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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Hwasong 6 / Scud-C

By © Charles P. Vick 2006 All Rights Reserved

March 1, 2007


The opinions and evaluations stated here in are only the author's and cannot be construed to reflect those of any Government agency, company, institute or association. It is based on public information, circumstantial evidence, informed speculation, declassified U.S. intelligence community documents, official Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean government documents and histories, oral histories, interviews and engineering analysis. As with all data regarding the Iranian, Pakistani and North Korean strategic space and ballistic missile programs, this analysis is subject to revision--and represents a work in progress.

Hwasong 6 / Scud-C

A program to modify the Scud-B (300 km/1,000 kg) is reported to have begun in 1988. The modified missile, referred to as the Scud-PIP (product improvement program), or Scud-C (500 km/700-800 kg), which achieved a longer range than its predecessors by reducing the payload and extending the length of the rocket body to increase the propellant by 25%.

The first of three successful test firings of the SCUD-C was reported to have been completed in June 1990 with one in July 1991 at least one between May 29 th, and May 30 th 1993 with additional test conducted by Iran, Syria and North Korea. (3, 4) The Scud-C was committed to full production in 1991 replacing the Scud-B production.

The first of three successful test firings of the SCUD-C was reported to have been completed in June 1990. Production capacity of the Scud-C was estimated at four to eight per month, and Pyongyang has hundreds of SCUDs in its inventory and available for use by its missile forces. In 1990, Iran is reported to have arranged for delivery of Scud-Cs, as well as North Korean assistance in setting up an assembly and manufacturing facility. Syria may also have received shipments of the Scud-C along with launchers, beginning in April 1991.

As of early 2000 it was estimated that the North Korean ballistic missile inventory included over 500 SCUDs of various types, according to General Thomas Schwartz, commander-in-chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander, United States Forces Korea. . The DPRK arsenal is believed to have at least 400 Scud – B ’ s and Scud-C launchers through the summer of 2006. Scud-C ’ s have almost certainly completely replaced the Scud-B ’ s by the mid 1990 ’ s. (3, 4)


1. Greg Gerardi and Jpseph Bermudez Jr. An Analysis of the North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7 , number 4, 1995, pp. 184-190.

2. Kugbanggwa Kisul, No. 127, Sept 89, FBIS-EAS 29 Nov 89 .

3., N. Korea ’s Missiles Right on Target, The Chosun Ilbo, July 5, 2006

4., Seoul Confirms Failure of Taep’o-dong-2 missile test by Jung Sung-ki, Staff Reporter, The Korean Times, September 17, 2006 .

6. Text: Korea Forces Commander on Korean Peninsula Security 07 March 2000

7. Jane's Intelligence Review - Special Report No. 2, (no date), p. 13.


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