Air Defense Aircraft
Over recent decades, the air defense interceptor force defending North America had been dramatically reduced from a high of 2,600 dedicated aircraft (including the Royal Canadian Air Force) in 1958. It had shrunk to 20 Air National Guard [ANG] fighters at 10 alert locations for CONAR by February 1996.
After the Korean War, air superiority, so far as fighter aircraft design was concerned, was limited largely to the defenseof the U.S. against enemy bombers. Tactical fighters were designed primarily for nuclear war where penetration was more important than maneuverability, ordnance, load-carrying ability more important than armament, alert status more important that sustained sortie rates. A very partial listing of Air Defense Command units illustrates the diversity and evolution of fighter and intereceptor aircraft used for strategic air defense in the early years of the Cold War:
- The 5th Fighter Squadron provided air defense of the eastern United States from 1947 to 1959. Aircraft included P-61 [1947-1948], F-82 [1948-1950]], F-94 [1950-1953], F-86 [1953-1956] and F-102 [1957-1960]. The Squadron moved to Minot AFB, ND on 1 February 1960 operating the F-106 [1960-1985] and later F-15 [1984-1988], and continued to provide air defense, trained, and participated in air defense exercised until the squadron deactivated on 1 July 1988.
- Air Defense Command's 52nd Fighter Interceptor Wing operated at McGuire Air Force Base with F-94 and F-86 jet fighters.
- Following World War II, the 66th Fighter Squadron was transferred to the Alaskan Air Command as an air defense unit. It remained there until 1957 when it was deactivated. While assigned to Alaska, the unit transitioned through several aircraft to include the P-51, F-80, F-94, and the F-89.
- In 1953, the 103rd Fighter Interception Wing entered the jet age and the Air Defense business when the F-84 entered the inventory. Throughout the remainder of the 50's and 60's the unit maintained 24 hour alert flying the F-84, F-86, F-94, F-100 and F-102 aircraft. From 1956 to 1971, members of this Connecticut Air Guard unit stood 24-hour alert in the F-102 Delta Daggers. In 1971, the 103rd was assigned to the newly redesignated Tactical Air Command.
- In September of 1952, the 137th Fighter Interceptor Squadron received the F-51 "Mustang" aircraft as well as a new air defense mission. In 1953, the unit entered the "Jet Age" when it received the F-94 "Starfighter" all weather interceptor. The unit retained its air defense mission until 1958 when it converted to the F-86 "Saber Jet" and was reorganized as the 105th Tactical Fighter Group.
- The 142nd Air Defense Wing was created in the late 1940's, and the 116th Fighter Squadron came under the 141st Air Defense Group with the headquarters in Spokane, Washington. In 1950 the squadron received five F-84 Thunderjets, and in 1955 received their first Lockheed F-94B Starfire all-weather interceptor. With this new aircraft the mission of the 116th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was changed from day interceptor to day and night all-weather interceptor. By 1957 the F-94's were replaced by 25 F-89D Scorpion all-weather interceptors. F-89J's were flown in the early 60's until 1965 when F-102 Delta Darts were received. The 116th Fighter Interceptor Squadron received it's first F-101B Voodoo aircraft in 1969.
- In 1952, the 354th Fighter Squadron was reactivated as part of the Air Defense Command and flew fighter-interceptor missions in the P-51, F-94 Starfire, and the Republic F-86 Sabre Jet.
Beginning in 1951, the Air Force established specific mobilization requirements for the Air Guard in its war plans for the first time. The ANG would train against those requirements and plans for the first time. ANG leaders proposed the air defense runway alert program as a way to combine realistic training and support of a significant combat mission in peacetime. Beginning on an experimental basis in 1953, it involved two fighter squadrons at Hayward, California and Hancock Field at Syracuse, New York. They stood alert from one hour before daylight until one hour after sundown. Despite Air Staff doubts and initial resistance, the experiment was a great success. By 1961, it had expanded into a permanent, round-the-clock program that included 25 ANG fighter squadrons. The runway alert program was the first broad effort to integrate reserve units into the regular peacetime operating structure of the American armed forces on a continuing basis. It was the precursor of the total force approach to reserve components training and utilization.
Today, the ANG provides 100 percent of the Air Force's continental-United States-based air defense interceptor force. At the end of the Cold War maintaining the air defense and air sovereignty of the CONUS were federal missions accomplished by 1st Air Force, a numbered air force (NAF) assigned to the ACC. The size and composition of 1st Air Force's flying unit force structure continued to be a major issue during the transition, and 1st Air Force continued to face strong budgetary pressures to either eliminate or dramatically reduce dedicated ANG fighter interceptor units for the air defense and air sovereignty.
In 1994, the Air Guard had begun taking over 1st Air Force which provided the command and control mechanisms for providing the air defense and air sovereignty of the continental United States. The original conversations proposing that transition had taken place between Maj. Gen. Killey, then ANG Director, and Gen. Robert D. Russ, then Tactical Air Command Commander, during 1990-1991. General Russ, a strong supporter of the Air Guard, had originated the dialogue. He had noted that all the fighter interceptor squadrons defending the CONUS by that time were ANG units. Defense of the homeland had seemed a natural fit for the Guard. The Air Force had wanted to transfer responsibility for resourcing that mission to the ANG primarily for two reasons. First, it had needed to reduce its own end strength because of post Cold War downsizing. Second, it had thought that the ANG was in a better position to politically defend that mission which had been coming under increasing attack as expensive and unnecessary.
For their part, Air Guard senior leaders wanted to maintain as much of its fighter interceptor force structure as possible. Moreover, they needed to find new missions for much of its combat communications and tactical air control units which faced dramatic drawdowns in the early 1990s. The BRAC report of March 1993 gave the transfer proposal additional impetus. It directed the Air Force to either move the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) from Griffiss AFB, New York or give it to the ANG. Since ACC did not want to move it and was unable to consolidate it with another sector, transfer to the ANG appeared to be a logical choice. Following discussions between General Killey and senior Air Force leadership, agreement was reached to transfer the entire responsibility for 1st Air Force to the ANG. In September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin approved the transfer.
On 28 January 1994, General Killey, who had just stepped down as Air Guard Director, assumed command of 1st Air Force as directed by General Merrill A. McPeak Air Force Chief of Staff. With that action, the main impetus for completing the transition to Air Guard control shifted to Tyndall AFB, Florida from the NGB, the Air Staff, NORAD, and Headquarters, ACC. However, the transfer was also intended to place the Chief of the NGB and the ANG Director in partnership with the Commander, 1st Air Force to assist the transition. Throughout the conversion process, all affected units had to maintain combat ready status.
On 1 December 1994, Headquarters NEADS was redesignated Headquarters Northeast Air Defense Sector (ANG). During FY 1995, Air Force leadership directed the acceleration of the transfer process and won approval from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to hire an additional 182 AGR personnel to help accomplish that. In October 1995, the Southeast Air Defense Squadron and the Western Air Defense Squadron were constituted and allotted to the NGB.
Command relationships for 1st Air Force were relatively complicated by traditional Air Guard standards. The NAF came under ACC. As the force provider to NORAD, ACC was responsible for providing organized, trained, and equipped units that maintained the air defense and air sovereignty for the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONAR). The NGB was responsible for ensuring that 1st Air Force was properly resourced, particularly its operations and maintenance as well as its military personnel budgets. ACC remained responsible for major systems acquisition including modernization of the NAF's sector and regional operations centers. NORAD continued as the war-fighting command that 1st Air Force was responsible to in the execution of its operational missions.
All of this was further complicated by the fact that most 1st Air Force personnel were Guardsmen who remained in state status (Title 32, U.S. Code) while organizing, training, and equipping for their federal missions. They automatically converted to federal status (Title 10, U.S. Code) when actually conducting federal missions such as doing intercepts of unidentified aircraft entering U.S. air space because air defense and air sovereignty remained federal, not National Guard, missions. Likewise, certain officers including the ROC/SOC commanders always remained in Title 10 status to insure an unbroken federal chain of command.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense rejected efforts to include language in the FY 1996 and FY 1997 Defense Program Guidance to include air sovereignty and air defense as a stated mission and to program resources for them. In 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) criticized the Air Guard for continuing to maintain 150 fighters in 10 dedicated air defense units to defend the United States against invading enemy bombers at a cost of nearly $500 million annually nearly a half-decade after the Soviet Union's demise.
The GAO urged that the 10 ANG units be either disbanded or given other missions. That criticism was well established in Washington, D.C. Gen. Colin Powell, while JCS Chairman, had advocated an end to dedicated continental air defense force in 1993 as had the GAO a year later. Both had suggested that general-purpose fighter forces of the Air Force, Navy and Marines -- active duty and reserve components -- could accomplish the mission.
By the end of FY 1997, the ANG had assumed total responsibility for all of 1st Air Force including its three Regional Operational Control Centers and its Sector Operations Control Center as well as its NAF headquarters. The transition to the Air Guard was officially complete. Air Guardsmen had accomplished that unprecedented transition while retaining high readiness levels throughout the process. It represented a major change in the Air Guard's historic role, executing the command and control function for a full-time Air Force mission. But, 1st Air Force faced a difficult balancing act and an uncertain future. Continuing pressures to balance the federal budget and the absence of an international peer competitor suggested that the very survival of 1st Air Force, especially its dedicated fighter-interceptor force, would remain an issue.
- Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed, (05/03/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-76)
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