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Aurora

5N25 Argun missile complex was prototype of missile complex for Aurora missile system. 5N25 Argun is designation for whole missile complex. The radar has designation 5N24/RKTs-35TA Istra. Elaboration of territorial missile defense system began simultaneously with the project A-35 . Preliminary design was completed in 1963, but there was a pause in connection with the priority project "Taran". In 1965, after "Taran" was stopped, it became clear that the system of A-35, even in a phased development is not able to reflect the massive raid of ballistic missiles equipped with the means to overcome missile defense, the Ministry of Defense and the Main Command of Air Defense, with the consent of the Central Committee of the CPSU, insisted on the development of a new project of territorial missile defense system.

The main problem was the problem of selection of ballistic targets. It was assumed that the massive raid on the US ICBM of the USSR all missiles at the same time come to the line of our radar detection means that all enemy ballistic missiles will be equipped with decoys, and that means the missile defense radar and early warning system of the country must necessarily interact with each other. It is estimated that each enemy ICBM could be equipped with seven decoys.

On November 5, 1965 the USSR Defense Council heard reports from Chief of the Air Defense Air Marshal VA Sudtsa and General Designer GV Kisunko on the status of the system A-35, the ways of its modernization through the establishment of the second stage and on the job development of preliminary design of the system "Aurora" - workable in a massive raid advanced ballistic missiles. Meeting was chaired by Leonid Brezhnev.

G.V.Kisunko proposed the creation of a system of "Aurora" in three stages: to defend Moscow, the European part and the Asian part of the USSR. For target detection and target firing system it proposed to use two radar rings. On the periphery were to be placed AL Station Mintz 5N12G decimeter and centimeter range 5N12N around Moscow - station "Danube" UHF. The proposed use centimetric radar "Istra" as-firing radar. "Aurora" system should be able to destroy nearly 300 goals.

After reviewing the proposals G.V.Kisunko, AL Mintz said that it considers it inappropriate to use radar in the missile defense system "Aurora". Marshal I.S.Koneve said that designers want to destroy the whole country.

The topic was summed up by Leonid Brezhnev. He noted that the problem is very complex, and advised to focus on basic research. On the same day the decision of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers "On creation of the first stage of the missile defense of the European part of the country" G.V.Kisunko was set to develop a new system pilot project "Aurora" and the second stage of the A-35 system, AL Mints - development of a missile defense system with multi-function radar, YG Burlakov - development of ballistic radar target selection.

As a base for the system "Aurora" and for the second stage A- 35 Kisunko decided to use purpose firing radar "Istra" , using a "Aurora" modification "Istra-2". Realizing the impossibility of solving the problem of selection even with the help of an upgraded radar, Kisunko proposed to solve the problem using the "clears" trans-atmospheric explosions of special warheads high power, carried out in order of battle attacking ballistic missiles.

The proposal was based on the fact that the warheads weighing more than 300 kg, in contrast to the light decoys weighing about 5 grams, after the explosion SBCH interceptors will have minimal extra speed and will be "identified" radar. Efforts were applied to the new A-900 long-range anti-missile interceptor.

The second type of missiles - the modernized A-350 - designed to destroy ballistic missile warheads after "clearing" as large and low-level special charges of variable thickness for each height. In addition to the combat block IDB interceptors, the project received the index of A-351, to destroy warheads separated from the global missiles flying at flat trajectory. The system scheme was single echelon with two types of missiles.

The system was supposed to enter the four multi-firing system with the placement of the three of them in the suburbs, and one - in the Kuibyshev region. Distinction between the functions of detection and missile guidance persisted. As a means of early warning Kisunko suggested the use of the station "Danube-memory" AN Musatova to locate them in Solnechnogorsk and Zagorsk and perform guidance by radar target channel.

In fact, it was a completely new missile defense system, which was not supposed to use the A-35 systems.

According to deputy chief designer of the missile defense system, the head of department NIIRP O.V.Golubev. "The preliminary design G.V.Kisunko first proposed to build an information system based on radar with phased array antennas. Unlike radar with parabolic antennas, they have the ability to simultaneously support a plurality of objects (both warheads and decoys), thanks to a multi-module structure receiving-transmitting antenna curtains as in the "Aurora", as in "A-35" involves the use of one - extra-atmospheric - echelon interception purposes, the most difficult was the and the task of warheads recognition on the background of decoys.

"It turned out that the natural characteristics that distinguish warheads from false targets that could be detected by radar observations enough for efficient selection. In solving this problem, the idea of so-called nuclear breeding, which, one might say, the whole concept of the system "Aurora" was built. The idea was to apply the dynamic impact of the explosion of a high power nuclear warhead over the elements of complex ballistic targets. It was assumed that after such a blow, lightweight decoys will be destroyed or "blown away" with the area of complex objectives and a strong heavy targets will receive a mechanical impulse, which will change the parameters of their movement. On the basis of comparison of parameters of movement components of complex target before and after the explosion, the system anticipated recognition of the warheads.

"All questions of the construction of the system "Aurora" was elaborated by the summer of 1967 in the conceptual design. Illustrated outline maps of the European part of the Soviet Union, all covered with overlapping colored areas - defense zones, which G.V.Kisunko with his characteristic humor and metaphors left a great impression for all who know them.

"One can only speculate as would have happened in the military-industrial complex, and in general in the country, if it began the creation of this complex and giant system. Perhaps the realization of the project "Aurora" would lead to economic collapse of the USSR. Possibly contributing to the intensive development of key industries and fuller disclosure of scientific and technical capacity, the project would lead to the economic stability of the state and strengthening its role on the world stage. Hard to say".

According to the former director of the Institute for computer complexes Yu.V.Rogachev: "In 1965 Karcev proceeded to theoretical research in the field of computers ultra-high performance, and in March 1967, made a presentation on the work of the multicomputer complex M-9 performance of one billion operations per second at a symposium at the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The machine interested D .V.Kisunko, and once acquainted with the project, he decided to use a set of M-9 missile defense system "Aurora".

"However, the Ministry of instrument making, as part of which was INEUM, not part of the military-industrial complex, and the leadership of the Ministry believed that such projects should be engaged Minradioprom. In April 1967, a meeting was held with the Deputy Chairman of the MIC L.I.Gorshkova involving M.A.Kartseva, Deputy General Designer I.D.Omelchenko, Academician Lebedev, senior officials of Ministry of Radio Industry, Minelektronproma and Minpribor.

"Gorshkov asked the opinion of Academician Lebedev. Worked on computers for missile defense systems, Lebedev evaded specific evaluation of M-9, but confirmed that in the West, "something like this is done." Ministry of Radio categorically refused master of the M-9, how to develop Minpribor. Yet Kartseva tasked with creating conceptual design of the new machine.

"On May 5, 1967 by government decree spetsrazrabotok M.A.Kartseva department was removed from the Ministry of Equipment and INEUM transferred to Minradioprom to develop a computer system for the M-9 missile defense system "Aurora". August 23 the same year, on the basis of the laboratory was established as a branch of OKB "Vympel". However, in October 1967, following the rejection of "Aurora" Commission Y. Votintseva on M-9 work was stopped, and just moved into the territory of CB-1 team was left without a new job. Fortunately, objects Rho were put into operation, and all our help was needed."

General YV Votintsev noted: "In the summer of 1967 I was called PF Batitsky , he said that next week he will meet with Dmitriem Fedorovichem Ustinovym and asked to prepare a certificate of the status of the missile defense system and PKO facilities. Some days we with Vasiliem Aleksandrovichem Edemskim , Evgeniem Konstantinovichem Braginym and several control officers prepared USSR small card with deposited thereon objects, as well as "clamshell" for each object.

"In the CC, to Ustinov , went in-Chief, Colonel-General Afanasiy Fedorovich Scheglov and me. Just a few minutes PF Batitsky reported a significant backlog of deadlines on almost all sites. Emphasizing fragmentation and poor organization leadership with numerous industry organizations, he recalled Ustinov about the positive experience gained by the Third Chief Directorate and its chief VM Ryabikova when creating the C-25 system.

After hearing just briefly on the status of each site, Dmitri said something like this: " You're right. We now have all-powerful ministry and the work becomes more difficult with them. Main TSU type control for missile defense and the SSP are no longer create. Experience the S-25 is not claimed. Beria himself was eliminated with Ryabikova ... One of these days I will gather ministers, designers, plant managers. The conversation will be impartial. In the near future you will be presented a number of alternative conceptual designs of missile defense systems. I have met with them, and not all of them satisfied me. It is necessary to evaluate them, to match. Together with the MIC, the General Staff, the Ministry established the competent inter-ministerial commission. Decide Pavel Fedorovich, with the chairman of the commission. Maybe they will mate Votintsev. But it's up to you. In general, the Commission is yours, and the work it should begin as soon as possible."

"They returned with the commander of his "Seagull". I sat with the driver, and Batitsky and his first deputy - behind. Cut off from my glass, they are about something animatedly talking, gesticulating vigorously. Arriving, Commander in Chief said: Just in time for dinner. I went after him, but I held Athanasius Fedorovich: Yura! Pavel Fedorovich Ustinov your report content. You will be chairman of the commission. Get ready. Now let's go to dinner.

"In August 1967 the directive of the General Staff and the military industrial complex solution was determined by the composition of the Commission for consideration of new sketch missile defense projects. In all sixty people came. Among them were general designers Boris Vasilevich Bunkin, Petr Dmitrievich Grushin, Grigoriy Vasilevich Kisunko, academicians Aleksandr Lvovich Mints , Yuliy Borisovich Hariton , Viktor Mihaylovich Glushkov, a member of the STC General Staff Rafgat Ahtyamovich Valiyev, the head of the STC Air Defense Forces Gennadiy Sergeevich Legasov, Deputy Minister of Radio Vladimir Ivanovich Markov, deputy chief of the 4th GU MO Mihail Grigorevich Mymrin, the head of the 4th MO GU Mihail Ivanovich Nenashev, and others.

"I was appointed chairman of the commission. My deputies were G.V.Kisunko, AL Mintz and M.I.Nenashev. With the head of the 45th CSIR Ivan Makarovich Penchukovym we read the first volume of projects which set out the objectives, key performance characteristics, terms and cost of creating the future systems. Ivan Makarovich identified subcommittees compositions and secured them a specific volume of preliminary designs. Place the plenary sessions identified a conference hall of the old building of the institute. The Sub-Commission have allocated space in a nearby two-story building. Defined time limit: plenary sessions held on Friday, if necessary - and the Sabbath. Other days - work in subcommittees. Working hours from 10.00 to 22.00.

"Everyone was strictly warned about the secrecy. Discussion - only in the offices. Recording - in secret workbooks. Other records and documents from the premises not stand. The first plenary meeting of the Commission held in early September, was devoted to organizational matters and it was quiet. At the next meeting started to consider G.V.Kisunko projects, AL Mintz and YG Burlakov. "The "Aurora" Grigoriya Vasilevicha Kisunko represented as a new missile defense system. Its elements were to enter multi firing system with radar detection and guidance radar. Detection station had phased array antenna can detect and track a large number of targets and provide information multichannel missile guidance station.

"Aleksandr Lvovich Mints suggested that the missile defense system being developed by sectoral multifunction station "Don H" with a phased antenna array, which could carry as the detection of ballistic missiles, as well as guidance on their missiles.

"The third project presented Yuriy Grigorevich Burlakov. He proposed to use for the missile defense system broadband radar "Neman" with Luneberg lens, which, in his opinion, to detect and were selected warheads of ballistic missiles against the background noise and false targets.

"Grigory not very convincingly defended his project. AL Mintz "attacked." The situation escalated. Things came to a mutual insults. It became clear that further discussion of the draft in the presence of the temperamental G.V.Kisunko, exasperated AL Mintz and stubbornly defended his station JG Burlakov futile. After consulting with IM Penchukovym, I decided to hold a detailed discussion in the narrow part of the commission. Yet familiar with the status of missile defense systems and the SSP, I drew attention to the fact that the chief designers create local system and do not want to agree with each other technical issues. Each system works in its coordinate system. Moreover, Kisunko and Mintz are bitter rivals. I must say that the tactical and technical specifications issued in those years, the chief designer, had not expected to link in a single coordinate system. Before the necessity of this came later. However, the designers, in my opinion, yet deliberately avoided concerted action. For example, Grigoriy Vasilevich Kisunko in its missile defense system, applied computer Vsevolod Sergeyevich Burtsev. Aleksandr Lvovich Mints used computer chief designer Mikhail Alexandrovich Kartseva. And TSKKP Burtsev installed a new computer with floating point. There were no connections and other issues. My observations clearly confirmed in the course of the work of the Interdepartmental Commission. I realized that the situation must be corrected, and the sooner the better."

Describing the creation of systems "A", A-35 and A-135, veteran NIIRP Yu.A.Kamensky recalled. "To participate in the defense of the project "Aurora" I was summoned from leave and put into a subcommittee review of nuclear and" near-nuclear "issues. Chairman of the subcommittee was my old friend General Staff Gen. R.A.Valiev. I was appointed his deputy. A member of the subcommittee was Yu.B.Khariton . One of the new phases of the system work was the so-called nuclear selection . This idea was considered in the United States, which in those years was carried out an underground test of a nuclear charge capacity of 5 Mt, designed for anti-missiles "Spartan".

"The project had a lot of other new proposals. Their implementation has been associated with the solution of very complex problems, and one day, after one of the subcommittee meetings, Yu.B.Khariton asked me: "Why does Grigory give such intractable promises? I said: It seems that this is the position of chief designer. Yuli Borisovich shrugged and said nothing."

Y. Votintsev continued : "So: the first project proposed to use radar separation of functions, the second project - a multifunctional radar and the third project - target selection radar. The Commission worked two months of debate has been fierce, and at one point it seemed that it would not be the end of one night... , flushed with these disputes, I decided to write down all the main issues that needed to be sure to get an answer to move on and come, finally, to certain conclusions. questions turned twelve. in the morning I read their member Commission m. Having heard all agreed to end the chaotic discussion and focus on the systematic discussion of these issues. All three projects G.V.Kisunko, AL Mints and YG Burlakov were rejected, as, in our opinion, none of them solved the main problem - multiplication ["breeding"] warheads of ballistic missiles with a the background of decoys in areas of high noise and nuclear explosions were necessary in the first place, the new radar, and secondly, the new computing means and, thirdly, new anti-missile and ordnance, founded on new physical principles.

"Kisunko proposed the creation of the Balkhash proving ground sample multichannel firing system "Argun", Mints proposed continuing to develop the multi-station "Don H" as a circular scan radar and reducing costs, while Burlakov proposed complete construction of the test range reduced sample station "Neman".

"Acts of working groups and the act of the committee were accepted by a majority of its members. However, representatives of the Ministry of Radio Industry issued dissenting opinions in support of projects. The commission's conclusions, I reported to the deputy chairman of the MIC Leonidu Ivanovichu Gorshkovu and head of the department of defense industry of missile defense, and PKO Viktoru Mihaylovichu Karetnikovu. Agreeing the issue with the commander of the Air Defense Forces, they presented the final document of the head department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Ivan Dmitrievich Serbin and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

"In late October at a meeting of the military industrial complex it was to hear my report. G.V.Kisunko spoke after me, and strongly contested the conclusions. Only a firm position to LV Smirnov and L.I.Gorshkova allowed to adopt our report. It was taken. It was also decided that a five-year plan of research and development work."

Unofficially, in the discussion of problems in the inter-departmental commission Y. Votintseva was the conclusion of the first time agreed that at the present stage of development of science and technology to solve the task of defending the country from a massive nuclear missile attack is impossible. The construction of the missile defense in European and Asian parts of the country would lead to the creation of systems of enormous complexity and cost, but they would not be able to defend the Soviet Union. However, officially to bring this to a conclusion of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the time no one dared.