Paul Bunyan - DEFCON 3
The axe murder incident, the most brutal event in the history of the Panmunjom’s JSA, occurred on August 18, 1976. It resulted in extremely heightened inter-Korean tension which escalated short of another war. A tall poplar tree was near the UNC checkpoint 3 and the Bridge of No Return. The tree limited visibility in the direction of checkpoint 4 for the soldiers working at checkpoint 3. So, five South Korean civilian workers were dispatched to trim the tree under the supervison of a UNC guard force. A group of North Korean guard forces arrived by truck and began attacking the South Korean workers and soldiers by wielding clubs and axes. The JSA Company Commander, Captain Arthur Bonifas, and First Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Mark Barrett, were brutally axed to death by North Koreans.
CIA was virtually certain that the violent incident in the Joint Security Area this morning was a deliberate provocation. CIA believed it was primarily intended to agitate American public opinion over the issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the U.S. election campaign. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the U.S. is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing. According to the account of the incident issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at the scene was heard to tell his troops to kill the UNC (i.e., U.S.) personnel.
The Joint Security Area is one of the very few places where North Koreans have direct, continuing contact with U.S. military personnel. In June, there were several similar incidents in which U.S. forces in the Joint Security Area were harassed by North Korean personnel. No casualties resulted, however. A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after the incident occurred described it as a U.S. provocation that forced North Korean security personnel to take defensive measures. The broadcast warned that future incidents of U.S. aggression would be met in this fashion, but otherwise signaled no major change in Pyongyang’s policy.
On August 5 — only a few hours after an exchange of fire between ROK and North Korean troops on the DMZ — North Korea, in an unusually high level statement, alleged that [Page 12]the U.S. and South Korea have now “completed” war preparations. The statement was the first issued at this level since 1969 that was directed specifically at U.S. actions in the South. CIA believed that the DPRK was extremely unlikely to embark upon a course that would run the risk of major U.S. reprisals or portraying North Korea as significantly raising the threat of instability on the peninsula.
The Washington Special Actions Group convened 18 August 1976.
Secretary Kissinger began the meeting by noting: "There is a practical problem I would like to point out. The attack occurred at 9:43 last night and I was not notified until 9:00 this morning.... Wasn’t there another incident where this sort of thing happened recently? Of course, there was the Mayaguez."
....
Secretary Kissinger: Well lets put that in abeyance. I have talked to the President today about this. He feels that some sort of strong action is necessary but does not know precisely what it should be. Now there are two things that come to my mind. A few weeks ago we turned off a B-52 exercise because it would be provocative to the Chinese. We might resurrect that exercise. The second possibility would be to alert all forces in Korea.
Adm. Holloway: We could go from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 3.
Secretary Kissinger: What would that do?
Adm. Holloway: Unless we had a specific plan in mind or the North Koreans felt we had a specific plan in mind they probably would not react at all.
Secretary Kissinger: Well on that basis you could not threaten anything.
....
Secretary Kissinger: I am in favor of that too but I don’t think we should do anything about the tree until after we do something with our forces. What is the meaning of the DEFCON alert stages?
Adm. Holloway: 5 is normal and 1 is war. Stage 2 means that war is inevitable and stage 1 is when the shooting starts.
Mrs. Colbert: If the alert were moved up to 3 how would the media and the U.S. people react to that in this campaign year.
Secretary Kissinger: That has nothing to do with it. The important thing is that they beat two Americans to death and must pay the price.
....
Secretary Kissinger: What I would like to do now is to go over possible courses of actions and meet again tomorrow at 8:00 a.m. to discuss them. The President wants to explore the possibility of taking one military step. What can we do? You may wish to think about it overnight. Whatever we do must be commensurate.
....
Secretary Kissinger: I like the idea of cutting the tree down. We should generate our forces first and then cut it down. We should also go on a higher alert. Let’s put our forces on DEFCON 3 tonight and get a plan for cutting down the tree from Stilwell.
....
Secretary Kissinger: It will be useful for us to generate enough activity so that the North Koreans begin to wonder what those crazy American bastards are doing or are capable of doing in this election year.
....
Mr. Gleysteen: A lot of this will soon become public knowledge.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have to decide on press guidance. It should be low key. We can admit to going onto DEFCON 3 because of the premeditated murders.
Mr. Clements: Do we have to notify the UN?
Habib: No. We have gone to DEFCON 3 before without notifying them.
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