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Nuclear Crisis - The October War - 1973

By 1973, both the USSR and the United States had robust strategic nuclear forces, which, in theory, could survive a first strike and retaliate with devastating force. This fearsome capability would, it was thought, ensure global stability and discourage either power from any act which might lead to war. This was not the always the case: In the Middle East in 1973 both powers made military moves of some significance.

As for the United States, on October 13, thirty C-130 transport aircraft with cargo headed to Israel. In total, 22,305 tons of cargo were delivered to Israel during this operation, which lasted 32 days (from October 13 to November 12). From American military airfields, the aircraft were sent to the Lajes military base in the Azores, where they refueled or reloaded the cargo onto other aircraft, which in turn were sent to Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv. Equipment and supplies were also delivered to Israel from American military warehouses in Europe. The largest (at that time) transport aircraft in the world, the C-5 Galaxy, was used for the first time.

The confrontation, which began early in the morning of October 24th, lasted less than forty eight hours. There was little time for sophisticated planning on either side and responses were ad hoc reactions to circumstance. By October 24th, Israeli forces had repulsed a combined Egyptian and Syrian onslaught and were on the offensive. UN cease-fire agreements had failed to hold in Egypt, where Israeli had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army on the western bank of the Suez Canal. American efforts to persuade Israel to adhere to the UN agreements were insufficient and the beleaguered Egyptian commander, against Cairo’s orders, persisted in trying to spring the trap, giving the Israelis ample excuse for continued aggression.

Henry Kissinger had flown to Israel on the 20th, in an effort to convince Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to forgo destruction of the Third Army in return of a promise of peace talks with Egypt. The Israelis were unimpressed with his scheme, which suggested they abandon their bird in hand in for unspecified future gain. Yet while the exact nature of the discussions is unclear, Kissinger left Israel on the 22nd in the belief that the crisis was over and the situation could be diffused.

He returned to Washington on the following day to find that the crisis was still very much in full swing. It appeared that the Israelis were ignoring the cease-fire: “My God, the Russians will think I’ve double crossed them. And in their shoes, who wouldn’t?” he said. He was right.

By the 24th all seven Soviet airborne divisions were on alert. An air command post had been established in Southern Russia and the heightened state of readiness that had pertained throughout the conflict was now increased. There were an “unprecedented” amount of Soviet warships were in the Mediterranean.

But the most unpleasant thing was the American report on October 22 about the detection of radioactive radiation on Soviet transports heading to Egypt. This was assessed as Soviet nuclear weapons being sent to Egypt. The United States did not have reliable information on this matter. On November 21, at a press conference, Henry Kissinger was asked: "Were there Soviet nuclear weapons in Egypt?" The Secretary of State answered: "We do not know for sure. The Soviet Union denies it. But I repeat, we do not know for sure." US Intelligence was tracking a ship which passed through the Bosporus on the 22nd and reached Port Said on the 25th. Intelligence believed it to be carrying radioactive material, possibly warheads for a brigade of SCUD missiles previously deployed by the Soviets near Cairo. Although the rumours were never confirmed, the spectre of atomic escalation now became part of American threat assessment.

The fact that Soviet aircraft carrying military supplies to Egypt and Syria stopped flying and returned to Soviet airfields was also noted as a possible preparation for Soviet intervention. An apparent standing down of the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Syria on the morning of the 24th proved a false dawn for de-escalation. By noon a large portion of the Soviet air fleet could not be located and intelligence intercepts indicated that plans had changed from the previous day’s. Activity on certain Soviet networks surged, a good indication that an operation was beginning. The Americans were also very concerned about the Soviet landing ships that were part of the 5th Squadron. The possible presence of Marines on them was seen as an increased likelihood of Soviet intervention in the fighting.

On October 24, the United States received information that 7 Soviet landing divisions had been placed on high alert. There were 85 Soviet warships, including landing craft, in the Mediterranean. Washington came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was planning to send its troops to participate in the fighting on the side of Egypt. At 11 p.m., a meeting of the Supreme Command Council was convened, at which it was decided to place American conventional and nuclear forces on high alert DEFCON 3 (high alert) throughout the world. At the same time, Nixon sent a letter to Brezhnev, in which he stated that he was against sending combined Soviet and American troops to the Middle East, but considered it possible to send civilian observers from the superpowers. The tone of the letter was extremely polite.

On October 24–25, Israeli troops, despite the UN Security Council resolution of the 22nd, building on their success, reached the outskirts of Suez, and naval landings were made, capturing Ain Suhio and Ras Abu Darag. And then the Soviet government issued a Statement on the situation in the Middle East. It warned “the Israeli government of the most serious consequences that would result from continuing its aggressive actions.” The West regarded this as a direct threat to Israel. Meanwhile, the situation in Sinai was deteriorating. And Sadat again turned to the Soviet Union with a request for urgent military contingents together with the United States, and if the United States refused, the President asked the Soviet Union to act separately. The Soviet leadership could not believe that Israel could disobey the United States, so suspicions immediately arose about the double game being played by Nixon and Kissinger. The Soviet side made an unambiguous and firm statement to the American administration about the readiness of the Soviet Union to immediately fulfill Egypt's request.

On October 25, Nixon reported that the proposal to send Soviet and American military contingents was unacceptable under the current conditions. Soon after the presidential message was delivered to the Soviet side, it became known that the US troops had been put on heightened combat alert. It was decided to reinforce the US 6th Fleet with the attack aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy, which was in the North Atlantic. In response, the Soviet Union began to build up the forces of the Mediterranean squadron.

Nixon awaited the General Secretary's response to the letter. The President was confident that the news of the alarm had already been intercepted by Soviet intelligence. And indeed, a message came from Brezhnev, in which he proposed sending 70 observers to the Middle East. The letter from the head of the Soviet state was also written in a restrained, calm tone.

The USSR had no intention of intervening in the Middle East, as this would undoubtedly have caused a serious conflict with the USA. In addition, such an operation could not be carried out without preliminary preparation. In this case, Moscow only wanted to show the Americans the USSR's firm will. The Soviet leadership was divided on the content of the message to the Americans. The toughest position was taken by Defense Minister Grechko, who insisted on a symbolic demonstration of the presence of Soviet troops in Egypt. Kosygin categorically opposed this, supported by Gromyko, and then by Brezhnev himself.

It is interesting that the prepared text of Brezhnev's address to Nixon did not contain the phrase "on the possible adoption of measures by us unilaterally"; it somehow appeared later. The Soviet Union decided to back up its words with deeds and held maneuvers in the Transcaucasian Military District with the participation of aircraft, which all foreign analysts did not fail to note.

In response to this, the United States decided to put pressure on Israel in order to prevent the defeat of the 3rd Egyptian army, which was what the Soviet Union was trying to achieve, but which was also in the interests of the United States. As the Israeli journalist Mati Golan wrote, whose book was banned by censors in Israel, citing the publication of classified information in it: “He (Kissinger. - S.S.) called the (Israeli) ambassador Dinitz and said directly and rudely: “You want the 3rd (Egyptian) army? And we are not going to enter the 3rd world war because of you,” he warned Dinitz. Dinitz could convey to Mrs. Meir (the Israeli Prime Minister) that if the war continued as a result of Israeli actions, she could no longer count on military assistance from the United States."

By the afternoon, events had begun to accelerate dangerously. Amid signs of increasing panic in Cairo, President Sadat appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to impose a joint peace-keeping force between Egyptian and Israeli units. The Soviets, by now convinced of Kissinger’s betrayal, supported the proposal, one which the United States was unable to accept: Kissinger would not countenance the risk of combining the forces of two nuclear powers in such a volatile region. Brezhnev, in a telegram received late in the evening in Washington had reinforced the Soviet position and American policy makers were certain that failure on their part to act would result in Soviet intervention.

Kissinger chose to ignore all Soviet messages and made no personal contact with the Soviets. Instead, American communication was to be made through action. At around midnight, the alert status of US forces was raised to DEFCON III. Fifty to sixty B-52 strategic bombers were moved to the United States and air refuelling tankers began non-routine operations. The aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy was dispatched toward the Mediterranean from just outside the Straits of Gibraltar and the 82nd airborne division was told to be ready to move by 6:00am. Only at 5:00am was a message delivered to the Soviet Ambassador, stressing the impossibility of joint action. While Kissinger’s note made no overt reference to nuclear weapons the implicit warning of escalation was clear. “In these circumstances, we must view your suggestion of unilateral action as a matter of gravest concern, involving incalculable consequences,” While warning them in no uncertain terms against intervention, the note left a way out for the Soviets, suggesting the introduction of a small number of Soviet observers. This was the route eventually taken.

Among the reasons Washington selected the alert as the most appropriate response to the crisis was the belief that this was the best way of sending a clear signal to the Soviets without creating a large public debate in the United States. In this respect, there was a serious miscalculation. By the early morning of the 25th, the alert was the main item of television news. The public, already conditioned by the events of Vietnam to treat military action with scepticism, was unconvinced that the crisis had not been engineered by the President as a distraction from the other big story of the moment, Watergate. It is perhaps for this reason that Kissinger’s public speech that afternoon dwelt on the gravity of superpower confrontation.

The crisis was soon ended by an adjustment of Soviet demands for joint deployment. The decision by the United States to threaten nuclear action was facilitated by the unambiguous nature of the crisis. Washington was in little doubt of the Soviet intention to intervene and of the detrimental consequences of any such action for the American position in the Middle East.

Whether it was the (implicit) threat of nuclear action itself that discouraged the Soviets is a question which falls within the wider debate of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence: Popular belief has exaggerated the magnitude of most commonly acknowledged nuclear ‘crises.’ Only a few presented a real danger of nuclear conflagration. It is difficult to assess how much the direct threat of nuclear bombing influenced strategically the prospective target. The greatest danger faced by either side in the Cold War was not a nuclear strike as a strategic first response to a crisis. The factor that most inhibited the use of force was the knowledge that small conventional clashes in the Third World could rapidly become inflamed, with incalculable consequence.