did not yet have sufficient development, and the USSR did not possess air supremacy of strategic aviation. Therefore, a serious stake was placed on missile submarines capable of providing a retaliatory nuclear strike.

The search for the best version of missiles for submarines was carried out among numerous developers of missile weapons. No one had any experience in creating reliable naval missiles, combining high efficiency with the ability to be placed on a submarine and launched from under water. They offered for submarines almost land missiles, which are distinguished by a large length. At one meeting, the General Designer of rocket space complexes V.N. Chelomey turned to S.N. Kovalev with a proposal to accept a missile for a submarine, the length of which is commensurate with the length of the submarine, and it should have been launched by placing the submarine in a vertical position. Naturally, Sergei Nikitich replied that it was impossible.

But some experts were tempted to work out exotic projects, including with the rotation of long missiles from a horizontal position to a vertical one, with the assembly of missiles from separate blocks directly on a submarine, with the creation of sliding shafts, towing missiles behind a boat, etc. this is a lot of ingenuity. These ideas were based on a complete lack of understanding of the harsh conditions of interaction between a missile, a mine and a submarine at the stages of storage, prelaunch preparation and launch. Victor Petrovich Makeev managed to solve the problem, who became the only General Designer of all sea ballistic missiles for many years. Together with his closest associates, he made two bold basic decisions: firstly, the propulsion system was placed ("drowned") inside the fuel tank of the second stage of the rocket; secondly, the rocket was fed to the submarine filled with both fuel and oxidizer, and was on alert throughout its entire service life.

According to V.P. Makeeva, the first solution made it possible to significantly reduce the length of the rocket, the second made it possible to abandon complex and unreliable systems for refueling missiles before launch. These improvements put the missiles on a par with their American competitors in terms of combat readiness (US missiles for submarines were created from the very beginning on solid fuel, and these problems simply did not arise there).

A constructive solution to the question of the weight and size characteristics of the new missiles was not slow to affect the development of a new project of missile submarines. This project was the 667A project. Sergei Nikitich was appointed chief designer of this project in June 1961. All the best forces of science and industry of the country were involved in the creation of the 2nd generation nuclear submarine, which became a priority task of the state scale, through the relevant resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the government. It was required to create a submarine capable of carrying out combat patrols in any area of ??the World Ocean, including the Arctic basin, and near the shores where potential targets are located, taking into account the missile range. The number of missiles and the power of their warheads must be sufficient to solve the strategic task. The design of the submarine assumed the possibility of its serial construction at the Sevmash enterprise and at the plant named after Lenin Komsomol at the maximum rate. It was necessary to "tie" the submarines to the existing bases in the Northern and Pacific fleets. There was no question of lack of funding for the implementation of the approved program.

Most SLBMs developed in the USSR used liquid rocket fuel. Such missiles were well developed and had excellent characteristics (R-29RM has the highest energy-mass perfection among all ballistic missiles in the world: the ratio of the mass of the rocket's combat load to its launch weight, reduced to one range of flight.) For comparison, Sineva has 46 units, the American ballistic missile of sea basing "Trident-1" - 33, and the "Trident-2" - 37.5), but they had several significant drawbacks, primarily related to the safety of operation.

The fuel in such rockets is nitrogen tetraoxide as an oxidant and asymmetric dimethylhydrazine as fuel. Both components are highly volatile, and are toxic and toxic. And although the ampoules are used on missiles, when the missile comes from the manufacturer already filled, the possible depressurization of the fuel tanks is one of the most serious threats in their operation. Also, the likelihood of incidents during the unloading and transportation of liquid-fueled SLBMs for subsequent disposal is also high. Here are the most well-known: During the operation there were several accidents with the destruction of missiles.

On such accident killed five people and lost one submarine on October 3, 1986. For unknown reasons, when immersing after a communication session, water began to flow into the rocket shaft. The crew tried to turn off the automatic system and drain the water by non-standard means. As a result, first the pressure was equaled with the outboard and the rocket tanks collapsed. Then, after the launch tube was drained, the components of the fuel ignited. The disabled automatic irrigation did not work and an explosion occurred. The cover of the missile shaft was torn down, and a fire began in the fourth missile compartment. It was not possible to extinguish the fire on its own. The personnel left the boat, the compartments filled with seawater, and the boat sank.

The developed complex Bark "(D-19UTTX) had improved characteristics in comparison with the D-19U complex and was to replace it with the 941 missile carriers. . All technical issues, including the most complex ones, connected with the creation and maintenance of the operation of the unique underwater missile carrier of the 941 Akula project and the SLBM with a launch weight of 90 tons, were successfully solved during the development of the D-19 missile system SLBM R-39 in the period 1973-1983. In terms of technical level and combat capabilities, the R-39UTTX missile was not inferior to the American Trident-2 SLBM. However, in 1998 at the stage of flight tests, it was decided to terminate work on the D-19UTTH, the technical readiness of which by this time was 73%, and to develop instead a new missile complex "Bulava-30." The feasibility of such a move on was based on the possibility of creating an inter-specific missile for the Navy and the Strategic Missile Forces and, accordingly, achieve significant cost savings.

Moscow Heat Engineering Institute [MIT] was engaged in solid-fueled land-based ICBMs and therefore, naturally, had no experience in developing solid-fueled SLBMs, which the GCM named after academician V.P.Makeev possessed. The steps taken at that time had serious negative consequences, affecting both the current state and the further development of Russia's maritime strategic nuclear forces. As a result, in connection with the development of the Bulava-30 complex, the 941 submarine was left unarmed, since the production of the SL-39U SLBM was discontinued. In the absence of funds for the operation of the missile carriers, three unique submarines of this project were scrapped for funds allocated by the United States.

Otherwise, the development of the Bulava SLBM stalled the development of domestic naval strategic nuclear forces. As a result, Russia had neither a group of missile carriers of Project 941, nor a flying missile Bulava. Originally declared deadlines for the completion of the development of this complex (2005) had long passed. Taking into account the negative statistics of the conducted flight tests, the further development of this complex in terms of time, the final result and the required volume of financing was difficult to predict.

By 2010, without rocket weapons, there may be new missile carriers of the 955 Borey project, which were planned to be equipped with the Bulava missile system. The Bulava missile, in terms of its tactical and technical characteristics, is inferior to the US Trident-1 SLBM developed thirty years ago, not to mention the TRIDENT-2 SLBM. If the Bulava SLB eventually armed the Borey Project 955 submarine, a group equivalent to its combat potential to the liquidated grouping of the submarine of Project 941 with a D-19U type complex can not be created in the foreseeable future. This is the price of erroneous and largely opportunistic decisions taken in the late 1990s.

The situation was saved by the resumed serial production of the SL-29RMU SLBM and the adoption in 2007 of the R-29RMU2 ("Sineva") missile.

Of 62 strategic submarines deployed by the Soviet Union in 1990, by 1998 the Russian Navy had only 28, and by some recent reports, as few as 23 were operational. Most of the rest had been junked or were waiting to be. At a peak of the Cold War tensions, 20 to 22 submarines were at sea. By the late 1990s there were usually two, and they did not go far. By the late 1990s the lack of resources and qualified personnel forced the Russian Navy to cut back operations considerably, with typically only two of its two dozen ballistic missile submarines on combat patrol at sea at any time -- typically, a Delta-IV submarine in the Northern Fleet, and a Delta-III in the Pacific.

Since the late 1990s, the Russian Navy had been able to keep no more than two SSBNs on combat duty at a time (with anywhere from 96 to 258 warheads aboard). This level is comparable to that of Britain and France, each of which has only four such submarines. By 2000, the Russian Navy had suspended combat patrols by submarines. Since 2001, Russia has resumed global patrolling of the world ocean by its nuclear submarines.

As of May 2004 the Navy included six Project 667BDR (Delta III) and six Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) strategic submarines. These submarines carried a total of 192 SLBMs that could deliver 672 nuclear warheads. Two of these submarines of the Project 667BDRM type were undergoing overhaul. A single submarine of the Project 941 Typhoon class remained in commission, but it is refitted to carry the new Bulava missile system which has not entered production.

In FY 2003, 92 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 12 SLBM launchers, and 3 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were destroyed or eliminated with CTR assistance. One additional SSBN was placed on contract for dismantlement at the State Machine Building Enterprise Zvezdochka.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program FY 2005-FY 2009 Five Year Plan will assist Russia in eliminating approximately 628 SLBM launchers in accordance with the START C or E Protocol at five START designated SLBM launcher elimination facilities and will provide assistance to dismantle 30 associated SSBNs and partially dismantle an additional 12 SSBNs. Two Yankee class, 35 Delta class, and 5 Typhoon class strategic SSBNs will be eliminated. This was a decrease of one Delta IV SSBN from the FY 2004 CTR Annual Report. Russia will eliminate 80 SLBM launchers and six associated SSBNs using the DoD provided equipment and infrastructure upgrades. In addition, DoD, through direct fixed-price contracts, will eliminate 548 launchers and dismantle 36 associated SSBNs.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program FY 2006-FY 2011 Five-Year Plan anticipated Russia eliminating approximately 572 SLBM launchers in accordance with the START C or E Protocol at four START-designated SLBM launcher elimination facilities and will provided assistance to dismantle 32 associated SSBNs and dismantle an additional 7 SSBNs except for the bows and sterns. This was a decrease of one Delta IV and two Typhoon SSBNs from the FY 2005 CTR Annual Report since it was anticipated that Russia will keep these submarines beyond the FYDP. Russia eliminated 80 SLBM launchers and 6 associated SSBNs using DoD-provided equipment and infrastructure upgrades. DoD, through direct fixed-price contracts, will eliminate 492 launchers and fully dismantle 26 associated SSBNs.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program FY 2007-FY 2011 Five-Year Plan anticipated dismantling 32 SSBNs. An additional seven SSBNs will be dismantled except for their bow and stern sections. Russia eliminated 80 SLBM launchers and 5 of 6 associated SSBNs using DoD-provided equipment and infrastructure upgrades. DoD, through direct fixed-price contracts, will eliminate 492 launchers and fully dismantle 26 associated SSBNs.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program FY 2008-FY 2013 Five-Year Plan will eliminate 136 SLBM launchers and partially dismantle 7 associated SSBNs by FY 2013. Russia is responsible for completing dismantlement of the bow, sail, and stern sections. Support includes SSBN towing, SLBM launcher elimination, spent naval fuel defueling and transport to interim storage, sectioning and preparation of reactor-core compartments for storage afloat, and processing of low-level radioactive material. This project provides storage/transportation containers (casks) for spent naval fuel removed when defueling Delta III-class SSBNs and special railcars for transportation of fuel from the shipyard to a final storage/disposition location.

As of June 2009 Russia's navy had 12 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in service, but only eight of them are combat-capable. "Out of 12 vessels, Northern Fleet's Typhoon class Dmitry Donskoi submarine has been overhauled to test new Bulava sea-based ballistic missiles, six Delta-IV class units are being refitted with modernized version of the R-29RM (SS-N-23) missile, known as Sineva, and five Delta-III class submarines are deployed with the Pacific Fleet" said Mikhail Barabanov, editor-in-chief of the Moscow Defense Brief magazine. "Submarines of the Delta-III class are being gradually decommissioned. About eight [strategic] submarines in total are considered combat-ready," the analyst said. He added that two Typhoon class submarines, the Arkhangelsk and the Severstal, remain in reserve at a naval base in Severodvinsk in north Russia, but they are not fitted with missiles and need further repairs. Typhoon class subs will be replaced by new-generation Borey class strategic submarines, which will be equipped with Bulava sea-based ballistic missiles. Russia started mooring trials of the first Borey class vessel, the Yury Dolgoruky, in March 2009. Two other Borey class nuclear submarines, the Alexander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh, were under construction at the Sevmash shipyard and are expected to be completed in 2009 and 2011. Russia was planning to build a total of eight submarines of this class by 2015.

The launches of strategic missiles (intercontinental ballistic and medium-range cruise missiles), carried out as part of the Grom-2019 SKSHU, made a rather strong impression. Karelia (SF) fired at Sineva, Ryazan (667BDR, Pacific Fleet) - Station-2 (R-29RKU-02, RSM-50), Severodvinsk and Gorshkov - Gauges (3M14 ). It would seem that everything was fine, but the question involuntarily arose: why are the newest Boreas with the R-30 Bulava SLBM from the Far Eastern group of nuclear forces inactive?

The reason for raising such a question is simple. Since the completion of the intermarine naval crossings of the SSBN, project 955 K-550 “Alexander Nevsky” (September 30, 2015) and K-551 “Vladimir Monomakh” (September 26, 2016), i.e. over the previous 3-4 years, the Pacific “strategists” had not completed a single launch of SLBMs - the old Kalmar (Podolsk, St. George the Victorious and the aforementioned Ryazan) worked for them. “Monomakh” shot “Bulava” twice (09/10/2014 and 11/14/2015), but both times in the Northern Fleet from the White Sea, “Nevsky” - also twice (11/28/2014 and unsuccessful 07/07/2013), and also in the North. There was evidence that the third launch from the K-550 (and the first from the Far East) was planned for September 2015 upon arrival of the SSBN to the duty station, but it did not take place. Given the fact that firing R-30s from west to east has long been commonplace, the absence of Bulava launches in the opposite direction took on a certain mystical (irrational) connotation.

Until recently, the RPKSN Pacific Fleet group made a very favorable impression, especially against the background of two other components of the Pacific nuclear submarine forces. Their multi-purpose component, revived recently (in the middle of 2016), for a long time (before the arrival of the first Yasen in Vilyuchinsk) will be represented by the only PLC Project 971 “Kuzbass”, and the “anti-aircraft” - probably also the only APKRK Omsk, pr. 949A (the training and combat activity of Tver and Tomsk have not been reported for a long time - from 2016 and 2018, and Irkutsk and Chelyabinsk were stuck in a long-lasting repair with modernization on Zvezda).

Umka-21 Arctic Ice surfacingThree nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy surfaced through Arctic ice for the first time in Russian history with incomparable numbers. "For the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, three nuclear missile submarines come together out of the ice in the Arctic," Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, the commander in chief of the Russian Navy, told the Supreme Commander. of the Russian Armed Forces, President Vladimir Putin, March 26. Admiral Nikolai Evmenov noted that the ice in the submarine had grown 1.5 meters thick. The submarines came up with an idea and a plan at the right time within a radius of 300 meters. The operation took place near Alexandra Land, a large island and home to the Nagurskoye military base, about 3,000 km north of Moscow.

On March 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense released detailed information as well as photos of the submarine's operations during the Umka-2021 ICEEX [ Umka is a white polar bear cartoon character from the Russian animation studio Soyuzmultfilm]. More than 600 soldiers and civilians and about 200 models of weapons, equipment and special equipment participated in the exercise. In the area where the exercise took place, the average temperature ranged from -25 to -30 degrees Celsius, and wind gusts up to 32 meters per second.

So far, the Kremlin has not officially confirmed which submarines will participate in the exercise starting on March 20. However, according to The Drive, an official video provided by the Russian Defense Ministry shows that at least two of the three submarines are Delta IV class submarines - also known as Project 667BDRM Delfins. "Drive" reported that perhaps a third submarine - the "Borey" class or the single "Borey-A Prince Vladimir" submarine, is currently in service.

On 26 March 2021 the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, listened via video-conference call to the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, on the ongoing Umka-21 integrated Arctic expedition. Admiral Nikolai Evmenov reported that since March 20, 2021, in the area of the Franz Josef Land archipelago, Alexandra Land island and the adjacent water area covered with continuous ice, under the leadership of the Main Command of the Navy, a comprehensive Arctic expedition Umka-2021 is being conducted with the participation of the Russian Geographical Society.

According to Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, during the expedition, 43 events are envisaged, of which 35 have been completed to date, including 10 jointly with the Russian Geographical Society. All activities of the expedition are carried out as planned. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy said that the expedition involved more than 600 military and civilian personnel and about 200 pieces of weapons, military and special equipment. All planned activities take place in harsh climatic conditions: in the area of the expedition, the average temperature is minus 25-30 degrees Celsius, the thickness of the ice cover is up to 1.5 meters, the wind in gusts reaches 32 meters per second.

Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov reported to Vladimir Putin that within the framework of the Arctic expedition, for the first time in the history of the Russian Navy, the surfacing from under the ice of three nuclear submarines in a limited area with a radius of 300 meters. "Based on the results of the measures taken, the samples of weapons, military and special equipment participating in military-technical experiments have generally confirmed their tactical and technical characteristics in conditions of high latitudes and low temperatures," said the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

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