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Soviet Nuclear Weapons - Other

Soviet Back-Pack Nukes

In the USSR, the release of Ya.M.S. [Yadernaya Mina Specialnaya - special nuclear mine ] was launched in 1967; production ceased in 1993. In total, approximately 250 Ya.m.S. were produced in four modifications - RA41, RA47, RA97 and RA115. Application of Ya.M.S. were with trained special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR / RF and special units of the Marine Corps of the USSR / RF Navy. At the same time, only simulators were used in the training process, and the trainees practiced their actions on the ground with the use of cargo models of Ya.M.S. themselves were stored at the one-of-a-kind arsenal of the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR / RF Ministry of Defense, they were never transferred to the troops. At the beginning of 1994, Russia had 150 ya.m. s. RA115 (other modifications of an earlier release were scrapped by this time). According to published information, by the beginning of 1994, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation had 150 RA115 series nuclear weapons at their disposal, all previous samples had been eliminated by that time. The same fate, in accordance with the obligations assumed by Russia, befell RA115 four years later. The Americans did the same with their sabotage nuclear weapons a little earlier.

"Nuclear knapsack" is a common name for a small-sized sabotage munition carried by one (light version) or two (heavy) special forces soldiers. Sometimes such a load is classified as special nuclear mines or land mines. These are, as a rule, ammunition of a really knapsack type, which is a transport and packaging container with a nuclear charge, an automation unit with a code blocking panel, a power supply, radio and clock devices, and other necessary devices. But it is not known whether one of them was actually called RYa-6 ("sixth nuclear backpack"), as the well-known publicist and former colonel of the engineering troops of the Soviet Army Mark Steinberg stated in the Russian-language American magazine "Vestnik Online".

From open semi-official (but unofficial) sources it is known that in sabotage portable nuclear explosive devices (NED) were mass-produced in 1967-1993. Approximately 250 of them were released. In special-purpose units and subunits of the GRU, including the naval ones (the 17th separate brigade of the Black Sea Fleet's special purpose, after the collapse of the USSR, went to Ukraine, and naval special-purpose reconnaissance points of all fleets and the Caspian Flotilla) , the personnel were trained with their weight and size models. Themselves such JAVU (RA41, RA47, RA97, RA115 and its modification for combat swimmers RA115-01) were concentrated in a special arsenal of the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

To quote, however, Steinberg: “The weight of RYa-6 is about 25 kilograms. It has a thermonuclear charge, in which thorium and californium are used. The charge power varies from 0.2 to 1 kilotons of TNT ... Due to its small size, it is relatively easy to carry, install and camouflage near a dam, airport, nuclear power plant or other vital facility. A nuclear mine is activated either by a delayed-action fuse or by remote control equipment at a distance of up to 40 kilometers. It is equipped with several non-neutralization systems: vibration, optical, acoustic and electromagnetic, so it is almost impossible to remove it from the installation site or neutralize it."

Based on the characteristics of the nuclear charges, it is appropriate to assume that the charges themselves were most likely not long-lasting due to the natural radiochemical degradation of californium and required periodic refreshing. Apparently, the charges were still not thermonuclear, but nuclear with thermonuclear boosting (using a deuterium-tritium unit to increase the efficiency of using fissile material).

"Nuclear backpacks" were intended for the destruction of especially important objects, military or economic infrastructure, by sabotage and reconnaissance groups of special forces. reconnaissance ships disguised as harmless auxiliary vessels, carrying torpedo-like two-seater carriers of combat swimmers of the "Sirena" type, equipped with a capacious cargo container. In principle, Soviet reconnaissance divers (combat swimmers) could also be deployed on board merchant and fishing vessels visiting foreign ports.

The United States was the first to create this kind of weapon. In 1964-1983, for parts of green berets, rangers and SEAL (combat swimmers), more than 600 sabotage nuclear weapons M129 (weight - 27 kg) and M159 (70 kg), classified as SADM (special atomic demolition munitions - special atomic demolition munitions) ). The 0.1–1 kiloton charge was created on the basis of the W-54 small-sized nuclear projectile used in the Davy Crocket's recoilless atomic weapons. In the United States, various methods of using portable nuclear weapons have been worked out, including those transported to the target by parachutists-scuba divers (dumping into the water from a P-5 Marlin seaplane patrol aircraft, CH-46 Sea Knight and SH-3 Sea King helicopters, etc.). Field manuals FM 5-26 Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions and FM 31-20 Special Forces Operational Techniques served as combat manuals for units using SADM.

In principle, the main task of the American atomic miners (and these were also special units of the engineering troops, armed with heavy nuclear bombs transported by cars) was to create destruction zones during the explosion of hydroelectric power plants and flooding locks in order to limit the maneuverability of enemy troops and significantly reduce their material support. At the same time, the ability of the MTR to operate deep behind enemy lines, including being delivered there preemptively, turned "nuclear backpacks" into strategic weapons that could destroy critical objects, including protected ones (including command posts) that could survive nuclear missile strikes. And although the available information speaks of the refusal of both sides from weapons of the SADM category and does not record its presence in other states, in reality, this may not be the case. For example, at parades in Pyongyang, they like to carry North Korean special forces soldiers in trucks with "nuclear backpacks" demonstratively decorated with the sign of radioactivity. Of course, the creation of such nuclear devices requires breakthrough achievements in the miniaturization of nuclear charges, so for now these are probably only dummies.

According to Colonel Lunev, a key component of Russia's strategy against the West for decades had been sabotage and assassination. In his testimony, he stated that one of his jobs at the Russia Embassy was to collect information about elected leaders in this country. This information would be used to assassinate them in a time of war or crisis. Another of Colonel Lunev's jobs was to scout out sites where weapons or explosives could be prepositioned. From time to time he would travel to the Shenandoah Valley to photograph areas where ``dead drops'' would be established. Weapons would be placed in these dead drop areas so that in times of crisis Russian agents could come into the country to commit sabotage against power plants, military bases, and communications facilities.

According to Colonel Lunev, part of the Soviet's plan called for the use of, "portable tactical nuclear devices,'' to be used to commit sabotage against highly protected targets. If has been widely reported that the Soviet Union manufactured portable briefcase-size nuclear devices that cannot all be accounted for. Were conventional or nuclear weapons prepositioned in the United States? Colonel Lunev doesn't know if the sites he identified were ever used.

On 24 January 2000, Republican Congressman Curt Weldon testified that on "May 30, 1997, I led a bipartisan delegation to Moscow. One of meetings we had scheduled was with then General Alexander Lebed, currently the Governor of Krasnoyarsk. General Lebed, as you know, was the top defense advisor to Yeltsin. At the meeting, Lebed for the first time revealed that one of his responsibilities when he worked for Yeltsin was to account for 132 suitcase-size nuclear devices. He said he could not find them. He said he could locate only 48. Now, Democrats and Republicans with me said to him in this private meeting, well, where are the rest, General? He said, I have no idea; they could have been destroyed; they could be secure; or they could have been put on the black market for the highest bidder. Because the General is making a point to us that the instability in the Russian military was causing military officers to sell technology around the world.

"A producer for 20/20 picked up on the story, Leslie Coburn. She called me; and she said, Congressman, did Lebed really say this? I said absolutely. She said do you think he would say it on national TV? I said you will have to ask him. She went to Moscow. 20/20 interviewed Lebed; they interviewed me and both of us with a lead story in September 1997 on the national media where he again said in his own words, that Russia had, in fact, produced these small atomic demolition munitions and could not account for all of them.

What was the response of the Russian Government? They denied they ever produced them. The minister of foreign affairs for Russia publicly said Lebed is crazy; he doesn't know what he's talking about; he's trying to gain popularity."

Mr. Burton. So when they built these 132 nuclear devices, the briefcase-like device that you showed me, they intended for them to be used for internal civil disorders, I presume, as well as external threats to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Weldon. Absolutely. In fact, there was an allegation made by Dudayev in the first Chechen conflict that he had, in fact, a small atomic demolition device, and if you read the book One Point Safe by Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, which I have asked the CIA to refute and they have not done that publicly, there is a chapter dedicated to the United States taking that charge so seriously that we sent agents to work with the Russians to find out whether or not Dudayev did in fact have a small atomic demolition device. That's how seriously we took that allegation.

Mr. Burton. Now, they said that they were going to destroy all of these 132 nuclear devices by the year 2000, but only 48 can be accounted for. That means, according to my mathematics, about 84 are still unaccounted for.